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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the extent to which Fairtrade (FT) might lead to a systemic shift in the way 
power relations are embedded and exercised in the international trading system. In doing so, it 
utilises power relations by positioning FT in the context of the world-systems theory, whilst arguing 
that FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’, top-down approach, principle implementation and scale have proven 
inadequate in modifying the international trading system. 
As such, by focusing on value chain ‘‘governance as power’’ (through its ‘‘buyer-driven’’ structure) 
and ‘‘governance as coordination’’, we highlight FT’s lack of systemic appreciation through its 
orientation towards only farming and consumer level by working solely with big brands. In parallel, 
we employ power analyses of some feminist authors in order to provide a bottom-up and 
horizontal dimension, which enables us to further advance the importance of FT’s farmer 
organisation and empowerment. As such, pursuing a qualitative approach, we use four FT GVCs 
as case studies: Two of them in Ghana-UK for cocoa-chocolate, in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine and 
Cocoa Life-Mondelez, and two in India-UK for cotton-apparel, in Chetna Organic-No Nasties and 
Agrocel-M&S.  
On this basis, our empirical findings aren’t favorable for FT’s contribution to systemic change. FT 
is used as a marketing tool by Mondelez and M&S, whilst leading to the dilution of FT principles 
and jeopardising FTI’s sustainability. FT has often proven irrelevant and ineffective due to strong 
government intervention, but also because of the market and governance structure advanced by 
TNCs. Thus, we argue that FT needs to consider going back to its fair trade roots and work with 
nation states instead of TNCs, whilst trying to replicate Kuapa Kokoo and Chetna as success 
cases, that went ‘‘beyond FT’’ through farmer ownership, forward integration, women 
empowerment and strong democratic processes, in order to achieve meaningful farmer 
empowerment and organisation in the long-run. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The link between markets and international development has been analysed extensively since 
the rise of neoliberalism in the early 1980s. Scholte (2005) explained that neoliberalism rests on 
two main premises. ‘‘Economism’’ advances that economic analysis prevails above all other 
understandings of globalisation. As such, other approaches, including political, cultural, ecological 
and psychological, are approached as functions of, and subordinate to, economics. Neoliberalism 
also relies on ‘‘marketism’’, advanced by laissez-faire market economics. According to these, the 
global economy should be a free and open market, in which production, exchange and 
consumption of resources takes place through the forces of supply and demand, as a result of 
uninhibited interactions of firms and households in the private sector. In this context, the role of 
the public sector in the economic sphere is to enable rather than to do. In turn, these two premises 
are materialised through the policies of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation.  
In this vein, Tiffen (2002) illustrated by referring to the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
implemented in the 1980s, along with Ghana’s cocoa sector partial liberalisation in 1993, which 
we have provided an overview of during chapter 4. SAPs in Ghana were the result of a strong 
push for free-market reforms, which however posed significant barriers to the development of pro-
poor commercial institutions within the liberalised commodity sectors, such as the lack of rural 
credit, the end of legitimate support for farmers, along with poor roads and infrastructure (ibid). 
Similarly, Devaraja (2011) outlined the emergence of the organised spinning sector in India 
facilitated by the Government’s policies that involved liberalisation of trade and industrial 
delicensing in the 1990s. 
In this context of neoliberal policies, Edward and Tallontire (2009) suggested that the use of the 
voluntary activities of business and the market, the original ‘‘invisible hand’’, to promote 
development objectives, has become particularly popular the past two to three decades. This has 
been widely manifested in the extension of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a tool for 
development, the role of business in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as 
well as micro-finance and the idea of the ‘‘bottom of the pyramid’’. This has been founded upon 
the belief that because of the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of the market, businesses become efﬁcient 
organisations for delivering social beneﬁts. This has been contrasted to the perceived failures and 
inefﬁciencies of traditional bureaucratic state and institution-led approaches to development.  
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1.1 FAIR TRADE AND FAIRTRADE (FT) 
In light of this, various speciﬁc business practices and market-based tools such as labour codes 
of practice, eco-labels and fair trade to promote sustainable development in the context of the 
supply chain, have emerged (ibid). As we explain in detail in chapter 2, when referring to fair trade 
we need to distinguish between the fair trade movement and the fair trade network, as well as fair 
trade (two words) and Fairtrade (one word). Influenced by dependency theory and Prebisch’s and 
Singer’s work on the declining terms of trade, the fair trade movement was trying to combat unfair 
commodity prices and emphasise developing alternatives to the existing system through 
international market regulation with the nation-state as a primary agent in development. In turn, 
the fair trade network was part of a broader and unofficial fair trade movement and was influenced 
by it. Up to 1970s, the fair trade network focused on connecting peasants, workers, and 
craftspeople in the South with partners in the North through a system of rules and principles 
(Fridell, 2004; 2006).  
Nonetheless, the fair trade network deviated from the fair trade movement in the 1980s (Fridell, 
2006). Fridell (2004) suggested that the fair trade network chose to attain developmental gains 
within the existing trading system through transnational corporations (TNCs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), instead of insisting on the nation-state as a primary agent 
in development and an alternative to existing international trading system. As part of this, Shreck 
(2005) emphasised the emergence of Fairtrade labelling initiatives, whereby goods are certified 
as ‘‘Fairtrade’’ by Fairtrade umbrella organisations if they are exchanged under the terms of a 
minimum guaranteed price, a premium and are produced in line with the principles of democratic 
organisation, no utilisation of child labour, recognized trade unions for workers, and environmental 
sustainability (Fridell, 2004).  
On this note, Fairtrade International (2015) suggested that the term ‘‘Fairtrade’’ (one word), which 
is the focus of this research, is used to describe the certification and labelling system governed 
by Fairtrade International (FTI). The Fairtrade (FT) system allows consumers to identify goods 
that have met internationally agreed Fairtrade Standards by looking for the FAIRTRADE (FT) 
Marks on products. On the other hand, the term fair trade (two words) is used to refer to the fair 
trade movement as a whole and the organisations that are part of it, including both labelled and 
unlabeled goods1.  
                                                          
1 See page 9 for fair trade and Fairtrade (FT) abbreviations and their meaning. 
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Building on this, the FT labelling initiative that Shreck (2005) and Fridell (2004) referred to above 
is the one managed by FTI. This was driven by the desire to increase the size of fair trade markets, 
which were too small to meet the needs of the certified partner, along with neoliberal reforms that 
reduced national and international market regulation by states and advanced market-driven 
visions of fair trade based on nonbinding, voluntarist commitments from private corporations 
(Renard, 2003; Fridell, 2006). As such, whilst many authors view the contemporary fair trade 
network (after its shift from the fair trade movement) articulated through FT labelling, as an 
innovative challenge to neoliberalism and view the growth of FT sales as a small yet important 
victory in the struggle against deregulation and social spending cuts imposed by neoliberal 
reformers, this is not the case (Fridell, 2004).   
1.2 POWER RELATIONS 
In order to explain why this is not the case, we have utilised a specific conceptualisation of power 
relations. This has been chosen on the basis that it’s important to highlight the macroeconomic 
relations and mechanisms that underpin neoliberalism’s ‘‘marketism’’ and its microeconomic 
focus on the abstraction of supply and demand. To this end, Fridell (2006) suggested that the 
effect of neoliberal globalisation and ultimately Fairtrade’s impact is to stress microeconomic 
adjustment rather than confronting highly unequal macroeconomic relations of power. Similarly, 
whilst Barratt Brown (1997) referred to liberalisation as another tool for exploitation by entrenched 
interests, he emphasised that ‘‘the market place is not a bad place, only the inequality of power 
in the market. The market is bad because of unequal power in it’’ (ibid; p.271). As such, the issue 
is not market activity per se, but the power of capital in the market (ibid). Also, as we have 
examined in detail through the section on Fairtrade and our findings, Fairtrade explicitly talks 
about power through its vision and the FT standard on farmer organisation and empowerment. 
To this end, we have defined and ‘‘operationalised’’ power relations in chapter 2 through drawing 
from literature on world-systems theory, power analyses of some feminist authors and the Global 
Value Chain (GVC) analytical framework. As such, world-systems theory is an adaptation of 
dependency theory, which-as we mentioned earlier-has influenced the fair trade movement and 
network before the 1980s. Nonetheless, power relations were put in the centre of world-systems 
theory’s global systemic approach, as McMichael (2000; p.669) suggested that ‘‘development 
was now posited as a systemic process, where core-periphery relations were the real 
development dynamic and core states were outcomes, rather than units, of development’’ (ibid; 
p.669). In highlighting this process and power relations, Wallerstein (1995) made special mention 
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to the primacy of capital accumulation along with the mechanisms that would allow this, such as, 
production networks, state and interstate structures and geoculture. 
Building on Wallerstein’s and world-systems theory’s reference to production networks, the Global 
Value Chain (GVC) specified that due to globalisation, trade has been taking place increasingly 
in sub-components and services (Kaplinsky, 2000). Whilst the GVC perspective is an effective 
means to articulate and explain the functional integration between internationally dispersed 
activities (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001), Gereffi et al. (2001) have stressed the importance of 
focusing on the lead agents of the value chains-the multinational enterprises, and how chains are 
organised and managed through the concept of governance. To this end, we have utilised 
‘‘governance as power’’ (with its distinct governance structures: ‘‘buyer-driven’’ and ‘‘producer-
driven’’) as the cornerstone of our analytical framework and overlaid ‘‘governance as 
coordination’’ to add further analytical rigor in order to reflect the distinct governance features 
between each node of the chain. As such, ‘‘governance as power’’ was defined through ‘‘the 
authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources 
are allocated and flow within a chain’’ (Gereffi, 1994; p.215).  In parallel, ‘‘governance as 
coordination’’ was articulated through the description of five discreet governance structures: 
markets, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark, 2011). 
But, whilst world-systems theory and GVC focus on the structure of international trade and 
position power relations within the remit of lead buyers and their suppliers within the vertical 
dimension of the chain, others noted that there is also a horizontal dimension of power (Tallontire 
et.al, 2009). On this note, Gibbon et al. (2008) highlighted the influence of certain external actors 
(those not directly supplying a product or service) that could have an impact in how a chain is 
governed, such as government bodies or civil society organisations. To this end, building on the 
horizontal dimension of power, we have utilised power analyses of some feminist authors in order 
to highlight the influence of external actors. This has taken place without focusing on gender, 
albeit in a ‘‘gender-aware’’ manner. Also, whilst world-systems theory and GVC analysis 
emphasise on the top-down structure, ‘‘power-over’’ and ‘‘role of the other’’ (e.g. lead TNCs on 
buyer-driven chains) dimensions, these power analyses provide a bottom-up view whereby power 
can be seen as empowerment. The focus on bottom-up empowerment is also in line with 
Fairtrade’s focus on farmer empowerment and organisation, hence these power analyses have 
enabled us to explore this thoroughly. This notion of empowerment further highlights the need to 
include the political dimension as part of our analytical building blocks. 
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To this end, building on the previous discussion on Fairtrade and power relations as well as our 
empirical findings, four important themes have emerged as ‘‘building blocks’’, which we used in 
order to structure our empirical findings. These are:  
1. Sustainability – Driven by FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and working with TNCs. This was further 
enhanced by our fieldwork, whereby the concept of corporate sustainability was often mentioned 
in relation to FT’s mainstreaming and the sustainability of Fairtrade International.  
2. Political – Driven by the strong role of the nation state as a mechanism that enables capital 
accumulation as per Wallerstein and FT’s notion of empowerment we outlined earlier. This 
dimension was also further enhanced through our fieldwork whereby we were constantly being 
reminded of the strong role of the state and politics across our case studies. 
3. ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ – Articulated by the power that TNCs exercise and derived from GVC’s 
‘‘governance as power’’ concept. 
4. Chain Relations and Coordination – Demonstrated by the types of governance structures 
we earlier outlined through GVC’s ‘‘governance as coordination’’ concept. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS & QUESTIONS 
In this context, this research focuses on Fairtrade’s (FT) role in systemically affecting the way that 
power relations are embedded and exercised in the international trading system, as articulated 
through the theoretical underpinning of the world-systems theory and the analytical lenses of the 
GVC approach and power analyses of some feminist authors. We earlier mentioned that in the 
1980s the fair trade network shifted away from the fair trade movement, which was influenced by 
theories like dependency theory that advocated systemic change and highlighted the systemic 
inequalities and power imbalances prevalent in the international trading system between 
developed and developing countries. Whilst these theories were further developed and took 
shape in world-systems theory and the GVC analysis, the fair trade network moved away from 
this thinking and repositioned itself as a market-based mechanism driven by the neoliberal 
doctrine that has intensified since the 1980s. As such, the focus shifted away from state-driven 
development to working within the existing international trading system and its agents-the TNCs 
and NGOs. This has been embodied in FTI’s labelling, whereby TNCs and other fair trade 
organisations (FTOs) or FTSEs can voluntarily carry the FT label on their products in exchange 
for fulfilling FTI’s standards we mentioned earlier. 
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As such, our focus has been FT as articulated by Fairtrade International and its labelling. We 
have, however, examined this in the context of the fair trade movement and body of theory that 
the fair trade network was influenced by before the 1980s, along with the world-systems theory 
and GVC analysis. Utilising world-systems theory has allowed us to examine to what extent 
Fairtrade has affected the world-systems’ primary drive for allowing and defending capital 
accumulation, or how has it changed the role of States in allowing and defending this capital 
accumulation (Wallerstein, 1995). Through the GVC analysis, we have researched the role of FT 
in relation to the power exercised by lead TNCs along the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ value chains, as well as 
how has FT been implemented by FTOs and TNCs in their respective FT value chains, including 
the resulting changes in power relations and governance structures between nodes of the GVC 
(Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). But, in order to 
understand FT’s systemic impact in shifting embedded power relations that led to an uneven 
market place, we had to compare the power dimensions in the FT value chains to the ones in the 
conventional GVCs.  
Beyond the vertical dimension of power, we have employed power analyses of some feminist 
authors in order to further assess FT’s potential of structural shift in the embedded power relations 
through its standard on farmer empowerment. In parallel, we aimed to understand the differences 
between the notion of empowerment across the FTO and TNC FT GVCs, as well as the 
contribution of FT in marginalised farmers and other groups, like women. Furthermore, we aimed 
to understand the impact of civil society, state and other organisations on the value chain power 
relations and, in specific, the role that FTI’s decisions and business model have had on FTOs, 
TNCs and vice versa.  
As such, our research aims have been addressed at multiple levels and primarily at GVC macro-
chain level, as the main unit of analysis. Following this, we have examined the FT organisational 
level (through Fairtrade International), FT principle level (through the FT standards), and GVC 
level (including micro-level through the power relations between nodes of the GVC) through the 
implementation of the FT standards, and other initiatives beyond them, as undertaken by FTOs 
and TNCs in their respective chains.  
To this end, the overarching research question is: 
To what extent does Fairtrade (FT) lead to a systemic shift in the way power relations are 
embedded and exercised in the international trading system? 
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This has been further operationalised into the following four main research questions: 
1. How does Fairtrade’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ relate to TNCs corporate sustainability and what 
are the implications for Fairtrade International’s organisational sustainability? 
2. How does Fairtrade shift the power held by nation states over the lives of farmers?  
3. How does Fairtrade affect the power mechanisms that lead TNCs utilise in ‘’buyer-driven’’ 
GVCs? 
4. To what extent and in what way has Fairtrade changed the nature of governance 
relationships between GVC nodes? 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
As the research aims and questions indicate, the focus of this research has been in exploring and 
explaining power relations at multiple levels within the GVC, but also between influencing 
organisations, like nation states, TNCs and FTI, and the GVC in question. This called for a 
qualitative approach that aimed to probe for depth and requires a sensitive approach (Tallontire, 
1999). In light of this and our goal which has been to synthesise theory through empirical evidence 
gathered by narratives from our interviewees2 mainly through semi-structured interviews, we 
selected the case study methodology. As a result, we have decided to use four case studies (FT 
GVCs), in order to enhance the explanatory power of our theory and make this research more 
‘‘generalisable’’ through providing a robust and varied basis of empirical evidence.  
To this end, we have utilised Seawright and Gerring’s (2008) diverse case through selecting our 
cases according to the variance within the FT chain/product, FT organisation, and geography 
dimensions. Therefore, we firstly selected two conventional GVCs that comprised our context: the 
cocoa-chocolate (non-industrial) value chain between the UK and Ghana and the cotton-apparel 
value chain between the UK and India. Following this, we picked two FT GVCs for cocoa-
chocolate in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine and Cocoa Life-Mondelez, and two for cotton-apparel in Chetna 
Organic-No Nasties and Agrocel-M&S. 
In relation to the FT chain/product dimension, by selecting cocoa and cotton, variance has been 
achieved on the basis of the FT sales and growth performance (cocoa/chocolate-high sales and 
growth-unlike cotton), stage of product lifecycle within FT (cocoa/chocolate established, whilst 
cotton has been more recent), and type of product through covering both food (cocoa/chocolate) 
and non-food (cotton/apparel) products. Also, in relation to the type of FT organisation, for the 
                                                          
2 See appendix 1 for the list of our interviewees. 
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cotton-apparel FT GVCs, variance has been demonstrated on the basis of the profit (Agrocel) or 
development orientation (Chetna) at producer level and on the type of organisation (hybrid-No 
Nasties or profit-oriented business-M&S) on marketing level. Similarly, for the cocoa-chocolate 
FT GVC, variance is demonstrated through Divine (FT social enterprise) and Kuapa Kokoo 
(development-oriented producer organisation) against Mondelez (profit-oriented business) and a 
newly formed Cocoa Life cooperative (profit-oriented producer organisation). On the same note, 
geographical variance has been achieved by selecting Ghana and India. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
To this end, chapter 2 provides a review of the structure of the international trading system through 
world-systems theory. We do so by articulating the systemic approach and focus on power 
relations, whilst examining the agents and mechanisms through which the drive for capital 
accumulation is fulfilled. Following this, we provide a review of the literature on fair trade and 
Fairtrade through explaining their roots, vision, definition and FT principles, followed by a brief 
discussion on the main themes related to FT’s impact, as well as a discussion on strategic 
matters, such as FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. Then, drawing on world-systems’ body of theory, the 
discussion on power and the structure of the international trading is elaborated and further 
operationalised through focusing on lead TNCs and the key GVC concepts, ‘‘governance as 
power’’ and ‘‘governance as coordination’’. Having examined the vertical and top-down dimension 
of power, we then examine the bottom-up and horizontal view of power through power analyses 
from some feminist authors that finalise our analytical framework. In turn, we discuss key 
principles from some feminist authors that informed and shaped our research design, data 
collection and analysis. 
To this end, chapter 3 firstly looks at our research philosophy as articulated by a predominantly 
‘‘objective’’ articulation of Critical Realism, which entails a qualification of our hypotheses through 
empirical analysis and narratives. Following this, we explain our goal to synthesise theory through 
this research, whilst presenting our research design based on Feminist Grounded Theory and a 
qualitative approach based on a multiple case study design. Then, we outline our methods for 
collecting data. Building on this, chapter 4 provides an overview of our four case studies whilst 
explaining the unit of analysis, outlining the research questions and articulating the rationale for 
selecting the specific cases. 
Following the operationalisation of this research, chapters 5 and 6 present our empirical findings 
structured according to the four themes that emerged through our theory and analytical 
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framework: a. Sustainability, b. Political, c. ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ and, d. Chain relations and 
coordination. We first describe the conventional and FT cocoa and cotton chains between the UK, 
Ghana and India respectively. The analysis proceeds with an examination of corporate and FT 
sustainability, whilst the next section examines Fairtrade though a political angle. In turn, Fairtrade 
is assessed in relation to the power that lead TNCs exercise in their respective ‘‘buyer-driven’’ 
chains, and then through the governance structure between each node of their chains. Finally, 
chapter 7 concludes whilst providing the implications of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW & ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the structure and mechanisms that comprise the international 
trading system through the world-systems theory. In doing so, the power imbalances which are 
embedded in the international trading system, and which FT seeks to address, are highlighted. In 
this context, we emphasise Fairtrade’s market-driven approach, which is based on voluntary 
commitments from consumers, TNCs and NGOs. Through linking and contrasting Fairtrade to the 
international trading system’s power structures and its FT movement roots, as well as outlining 
FT’s vision, principles and on-the ground impact, we highlight the disconnect between FT’s vision 
of modifying the existing international trading system and its ‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach.  
In order to achieve this, we have utilised the lenses of power relations which form a common 
thread across the literature on Fairtrade, world-systems theory, the GVC approach and power 
analyses of some feminist authors. To this end, the GVC analytical framework operationalises the 
concept of power and illustrates the way through which power imbalances and capital 
accumulation take place, whilst highlighting the leading role of TNCs that FT has chosen to work 
with. Lastly, this chapter refines the GVC analytical framework though examining power analyses 
from some feminist authors that concentrate on the horizontal and bottom-up power relations that 
FT has also focused on through farmer empowerment and organisation. 
2.1 WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY 
In order to examine the extent that FT has effected systemic shift in the way power relations are 
embedded and exercised in the international trading system, we will need to first review the 
structure of the international trading system. To this end, world-systems theory has mapped and 
explained the structure of the international trading system through a top-down global perspective 
of the power relations, agents (nation state, TNCs) and mechanisms (production networks, 
unequal exchange) through which its primary drive of capital accumulation is achieved.  
As such, this section begins with a brief overview of world-systems theory’s roots underpinned by 
their main systemic focus and analytical angle on power relations. Following this, we examine 
some of its definitions, as well as the main trends. Lastly, we conclude with the institutional 
structure and arrangements that have allowed and defended capital accumulation, such as the 
production networks, the state and interstate structures and the geoculture. 
2.1.1 BACKGROUND & APPROACH 
World-systems theory was initially conceptualised by Wallerstein and was later expanded, among 
others, by theorists like Chase-Dunn and Hall. The Journal of World-systems Research has been 
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the main ‘‘vehicle’’ to communicate the intellectual advancements of this theory. Similarly to the 
influence on the fair trade movement, dependency theory also provided a major intellectual 
building block for world-systems theory. On this note, Cardoso (1972), a prominent dependency 
theory author, referred to ‘dependent capitalist development’ to describe the relationship between 
imperialist and dependent nations, which is based on multinational corporations. According to this 
form of dependency, foreign investment in dependent countries has moved away from raw 
materials and agriculture to the industrial sector, forming new patterns of economic ownership 
comprised by local state, private and international capital. Consequently, there occurs a kind of 
‘dependent capitalist development’, caveated by the fact that countries tied to international 
capitalism by that type of linkage remain economically dep endent, since the technology is still 
concentrated in advanced capitalist economies and the multinational corporations. Also, statistics 
demonstrate that dependent economies are exporting capital to the dominant economies and 
despite controls and limits by dependent governments, multinational corporations found an 
alternative way to send returns abroad-through payments for licences and patents for their 
technology. Furthermore, Cardoso stressed the political implications of this form of dependence: 
internal fragmentation and dualism, deriving from the fact that part of the national bourgeoisie is 
the direct beneficiary of the foreign interest, unlike the backward economic and social sectors 
(ibid). 
UNCTAD researchers have adopted this thinking and further developed it. For example, UNCTAD 
(1997) elaborated on the important role TNCs play in developing countries through foreign direct 
investment, whilst highlighting the importance of regulatory mechanisms and appropriate 
competition policies as means to mitigate lack of technology, capital and know-how transfer, as 
well as high concentration and anti-competitive practices. In the context of the asymmetries 
between developed and developing countries in global economic and trade governance, 
UNCTAD (2006) criticised the constraints of national policy autonomy as a result of market-
oriented reforms and the liberalisation of trade and international trade agreements. Furthermore, 
UNCTAD (2007) focused on the development role of transnational corporations in developing 
countries’ extractive industries, while UNCTAD (2011) emphasised the broadening range of 
production and investment models, such as contract farming (as we will later see in chapter 6), 
outsourcing, franchising and licensing. Finally, UNCTAD (2013) dealt with maximizing the benefits 
and minimizing the risks associated with global value chains in order to ensure more inclusive 
growth and sustainable development, whilst UNCTAD (2015) debated options for international 
tax and investment policy reforms especially in light of TNC tax avoidance practices. 
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In this context, Chirot and Hall (1982) asserted that world-systems theory is in most ways a North 
American adaptation of dependency theory, however, we argue below that it is much more 
sophisticated. Chirot and Hall (1982) further highlighted dependency theory’s focus on TNCs and 
industrialisation based on import substitution in the most advanced Latin American countries, 
which has created new forms of dependence and sociopolitical imbalances. They further 
underlined Wallerstein’s contribution in advancing this analysis through rejecting the analysis of 
individual societies in isolation and focusing on powerful transnational forces through a global 
perspective.  
World-systems theory’s sophistication derives from its emphasis on systems that consequently 
highlighted the power dynamic FT was referring to earlier between the North and the South. 
Although we will provide a tangible example of a system through our Global Value Chain (GVC) 
analytical framework later in the chapter, a working definition from Bertalanffy (1956; p.3) defined 
system as ‘‘a set of elements standing in interaction’’. As such, building on Chirot and Hall (1982) 
view, McMichael (2000) outlined dependency theory’s shortcomings through Wallerstein’s 
utilisation of world-systems as a broader analytical unit. By positing a broader analytical unit, 
world-systems analysis was able to accommodate the phenomenon of the New Industrial 
Countries and explain the shortcomings of national developmentalism. Development was now 
articulated as a systemic process, in which core-periphery power relations were the real 
development dynamic and core states were outcomes, rather than units, of development (ibid). 
Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) agreed that world-systems theory emerged in the 1970s, at the 
right time to illustrate that national development could only be understood contextually through 
the global nature of economic networks linked into one integrated unit: the modern world system. 
2.1.2 DEFINITION & MAIN FEATURES 
This brings up the question regarding the definition of world-systems. In defining the modern 
world-systems, Wallerstein (1974) stated that a world-system is a multicultural territorial division 
of labor in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for 
the everyday life of its inhabitants. Dunn and Hall (1993; p.855) proposed a general definition of 
world-systems to facilitate comparisons among very different intersocietal networks (including 
small world systems). They defined world-systems as ‘‘intersocietal networks in which the 
interactions (e.g., trade, warfare, inter-marriage) are important for the reproduction of the internal 
structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local 
structures’’. In this way, they separated the world-systems concept from the existence of states 
and core/periphery relations. Others highlighted that networks of the exchange of prestige or 
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luxury goods should also be included in Wallersteins’s world-systems definition as they are 
important for the reproduction of local social structures (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). 
Wallerstein (1995) contended that the modern world-systems have two main features: An axial 
division of labor whose effective "stretch" defines its boundaries, and that it functions by means 
of a mixture of cyclical rhythms and secular trends. Importantly, he carried on asserting that the 
primacy of the drive for the accumulation of capital differentiates the modern world-systems from 
all other historical systems. The primacy of the drive for capital accumulation is an important point 
and reoccurring theme during our empirical analysis mainly in relation to FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. 
As we argue in detail during our empirical analysis, FT’s attempt to systemically shift power 
relations within the international trading system was often severely limited by the system’s drive 
for capital accumulation. On that note, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) outlined the following 
major trends (some of which we will examine below in more detail) in the modern world system: 
 Population – Fertility is mainly affected by economic factors. As a result, in the core 
states, state-subsidised education, pensions and wage scales that made possible the 
support of children by their parents and the support of people at old age (without the need 
to have children to rely on for support), have removed the economic incentive to have 
large families. But in the periphery, the semi-proletarianised, semi-peasant coerced work-
force sustains the high value of children as valuable economic assets and continues to 
provide a motivation for high rates of fertility. 
 Technological Change – Technological change has also accelerated in modern 
capitalism while the social effects of this change have been ignored due to the profit-
seeking objectives of the firms. 
 Commodification – It refers to the assignment of a market price to an increasing number 
of outputs of human activity, like products or services. 
 Proletarianisation and Capital Intensity – The wage relation between employers and 
employees is widespread. This has meshed with, and powered, the drive towards faster 
technological change. The overall pattern has been the displacement of labor by 
machinery. 
 Increasing Firm Size – The largest firms have grown in the last 200 years by every 
measure (e.g. geographic footprint, turnover). This ‘‘monopoly’’ sector is characterised by 
a small number of huge firms, which has changed the face of modern capitalism most 
obviously in the realm of international trade. This is in line with our empirical analysis, 
especially through the high concentration at cocoa processing/trading and branding level. 
25 | P a g e  
 
 State Formation – Although this has not been consistent when considering the era of 
neo-liberalism, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) claimed that the power of states over the 
lives of their citizens has expanded since the beginning of the first nation states. This 
expansion has taken on two forms: a geographical expansion of the power of the central 
government ever further away from the capital city, combined with a deepening of its 
power over the daily life of its citizens. To this end, we will examine the role of the state in 
detail during our empirical analysis and the ‘‘power over’’ conception and alternative 
articulations of power as expressed by some feminist authors later in this chapter. 
It should be noted that there are limits to each of these trends. For example, technological change 
often relies on energy sources that are finite. The increasing use of fossil fuels, which is the major 
cause of global warming, will lead to a great number of human losses threatening in this way the 
viability of the entire world-systems. Similarly, commodification requires the equal expansion of 
the ability to pay. This is also in line with our empirical analysis on FT certified garments, in which 
we will see that consumers significantly reduced their spending on FT garments during recession 
in the UK as a result of the premium attached to FT garments. The authors claim that recessions 
are largely caused by the failure of the working classes to consume an adequate volume of the 
products created by their own work (due to inadequate salaries and or automation). As such, each 
ceiling has the potential to throw the modern capitalist world-economy into acute crisis or systemic 
collapse (ibid). Different cycle phases either accelerate or retard trend developments, and each 
cycle acts along its own time-scale. The sum of the respective influences of all of these cycles 
and trends affects the trajectory of our future. Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) and Kitchin (1923) 
presented the following most important cycles: 
 Minor/Kitchin cycle – Kitchin (1923) suggested that they last approximately 3 years, they 
are inventory related and are the result of a rhythmical movement due to psychological 
causes or excess or deficiency in crops. Korotayev (2010) explained firms’ psychological 
reaction to the improvement of the commercial situation by increasing output. As a result, 
the market gets flooded with excess commodities, which in turn leads to demand decline, 
price drop and the consequent decision to reduce output. This process is accompanied 
by significant time lags between each decision and its implementation. 
 Juglar – Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) also referred to it as the "normal" or "classic" 
business cycle and suggest it last for 7-10 years. The main driver of this cycle is the 
average life span of capital equipment. 
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 Kuznet – They usually span over 20-25 years and their timing is a reflection of a cyclical 
pattern of reinvestment. 
 Kondratieff – The main argument is that every 40-60 years factories, means of 
production, communication, and transport tend to be rebuilt incorporating new 
technologies (ibid). 
2.1.3 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES 
The trends we have just described have not taken place in an institutional vacuum. Instead, 
Wallerstein (1995) made special mention to the institutional structure and arrangements that have 
allowed and defended capital accumulation over 500 years. He grouped these arrangements 
under three broad headings: production networks; the state and interstate structures; and the 
geoculture. 
1. Production Networks – There are five mechanisms through which the accumulation of capital 
is allowed: commodification (as seen earlier); the multiplicity of modes of labor control; commodity 
chains; unequal exchange between core and periphery; and the group of monopolising non-
specialised capitalists. The modes of labor control refer to the semi proletarian household and 
other inbuilt mechanisms by which the demands of workers for increased compensation can be 
restrained. In such households, the wages paid to members engaged in wage-labor activities are 
reduced because the household supplements this income with other income-generating activities. 
As a result, employing persons located in such households not only reduces the wage bills of the 
employers but also transfers part of the other surplus accumulated by the household to the 
enterprise via the subsidisation of the enterprise's below-par wages.  
We will discuss commodity/value chains in greater detail in the GVC section, but it is useful to 
highlight the initial articulation of the concept by Wallerstein (1995). These chains consist of 
different units which can be structured in different ways and may differ in themselves from one 
point in time to another. The individual units of the chain include a degree of geographic dispersion 
of the producing enterprises, a degree of overall monopolisation of production, different modes of 
labor control, degree of ownership and a degree of profitability. This is in line with our empirical 
analysis, which will highlight, for example, different profitability in various nodes of the 
conventional chain, as well as varying degree of ownership and monopolisation or oligopolisation 
of nodes of the chain by TNCs and nation states. Such commodity chains permit us to describe 
the axial division of labor as a core/periphery phenomenon in which unequal exchange is a major 
mechanism of surplus transfer and concentration. In essence, the core/periphery concept refers 
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to the relation between relatively monopolised units versus relatively competitive units, which is a 
high profit/low profit, high wage/low wage antinomy. This has been reflected empirically as a 
spatial phenomenon, whereby core-like activities tend to be concentrated in a few core countries 
and peripheral activities tend to be concentrated in most of the rest. Finally, the group of 
monopolising non-specialized capitalists refers to great accumulators who remain non-
specialised, and engage in all kinds of operations simultaneously in order to maintain high overall 
levels of profit.  
2. State and interstate structures – The accumulation of capital also depends upon the ability 
to defend its concentration both against predators and against the demands of the workers that 
have produced it. As such, sovereign states not only defend monopolising capitalists politically 
from working classes, but also protect them against competitors. The creation of strong states in 
the core ensured that states in the periphery would not become strong enough to interfere with 
the process of the worldwide accumulation of capital (Wallerstein, 1995). To this end, we will later 
explore in detail the role of the Ghanaian, Indian Government and foreign national governments 
in protecting the interests of their industries, for example, the hauliers which fund political parties 
in Ghana, the vertically integrated garment manufacturers in India, and the cocoa processing 
industry in the Netherlands. In return for providing a strong refuge for their property and advancing 
their interests in the world-systems, the strong core states require a higher level of taxation from 
the monopolising capitalists as a protection cost. However, the establishment of the liberal state 
ensures internal order and protection at a lower cost. 
On the other hand, inter-capitalist competition has an impact on the state and interstate structures. 
Any political mechanism that aids the maintenance of particular monopolising efforts represents 
an obstacle for its non-beneficiaries, which they will seek to overcome for example by asking for 
more ‘‘laissez-faire’’, support to protectionism in core states and calls against it in others. The 
greatest impact though is the fall and rise of hegemonies because of the self-destructing nature 
of hegemonies due to the rising cost of protecting monopolising capitalists (ibid). 
3. Geoculture – In this context, Wallerstein (1995) argued that the active opposition to the 
protection of monopolising capitalists (TNCs) by the state and interstate structures exercised by 
oppressed strata is a constant of the modern world-systems. The pressure of working strata 
tended to push wage levels slowly upward, which led to the need to seek out working strata ready 
to work at lower income levels. This was one of the main factors behind the repeated geographic 
expansion of the modern world-systems. The constant opposition was coherently and formally 
28 | P a g e  
 
expressed in late nineteenth century demanding normal change and popular sovereignty, posing 
in this way a threat to the stability of the world-systems and legitimating democracy. In response 
to these, a trinity of ideologies has emerged (conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism/socialism), 
each representing a different mode of coping with the normality of change and popular 
sovereignty (ibid). In this context, FTI, TNCs involved in FT and FTOs have been trying to 
empower farmers in the South through the principle of democratic organisation, but the type of 
empowerment that resulted out of this process has been either questionable or too niche in order 
to effect true change, as we will argue later during the empirical analysis.  
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2.2 FAIR TRADE AND FAIRTRADE (FT) 
Fairtrade (one word), which is the focus of this research, has been developed as a solution in the 
context of the international trading system’s structure and its resulting uneven power relations, as 
articulated by the world-systems theory. Neo-liberal reforms that advanced market-driven 
approaches to development shaped Fairtrade (FT) into a market-driven tool based on voluntary 
commitments from consumers, TNCs and NGOs.  
To this end, this section begins with a brief overview of FT’s roots with emphasis on fair trade 
network’s significant shift away from fair trade and the fair trade movement through the 
consequent emergence of FT labelling. Following this, we examine some of fair trade’s and 
Fairtrade’s key features, such as definition, vision, principles, organisations and the FT mark. 
Lastly, we conclude with the key themes that highlight FT’s impact and strategic direction. 
2.2.1 BACKGROUND  
When describing the history of fair trade it is essential to distinguish between the fair trade 
movement and the fair trade network, as well as fair trade (two words) and Fairtrade (one word). 
This is critical as it shows the transition from a state-led notion of development (articulated by fair 
trade, two words) to a market-based mechanism (articulated through Fairtrade, one word). Fridell 
(2004) explained that the fair trade network and FT have been part of a broader and unofficial fair 
trade (two words) movement and were influenced by it. The origins of the fair trade movement 
can be traced in attempts to control international commodity markets from 1918 to 1939 as a 
reaction to combat the rapid decline in terms of trade in manufactures. The unofficial fair trade 
movement gained traction through Prebisch’s and Singer’s work on the declining terms of trade 
and dependency theory.  
The fair trade network connects peasants, workers, and craftspeople in the South with partners 
in the North through a system of rules and principles. During this early phase (up to 1970s), it was 
heavily influenced by the fair trade movement. Thus, it was trying to combat unfair commodity 
prices, attain ‘‘trade not aid’’ and emphasised developing alternatives to the existing system (ibid). 
Renard (2003) emphasised that the fair trade network was predominantly aimed to find markets 
for the products of the underdeveloped countries in the North by creating a circuit parallel to large 
mainstream distribution through networks of specialty stores (world stores). Jaffee and Howard 
(2009) added that at its inception, the fair trade movement was centered on a fundamental critique 
of the structural injustice of global trade. With roots in development charities and radical solidarity 
NGOs in Europe and the U.S., the movement was initially characterized entirely by the Alternative 
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Trade Organization (ATO) model, in which goods from producer cooperatives are sold through 
non-proﬁt organizations or ethical for-proﬁt businesses. 
Nonetheless, the fair trade network deviated from the fair trade movement. Fridell (2006) 
suggested that this strategic reorientation of the fair trade network marked a critical turning point 
in the history of fair trade the importance of which is not captured in most of the literature. The fair 
trade network’s orientation changed significantly in the 1980s. Shreck (2005) indicated that 
although it took several months of discussion and strong resistance, the major shift was to rely on 
and work within large conventional circuits of distribution channels. The main drivers for this shift 
have been: 
 Limitations of alternative trade as it existed at that time in resolving the problems of selling 
Third World products. 
 The emergence of fair trade labelling initiatives, which were branded as ‘‘Fairtrade’’ (one 
word), and intended to create a reality within the market, instead of constructing an 
alternative outside the market. 
 Change in the goals of the fair trade network as it sought to gain access to conventional 
markets that they hoped to reform. This was driven by the desire to increase the size of 
fair trade markets, which were too small to meet the needs of the certified partners, or to 
make a systemic difference, as we put to test in this thesis and demonstrate in our 
empirical analysis later. 
 Neoliberal reforms that reduced national and international market regulation by states and 
advanced market-driven visions of fair trade based on nonbinding, voluntarist 
commitments from private corporations, articulated by FT labelling (Renard, 2003; Fridell, 
2006). 
This significant shift has led to great financial success and the fair trade network has seen 
unprecedented growth in the era of neoliberal globalisation (Fridell, 2006). Raynolds (2004) 
emphasised that fair trade has grown rapidly from its alternative trade organisation roots over the 
past 15 years predominantly as a result of Fairtrade’s labelling. For example, the FT Foundation 
(2011) highlighted that UK sales of FT chocolate grew from £18m in 2005 to £343m in 2010. FLO 
(2004), quoted in ibid, states that the key to this successful strategy has been to get Fairtrade into 
the supermarkets where most people do their shopping. Nonetheless, as our empirical section 
indicates, growth has been uneven across products. So, whilst FT chocolate sales grew, FT 
labelled garments sales in 2012 have been reduced by 50% since their peak in 2008. But, despite 
FT’s overall sales growth, Fridell (2006; p.11) argued that to: 
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‘‘gain the support of conventional partners fair traders have had to abandon their original vision 
of the network as an alternative trading system based on international market regulation in 
favour of a more moderate vision aimed at reforming the existing trading system on the basis 
of voluntary commitments from corporations and consumers’’. 
This shift highlighted the departure from the nation state as a primary agent in development and 
away from a parallel trading network that, in the long run, aspires to be free from the pressures 
imposed by profit-driven transnationals. As we will later explain in our empirical analysis, this has 
not been achieved within the existing trading system, as FTI have been influenced by garment 
retailers and chocolate brands to, for example, abandon the traceability standard and the FT 
minimum price as they were too costly for them. Instead, most depict fair trade now as a market-
based project articulated through Fairtrade (one word) aimed at attaining developmental gains 
within the existing trading system (ibid; Fridell, 2004). On this note, Bacon (2015) argued that 
although in the previous two decades smallholders, advocates, cooperatives and businesses 
collectivised power and used FT in an attempt to build a fairer and more sustainable market, there 
were arguments over the aspirational goals of FT between 2007 and 2011. These resulted in the 
separation of TransFair USA (FT USA) from Fairtrade International. As such, ‘big tent’ fair trade 
collapsed as social movement organisations and many smallholder cooperatives became 
disillusioned with the mainstreaming strategy and undemocratic governance structure common 
to Northern certiﬁcation agencies, particularly FT USA. 
2.2.2 KEY FEATURES  
Having described the historically distinct phases of fair trade, it is useful to clarify that the 
alternative trade world stores have not disappeared, but they are still working under the concept 
of fair trade, together with Fairtrade labelling. All these organisations came together in 1998 under 
the informal umbrella group FINE (an acronym based on the first letters of FLO-Cert, IFAT, NEWS 
and EFTA) (Renard, 2003). 
1. Definition – FINE established one single definition of fair trade (ibid): ‘‘Fair trade is a trading 
partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect that seeks greater equity in 
international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions 
to, and securing the rights of, marginalised producers and workers-especially in the South’’ 
(Fairtrade Foundation, 2011). 
Fairtrade International (2015) further suggested that the term ‘‘Fairtrade’’ (one word), which is the 
focus of this research, is used to describe the certification and labelling system governed by 
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Fairtrade International (FTI). The Fairtrade (FT) system allows consumers to identify goods that 
have met internationally agreed Fairtrade Standards by looking for the FAIRTRADE (FT) Marks 
on products. On the other hand, the term fair trade (two words) is used to refer to the fair trade 
movement as a whole and the organisations that are part of it. This includes both labelled and 
unlabeled goods and the work of alternative trade organizations, fair trade federations and other 
networks.  
Although Tallontire (1999) presented a few more definitions, she argued that despite the 
differences, three themes appear to be common: 
 Trade should benefit the primary producer of the commodity. 
 Consumers have a role to play in making trade fair (through purchasing and paying a 
higher price for a primary commodity or an end product which contains a primary 
commodity, under the principles described below). Nonetheless, as we argue in our 
empirical analysis later, the role of consumers within FT needs to be questioned on the 
basis of the dilution of FT principles, profiteering across the value chain on the back of FT 
and the strategic importance of considering states and TNCs first in shaping solutions to 
make trade fairer. 
 Fair trade is about advocacy as well as practical trading. 
2. Vision – Moore (2004; p.2) suggested that fair trade has, in essence, two basic visions. ‘‘The 
first is to provide a working model of international trade that makes a difference to the producers 
and consumers that engage in it. (..). Renard, quoted in ibid, suggested that ‘‘the second and 
more radical is to challenge orthodoxy in business practice and to do so not simply by 
campaigning but by being a tool for modifying the dominant economic model’’. Tallontire (1999) 
further argued that fair trade is a critique of conventional or unfair trade. She asserted that at a 
macro level, fair trade focuses on the concentration of economic and political power by the North 
in the hands of Northern institutions culminating in an uneven playing field for small scale 
producers in the South. At the micro level, it is concerned with the problems faced by small scale 
producers in the market place, whether they are land owners or waged labor. Whilst this has been 
fair trade’s vision, as we have seen earlier, fair trade network’s shift away from the fair trade 
movement has consequently signaled a departure away from the macro vision of fair trade. Also, 
our empirical analysis shows that FT’s focus on the macro level has been significantly toned down 
recently through FT’s theory of change, which acknowledged that the nature and extent of change 
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brought about by FT’s interventions will depend on a range of contextual factors and that FT is 
not the sole determinant of change (Fairtrade International, 2013). 
3. Principles & Organisations – Tallontire (1999) highlighted that fair trade can be considered 
both as a set of principles and as the organisations which implement these principles. This reflects 
what we will demonstrate in our empirical analysis later around the different implementation of 
the FT principles in FTO and TNCs FT GVCs. In terms of principles, the Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation (FLO), quoted in Renard (2003), explained that carrying the Fairtrade label on 
products guarantees that the buyers agree to meet the following conditions:  
 Direct purchase. 
 A price paid to cooperatives that covers cost of production (FT minimum price) and a social 
premium (FT premium price). 
 Advance payment or pre-finance in order to prevent small producer organisations from 
falling into debt. 
 Contracts that allow long-term production planning and sustainable production practices. 
The conditions for granting certification to the growers are: 
 Small scale farmers can participate in a democratic organisation. Nonetheless, as we will 
see in our empirical analysis, FT cotton in India operates under contract production 
standards, which do not require the producer organisation to have a legal status at the 
start of the project. 
 Plantation and factory workers can participate in trade union activities and have decent 
wages, housing and health and safety standards. 
 No forced or child labor. 
 Programs to improve environmental sustainability. 
On this note, ICCO (2005) explained that the FT minimum price is calculated on the basis of world 
market prices, plus FT premiums. As such, the Fairtrade Foundation (2015) suggested that the 
FT minimum price for cocoa is $2,000 per tonne, with a $200 premium per tonne on top of that 
for farmers to invest in their businesses or local community. If the world market price rises above 
$2000 per tonne, the FT price will be the world market price plus $200 per tonne (ICCO, 2005). 
Similarly, the FT Foundation (2015) indicated that the FT cotton minimum price is set by region 
and variety and ranges from €0.66/kg in Kyrgyzstan to €0.39/kg in South Asia (including India). 
In parallel, producer organisations are paid an additional FT Premium of €0.05/kg to invest in 
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business development and community and environmental projects chosen by their members. 
Similarly to cocoa, when the market price is higher than the FT Minimum Price, the buyer must 
pay the higher price. 
In terms of organisations, as per table 1 below, there are six groups involved in fair trade: 
Table 1: Fair trade groups & organisations     
Fair trade Group Description 
1. Producer 
Organisations/ 
Promoting Bodies 
in Southern 
countries 
 Producer organisations – These are usually cooperatives with smallholder 
farmers as members, and, as discussed above, they need to be democratically 
organised. They supply the commodity and, therefore, are the core of the 
Fairtrade labeling system.  
 Promoting Bodies – As we will see from our empirical section later, this group 
also includes promoting bodies like Agrocel Industries in India, which are more 
profit-oriented than producer organisations like Kuapa Kokoo or Chetna that are 
more development oriented. In relation to the scale limitations of FT, it should 
be highlighted that only a small proportion of total sales of these organisations 
takes place in FT terms.  
2. Alternative 
Trade 
Organisations 
(ATOs)/Fair trade 
Organisations 
(FTOs) 
 They actively participate in trading and other campaigning activities in varying 
degrees. Examples include Traidcraft, who trade and campaign, Oxfam who 
campaigns, and Twin Trading who trades and undertakes on-the ground 
development work. 
 The fair trade movement as normally understood has its origins amongst the 
ATOs, who, have been renamed FTOs as per the shift away from the alternative 
trading system we discussed earlier. 
3. Fairtrade 
Organisations 
 Fairtrade International (FTI) – Coordinates Fairtrade’s work across the world 
by developing global Fairtrade strategy, setting international Fairtrade 
standards, and organising support for producers. 
 FLO-Cert – An independent company that runs the Fairtrade certification 
system by checking compliance with Fairtrade Standards. It ensures that the 
relevant social and environmental standards are met for the raw materials and 
products that carry the FAIRTRADE Mark and that producers receive the 
Fairtrade Minimum Price and Fairtrade Premium.  
 Fairtrade Foundation – An independent non-profit organisation that licenses 
use of the FAIRTRADE Mark on products in the UK in accordance with 
internationally agreed Fairtrade standards. Building a market for Fairtrade 
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products is carried out by national Fairtrade organisations. The Fairtrade 
Foundation is one such member responsible for the UK. 
4. Network & 
Umbrella 
Organisations 
These organisations were established by ATOs/FTOs to facilitate cooperation and 
information flows. 
 International Federation for Alternative Trade (IFAT) – It is a worldwide 
membership organization that brings together both producers and buyers. It 
consists of approximately 110 producer organizations and 50 buying 
organisations. 
 Network of European Shops (NEWS) – Acts as the umbrella body for the 
‘‘world shops’’ that retail predominantly fair trade goods across Europe. 
 European Fair trade Association (EFTA) – It is an association of 12 importing 
organisations in nine European countries. 
5. Profit-oriented 
TNCs 
 Conventional businesses that are, or make claims to be, involved in FT in some 
form. Retailers like M&S (through its Plan A), or branded manufacturers like 
Mondelez and Nestle. 
6. Fairtrade Social 
Enterprises 
(FTSE) 
 For example, Divine Chocolate UK or Cafedirect, which market solely 100% FT 
products.   
Source: Adapted from Moore (2004), Huybrechts and Defourny (2010), FT Foundation (2015) and 
Oxford Policy Management and International Institute for Environment and Development (2000) 
4. FT Mark – In exchange for meeting the conditions or FT principles we have mentioned earlier, 
the buyers get to carry the Fairtrade label on their FT certified products. This is associated with 
significant customer recognition and demand which translates into purchasing. Fairtrade 
International (2013) mentioned that 90% of consumers in five leading FT markets recognised the 
FT Mark. In particular, in the UK, customer recognition has been the highest with 96%. In parallel, 
across all 17 markets, over 60% of consumers trust the FT mark, whilst in the UK consumer trust 
has been the second highest with 89%. Table 2 summarises and illustrates further. This trend is 
likely to carry on going forward as well, as according to FTI (2014) 97% of 1000 teens aged 13 – 
20 who were surveyed said that they see the FT Mark sometimes or often. To put this in 
respective, this was compared with 69% for the Rainforest Alliance logo and 41% for the Soil 
Association Organic label, making the FT mark the most widely recognised ethical label among 
UK teens. We will also later explain during our empirical analysis how customer recognition and 
trust were also translated into sales in FT chocolate. 
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Table 2: FT Mark-Consumer recognition and trust 
FT Mark 17 Country Average UK 
Consumer Recognition 56% 96% 
Consumer Trust 61% 89% 
Source: FTI (2013) 
2.2.3 KEY FT THEMES 
Having presented a brief overview of fair trade and Fairtrade, we will now present the key themes 
often mentioned in our literature review in relation to Fairtrade’s impact and strategic direction. 
These themes reflect a discussion on some of the key FT principles we have just presented and 
their on-the ground impact, as well as a discussion on FT’s more strategic matters, such as the 
‘‘mainstreaming’’ and FT’s approach. 
1. FT Price, Premium and direct purchase – Ronchi (2005) justified Fairtrade on the basis that 
it aims to increase the returns to producers, while FAO (2004) confirmed that farmers selling 
Fairtrade products tend to enjoy better market access and higher prices than conventional 
farmers. On the same note, Le Mare (2008), Imhof and Lee (2007) suggested that the FT price 
or wage have improved the economic position of the FT producers, whilst Raynolds (2004), based 
on seven FT coffee case studies, demonstrated that the clearest and most direct benefits are 
from the higher prices paid for FT coffee. Because the world coffee price has been below the FT 
minimum price, the impact on FT farmers has been substantial and sustained (ibid). Nonetheless, 
as we will see later in our empirical findings, the impact is highly dependent on the context. In 
particular, the market price of the crop, as well as government intervention on pricing, which 
resulted in a consistently higher price than the FT minimum price that in essence made the FT 
minimum price irrelevant. Despite this, FT certified farmers have benefited from the FT premiums.  
On this note, Hopkins (2000), quoted in Imhof and Lee (2007), questioned whether the higher 
incomes from FT accrue directly to producers, arguing that they often are retained at the 
cooperative level. This, however, depends on the organisational structure of the cooperative. In 
relation to the FT premium distribution, our empirical findings will later demonstrate some 
variance. At a high level, the variance in our cases went from confirming Hopkin’s challenge to 
further questioning and highlighting the top-down decision making process along with the lack of 
monitoring and enforcement around the use and distribution of the FT premiums. In relation to 
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direct purchase, Oxfam (2002) argued that by purchasing cocoa direct from farmers’ 
organisations, Fairtrade organisations bypass the local intermediaries or ‘‘middlemen’’ who often 
abuse their strong position. In stark contrast, our empirical analysis will later illustrate limited 
evidence of direct purchasing across our cases when considering the entire chain. 
2. Farmer Empowerment and capacity building – Ronchi (2005) mentioned that another tool 
to achieve higher price is a range of development activities aimed at removing the factors that 
mark down producer prices for coffee such as the market power of coffee buyers. At the 
organisational/cooperative level, Le Mare (2008), Imhof and Lee (2007), emphasised improved 
institutional capacity and sustainability of commercial organisations. Raynolds (2002) and Conroy 
(2005), quoted in Baumann et al. (2010), argued that benefits of FT come from improvements in 
capacity building, technical expertise and market information. Lastly, Imhof and Lee (2007) 
highlighted access to credit at low rates and learning about the export process. As we will see 
later during our empirical findings, the overall impact of FT deriving from the farmer empowerment 
and capacity building angle, is ultimately being determined by the bottom-up or top-down 
approach pursued, the level of farmer ownership and representation. 
3. Pre-financing and long term commitment – Doherty et al. (2013) suggested that long-term 
contracts are designed to ensure producers do not suﬀer from the eﬀects of buyers’ short-term 
bias. It’s also the key FT principle which brought the most beneﬁt to farmers because it provided 
the ability to plan and improve yield and production techniques. Despite these benefits, they have 
identified that contracts only extend for one growing season in practice, or are completely ignored 
by major retailers. To this end, our empirical analysis indicated mixed outcomes depending on 
the case and organisations involved, which we will examine in detail in the empirical findings. 
In relation to pre-financing, Doherty et al. (2013) mentioned that it’s critical because it allows 
producers to receive advance payment for their crop before export, enabling producer 
cooperatives to remain competitive against private traders. Despite this, pre-ﬁnancing is not being 
overseen eﬀectively and FTI have suspended the requirement for pre-ﬁnancing. Following this, 
we have also not identified any evidence of crop pre-financing in our empirical analysis. 
4. Scale – Despite the benefits we have already discussed, Oxfam (2002) suggested that FT 
prices are only available to a limited number of producers. The Fairtrade Foundation (2011; p.2) 
highlighted that ‘‘around 122,000 farmers from 62 producer organisations in 18 countries benefit 
from supplying FT cocoa’’. To put this into perspective, there are 5-6 million cocoa farmers 
worldwide, which illustrates that only 2-2.5% of the worldwide total cocoa farmers are FT certified 
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(World Cocoa Foundation, 2010). Similarly, Kuapa Kokoo ltd only sold 2,500 tonnes in FT terms 
to CMC, which is only a tiny fraction of the 35,000 tonnes it buys from the farmers who are 
members of Kuapa Kokoo’s cooperative (Ryan, 2011). At the same time, FT assists one set of 
producers at the expense of others. While the minority will benefit from FT prices, the majority of 
non-FT smallholders in the export sector will suffer a fall in prices for their primary products. On 
top of this, the other FT benefits we described above are also likely to widen this gap further 
(Leclair, 2002).  
Despite Leclair’s argument, our empirical findings in Ghana showed that the non-FT cocoa 
farmers in Ghana did not suffer a fall in prices, as they were protected by the government’s price 
that applies to all farmers, including the FT ones, as the FT minimum price has been consistently 
lower than the Government’s price. FT’s scale limitations have been verified, emphasised and will 
be further elaborated later during our empirical findings. This has taken place using different scale 
measures at various levels of the chain. For example, scale has been articulated through the 
number of FT certified farmers as a proportion of the total farmers, tonnes of FT certified 
cocoa/cotton bought as a proportion of the overall cocoa/cotton produced or purchased. These 
measures have been mapped at country production level, GVC brand/retailer level and 
cooperative level. 
5. Value Added/Upgrading – Beyond the limited scale of FT, there is a more structural argument. 
Shreck (2005) criticised FT projects for not challenging paternalistic, often neo-colonial relations 
that support dependency through current patterns of trade in tropical agriculture commodities. 
Instead, FT attempts to make the trade patterns fairer under a socially and environmentally 
friendly guise that, in essence, reproduces the same patterns. On the same note, Leclair (2002) 
suggested that the emphasis of FT on traditional products can prolong the economic dependence 
of underdeveloped countries. In fact, Singer (1950) underlined that favorable prices for primary 
commodities especially if coupled by a rise in quantities sold might take away the incentive from 
underdeveloped countries to invest in their own industrial development. To this end, Ryan (2011) 
challenged FT and Divine Chocolate for not advancing solutions that entail diversification and 
growth of crops other than cocoa, which could arguably be more sustainable in the long term than 
simply paying farmers more for their cocoa beans. To illustrate, she highlighted that Divine’s 
chocolate bar is made in Europe, which means that most of the value in the chocolate- the value 
added from beans to bar and then brand- is added outside Ghana. 
39 | P a g e  
 
To this end, based on our empirical analysis, we will also see later that both cocoa and cotton 
farmers across our cases were keen on the prospect of being part of FT, but partly, for the wrong 
motivation-the FT premium. Also, whilst at FT principle level, it is clear that FT does not in any 
way incorporate any provisions to add value, some of our cases attempted to add some value 
and diversify through going beyond the FT principles. This took place through forward integration, 
small scale diversification projects, the political empowerment of farmers and a bottom-up 
approach.  
6. Top-down approach – However, the lack of focus on in country value added may be deriving 
from the people who came up with concept. FT has generally been perceived as a top-down 
approach when considering the reliance on purchasing of Northern customers, the FT 
conceptualisation from Northern activists, the definition that derived from FT organisations in 
Europe, the fact that Northern organisations decide what commodities to certify, which producer 
groups to work with, and finally, the reliance on Northern TNCs (Leclair 2002, Shreck 2005). As 
a result, the development context as well as other more systemic and structural elements have 
been omitted. To this end, Raynolds (2002) quoted in Le Mare (2008; p.11) highlighted that ‘‘there 
are many factors that influence the extent of the FT impact, such as global and national policies, 
the organisation and qualities of the FTOs, and the individual characteristics of producers’’. For 
example, Ryan (2011) emphasised that Kuapa Kokoo borrows money from the Ghanaian 
government in order to purchase the beans from the farmers. In turn, the government raises 
finance on the international markets to fund cocoa purchases.  
In line with the literature, our empirical findings later indicate that FT has been perceived as ‘‘one 
size fits all’’ top-down certification, which imposes things that farmers already do, whilst 
disregarding key contextual conditions, such as the strong role of the Ghanaian and Indian 
governments and the role of corporate sustainability programmes by TNCs, among others. The 
top-down approach has been further magnified by the various ways that FT has been 
implemented in a couple of our cases, whereby productivity goals were prioritized over genuine 
farmer empowerment. As we also examine during our empirical analysis, although FT seems to 
acknowledge this through their theory of change, their top-down approach hasn’t been adjusted 
accordingly.  
7. ‘‘Mainstreaming’’ – Whilst Goodman et al (2011) have been critical of FT’s shortcomings in 
meeting its vision, as a result of the powerful mainstreaming exerted by TNCs and the influence 
of neoliberalism, they’ve also argued that in some cases alternative economies have carved out 
40 | P a g e  
 
relatively independent positions. Similarly, Jaffee and Howard (2009) argued that FT needs to 
continue efforts at the margins to strengthen and/or protect the FT standards/principles, that have 
been weakened significantly by mainstreaming, corporate power and their goal to accumulate 
capital. On this note, Fridell (2006) argued that the FT network does not seek to overturn the 
power of TNCs like Starbucks Coffee, Procter and Gamble and Mars, who have been responsible 
for structuring an unequal global economy. On the contrary, they are persuading them to play by 
the rules of FT on the basis of mutual interest. In response, TNCs have decided to participate, 
but did so not from ideological conviction, but because it is convenient and profitable (Renard, 
2003). On this basis, Fridell (2004; p.423) underlined that ‘‘TNCs are concerned only with the 
need to protect their public image for the sake of profitability’’. To illustrate, Procter & Gamble and 
Sara Lee lobbied the US government to abandon the International Commodity Agreements in 
1989 and are currently making huge profits as a result of the global coffee crisis while at the same 
time displaying support for FT coffee. However, the main issue is that the relatively minor 
commitment of these TNCs is a major one for the FT network - Starbucks is now among the 
largest FT roasters in North America -which gives TNCs great influence on the future direction of 
the network (ibid). 
This argument has been verified by our empirical findings, whereby we have demonstrated that 
the TNC involvement in FT has been underpinned by a strong profit motivation driven by demand 
from a niche customer segment, the good story that accompanies Fairtrade, security of supply 
concerns and brand reputation on the back of increasing publicity regarding child labour. 
Furthermore, on the back of FT’s scale limitations we have outlined earlier and that we 
demonstrate in detail during our empirical findings, it’s obvious that a small commitment from 
TNCs is a major commitment for FT as a whole. 
Moreover, the involvement of TNCs who are not part of FT has also raised serious doubts 
regarding the whole success of the FT network. Le Mare (2008) asserted that the use of power 
by non-FT certified organisations, such as buying houses and middle men remains problematic. 
On that note, Shreck (2005) emphasised that FT initiatives are not immune to the demands of 
powerful actors who control conventional commodity chains. Since most of these conventional 
organisations are exempt from complying with the Fairtrade criteria that producers are held to, 
they continue to maintain control in the Fairtrade banana sector.  
Renard (2003) confirmed that since not all of the TNCs adhere to the ideological principles of FT, 
this means that power relations at the heart of the network do not change. In parallel, Fridell 
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(2003) argued that the challenge which FT poses to the global capitalist market is ultimately 
restricted by its involvement in it. As such, the dominance of the agents, mechanisms, and 
structures of global capitalism remain unaltered and, in many ways, unquestioned. This is in line 
with our findings, which demonstrate that international traders/processors have maintained their 
power and, in fact, at this stage of the chain the FT and conventional GVCs overlap across our 
cases. Also, these TNCs leverage FT as a tool in order to increase their revenue and profit margin 
in the chain despite not fully adhering to FT’s principles.  
Beyond TNCs, there has been criticism that organisations involved in Fairtrade and specifically 
FTSE, do not pose any fundamental challenge to the system of unfair trade or the unfair structures 
which underlie trade (Tallontire, 1999). This is because, for example, Divine not only seems to be 
advocating the adoption of FT by TNCs, but also seems to be ignoring the competitive threat this 
might present for Divine itself. Ryan (2011) claimed that Cadbury announced plans to buy cocoa 
directly from Kuapa and invest £30m in Ghana. Divine Chocolate’s Chair (Divine Annual Report, 
2008; p.2) mentioned: ‘‘I recall in 1998 saying that when Cadbury went Fairtrade we would have 
won’’. Divine’s website (2011) emphasised that Divine leads the way as a catalyst for change in 
the chocolate market with the announcement of Cadbury’s converting approximately 20% of their 
chocolate range to Fairtrade. Other chocolate brands have since then followed.  In response, 
Ryan (2011) positioned Divine and FT in the ethical marketing space, while pinpointing the 
dominance of the TNCs (though market concentration) in determining the low price the majority 
of the farmers receive. On the same note, Raynolds et al. quoted in Doherty (2010) argued that 
mainstream companies refashion FT into a niche orientated marketing scheme rather than a 
concept to transform international trade. Raynolds (2004) further suggested that FT is absorbed 
by the market, while Fridell (2004) claimed that TNCs may pose a significant threat to the viability 
of FTSEs like Divine, which lack the formers' financial and marketing resources.  
In relation to the argument above, as we will see during our empirical analysis, the reaction to this 
has varied. Whilst, some FTOs have acknowledged the situation and have raised serious 
concerns about ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and the competitive threat it poses to them, others argued that 
TNCs involvement opened up the market for them. In parallel, the niche character of Fairtrade 
has been demonstrated in the scale section previously, whilst the rationale around FT being a 
marketing tool has been confirmed by our interviews across our cases. 
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2.3 GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN (GVC) APPROACH 
This section further elaborates on the notion of commodity chains that Wallerstein (1995) referred 
to earlier in the world-systems theory, as one of the institutional features of the world-systems 
that have allowed and defended capital accumulation. To this end, this section on Global Value 
Chain (GVC) provides us with the analytical framework through which we have investigated the 
structure of the international trading system and operationalised the notion of power from a top-
down global perspective, in order to address our research questions. We have further 
complimented this framework with a bottom-up perspective on power outlined in the next section, 
where we discuss power analyses from some feminist authors.  
As such, this section begins with a brief overview of GVC’s foundations, followed by its five main 
dimensions. In turn, we examine ‘‘governance as power’’ and ‘‘governance as coordination’’ at 
length, since they provide the cornerstone of our analytical framework.  
2.3.1 FOUNDATIONS 
The GVC concept has emerged in the context of globalisation and the consequent shift of the 
nature of trade during globalisation, which have changed the way we view and analyse the 
international production system and the division of labour. Kaplinsky (2000) claimed that trade 
was largely undertaken in arm’s-length relationships in the earlier period, with final products being 
largely manufactured in a particular country and then exported. On the other hand, in the era of 
globalisation, trade has been taking place increasingly in sub-components and services and is 
consequently more complex (ibid).  
Gereffi et al. (2001) underlined that a significant part of global trade is conducted within 
multinational enterprises or through systems of governance that link firms together in a variety of 
sourcing and contracting arrangements, while Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) added that trade is 
organised by global buyers of major retailers or brand-name companies. As a result, and building 
on the world-systems theory’s systemic theorisation of the world as an integrated unit linking 
together global economic networks, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) asserted that the global value 
chain perspective is an effective means to articulate and explain the functional integration 
between internationally dispersed activities. The increased complexity and ‘‘disaggregation’’ in 
sub-components have led Gereffi et al. (2001) to highlight the shift in focus from production alone 
to the whole range of activities from design to marketing.  
Kaplinsky (2000) agreed and elaborated that this complexity requires sophisticated forms of 
coordination, not merely with respect to logistics and the integration of components into the design 
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of the final products, but also the quality standards with which this integration is achieved. He also 
emphasised power relations, the identification of opportunities and apportioning roles to key 
players, which reflects the act of governance. As such, Gereffi et al. (2001) have stressed the 
importance of focusing on the agents of this shift-the multinational enterprises, or TNCs. As a 
result, access to developed country markets has become dependent on entering into the global 
networks of lead firms located in developed countries. Trading within these international networks 
has been taking place through a variety of relationships whose nature and implications for 
development Global Value Chain research seeks to understand. This is facilitated by 
problematising the question of governance – how chains are organised and managed and asking 
questions about the winners and losers in the globalisation process. 
Granleese (2009) informed us that GVC first appeared in the literature under the title of the 
‘‘Global Commodity Chain’’, while Gereffi et al. (2001) outlined various contending concepts such 
as: supply chains, international production networks, global commodity chains, French filière and 
global value chains. They further highlighted that the ‘‘value chain’’ concept was adopted over 
several widely used alternatives because it was perceived as being the most inclusive of the full 
range of possible chain activities and end products. For the purposes of this study, we will be 
using the Global Value Chain (GVC) concept as our analytical framework, which represents 
Gereffi’s (1994) initial conception of commodity chains and its modern representation (the GVC).  
We mentioned earlier that Wallerstein (1995) referred to the concept of commodity chains in order 
to describe the axial division of labor as a core/periphery phenomenon in which unequal exchange 
was a major mechanism of surplus transfer and concentration. Indeed, many authors (Gereffi and 
Christian 2008, Granleese 2009, Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Gibbon et. al 2008, Raikes et al. 
2000), have acknowledged world-systems theory’s influence on the articulation of GVC. For 
example, Gereffi and Christian (2008) stated that GVC research has its foundations in world-
systems theory. This is taking place through building on dependency and world-systems theory’s 
core, periphery and semi-periphery concepts associated with the power and hierarchy relations 
and consequent development capabilities reflected from their specific position. The powerful role 
of TNC lead firms is added to these core principles, shifting in this way the focus to firm behavior 
in the first incarnation of GVC analysis, the global commodity chains (GCC) framework. To 
confirm, Raikes et al. (2000) suggested that the notion ‘‘commodity chain’’ comes from 
Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, which is an extension of dependency theory, combined with 
Braudelian history. The notion of the network of labour and production processes whose end 
result is a finished commodity, comes from Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994). 
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From what we have discussed already, we briefly demonstrated that the GVC approach is 
radically different to the traditional trade and economic theories. Firstly, GVC sees trade as being 
embedded in, and considerably determined by institutional structures, while economic theory 
focuses on individual optimising behavior through supply and demand, as we briefly mentioned 
during the introduction. The governance or power exercised by the lead TNCs across the chain 
along with the implications of this power are key focus areas, in contrast to traditional trade 
theories. As such, through utilising the GVC approach during this study, we have placed 
institutions and the concept of governance and power in the center of our attention. 
2.3.2 DEFINITION & MAIN FEATURES 
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) asserted that the GVC approach describes the full range of 
activities that firms and workers perform to bring a product from its conception to end use. This 
includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the final 
consumer. There are five main dimensions that the GVC explores: 
1. Input-output structure – Describes the process of transforming raw materials into final 
products. The first step here is to identify the main activities/segments in a global value chain, 
typically represented as boxes connected by arrows as per example of the textile value chain 
below in Figure 1. These show the flows of tangible and intangible goods and services, which are 
critical to mapping the value added at different stages and in turn, the differing returns for the 
chain actors. 
Identifying the dynamic and structure of companies under each segment of the value chain is 
equally important. As such, we need to map the type of companies involved in the industry and 
their key characteristics: global or domestic; state-owned or private; large, medium, or small; etc. 
Identifying the firms that participate in the chain will help us to understand its governance structure 
(ibid). 
2. Geographical scope – Geographical analysis is based on the identification of the lead firms 
in each segment of the value chain. GVCs operate at local, national, regional and global scale 
and allow mapping the geographic shifts of global industries (ibid). 
3. Governance structure – Gereffi (1994; p.215) defined governance structure as the ‘‘authority 
and power relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated 
and flow within a chain’’. In other words, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) explained that 
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governance describes how the value chain is controlled. Given its importance in this study, we 
will examine this in detail in the next section. 
Figure 1: Input-Output Structure of the Textile Value Chain 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi (2011) 
4. Institutional context – GVCs are embedded within local economic, social and institutional 
dynamics. Economic dynamics entail labour costs, infrastructure availability while social dynamics 
include skills level and female participation, while institutional dynamics involve tax regimes and 
policies. Thus, an analysis of the local dynamics requires examination of the stakeholders 
involved. As we briefly mentioned during the previous section on Fairtrade and in line with the 
empirical analysis that will follow, the institutional context will be particularly relevant in relation to 
FT in light of the criticism it has attracted for its disregard of contextual factors and its top-down 
approach. 
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5. Upgrading – It describes the movement within the value chain by examining how producers 
can shift between different stages of the chain. The GVC approach analyses the global economy 
top-down and bottom-up. The key concept for the top-down view is “governance” of global value 
chains and focuses mainly on lead firms. On the other hand, the main concept for the bottom-up 
view is ‘‘upgrading’’, which focuses on the strategies used by countries, regions, and other 
economic stakeholders to maintain or improve their positions within the GVC. As we will see later 
through our empirical evidence, this concept will be particularly relevant when comparing the FT 
GVCs in terms of the type of upgrading they have achieved (ibid). Gereffi et al. (2001) and Gereffi 
and Fernandez-Stark (2011) outlined the following types of upgrading: 
 Product upgrading: This entails moving into more sophisticated product lines. 
 Process upgrading: Firms can upgrade processes by transforming inputs into outputs 
more efficiently through superior technology or re-organising the production systems.  
 Functional upgrading: This entails both intra-chain and inter-chain upgrading which 
involves acquiring new functions (or abandoning existing functions) to increase the overall 
skill content of the activities. For example, intra-chain upgrading could mean moving from 
production to design or marketing within the same chain, achieving vertical integration, or 
even, diversifying their buyer-supplier linkages through working with different kinds of lead 
firms. Inter-chain upgrading involves competence acquired in a particular function of a 
chain and using it in a new sector. 
2.3.3 GOVERNANCE 
In response to the main five dimensions of GVC outlined above and similarly to the systemic 
articulation of the modern world-systems by world-systems theorists earlier, Gibbon et al. (2008) 
characterised GVC as the critical infrastructure of economic globalisation since they can be 
thought of as the integrative counterpart to the current processes of geographical dispersion, 
economic specialisation, differentiation and risk externalisation. However, both disintegration of 
production and its re-integration through inter-firm trade do not occur spontaneously, 
automatically or even systematically. Instead, these processes are initiated and institutionalised 
as a result of concrete strategies and decision-making usually by large firms that manage access 
to final markets in developed countries and emerging economies. The relevance of governance 
to GVC analysis is thus that it emphasises the practices and organisational forms through which 
a division of labour between lead firms and other agents involved in the conceptualisation, 
production and distribution of goods and services in global industries is established and managed.  
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There have been two main approaches to articulating governance in the literature review we have 
undertaken. The first one highlighted power and power relations as a central concept within 
governance and the second one referred to coordination.  
For the purposes of this study, we defined governance as power (with its distinct governance 
structures: ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ and ‘‘producer-driven’’) and overlaid ‘‘governance as coordination’’ 
where necessary to add further analytical rigor in order to reflect the distinct governance features 
of each chain. We will now examine ‘‘governance as power’’ and ‘‘governance as coordination’’, 
which are key components of our analytical framework. 
1. ‘‘Governance as Power’’ – We earlier saw Gereffi (1994; p.215) defining governance as the 
‘‘authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources 
are allocated and flow within a chain’’. In this regard, Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark (2011) stated that initially in the global commodity chain framework, two distinct governance 
structures have emerged and were described as ‘‘buyer-driven’’ or ‘‘producer-driven’’ chains. 
Gereffi (1994) emphasised that these two distinct structures of governance have emerged as a 
result of the barriers to entry that allow commercial and industrial firms to control backward and 
forward linkages. 
 ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ – Chains whereby powerful and large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and 
Tesco, and highly successfully branded merchandisers (e.g., Nike, Reebok), play a pivotal 
role in setting up decentralised production networks in a variety of exporting developing 
countries (ibid). Furthermore, they dictate the way the chains are operated by requiring 
suppliers to meet certain standards and protocols, despite limited or no production 
capabilities (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). In essence, Gereffi (1994) argued that 
the main job of the powerful TNCs is to manage the chain and integrate the various pieces 
of business. He further highlighted that this type of governance has been prevalent in 
labour intensive industries. As we will see from our empirical analysis, both the cotton-
apparel and cocoa-chocolate GVCs are ‘‘buyer-driven’’. To this end, we will demonstrate 
how the lead TNCs exercise their power through positioning close to customer demand, 
setting quality parameters, striving for profitability, leveraging their purchasing power, and 
adding value. Following this, we will examine how have these mechanisms been affected 
by FT and the FT GVCs. 
 ‘‘Producer-driven’’ – Chains whereby powerful TNCs play the central role in controlling 
the production system along with the backward and forward linkages. The geographic 
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spread of these chains is transnational and the levels of development of the countries 
participating in these are varied. Producer-driven chains are typical within capital-intensive 
and technology-driven industries. A key distinguishing element is the control exercised by 
the TNCs administrative headquarters (ibid). It should also be noted that producer-driven 
chains are more vertically integrated along all segments of the chain and leverage the 
technological or scale advantages of integrated suppliers (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 
2011). 
2. ‘‘Governance as Coordination’’ – Granleese (2009) highlighted that the conceptualisation of 
‘‘buyer-driven’’ or ‘‘producer-driven’’ governance structures has been further advanced to reflect 
the distinct features of the governance structures of each chain. Although the concept of buyer 
‘‘driven-ness’’ is still applicable across many chains, this ‘‘driven-ness’’ is manifested in different 
ways, degrees and has different drivers. Furthermore, Gereffi (2001) reminded us that 
governance structures evolve according to technological, institutional, and organisational 
innovations, as well as changes in regulatory environments and ‘‘thus, in any particular time 
period or within a given industry, new governance structures co-exist and interact with earlier 
forms of governance’’ (ibid; p.30). As such, from the literature review, ‘‘governance as 
coordination’’ is based on the ideal types of ‘‘buyer-driven’’ or ‘‘producer-driven’’ structures with 
further analytical inputs to reflect specificities of chains and contextual changes and trends. 
More specifically, Gibbon et al. (2008) referred to Sturgeon’s work on the electronics industry to 
explain the conceptualisation of ‘‘governance as coordination’’. Gereffi et al. (2001; p.6) defined 
GVC governance as ‘‘non-market coordination of economic activity’’. On a similar note, Humphrey 
and Schmitz (2002; p.25) noted that ‘‘chain governance structures are the relationships and 
institutional mechanisms through which non-market coordination of the chain is achieved’’.  The 
latter definition has been more suitable for our analysis as it included the coordination of the whole 
chain and not just the economic activity. As such, social and political dimensions, which we deem 
critical, have been part of our analysis. This is important as lead institutions or TNCs may control 
chains in more ways than just economic activity through, for example, requiring suppliers to meet 
certain standards and protocols, as seen earlier in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chains. Also, according to our 
interpretation of Humphrey’s and Schmitz’s (2002) analysis of arm’s length market relations, both 
Humphrey and Schmitz and Gereffi et al. may have referred to ‘‘non-market’’ coordination in their 
definitions as this involves limited to no relationship between the buyer and producer. As such, 
no ‘‘governance as coordination’’ is required. This may imply that the buyer buys a standard 
product, or buys product made-to-order on the basis of predefined options, or provides drawings 
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and purchases producer's universal production skills. This may also imply that the buyer's 
requirements (including quality, reliability, etc.) could be met by a range of suppliers. 
Gereffi et al. (2001) went on to specify the following governance features:  
 Coordination can take various forms in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chains. Other than arm’s length 
market relations, coordination takes place through: inter-firm networks, quasi-hierarchical 
relationships between powerful lead firms and independent but subordinate firms in the 
chain, and vertical integration within enterprises. Similarly, Humphrey and Schmitz, quoted 
in Granleese (2009), advanced the understanding of governance in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chains 
by outlining the same modes of governance pursued by powerful buyers in global value 
chains.  
 Gereffi et al. (2001) suggested that where powerful lead firms exist, their power stems 
from two attributes: their market power (measured in part by concentration or market 
share) and their positioning in chain segments. Both sources of power are derived from 
barriers to entry.  
 Governance structures arise in response to two needs for coordination. Firstly, the more 
companies are involved in specifying the products that their suppliers make, the more they 
are likely to develop structures to coordinate their activities. Secondly, the more they are 
exposed to risks as a result of the suppliers’ failures, the more they will intervene to 
coordinate and monitor the chain (ibid). 
 Governance involves the ability of one firm in the chain to influence or determine the 
activities of other firms in the chain. This may involve defining the products to be produced 
by suppliers and specifying processes and standards to be used. This power is exercised 
through the lead firms’ control over key resources needed, decisions about entry to and 
exit from the chain and monitoring of suppliers. It may also involve technical support to 
suppliers in order to enable them to achieve the required performance.  
 Chains differ significantly with respect to how strongly governance is exercised, how much 
governance is concentrated in the hands of a single firm, and how many lead firms 
exercise governance over chain members (Gereffi et. al, 2001).  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) asserted that governance has to do with the exercise of control 
along the chain which is articulated by a set of questions. These include: what is to be produced, 
how it is to be produced (which may include the technology to be used, quality systems, labour 
and environmental standards), when it is to be produced, how much is to be produced and at 
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what price. They further highlighted that from the point of view of the analysis of inter-firm linkages 
in the global economy, the critical parameters for value chain governance are the first two. These 
are often set by buyers at various levels of specification, but it is also important to highlight that 
the ‘‘what to be produced’’ and ‘‘how to be produced’’ can also be set by agents external to the 
chain, such as the Government or international NGOs. This is in line with our case studies, 
whereby the Ghanaian and Indian Government have a significant role to play, as well as FTI, but 
to a lesser extent. But, we will examine this in detail through our empirical analysis. 
In a later paper, Gereffi et al. (2005) built on Gereffi et al. (2001) and Humphrey and Schmitz’s 
forms of coordination in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chains. They provided a more elaborate typology of five 
governance structures (see figure 2), based on the complexity of transactions, ability to codify 
them and supplier capabilities in relation to a transaction’s requirements. This elaborate, albeit 
transactional and micro-view of governance and GVC has resulted in the following governance 
types depicted below: markets, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy. In line with these 
governance types, during our empirical analysis later, we establish the governance type between 
nodes of the conventional and FT GVCs in order to assess FT’s systemic impact in shifting value 
chains relations. Gereffi et al. (2005) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) explained: 
 Market: Involves transactions that are relatively simple. Information on product 
specifications is easily transmitted, and suppliers make products with minimal input from 
buyers. This type of governance requires little or no formal cooperation. The central 
governance mechanism is price rather than a powerful lead firm. Spot markets are a 
typical example of this governance type. For example, we could consider commodities or 
securities markets in which goods are sold for cash and delivered immediately. 
 Modular: Occurs when complex transactions are relatively easy to codify. Suppliers make 
products to a customer’s specifications and take full responsibility for process technology. 
This keeps costs low and limits transaction-specific investments. Relationships are more 
substantial than in simple markets because of the high volume of information. Sturgeon, 
quoted in ibid, added that highly competent suppliers could be added and subtracted from 
the global production arrangements on as as-needed basis. This, in combination with 
making products according to a customer’s specifications reflects a buyer-driven 
governance structure. The electronics industry and contract manufacturing could provide 
an example here, whereby the branded laptop merchandiser and retailer Dell specifies the 
overall product (laptop) and its individual components and chooses among a variety of 
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full-package suppliers who provide them through assembling them from numerous 
component and material suppliers. 
 Relational: Takes place when buyers and sellers rely on complex information. This results 
in frequent interactions and knowledge sharing between parties. Lead firms still specify 
what is needed, and thus have the ability to exert some level of control over suppliers, 
reflecting in this way a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ governance structure. Relational linkages take time 
to build, so the costs required to switch are high.  
 Captive: In explicitly mirroring a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ governance structure here, small 
suppliers are dependent on one or a few buyers that often exercise great power. Such 
networks entail a high degree of monitoring and control by the lead firm. For example, this 
could be manifested when food crop farmers rely on one or few buyers to purchase their 
produce by using equipment which was given to them by the buyer. 
 Hierarchy: Describes chains characterised by vertical integration and managerial control 
within lead firms that develop and manufacture products in-house. This usually occurs 
when product specifications cannot be codified, products are complex, or highly 
competent suppliers cannot be found. 
Figure 2: Five GVC Governance types 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi (2011) 
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3. Governance Meta-Analysis and critique – Given the analysis above and despite the criticism 
we outline and address below, we refer to ‘‘governance as power’’ through the conceptualisation 
of the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ governance structure. In addition, we have utilised ‘‘governance as 
coordination’’, on top of the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ concept, since this has provided us with further 
analytical inputs that reflect the specificities of chains, contextual changes and trends. Granleese 
(2009) concurred through defining governance as power and coordination whilst asserting that 
the obvious merit of using the GVC analysis to trade and economic relations is at the macro level 
where GVC analysis offers the greatest insight through its focus on the location of power, and 
how the influence of power within one segment can determine the organisation of the entire supply 
chain.  
On the other hand, he stated that Gereffi et al. (2005) articulation of five governance structures 
extended the somewhat limited buyer/producer driven dichotomy but criticised it for focusing on 
the micro-level and thus reducing governance to something highly similar to transaction cost 
economics. Gibbon et al. (2008) also identified two main problems with Gereffi et al. (2005) 
articulation of ‘‘governance as coordination’’ through five governance structures. Firstly, the 
explanatory scope of the governance concept is narrowed from the length of the chain to the inter-
firm transaction at a specific node in the chain; second, the ‘‘governance as coordination’’ 
formulation reflects a key assumption of transaction cost economics, i.e. that the economy’s 
organisational forms emerge as efficient solutions to structural challenges of transacting. This 
marks a sharp break from the ‘‘governance as power’’ formulation and from the early commodity 
chains research agenda of world-systems theory. So, while the ‘‘producer-driven’’ and ‘‘buyer-
driven’’ typology sought to make explicit the power relations and explain why they differ in capital 
versus labour-intensive industries, the ‘‘governance as coordination’’ suggests that power is a 
contingent property of only certain types of inter-firm coordination (ibid).  On the same note, 
Raynolds (2002) criticised micro-level commitments which overshadow the need for more macro-
level research and the analysis of global-local linkages allowed by the GVC analysis through its 
focus on power relations. However, we argue that by using the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ governance 
structure with an overlay of ‘‘governance as coordination’’, we have maintained our focus on 
power across the chain whilst enriching it analytically with the governance structure between 
nodes of the chains. 
Despite the merits and our rationale for using power in the centre of our analytical framework, 
there have been various criticisms regarding the ‘‘producer and buyer-driven’’ governance 
structures. For example, Fold (2008) suggested that there is little evidence of the ability of one 
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lead ﬁrm (or single type of buyer) to impose its strategic decisions in most food-based GVCs. 
Instead, food-based GVCs typically contain different types of dominant actors who all are 
‘‘buyers’’ and could be branded manufacturers, category managers, contract manufacturers, 
retailers or international traders. Although this is a legitimate critique, we don’t see how this could 
potentially dismantle the notion of governance as driving power, since we are still referring to 
power relations deriving from an oligopoly instead of a monopoly.  
In addition, Gibbon et al. (2008) mentioned critics who claimed that the ‘‘producer-driven’’ versus 
‘‘buyer-driven’’ distinction was too narrow or excessively abstract and that these two types failed 
to capture the range of governance forms observed in actual chains, including the influence 
certain external actors (those not directly supplying a product or service) could have in how a 
chain is governed. This is however, why we also decided to use the concept of ‘‘governance as 
coordination’’ by Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) above, who incorporated agents external to the 
chain in their parameter analysis. Also, similarly to our argument above, by using ‘‘governance as 
coordination’’ on top of the the “buyer-driven” or “producer-driven” governance structures will 
provide us with the further analytical tools required to articulate the specificity of actual value 
chains.  
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2.4 FURTHER PERSPECTIVES ON POWER  
We have earlier examined the way in which world-systems and GVC theory analyse power 
imbalances and their impacts. World-systems theory through its focus on the institutional systemic 
features that have allowed and defended capital accumulation permits us to describe the axial 
division of labor as a core/periphery phenomenon in which unequal exchange is a major 
mechanism of surplus transfer and concentration. Similarly, and building on world-systems 
theory’s core, periphery and semi-periphery concepts associated with the power and hierarchy 
relations and consequent development capabilities reflected from their specific position, GVC 
concentrates on governance articulated through power imbalances by incorporating the powerful 
role of TNC lead firms within global value chains. It’s also been suggested that a concern with 
asymmetric power relations has been a central feature in power analyses of some feminist 
authors3 (Kenny, 2007). 
As such, the focus on asymmetric power relations is the element which directly links the world-
systems theory, the GVC approach and power analyses of these feminist authors. This has taken 
place in this research without focusing on gender, albeit in a ‘‘gender-aware’’ manner, which we 
explain later in more detail. These theories have been preoccupied with understanding, 
uncovering and explaining hidden structures that underline power imbalances. World-systems 
theory and power analyses of these feminist authors share a critical eye towards power relations 
whilst advancing direct links between them. For example, as explained by world-systems theory, 
the semi proletarian household is a mode of labor control through which demands of workers are 
restrained in the context of the institutional structures that have allowed capital accumulation. This 
systemic and institutionalised form of sexism forces households to absorb these costs through 
women’s reproductive and subsistence labor. Thus, individuals in households adapt to the 
corporate externalisation of costs by pooling resources in order to live, including wages, 
reproduction, subsistence food production, and informal work (York and Ergas, 2011).  
Furthermore, we earlier referred to the power of the central government over the daily life of its 
citizens as part of our world-systems theory. As we will examine in the next section, the conception 
of power as ‘‘power-over’’ has been prevalent among some feminist theorists. Also, in line with 
commodity chains in world-systems theory and value chains in GVC, York and Ergas (2011) 
                                                          
3 York and Ergas, Allen, Miller, Hartsock, Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez, Mies, Stanley and Wise, 
Oakley, Strassman, Harding and Nelson, Wuest and Merritt-Gray, Wuest, Ferber, Mies, Temperley. 
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contended that nodes of commodity chains are the most promising concepts for analysing work 
deriving from locally based extractive and productive systems.  
Therefore, this section firstly provides different articulations of power from some feminist authors. 
Following this, we present the way these power analyses enhance and shape our GVC analytical 
framework. Then, we examine some of these authors’ key principles in two levels: the 
epistemological and methodological. Lastly, we conclude by summarising this chapter and 
highlighting the elements of our analytical framework that helped us structure our empirical 
findings in four key themes. 
2.4.1 TAXONOMY OF POWER 
Allen (2013) provided a comprehensive taxonomy of perspectives on power: 
a. ‘‘Power as Resource’’ – Power is understood as a positive social good that is unequally 
distributed. The goal is to redistribute this resource so that women will have power equal to men. 
This conception entails a dyadic, atomistic understanding of power and consequently fails to 
illuminate the social, institutional and structural contexts that shape individual relations of power. 
This makes the distributive model unhelpful for understanding the structural features of 
domination (ibid). 
b. ‘‘Power as Domination’’ – In contrast, Allen (2013) asserted that in ‘‘power as domination’’ 
feminist theorists have used a variety of terms to reflect domination, including oppression, 
patriarchy, and subjection. The common thread is an understanding of power as a specific kind 
of ‘‘power-over’’ (similar to the one exercised by central governments over their citizens articulated 
in world-systems theory) that may be unjust or illegitimate in the context of relations that include 
domination. 
c. ‘‘Power as Empowerment’’ – Other feminist theorists argued that power as ‘‘power-over’’, 
domination, or control is implicitly masculinist. In order to avoid this connotation, some feminist 
theorists have advanced a reconceptualisation of power as a capacity or ability, specifically, the 
capacity to empower or transform oneself and others. For example, Miller quoted in ibid, 
suggested that it is natural for women not wanting to use power as it is presently conceived and 
used. ‘‘Rather, women may want to be powerful in ways that simultaneously enhance, rather than 
diminish, the power of other’’. On the same note, Nancy Hartsock, quoted in ibid, referred to the 
understanding of power as energy and competence rather than dominance.  
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On this note, Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez (2002) critically analysed the top-down, 
‘‘neutral’’ and ‘‘objective’’ approach of world-systems, whereby attention is directed to the ‘‘role of 
the other’’ as necessary for the process of accumulation in a paradigm centered on the West. 
This is embedded in the ‘‘West and the rest’’ syndrome where the ‘‘rest’’ is largely a consequence 
of the West, leading to the undermining of the role of the ‘‘other’’ and local circumstances. Without 
rejecting the importance of the capitalist process of accumulation, they argued for the value of 
privileging the ‘‘responsibility to act’’ over the ‘‘responsibility to otherness’’ in an effort to also draw 
attention to the importance of context, subjectivities and experience which can inform social 
theory and facilitate mobilisation for change. By utilising the feminist perspective on power seen 
as empowerment, Temperley (2013) suggested we can take into consideration power emerging 
from the margins of society or through cooperation between the dominated. This is also in line 
with FT’s farmer organisation and empowerment principle, which we will be examining during our 
empirical analysis later. Therefore, by examining ‘‘power as empowerment’’, we acquire a fuller 
understanding of different strands of power and a bottom-up view of power which is grounded on 
experience and compliments the top-down view offered by world-systems theory and GVC. 
2.4.2 ENHANCED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
On this note, we argue that, by combining GVC with power analyses from these feminist authors, 
we are able to articulate a robust analytical framework through which we have examined our 
research questions. This is because, despite their similarities, these theories arrive at their 
conclusions regarding power imbalances from different angles. These are summarised succinctly 
from Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez (2002) by referring to differences in the level and unit 
of analysis, role of actors and developmentalism. Thus, while feminist analyses usually take place 
at micro level, world-systems theory and GVC analyses are predominantly at macro level. York 
and Ergas (2011) confirmed this and also suggested that world-systems analyses tend to look at 
the effect of global forces on local events, while feminist analyses tend to look at how women and 
men contribute to and attempt to change structural processes. On this note, we earlier referred to 
Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez (2002) who critiqued the centrality of the West and the Core 
in defining prospects for change outside the core, whilst advancing instead the scope to redefine 
relations of power from outside the core. 
Building on this, Tallontire et.al (2009) argued that whilst GVC analysis focuses on the structure 
of international trade and position power relations within the remit of lead TNCs and their suppliers 
within the vertical dimension of the chain, others noted that there is also a horizontal dimension 
of power. To this end, Gibbon et al. (2008) highlighted the influence of certain external actors 
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(those not directly supplying a product or service) that could have an impact in how a chain is 
governed, such as government bodies or civil society organisations. Therefore, building on the 
horizontal dimension of power, we have utilised power analyses from these feminist authors in 
order to highlight the influence of external actors, but also to underline Fairtrade’s focus on farmer 
empowerment and organisation. As we will see later in our empirical analysis, this horizontal 
dimension of power enhances the analytical rigor of GVC’s ‘‘governance as power’’ at chain level 
and ‘‘governance as coordination’’ which, aims to reflect the distinct governance features between 
each node of the chain. This has taken place through exploring key horizontal power relations, 
such as the power dynamic between FTI and TNCs/FTOs, the uneven playing field between 
smaller and larger cooperatives on the basis of FT’s cost of certification, but also the role of 
marginalised groups, such as women within cooperatives. 
Therefore, integrating key strands of power analyses from these feminist authors with the world-
systems theory and GVC, has enhanced our macro, systemic, normative, vertical and top-down 
analysis (articulated by world-systems and GVC) by providing a more constructivist, contextual, 
reflexive, diverse, micro, horizontal and bottom-up angle. This has taken place without focusing 
on gender, albeit in a ‘‘gender-aware’’ manner, which, as we said earlier, takes under 
consideration the horizontal power relations between women and the cooperative in the context 
of the broader farmer empowerment and organisations advanced by FT. Furthermore, key 
features from these power analyses have also been reflected at methodological level and 
informed our research design, data collection and analysis accordingly (which we will examine 
later in Grounded Theory in more detail). Lastly, incorporating these power analyses has also 
allowed us to be consistent with our interpretation of critical realism, which we will explain in the 
next section.  
2.4.3 KEY PRINCIPLES 
The feminist theorists we earlier referred to have articulated some key principles. For example, 
Wuest and Merritt-Gray (2001) asserted that commitment to feminist methodology indicates 
reflexivity, diversity and transformation. In turn, Wuest (1995) structured these principles in two 
levels: the epistemological and methodological. 
On the epistemological level, as briefly outlined earlier, the key principles of diversity and 
reflexivity are highlighted through the recognition of multiple sources of knowledge. These were 
mainly articulated as a critique to the essential feature of traditional social sciences, including 
mainstream economics: the mathematical-deductive approach. Lawson (2006) highlighted the 
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importance of the formalistic-deductive reasoning for traditional sciences whilst pinpointing that 
mainstream economists adopt it everywhere in a way that renders method more important than 
ideas and usefulness. The insistence on the mathematical-deductive approach associated with 
value-free, objective and uninvolved research has been heavily criticised by feminists (Mies 1993, 
Stanley and Wise 1983). Nelson (2001) explains that this has been a result of androcentrism and 
was reflected through a set of contrasting values. For example, ‘‘objectivity, separation, logical 
consistency, individual accomplishment, mathematics, abstraction, lack of emotion and science 
itself have long been culturally associated with rigor, hardness – and masculinity. At the same 
time, subjectivity, connection, intuitive understanding, cooperation, qualitative analysis, 
concreteness, emotion and nature have often been associated with weakness, softness – and 
femininity’’ (ibid; p.94).  
As a consequence, Mies (1993) and Stanley and Wise (1983) argued for understanding, emotion 
and qualitative analysis, whilst Strassman (1993) advocated for on-the-ground empirical work to 
provide a wider range of explanations. In this way, the importance of empirical evidence and 
narratives from various sources has become a central feature of feminist theories. Given the 
diversity of sources of information, Wuest and Merritt-Gray (2001) emphasised that the use of 
feminist theories reminds us to attend to points of difference and rework theory, which underlines 
the reflexivity required to go back and forth between empirical evidence and theory (as we will 
examine later within critical realism and Grounded Theory). 
Following on from Strassman’s emphasis on diversity expressed via the recognition of multiple 
sources of knowledge, it is also implicit from the discussion above that universal and objective 
truths are rejected and so are dichotomies and dualistic thinking. Indeed, Wuest (1995) rejected 
any universal and objective truth, while Jennings (1993) emphasised the need to overcome 
dualistic thinking. Harding, quoted in ibid, criticised science for claiming to have the right to 
objective truths whilst arguing against dualistic metaphors. For this reason, Harding (1995) argued 
for a shift away from individualism and individually held false beliefs towards institutional and 
structural aspects that shape biases.  
On the same note, Ferber and Nelson (1993) explicitly referred to culturally and socially 
constructed terms, which render dualisms as matters of social belief. At this stage, it is important 
to highlight that feminist theorists have expressed various positions regarding the degree of 
rejecting dualistic thinking. Our position reflects the feminist position of rejecting universal truths 
deriving solely from objective and mathematical-deductive approaches. We have also earlier 
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explained our rationale for complementing the top-down view articulated by world-systems theory 
and GVC with the bottom-up and on-the ground experiences advocated by feminist conceptions 
of power, which are communicated through narratives. Having said this, we will explain in detail 
how we intend to combine narratives and empirical experience with positivism and to what degree 
later in the critical realism section.  
On the methodological front, the main features include the non-hierarchical relationship between 
the researcher and the ‘‘researched’’, the empowerment, transformation and emancipation goals 
of feminism. With regards to the research relationship, Wuest (1995) suggested that feminism 
has produced various debates and positions on this topic ranging from a reciprocal relationship 
on one end to ‘‘friendly stranger’’ on the other. For example, Oakley (1998) called for the 
researcher to be treating the researched as she/he would like herself/himself to be treated. In 
agreement with Oakley, Mies (1993) proposed that the ‘‘view from above’’ should be replaced 
with the ‘‘view from below’’. The rationale for this is that ‘‘research, which so far has been largely 
an instrument of dominance and legitimation of power elites, must be brought to serve the 
interests of dominated, exploited and oppressed groups’’ (ibid; p.68). On the other hand, Wuest 
and Merritt-Gray (2001) advanced respect for participants and avoiding oppression. Our position 
has demonstrated full awareness of the powerlessness certain interviewees were experiencing 
and was mitigated through demonstrating an active understanding of their situation. However, this 
has not been as applicable to other interviewees given their current position and power within 
their organisations. 
Lastly, transformation, empowerment and emancipation have been central tenets in our feminist 
theorists’ arguments. For example, Harding (1995; p.24) calls for feminist insight based on an 
empirical and theoretical project, ‘‘requiring political and scientific struggles against the dominant 
institutions and their discourses’’. Feminist theory is challenging the existing ideologies and 
methodologies by the empowerment of groups whose needs and aspirations have previously 
been denied. Insights were achieved not only through conversation but through actual 
transformation, which underlines the goals of feminist social research: empowerment and 
emancipation (Folbre, 1993). Mies (1993) echoed the goals of emancipation and empowerment 
and advanced the political character of feminist research. According to Mies, the political goal of 
liberation cannot be separated from the scientific one (ibid).  
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to articulate what Fairtrade stands for whilst positioning it among 
theories of international trade and power analyses from feminist authors that have been 
concerned with power relations. In doing so, we have established that the FT network, having 
departed from international trade theories that envisaged an alternative trading system on the 
basis of strong nation state regulation, is now a market-driven approach based on voluntary 
commitments from consumers, TNCs and NGOs. This has taken place through the emergence 
of labeling and Fairtrade. 
In light of this, and though outlining FT’s and fair trade’s vision, FT principles and on-the ground 
impact, we argued there is a disconnect between the vision of modifying the existing international 
trading system and FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach that involves working within it and its agents. 
Furthermore, we have also highlighted that the impact of FT has been shaped and determined 
not only by the context within it operates, but also by the organisations that implement FT and the 
way they do so. For example, the FT minimum price has been irrelevant due to government 
intervention in pricing. Also, we have outlined that farmer empowerment heavily depends on the 
bottom-up or top-down approach pursued by the FT participating organisations. But, despite the 
differences in impact, we also argued that FT’s overall scale is insignificant when considering a 
variety of scale measures across the GVCs. 
In order to explain FT’s shortcomings, we have positioned it in the context of the world-systems 
theory that articulates the systemic structure of the international trading system through its agents 
and mechanisms. As such, we have demonstrated that the primacy of the drive for capital 
accumulation and the mechanisms in order to achieve this are fundamental in understanding the 
existing power imbalances. To this end, nation states and TNCs have a lead role in driving and 
defending capital accumulation. Following this, we argued that the analytical tool that better 
articulates and explains power imbalances and the drive for capital accumulation is value chain 
governance. In this context, Fairtrade has limited its potential for systemic change by choosing to 
operate in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs and work with the powerful TNCs that drive and control them. On 
top of this, we have shown that FT’s principles and orientation are geared towards only farming 
and consumer level through working with brands. This means, however, that FT has omitted the 
fact that there are other participants in the GVCs that relate to others in GVC nodes through 
various governance structures. Nonetheless, in line with the power perspectives we have 
examined in the last section, whereby power has been articulated through its horizontal dimension 
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and its potential to empower, FT has advanced the notion of farmer organisation and 
empowerment. 
To this end, through bringing our literature review and our enhanced analytical framework 
together, there are four key themes emerging, which we later use in order to structure our 
empirical findings. These are: 
1. Sustainability – The role of TNCs has been highlighted in relation to FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’, 
particularly by choosing to get involved in FT in order to protect their image and enhance their 
profitability. As such, this theme will allow us to test this during our empirical chapters. 
2. Political – The nation state has been emphasised through its role in enabling capital 
accumulation and exercising regulatory power. Beyond this top-down political dimension, we also 
previously highlighted the bottom-up power dimension and FT’s notion of farmer organisation and 
empowerment. Utilising this theme will later allow us to demonstrate the role of nation states in 
contrast to FT’s approach. 
3. ‘‘Buyer-Driven’’ – In ‘‘operationalising’’ power relations through the GVC approach, we earlier 
referred to ‘‘governance as power’’ by its distinct ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVC. By using this theme we will 
later demonstrate how lead TNCs exercise their power on the GVCs and its participants through 
various mechanisms.  
4. Chain Relations & Coordination – In ‘‘operationalising’’ power relations through the GVC 
approach, we earlier also referred to ‘‘governance as coordination’’ by its 5 types: markets, 
modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy. This will allow us to illustrate relations between nodes 
of the GVCs and to what extent they shifted as a result of FT.  
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY & METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this chapter is to explain how we have conducted our research. In doing so, through 
the course of this chapter we explain why a qualitative approach, mainly based on semi-structured 
interviews within a Feminist Grounded Theory design and multiple case studies, is suitable to 
address our research area and our goal to synthesise theory.  
To this end, through our moderate interpretation of critical realism which involves qualifying 
generative mechanisms through empirical data, we articulate our research philosophy. Following 
this, we explain our research goals and our research design, before outlining the criteria our 
research is going to be assessed against and the sources we have leveraged in order to acquire 
a robust evidence base. 
3.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
Having examined our theoretical and analytical framework, it is now time to turn to the research 
methodology adopted in this study. Jankowicz quoted in Doherty (2010; p.94) defined 
methodology as ‘‘... the analysis of, and rationale for, the particular method or methods used in a 
given study, and in that type of study in general’’. Leedy (1997) highlighted that research 
methodology underlines and directs the study. He went on to assert that research methodology 
undertakes the following: 
 Controls the study 
 Dictates data acquisition and arranges them in logical relationships 
 Applies means to refine raw data 
 Engineers an approach to highlight underlying meanings from data 
 Issues conclusion(s) that expand knowledge 
The development of research methodology is driven by research paradigms (Doherty, 2010). 
According to Bryman, quoted in Henn et al. (2006), a paradigm is a cluster of beliefs which dictates 
the way scientists in a particular discipline should be doing their research, how results should be 
interpreted and so on. In other words, ‘‘it is a set of assumptions about how the issues of concern 
to the researcher should be studied’’ (ibid; p.10). Firestone, Lincoln and Guba, quoted in Doherty 
(2010), stressed that paradigms are related to the acceptance of assumptions related to ontology, 
epistemology among others. 
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3.1.1 ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
The set of assumptions included in paradigms also include assumptions regarding what we study. 
Della Porta and Keating (2008) defined that ontology is about the object of our investigation, how 
the world fits together and how we make sense of it. Bryman (2004) suggested that the question 
here is whether social entities should be considered objective entities that have a reality external 
to social actors, or are they social constructions built up from the perceptions of social actors. On 
the other hand, epistemology is about how we know things and the forms this knowledge takes. 
There are two main divergent views regarding epistemology in Positivism and Interpretivism. 
There is also a third one, which lies between the first two, Critical Social Research (Della Porta 
and Keating, 2008). For this study, we have used Critical Realism, which we review below.  
3.1.2 CRITICAL SOCIAL RESEARCH 
Blaxter et al. (2010) stated that Critical Social Research naturally critiques both positivism and 
interpretivism. Consistent with our analysis of structures that facilitate power imbalances through 
world-systems, GVC and our power analyses earlier, Henn et al. (2006) suggested that behind a 
misleading surface manifestation lie deep structures and mechanisms of power. Critical Social 
Research urges researchers to uncover these structures and mechanisms that maintain and 
perpetuate an unequal distribution of power which results to the exploitation of the majority by an 
elite minority. Thus, in order to know the social world, Critical Social Research requires revealing 
the underlying mechanisms and structures within the historical, social and political contexts, which 
constrain human thought and action.  
Ultimately, the purpose and ideal of critical social researchers is to ask critical questions with a 
view to changing society (ibid), and we envisage that this research would contribute to the debate 
around this long and complex path of societal change. This is in line with the transformational, 
empowerment and emancipatory aspirations of some feminist theorists we examined earlier 
through Folbre (1993) and Mies (1993). Blaxter et al. (2010) agreed and insisted that Critical 
Social Research ideally aims to challenge and to change society. Consequently, Positivism and 
Interpretivism are both rejected as amoral and passive. (Henn et al., 2006). As explained earlier, 
research for critical researchers is a moral-political activity, not merely an academic pursuit. This 
is also in line with strands of feminist theory and Harding’s (1995) view of the necessity for political 
and scientific struggles against the dominant institutions and their discourses. Henn et al. (2006) 
suggested that this stance has been naturally criticised for an abandonment of the researchers’ 
obligations, which is to generate knowledge. However, Humphries quoted in ibid (p. 17), suggests 
that ‘‘all research is inevitably political, since it represents the interests of particular (usually 
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powerful, usually white male) groups.’’ Clough and Nutbrown (2003; p.12) insisted that research 
is inevitably political as it takes place in policy contexts whilst claiming that ‘‘research which 
changes nothing - not even the researcher- is not research at all’’. For example, this has been 
demonstrated through my own experience in this study, whereby I initially held significantly more 
favorable views about Fairtrade than by the end of the research. 
3.1.3 CRITICAL REALISM 
Scheyvens and Storey (2003) explained that critical realism and feminism are part of Critical 
Social Research. As mentioned earlier, we have used Realism as the ontological basis for the 
purposes of this thesis. However, at the epistemological level, in agreement with Granleese 
(2009), we have utilised empirical evidence in order to qualify the generative mechanisms 
established through the process of retroduction. This represents a moderate interpretation of 
Critical Realism’s epistemological beliefs, as according to Walters and Young (2001) critical 
realists stress the importance of non-observable structures and mechanisms without placing such 
heavy emphasis on empirical observation.  
Critical Realism has its origins in Bhaskar’s work (Granlesse 2009, Jefferies 2011, Yeung 1997). 
Jefferies (2011) suggested that the term Critical Realism derives from the phrases 
‘’transcendental realism’’ and ‘‘critical naturalism’’. In order to describe an interface between the 
natural and social worlds, Bhaskar articulated a general philosophy of science in transcendental 
realism and a philosophy of social science in critical naturalism (ibid). Bhaskar (1975) articulated 
the core ontological argument of critical realism by arguing the existence of a complex and deep 
reality comprised by the three domains below, which cannot be collapsed into just our immediate 
experiences, as empirical realism advocates. In explaining transcendental realism, Bhaskar 
(1975) focused on structures and mechanisms as objects of knowledge and not events. These 
structures and mechanisms operate and endure independently of our knowledge and experience. 
In order to further illustrate he conveyed a reality consisting of three distinct domains whereby 
mechanisms exist, events occur and experiences are taking place. Walters and Young (2001) 
highlighted that these levels of reality are conceived as being typically out of phase so that, 
surface experiences do not reveal the underlying generative mechanisms consisting of powers, 
relations and generative structures. These domains are: 
 The domain of Real – Whereby generative mechanisms exist unactualised and 
independently with the tendency to produce events. 
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 The domain of Actual – In which the interaction of causal structures which cause 
observable events takes place. 
 The domain of Empirical – Where experiences can be directly apprehended (Bhaskar 
1975, Owens 2011). 
By referring to the hermeneutic critique of positivism, Owens (2011) suggested that Critical 
naturalism develops transcendental realism by recognising that the knowledge claims made about 
reality have an interpreted character. This clearly highlights positivism’s insensitivity towards the 
socially constructed element of knowledge. In addition, critical naturalism advances the fallibility 
of knowledge claims on the basis that our knowledge of the world is never complete since much 
of the world lies hidden from our experience located in the domain of actual and real in the form 
of hidden causal structures and mechanisms. As such, the conceptual models constructed to 
capture the world describe tendencies, rather than laws of nature. Walters and Young (2001; 
p.486) concurred by saying that ‘‘the objects of social science are historically contingent and the 
underlying structures, powers and mechanisms may change over time’’ (ibid; p.486). Meanwhile, 
Oliver (2011) suggested that the continuous interplay of generative mechanisms and the looping 
relationship between ideation and reality make our social reality shifting and unpredictable. As a 
result, all knowledge must then be seen as tentative and fallible.   
Despite the interpretative nature of knowledge production, Owens (2011) clarified that critical 
realism departs from strong constructivism on the basis of the ontological grounds we mentioned 
earlier. Strong constructivism rejects the existence of any intransitive mind-independent reality. 
On the other hand, Critical realism objected to strong constructivism on the grounds that it 
commits a version of the epistemic fallacy by collapsing the intransitive object of investigation into 
the transitive domain as a mere epistemic construct. As such, while critical realism understands 
the role that concepts play in generating social phenomena and recognises how we speak to be 
important, it does not see social objects as being exhausted by these concepts. Rather they are 
composed of real generative causal mechanisms. Critical realism also suggests that the object 
that is spoken about shouldn’t be forgotten, and that researchers should hold a dual focus on both 
of these things. As a result, while constructivists ‘‘may view social structures and mechanisms as 
cognitive constructs, critical realists see them as real and potentially mind-independent parts of 
the world on account of their causal efficaciousness’’ (ibid; p.10).  Bhaskar, quoted in ibid, 
stressed that social structures exist and will continue to exert a causal influence regardless of 
whether human beings are aware of them or not. Importantly, this enables critical realists to add 
a critical dimension to their analysis of social theories and discourses.  
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Consequently, although critical realism endorses relativism on the basis that knowledge is subject 
to interpretation, its commitment to the ontology we outlined earlier means that every 
interpretation is not as good as another. Rather, some explanations of the world are more true 
than others (ibid). Similar to the focus of world-systems theory, GVC and power perspectives from 
some feminist authors on unveiling and explaining the mechanisms and structures that allow 
imbalances of power, Bhaskar (1979) and Brown et al. (2001) emphasise that due to the 
openness of socio-economic systems, results and consequences cannot be predicted but the 
mechanisms, social structures, powers and relations that causally govern the flux of events can 
be uncovered and explained. As a result, explanation, whereby an account of its causal history is 
given, is the goal of science in this instance. Bhaskar (1975) referred to the concept of explanatory 
power to compare rival theories, while Pratschke (2003) asserted that the explanatory adequacy 
of our hypotheses about these mechanisms can be assessed by investigating their observable 
effects. As such, theories with greater explanatory power can explain a wider range of phenomena 
than rival theories and be consistent with the available evidence. According to Owens (2011), this 
completes the articulation of critical realism through its three main components: ontological 
realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality (ibid).  
Following the explanatory nature and the critical dimension of critical realism, which is to illuminate 
that social structures exist and will continue to exert a causal influence, it is now important to link 
this to its transformational vision. Bhaskar (1979) explained that the subject matter of social 
sciences is relations. Under this relational conception, society does not consist of individuals, but 
of the relations within which individuals stand. As a result, scientific theory consists of the 
movement from the manifest phenomena of social life to the essential relations that necessitate 
them. The agents may or may not be aware of the existence of such relations. The important thing 
though is that social science has the capacity to highlight these relations and in doing so it may 
come to be emancipatory. ‘‘The emancipatory potential of social science is contingent upon and 
entirely a consequence of, its contextual explanatory power’’ (ibid; p.32). This is in line to what we 
described earlier in critical research and some feminist theorists and their political 
transformational goals. At this stage it would be useful to clarify that although we have strived to 
construct a theory with great explanatory power, as we will see during our research goals later, 
our primary research objective has not been to achieve political transformation or the 
empowerment of our interviewees through our research. Having said this, as we also mentioned 
earlier, we envisage that our research will contribute to a debate that results in improved 
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understanding and robust explanatory theory, which is an essential first step towards 
empowerment, transformation and social change. 
Leaving the explanatory and emancipatory appeal of Critical Realism aside, we have also decided 
to employ Critical Realism because of its position regarding mainstream orthodox economic 
thinking. Criticism against mainstream economic thinking has intensified since the global financial 
crash of 2008, with some leading economists like Krugman and Stiglitz heavily criticising the sole 
focus on free-market education and policies (The Guardian, 2013). Granleese (2009) suggested 
that Critical Realists argue that orthodox economic thinking has led to flawed generalisations and 
policy prescriptions that disregarded contextual factors. Critical realism’s endorsement of 
epistemological relativism (on the basis that knowledge is subject to interpretation) and the 
utilisation of empirical evidence in order to qualify the social structures and mechanisms at the 
Domain of Real are in line with the principle of diversity, by the feminist theorists we outlined 
earlier, that advances the importance of empirical evidence and narratives. Dow (2000) explained 
that mathematical formalism entails a particular view of the nature of the subject matter, the 
economy, as capable of being modeled as a closed system. As a result, this pre-supposes that 
all information is knowable, including relevant variables, relationships and optimising agents. 
Bhaskar (1975, 1979) emphasised though that due to the openness of the socio-economic 
system, results and consequences cannot be predicted. As such, in critiquing the insistence on 
the mathematical-deductive approach, Lawson (2006) paved the way to other ways of knowing. 
As a result, Oliver (2011) mentioned that critical realism embraces epistemic relativism, or 
alternatively, that there are many ways of knowing.  
Furthermore, our feminist theorists’ rejection of universal truths was earlier echoed in critical 
realism’s articulation of tentative and fallible knowledge, whereby we suggested that conceptual 
models which are constructed to capture the world describe tendencies, rather than laws of 
nature. Having said that, we have also acknowledged earlier that social structures and 
mechanisms are seen as real and potentially mind-independent parts of the world on account of 
their causal efficaciousness. We have also stated that by qualifying our hypotheses regarding the 
social structures and mechanisms via their observable effects, we would increase the explanatory 
and critical power of the resulting theory. As such, we advanced an articulation of critical realism 
which leans towards ‘‘weak’’ positivism as it favors ‘‘objective’’ methods (abstraction) over 
narratives for the purposes of this specific research. On a similar thesis on FT, Granleese (2009) 
pursued a similar interpretation of the epistemological beliefs espoused within critical realism. 
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Effectively, he also acknowledged that a give and take between abstract theorising and concrete 
evidence is necessary.  
Also, in agreement with the critique of individualism earlier by our feminist theorists, critical realists 
advocated a shift away from individualism as well. Lawson (2006) argued that the dependency of 
mathematical-deductivist methods on closed systems necessitates and encourages formulations 
couched in terms of isolated atoms which exercise their own separate and independent effects. 
This implies the restriction that the social domain is constituted by sets of isolated atoms, which 
does not in any case represent social reality. Cohn (2003) echoed Lawson’s views through 
emphasising holism and coherence against methodological individualism in orthodox economics. 
Similarly, Davis (2006) rejected the atomistic individual conception in favor of a socially embedded 
individual conception, while we earlier saw Bhaskar (1979), suggesting that society does not 
consist of individuals, but of the relations within which individuals stand.  
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3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & METHODS  
In Critical Realism, we have already examined our preferred epistemological and ontological 
position above. The way our ontological assumptions feed into epistemology and how the 
epistemological approach has been operationalised through our methodology and methods was 
critical for the study’s objectives. The relationship among these key components is depicted below 
in figure 3 (Henn et al., 2006). 
Figure 3: Relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods 
Source: Henn et al. (2006) 
3.2.1 CRITICAL REALIST METHODOLOGY 
Following from the Critical Realist ontological and epistemological position described earlier, 
Walters and Young (2001) asserted that consequent methodological prescription is 
straightforward. The objective is to reveal and explain the real underlying mechanisms and 
powers that govern our social world and elucidate the causal structure between them and 
perceived phenomena. Then, we suggested the need to qualify these mechanisms and structures 
through empirical support. In order to achieve this objective, critical realists pursued the process 
of abduction or retroduction (Peirce 1993; Walters and Young 2001; Bhaskar 1979; Yeung 1997; 
Brown et al. 2001).  
Methods
Methodology
Epistemology
Ontology
70 | P a g e  
 
Brown et al. (2001) highlighted that retroduction is a method of abstraction. Yeung (1997) 
mentioned that abstraction is required in critical realism for three main reasons:  
 It is a practically robust way to mirror social structures and generative mechanisms. 
 It serves as the conduit towards conceptualising and theorising the real essence, power 
and mechanism of an object. 
 Helps to distinguish external/incidental/contingent from internal/essential/necessary 
relations between objects and events. 
Thus, abstraction can be very useful for identifying the possible causal structures (ibid). Brown et 
al. (2001) suggested that once the possible causal structures are identified they can be examined 
at a more concrete level. This is particularly important because only then will we be able to identify 
the outcome of the active causal mechanism. Yeung (1997) verified that as more empirical 
evidence is collected, a Realist may revise his abstraction so that the process of iteration 
continues until no further contradictory evidence is gathered and the suggested generative 
mechanisms are robust enough to explain the concrete phenomenon. This is the point whereby 
realistic abstractions have been achieved. 
Iterative abstraction is embedded in the Critical Realist process, known as retroduction (ibid). 
Retroduction describes the process through which an argument ‘‘moves from a description of 
some phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or is a condition for it’’ 
(Bhaskar, 1986; p.11). Alternatively, Yeung (1997) mentioned we should move from pure 
descriptions of the phenomenon to abstractions of possible causes. To discover these generative 
mechanisms responsible for empirical behavior, we need to suggest hypothetical entities. 
Granleese (2009) emphasised that retroduction is an iterative process, which begins with a 
critique of prior theory regarding the phenomena being studied. From this critique, we may be 
able to identify potential generative mechanisms that may help to explain the phenomenon. The 
existence of such mechanisms in practice should then be ascertained through the collection of 
data on the concrete phenomena. 
3.2.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Ragin (1994) has outlined seven major goals of social research: 
 Identifying general patterns and relationships 
 Testing and refining theories 
 Making predictions 
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 Interpreting culturally or historically significant phenomena 
 Exploring diversity 
 Giving voice 
 Advancing new theories 
It was discussed earlier that our position lies within critical theories, specifically Critical Realism, 
which aims to challenge and critique society. This takes place through unveiling the possible 
underlying mechanisms that reproduce inequalities and qualifying them through empirical 
evidence. We also highlighted our emphasis on empirical experience and focus on the exploited 
and oppressed groups through some of the feminist authors. Thus, our goal has been to test and 
refine by synthesising theory through the concept of governance and power relations as 
articulated in GVC and some of the feminist authors’ power analyses. Methodologically, this has 
taken place through an iterative process and a give and take between theory and field work. The 
refinement of theory has been derived through articulating and explaining the causal mechanisms 
and structures that underline Fairtrade’s theoretical and practical limitations to lead to a systemic 
shift in the way power relations are embedded in the international trading system. 
Tallontire (1999) highlighted that the issues raised by Fairtrade also call for a qualitative approach 
which seeks to probe for depth and require a sensitive approach, which would not be forthcoming 
with quantitative research methods such as a survey. As Scheyvens and Storey (2003) and Punch 
(2005) explained, this is also because qualitative research aims to understand the world through 
empathising with and understanding the actions and situations of its actors. Secondly, qualitative 
research tends to take place in the field, in natural settings and context (Scheyvens and Storey, 
2003). Also, qualitative research is used to develop ideas and theories (Ragin 1994, Scheyvens 
and Storey 2003, Punch 2005).  
Moreover, our articulation of critical realism earlier indicated the need for an integrated approach 
to our research strategy and consequent methods. As such, utilising both ‘‘objective’’ methods 
(abstraction, quantitative analysis) and narratives as empirical evidence is necessary. Therefore, 
our approach has been integrative, and in line with Oakley (1998), who highlighted the need for 
an interdisciplinary approach, we combined ‘‘objectivity’’ (associated with abstraction) and 
‘‘subjectivity’’ (associated with narratives). This way, we feel we have enhanced the explanatory 
power of the synthesised theory. Other than developing ‘‘richer’’ theory through qualitative and 
quantitative data, Doherty (2010) claimed that quantitative data will also help as means of 
triangulation. 
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3.2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
1. Feminist Grounded Theory – Following on from our goal to test and refine theory and our 
feminist analyses examined earlier, utilising Grounded Theory for our research design has been 
a good fit. We will explain this in more detail later but, at this point, we need to highlight that we 
used the feminist perspective of Grounded Theory and employed the tools and processes of 
Grounded Theory in coordination with the epistemological and methodological positions of 
feminist theorists we saw earlier. At this stage, we also need to reiterate that this has taken place 
without focusing on gender as a research objective, but because feminist analyses are useful in 
offering a horizontal, constructivist, contextual, reflexive, diverse, micro and bottom-up 
perspective to power relations. 
But, first we need to give an overview of the original Grounded Theory. Wuest (1995) mentioned 
that Grounded Theory was developed by Glasser and Strauss, who provided the theoretical 
underpinnings: pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. Although we will use retroduction 
according to our articulation of critical realism earlier, Glaser and Strauss (1967) originally 
suggested that Grounded Theory is about theory generation on the basis of data. Also, in contrast 
to the retroduction we will use, Punch (2005) mentioned that the first main feature was that theory 
would be developed from data and this would take place inductively, rather than deducing testable 
hypotheses from existing theories (Charmaz, 2006). However, also consistent with the critical 
realist philosophy and retroduction, we have intentionally taken a different approach and have 
done the literature review first in order to identify the potential causal mechanisms, which will in 
turn inform the development of research questions for data generation. In contrast, Charmaz 
(2006) suggested that the original Grounded Theory advocated delaying literature review to avoid 
seeing the world through the lens of extant theories. The second main feature of the original 
Grounded Theory is that data collection and analysis take place in tandem (Bryman, 2004), unlike 
traditional research approaches whereby data collection and analysis are distinct stages (Punch, 
2005).   
As a result, it should be noted that Grounded Theory is both a strategy/design for research and a 
way of analysing data (ibid). Henn et al (2006; p.199) mentioned that ‘‘the process of Grounded 
Theory begins with a desire to understand a research area. Research questions may be broad, 
with no specific objectives or operationalisation of concepts – these will come as the process 
unfolds’’. It entails openness to ideas developing and a complete rephrasing of research questions 
should new data and ideas emerge.  
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Bryman (2004) distinguished between tools and outcomes in Grounded Theory. The tools are the 
following: 
 Theoretical Sampling – Glasser and Strauss (1967; p.45) stated this is the ‘‘process of 
data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst simultaneously collects, codes, 
analyses their data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order 
to develop their theory as it emerges’’. 
 Coding – During this process, data are broken down in component parts, which are given 
names (Bryman, 2004). 
 Theoretical Saturation – Links the process of data coding and the collection of data, 
implying there is no further point in reviewing data to see how they fit with concepts or 
categories, and new data are no longer required in order to illuminate a category or 
concept. 
 Constant Comparison – Refers to the process of maintaining a close relationship 
between data and conceptualisation so that the link between concepts, categories and 
their indicators is not lost (ibid). 
He carried on with outlining Grounded Theory’s outcomes: 
 Concepts – Refers to labels given to phenomena. 
 Categories – A concept that has been elaborated in a way that reflects real world. 
 Properties – Comprise the attributes or aspects of a category. 
 Hypotheses – Initial hunches about relationships between concepts. 
 Theory – Consists of substantive and formal theory. The first one is applicable to a certain 
empirical instance, while the second has wider applicability and is at a higher level of 
abstraction (ibid). 
Since Glaser and Strauss’s classic statements in 1967, Grounded Theory has developed in 
somewhat divergent directions (Charmaz, 2006). One of the reasons for this has been several 
critiques against it. For example, Keddy et al. (1996) highlighted that the main critique focused on 
the ‘‘positivist’’ language it was articulated in. Breckenridge et al. (2012) outlined different methods 
or versions of Grounded Theory to use: such as the classic (we have just outlined), straussian, 
feminist or constructivist Grounded Theory.  
As stated earlier, we intend to use the feminist perspective of Grounded Theory advanced by 
Keddy et al. (1996) and Wuest (1995). Keddy et al. (1996) and Wuest (1995) have argued for the 
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compatibility of Grounded Theory and feminism at epistemological and methodological level. 
Keddy et al. (1996) argued for the benefits of a Feminist Grounded Theory on the basis that it will 
provide data suitable for deconstructing the contextual discourse, and taking the analysis of the 
data to a macro level, something which is desirable given our GVC analytical framework. As 
discussed earlier, Wuest and Merritt-Gray (2001) asserted that commitment to feminist 
methodology indicates reflexivity, diversity and transformation. 
On epistemological level, Wuest (1995) highlighted the consistency between feminist theories 
and Grounded Theory in recognising multiple sources of knowledge. Grounded Theory’s is open 
to various theoretical perspectives, whilst Critical realism’s endorsement of epistemological 
relativism (on the basis that knowledge is subject to interpretation) is in line with this. We also 
mentioned earlier our intention to integrate key strands of power analyses from some feminist 
authors and grounded experience with the world-systems theory and GVC. As such, Grounded 
Theory’s emphasis on grounded data and openness to various theoretical perspectives turns it 
into the right ‘‘conduit’’ that allowed us to go back and forth between theory (world-systems theory 
and FT) and empirical evidence. 
In addition, a Feminist Grounded Theory greatly benefits from the contextual explanatory power 
of feminism (Wuest, 1995) as according to Wuest and Merritt-Gray (2001), Grounded Theory can 
produce a storyline that diminishes contradictions and differences. Furthermore, feminist rejection 
of universal, objective truths and dualistic thinking is aligned to Grounded Theory. Wuest (1995) 
suggested that Grounded Theory treats subjective knowledge as a valid source of knowledge, 
while advancing that Grounded Theory accepts theory as process and never as a finished 
product, involving no separation between the process of theory development and grounded data 
collection methods. Oliver (2011) added that this is why its tools of open coding, constant 
comparison and questioning the data are intended to push the researcher beyond received 
understandings.  He also identified an overlap with critical realism in its belief that that all 
understanding is partial, tentative and temporary (ibid).  
On the methodological front, Wuest (1995) suggested that little has been written in Grounded 
Theory regarding the research relationship. Wuest and Merritt-Gray (2001) suggested that when 
Grounded Theory is informed by feminist theory, respect for participants and mitigating forms of 
oppression is a given. As discussed earlier, given the scope of our research, our position has not 
only reflected full awareness of the powerlessness certain interviewees might have been 
experiencing, but we have also mitigated through our questions which enhanced the 
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understanding of their situation. However, this has not been as applicable to other interviewees 
given their current position and power within their organisations. Lastly, with regards to the 
empowerment and emancipatory ideals of feminism and critical realism, Keddy et al. (1996) 
suggested that Grounded Theory in the past has been failing to use its result to inform social 
reform as its goal has not been social and personal transformation. However, Wuest (1995) 
suggested that this has changed given the easy to understand form, the language of Grounded 
Theory and its explanatory potential. Furthermore, as we stated earlier, improving understanding 
and building explanatory theory is a necessary first step towards empowerment, transformation 
and social change. 
2. Case Study Methodology – With Feminist Grounded Theory in the background, our selected 
research design was based on the case-study methodology. This methodology is also reflective 
of our goals to synthesise theory through empirical evidence and we feel this has conveyed the 
narratives of interviewees in the best possible way. We have mainly utilised Yin’s (1994, 2009) 
approach to case study strategy and design. An analysis of Fairtrade through the case study 
design also seems to be sensible as per Yin’s following rationale. Yin (2009) suggested the use 
of case study is useful when the questions are exploratory or explanatory and when the topic 
involves a complex contemporary phenomenon over which the researcher has little or no control, 
whereby boundaries between phenomenon and its context are not clear. He also highlights that 
utilising case studies can provide flexibility and an openness to new avenues of investigation.  
Yin (2009) outlined very succinctly the central elements of a robust case study design: 
 A study’s questions. 
 The theoretical propositions including pointing attention, limiting scope and suggesting 
possible links between phenomena. 
 The units of analysis. 
 Logic linking the data to the propositions. 
 The criteria for interpreting the findings including iteration between propositions and data. 
According to Granleese (2009), the utilisation of case study design is related to the Critical Realist 
methodology, on the basis of the ‘‘deep’’ level of understanding this approach enables to be 
achieved. The explanatory aims of Critical Realism we outlined earlier are in line with the case 
study design, as Yin (2009) suggested ‘‘how’’ and ‘‘why’’ questions are more explanatory and are 
likely to lead to the use of case studies. Christie et al. (2000) underlined that within the Realism 
methodology, the case study design is a particularly good fit as it aims to locate generative 
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mechanisms, is well suited for building a rich, deep understanding of new phenomena (such as 
FT) and allows for the opening up new ideas and interpretations of the phenomena being 
researched. Lastly, Doherty (2010) mentioned that FT is a new area and building theory from 
case studies is well suited to new topic areas. 
3.2.4 RESEARCH EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Despite the obvious advantages of utilising a case study approach for this study, the ultimate 
success of this endeavor will be assessed against the most prominent criteria for the evaluation 
of social research: reliability, replication and validity (Bryman, 2004). Yin (1994) agreed and 
focused on the validity and replication, since reliability as per Bryman (2004) refers particularly to 
quantitative research. As a result, we need to explain how robust our research will be against 
replication and validity. 
1. Replication – Bryman (2004) clarified that replication refers to whether researchers are able 
to replicate the findings of others. So, if a researcher does not articulate his or her procedures in 
a good level of detail, replication will be difficult. Grounded Theory’s tools and structured 
processes will facilitate replication as well as Yin’s protocol which, according to Tallontire (1999), 
ensures rigorous research design. We have already outlined Feminist Grounded Theory’s tools, 
so we will now cover the structure we have followed in order to achieve replicability and make our 
approach to case study design fully transparent. Yin (2009) suggested that a protocol contains 
the instrument, the rules and procedures to be followed in using the protocol. He asserted that a 
case study protocol should have the following sections: 
 An overview of the case study including objectives, issues and relevant readings. 
 Field procedures (credentials, access to sites, language pertaining to the protection of 
sources of data). 
 Study’s questions and potential sources for answering each question. 
 A guide for the case study report (outline, format for the data, use and presentation of 
other documentation). 
2. Validity – Bryman (2004) broke down validity into construct validity, internal validity and 
external validity.  
 Construct Validity – Bryman (2004) explained construct validity as the extent to which a 
measure that is devised of a concept really reflects the concept that is supposed to be 
indicating. Christie et al. (2000) emphasised that case study research can achieve 
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construct validity through a literature review, use of multiple sources of evidence, 
establishing a chain of evidence, and having key external informants review case study 
reports. Multiple sources and triangulation of evidence is also recommended as a 
technique for construct validity. We will however elaborate on this point in the next section. 
 Internal Validity – Bryman (2004) suggested that internal validity refers mainly to the 
issue of causality and whether a conclusion that involves a causal relationship is robust 
enough. In order to ensure internal validity, Christie et al. (2000) proposed various 
methods, which we have used, such as cross-case analysis, expert peer review and 
graphic data representation to demonstrate consistency of information. Furthermore, Yin 
quoted in ibid, also suggested clear articulation of the unit of analysis and linking of 
analysis to the theory. 
 External Validity – The main critique of the case study methodology has been focusing 
on external validity or generalisability (Granleese 2009, Bryman 2004, Punch 2005). The 
common criticism refers to the possibility (or impossibility) to generalise through a single 
case study. Stake quoted in Punch (2005) suggested that despite the counter arguments 
and exceptions, the argument against single cases and generalisability still holds in the 
literature. Our aim has also been to broaden the basis of our Fairtrade analysis and 
evidence across different contexts and organisations, thus utilising a single case study 
wouldn’t have supported this attempt. As a result, we have used multiple case studies in 
order to provide a robust and varied basis of empirical evidence. In our support, Eisenhardt 
and Graebner (2007; p.27) proposed that ‘‘multiple cases also create more robust theory 
because the propositions are more deeply grounded in varied empirical evidence’’. Ragin 
(1994) also favored multiple cases over single ones. He suggested that in-depth 
knowledge is best achieved by researching more case studies because by studying 
several instances of the same thing, different aspects become more visible. On the same 
note, Della Porta and Keating (2008) insisted that an in-depth knowledge of a small 
number of case studies provides a good basis for generalisations that are temporarily 
limited to the cases studied. Lastly, Christie et al. (2000) indicated that multiple case 
studies facilitate analytic generalisation into a broader theory and achieve external validity 
through replication logic and of comparison of evidence.  
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3.2.5 METHODS 
Nonetheless, a robust evidence base was required in order to meet the criteria for the evaluation 
of our research. To this end, we used a combination of data collection methods inspired by Punch 
(2005), Scheyvens and Storey (2003) and Yin (2009), in order to gather evidence: 
 Individual and group Interviews (typically open-ended and semi-structured). 
 Observation (formal or casual) & participant observation. 
 Documents and archival records (marketing material, fieldwork studies, commodity 
market/chain reports) 
Consistent with our interpretation of critical realism earlier and Feminist Grounded Theory, we 
conducted interviews and analysed documents and reports. One of the main research methods 
we used to collect data has been semi-structured interviews. We felt that in order to understand 
the underlying generative mechanisms and build FT theory, rich qualitative data will be essential, 
and these will be derived more effectively through interviews.  According to Flick (2002), a semi-
structured or semi-standardised interview allows us to collect data from the interviewees that are 
subjective in nature. The subjective knowledge of the interviewee can be expressed 
spontaneously through an open question. As Granleese (2009) mentioned, in order to uncover 
deep underlying mechanisms, we will need to ask ‘‘how’’ and ‘‘why’’ questions, but also ask ‘‘why 
not’’ and ‘‘what if’’ questions. We should also highlight that we applied snowball sampling during 
this process to identify additional or interviews or modify our existing list.  
In line with our earlier interpretation of Critical Realism, it has been necessary to utilise other 
methods as well to generate ‘‘richer’’ theory and ensure triangulation and mitigation of bias. Thus, 
we used documentary evidence in the form of quantitative and qualitative market reports, annual 
reports, publicity and campaign material from all the organisations, government departments in 
host countries and other organisations within the cotton and cocoa value chains. We have also 
obtained strategic planning documents, as well as articles from the media and academic journal 
articles. As Tallontire (1999) reflected on the importance of documentary evidence, we have used 
them ahead of interviews in terms of helping us ask the right questions and triangulate views. Yin 
(1994) argued that a distinct advantage of using multiple sources of evidence is the potential for 
triangulation and mitigation of bias. We have also conducted group interviews to collect data on 
the basis of our observations.  
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to explain how we are going to conduct the research. In line with our 
argument that ‘‘structure’’ (articulated through world-systems, GVC and power perspectives from 
feminist authors) generates power imbalances, we have demonstrated that a moderate 
interpretation of critical realism is suitable in order to identify the generative mechanisms that 
create these power imbalances. This is further facilitated and qualified through the use of 
empirical evidence. 
Following this and building on our goal to synthesise theory, we have argued that a qualitative 
approach supported by semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence, is best suited in 
order to analyse Fairtrade through the complex concept of power relations. In turn, we have 
employed the feminist perspective of Grounded Theory in order to analyse and structure our data 
and arguments, whilst arguing that a multiple case-study methodology is the most appropriate in 
order to achieve external validity of our research.  
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CHAPTER 4 – CASE STUDIES INTRODUCTION 
Having examined the way we conducted our research, the aim of this chapter is to introduce our 
case studies ahead of our findings chapters. In doing so, we explain how we selected our case 
studies, whilst specifying our research focus through the research questions and unit of analysis.  
To this end, we first provide an overview of our case studies swiftly followed by an overview of a 
typical conventional cocoa and cotton value chain which we will further refine during the following 
empirical chapters. In turn, we elaborate on our research design and case study methodology 
through articulating our research questions, unit of analysis and the different levels of our analysis. 
Lastly, we end this chapter by further developing the rationale for the case study selection and 
the objectives we set out to achieve. 
4.1 CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW 
As discussed in the previous chapter, we have pursued a multiple case study methodology in 
order to enhance our FT analysis as well as achieve replication and external validity. Seawright 
and Gerring’s (2008) typology of case selection techniques focused on typical, diverse, extreme, 
deviant, influential, most similar, and most different cases. In order to fulfill the research evaluation 
criteria described earlier and build a ‘‘richer’’ analysis of FT, Seawright and Gerring’s (2008) 
diverse case is the most appropriate. Seawright and Gerring (2008) explained that diverse cases 
primarily aim to achieve of maximum variance along relevant dimensions. Although, we will 
examine this in more detail later, the relevant dimensions we consider important in order to 
achieve maximum variance are the type of FT chain/product, FT organisation, and geography. 
Seawright and Gerring’s (2008) suggested that this is considered a distinct advantage as variation 
is likely to enhance the representativeness of the sample of cases. This usually requires minimum 
two case studies.  
As such, and building on world-systems’ and GVC’s systemic approach to power imbalances 
through the GVC analytical framework, we have firstly selected two conventional GVCs, that will 
provide the context for the following four FT GVC case studies: the cocoa-chocolate (non-
industrial) value chain between the UK and Ghana and the cotton-apparel value chain between 
the UK and India. Following this, we picked two FT GVCs for cocoa-chocolate in Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine and Cocoa Life-Mondelez (between the UK and Ghana), and two for cotton-apparel in 
Chetna Organic-No Nasties and Agrocel-M&S (between the UK and India). We will examine and 
justify this this in more detail later, but at high-level, these four FT GVCs will comprise our case 
studies in an embedded research design. We can now see below an overview of a typical 
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conventional cocoa and cotton value chain which we will further refine in the empirical chapters 
later to reflect the specificity provided by the host countries and organisations involved. 
4.1.1 CONVENTIONAL COCOA-CHOCOLATE GVC 
A typical global conventional cocoa-chocolate (non-industrial) value chain would broadly look like 
the chain on figure 4 below. We have omitted the role of the government cocoa-related bodies in 
producing countries as these have been mostly abolished (with Ghana’s exception) after the 
structural adjustment programs and consequent liberalisation of the market. We have also omitted 
the role and influence of any FT organisations at this stage, but we will introduce this later in the 
empirical chapter. 
Figure 4: Typical Cocoa-Chocolate Value Chain  
Source: Author (compiled from USAID 2014, UNCTD 2008, World Cocoa Foundation 2012, Fairtrade 
Foundation 2011, Kaplinsky 2004, Oxfam 2002) 
In relation to governance, the secondary data we have compiled on figure 4 above illustrate a 
concentrated corporate structure deriving from international traders buying into the processing 
segment of the value chain, the chocolate manufacturers and within branding and marketing. If 
we contrast this with the sheer number of cocoa farmers in the first segment of the chain, we 
could quickly see the relevance with dependency theory’s and Wallerstein’s (1995) core/periphery 
concept that explained the relation between relatively monopolised units versus relatively 
competitive units, which is a high profit/low profit, high wage/low wage antinomy. In line with this, 
Fold (2002) advanced that most agro-industrial commodity chains are ‘‘buyer-driven’’ whilst 
highlighting the bi-polar governance structure featuring in the global cocoa-chocolate industry. He 
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specifically referred to a few transnational companies in the processing segment and branding 
(chocolate manufacturers). UNCTAD (2008) agreed there are oligopolies at the middle stages of 
the chain heading downstream and mentions the balance between trading/processing corporates, 
branded chocolate manufacturers and global retailers. Furthermore, they underlined the structural 
imbalance upstream in the cocoa chain between cocoa producers and buyers who are highly 
concentrated. This asymmetry gives rise to the potential for the exercise of oligopsonistic or 
monopsonistic power in cocoa purchasing, both at the farm gate and at the international level. 
4.1.2 CONVENTIONAL COTTON-APPAREL GVC 
A typical global conventional cotton-apparel chain would broadly look like the chain on figure 5 
below. Similarly to the cocoa value chain, we have omitted the role of the government bodies 
related to cotton in producing countries as well as the role and influence of any FT organisations. 
We will introduce this later in the empirical chapter. 
Figure 5: Typical Cotton-Apparel Value Chain 
Source: Author (compiled from Cotton Connect 2014, Environmental Justice Foundation 2009, 
UNCTAD 2010, Hutson et al. 2005) 
Gibbon (2004) suggested that the cotton value chain is also ‘‘buyer-driven’’. Hutson et al. (2005) 
agreed and highlighted that there has been a shift in power from textile producers into the hands 
of retailers (including department stores, specialty retailers like The Gap, and large discount 
chains such as Wal-Mart and Target) and branded marketers (including Nike). They carried on 
asserting that discount chains are the most powerful actors in the chain, in terms of being the 
largest buyers of cotton apparel by volume. As such, the discount chains used low-cost sourcing 
methods for 100% of their apparel purchases. Also, some retailers of all shades who were the 
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main customers of branded marketers and manufacturers of cotton apparel in the past began to 
compete directly with textile manufacturers and brands by offering their own private label (or store 
brand) through establishing their own global sourcing networks. On the other hand, more specialty 
and upscale retailers like Gap exercise tremendous market power over the value chain through 
product design, fabric selection and monitoring of production functions. Pan et al. (2008) 
confirmed that the cotton/textile chain is a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ value chain that contains three types of 
lead firms: retailers, marketers and branded manufacturers. Similar to the cocoa value chain, If 
we contrast the above with the number of cotton farmers, we could quickly see the relevance with 
dependency theory’s and Wallerstein’s (1995) core/periphery concept that explained the relation 
between relatively monopolised units versus relatively competitive units, which is a high profit/low 
profit, high wage/low wage antinomy. 
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS & UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
In this context, the overarching and main research questions are outlined below.  
To what extent does Fairtrade (FT) lead to a systemic shift in the way power relations are 
embedded and exercised in the international trading system? 
This has been further operationalised into the following four main research questions: 
1. How does Fairtrade’s ‘’mainstreaming’’ relate to TNCs corporate sustainability and what 
are the implications for Fairtrade International’s organisational sustainability? 
2. How does Fairtrade shift the power held by nation states over the lives of farmers?  
3. How does Fairtrade address the power mechanisms that lead TNCs utilise in ‘‘buyer-
driven’’ GVCs? 
4. To what extent and in what way has Fairtrade changed the nature of governance 
relationships between GVC nodes? 
Having previously established the multiple sources of evidence and data collection methods we 
have used in order to answer our research questions for the selected case studies, it is time now 
to clearly define the unit of analysis and elaborate on our case study design we have outlined in 
the previous chapter. Gereffi et al. (2001) suggested that by focusing on the chain or 
organisational network as the unit of analysis, rather than the firm, interesting questions about 
power, governance and the dynamics of chains emerge. Therefore, and consistent with our GVC 
analytical framework, overview of case studies and research questions, our unit of analysis is the 
conventional and FT global value chain governance.  
84 | P a g e  
 
As such, the conventional and FT vertical value chain governance and power relations is analysed 
in two levels. Firstly, on a macro/chain level, we have looked at the FT cotton-apparel and cocoa-
chocolate value chain governance in Ghana-UK and India-UK, as exercised by lead TNCs and 
Nation States. We have also contextualised and contrasted the four FT GVCs outlined earlier and 
their associated governance structure with their broader context, which is the governance 
structure of the conventional cotton and cocoa value chains in the same geographies. Secondly, 
on a micro/firm level, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) earlier stated that firms that participate 
in the chain will help us to understand its governance structure. Therefore, by examining these 
four GVCs (Divine-Kuapa Kokoo, Mondelez-Cocoa Life, No Nasties-Chetna Organic, M&S Plan 
A-Agrocel) on a more micro, firm-level through the lenses of these organisations and the impact 
that their involvement in FT has on the relations with other organisations in each node of their 
chain, we have provided a further level of examination or unit of analysis in an embedded research 
design.  
Besides examining chain relations between nodes, in line with the previously mentioned feminist 
theorists’ focus on horizontal relations, we have also examined key horizontal relations, such as 
the one between FTI and TNCs/FTOs, and to some extent, smaller and larger cooperatives on 
the basis of FT’s cost of certification, but also the role of marginalised groups, such as women 
within cooperatives. These horizontal power relations have been contextualised against 
horizontal power relations prevalent in the conventional GVC, such as the one between farmers 
and LBCs purchasing agents in Ghana, as we further examine during our empirical chapter. 
Examining these relations as well as contrasting the governance of the FT chains with the 
conventional governance of the value chain on a macro level has not only highlighted the impact 
of FT participating organisations on the power relations and governance structures embedded in 
conventional global value chains, but it has also allowed comparisons between the organisations 
implementing FT and the value chains in question.  
Yin (1994) suggested that embedded designs include multiple units of analysis on different levels 
and look for consistent patterns of evidence across units, but within a case. Yin (2009) warned 
against the danger of focusing only on the subunit level and failing to return to the larger unit of 
analysis. In order to mitigate this, we have collected data from the embedded units (the relations 
between firms in nodes of the chains resulting from the organisations’ involvement with FT), but 
we have also contrasted and cross-examined it with the larger unit, the governance across the 
conventional and FT cotton and cocoa value chains. De Vaus (2001) justified our embedded 
research design selection by saying that a well-designed case study will avoid examining just 
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some of the constituent elements. He argued that the information will come from many different 
levels providing this way a richer qualitative story than each constituent element in isolation could 
tell us. Roberts and Bradley (1999) agreed that in keeping with the system perspective (value 
chain) focusing on the relationship instead of an entity makes sense as the bond is more important 
that the entity and its characteristics. 
From the sources above, it is evident we have stressed the importance of the context in this 
analysis. This is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, as Granleese (2009) stated, the importance 
of context in development research is paramount. Secondly, our literature review highlighted that 
the asymmetric power relations within commodity chains are embedded within the international 
trading system, of which FT is part of. Furthermore, Tallontire (1999) argued that fair trade is a 
critique of conventional or unfair trade. She asserted that at a macro level, fair trade focuses on 
the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of Northern institutions culminating 
in an uneven playing field mostly for small scale producers in the South. Thus, it has been 
fundamental to maintain the systemic and contextual elements at the centre of our data collection 
and analysis. 
4.3 CASE STUDIES SELECTION RATIONALE 
In articulating our research questions and unit of analysis earlier, we referred to FT organisations 
M&S Plan A-Agrocel and No Nasties-Chetna Organic in relation to cotton-apparel and Mondelez-
Cocoa Life and Divine-Kuapa-Kokoo in relation to cocoa-chocolate. We have also earlier quoted 
Seawright’s and Gerring’s (2008) case selection typology and have chosen the diverse case with 
its relevant dimensions as type of organisation, product and geography as the most appropriate 
in order to achieve maximum variance. It’s time now to elaborate on why we have chosen these 
specific FT organisations and cases. 
In order to explain our rationale, it is necessary to first remind ourselves of the different types of 
organisations involved in fair trade and implementing the principles of FT with more or less 
success, or genuine commitment. To this end, in chapter 2, we mentioned there are six groups: 
Producer Organisations/Promoting Bodies in Southern countries, Alternative Trade Organisations 
(ATOs)/Fair trade organisations, Fairtrade organisations, Network and Umbrella Organisations, 
Profit-oriented TNCs, Fairtrade Social Enterprises (FTSE). Therefore, building on Seawright and 
Gerring’s (2008) diverse case and its relevant dimensions as type of organisation, product and 
geography, we have selected the four GVCs (case studies) outlined above through a variety of 
organisations from within the FT typology above in order to achieve the following three objectives: 
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a. Build theory through a variety of FT organisations – The maximum variance along the 
organisational dimension will only be achieved if we select diverse organisations. As per fair trade 
groups and organisations above and the two cotton-apparel GVCs above, exploring the first 
cotton-apparel FT GVC with No Nasties (as a hybrid between an FTSE and a profit-oriented 
business) and Chetna (development-oriented producer organisation) against the second FT GVC 
with M&S Plan A (as a profit-oriented TNC) and Agrocel (profit-oriented promoting body), will 
allow a degree of variance. The variance can be demonstrated on the basis of the profit or 
development orientation at producer level and on the type of organisation (hybrid or profit-oriented 
business) at marketing level.   
Similarly, for the cocoa-chocolate FT GVCs, the first FT GVC with Divine (as an FTSE) and Kuapa 
Kokoo (development-oriented producer organisation) against the second FT GVC with Mondelez 
(as a profit-oriented TNC) and a newly formed Cocoa Life cooperative (profit-oriented producer 
organisation), will work towards the same end. The variance here results from the type of 
organisation at marketing level and the profit or development orientation at producer level. 
The variety of FT organisations will also allow us to examine entire GVCs from different 
organisational perspectives. As for the Fairtrade organisations and the Network and Umbrella 
Organisations, they have more of an enabling and coordinating role, thus there wouldn’t be as 
much benefit for our analysis from using them as the embedded unit of analysis. Nonetheless, we 
have also interviewed them in order to obtain their perspective on the horizontal power relations 
at chain and chain node level. Furthermore, selecting multiple FT organisations at various levels 
of depth and analysis has allowed us to examine and critique FT through a wide range of 
organisational goals, as seen in Figure 6 below. This has also allowed us to triangulate 
perspectives and data. 
No Nasties-Chetna Organic – No Nasties were chosen on the basis of their hybrid model which 
is profit-oriented whilst strongly positioning themselves as a 100% organic and Fairtrade brand. 
At the same time, the fact that they have only been operating since 2011 and are very limited in 
scale has generated interesting comparisons with a sizeable and more established brand like 
M&S. They were also chosen for practical reasons due to the unavailability or lack of willingness 
of other smaller organisations to be interviewed. At the bottom of the chain, Chetna was selected 
as one of the organisations No Nasties is working for, on the basis that they predominantly source 
from them, but also because of Chetna’s NGO status and reputation that provided significant 
variance when comparing to Agrocel. 
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M&S Plan A-Agrocel – The rationale for picking Marks & Spencer (M&S) Plan A, which 
comprises our selected organisation in relation to the cotton value chain within FT’s Profit-oriented 
TNCs type, is that it has a significantly greater drive for profitability than No Nasties. It’s also very 
different in terms of size and purchasing power. Also, M&S Plan A was selected on the basis of 
their reputation in the business world and among sustainability/corporate social responsibility 
professionals for their Plan A. M&S’s website (2013) explained that Plan A is a sustainability 
strategy that encompasses commitments across five different areas: Climate change, waste, 
natural resources, health and wellbeing and Fair partner. M&S’s intention is to integrate Plan A 
into every aspect of the operations – including the products M&S develops and sells, the stores 
they build or refit and the way they work with our suppliers and engage their employees.  
With regards to Fairtrade, M&S state ‘‘we’re only as strong as the communities in which we trade, 
so it makes good sense for us to be a fair partner – paying a fair price to suppliers, supporting 
local communities and ensuring good working conditions for everyone involved in our supply 
chains’’ (ibid). Consequently, Agrocel was chosen on the basis that they have been supplying 
M&S since M&S introduced FT, and that they provide significant variance to Chetna on the basis 
of their profit orientation. 
Divine Chocolate-Kuapa Kokoo – Divine Chocolate and Kuapa Kokoo were selected due to 
their bottom-up model and their reputation. Another reason is related to the difference of their 
model compared to Mondelez’s. This is linked to the organisational motivations but also the 
significant scale difference. Practicalities played a significant role here as well, as there is plenty 
of secondary data for Divine as opposed to other organisations and interviewees who were not 
forthcoming. 
Mondelez-Cocoa Life – Mondelez were chosen mainly because of their significant investment in 
cocoa sustainability through their Cocoa Life programme, which included FT. What has also been 
interesting is the drive for profitability and relative scale as opposed to Divine.  
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Figure 6: FT Organisation vs. perspectives/goals 
Source: Author 
b. Achieve product spread – Whilst achieving product spread is important for triangulation and 
building a ‘‘rich’’ theory, it is also important because in this way we can compare power relations 
and organisations across different GVCs. At the same time we also wanted to ensure that we 
cover products that have been achieving various performances in terms of FT sales and growth 
within Fairtrade. It has also been important to pick products which are in different parts of their 
product lifecycle within FT and cover both food and non-food products in order to highlight different 
realities.  
Hence, Divine-Kuapa Kokoo and Mondelez-Cocoa Life represent food products. Chocolate and 
cocoa have been long-standing products of the FT network with sales recorded since 2002. 
According to the Fairtrade Foundation (2013) as per Table 3 below, in 2012, chocolate and cocoa 
products were the second and third products in terms of overall sales of Fairtrade certified 
products in the UK.  Also, FT cocoa products and FT chocolate sales have grown at approximately 
50% and 31% respectively over 2011.  
On the other hand, No Nasties-Chetna Organic and M&S Plan A-Agrocel represent non-food 
products. Cotton has not been involved in FT as long as cocoa and chocolate (ibid). As per table 
3 below, cotton was the sixth product in 2012 in terms of overall sales of Fairtrade certified 
products in the UK. Also, FT cotton sales have contracted by 3.5% over 2011 and by 50% since 
their peak in 2008.  
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Table 3: Estimated UK retail sales of Fairtrade certified products-2002-2012 (£ million) 
Source: Fairtrade Foundation (2013) 
c. Achieve geographical/regional spread – The combination of cocoa from Ghana and cotton 
from India is giving us a good geographical spread that allows for generalisations to theory and a 
robust analysis of FT.  
4.4 CONCLUSION  
The aim of this chapter was to introduce our case studies whilst outlining the research questions, 
elaborating on the focus of our research and articulating the rationale for the selection of our case 
studies. To this end, in order to build ‘‘richer’’ theory and achieve external validity of our research, 
we pursued maximum variance within the FT chain/product, FT organisation, and geography 
dimensions. To this end, we have selected four FT GVCs as case studies: Two of them in Ghana-
UK for cocoa-chocolate, in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine and Cocoa Life-Mondelez, and two in India-UK 
for cotton-apparel, in Chetna Organic-No Nasties and Agrocel-M&S.  
Product/
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009
2010 2011 2012
Coffee 23.1 34.3 49.3 65.8 93 117 137.3 160 179.8 193 192.4
Tea 7.2 9.5 12.9 16.6 25.1 30 64.8 70.3 82.6 87.1 79.7
Cocoa 
products
3.9 7.3 9.6 13.2 16.4 25.6 25.6 44.5 162 212.8 320.9
Sugar 
products
5.7 8.7 14.3 19.5 23.7 50.6 107.7 164.6 384 441.7 549.1
Honey 
products
4.9 6.1 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.7 5.2 3.6 6.8 3.8 3.6
Bananas 17.3 24.3 30.6 47.7 65.6 150 184.6 215.5 206.6 210.9 242.5
Flowers n/a n/a 4.3 5.7 14 24 33.4 30 27.6 26.4 23.7
Wine n/a n/a 1.5 3.3 5.3 8.2 10 18.1 18.5 21.8 23.9
Cotton n/a n/a n/a 0.2 4.5 34.8 77.9 73.2 51.7 41 39.6
Fresh Fruit 0.1 1 5.9 8.5 17.6 28 32.2 24.3 15.5 12.5 12.3
Fruit Juices 0.8 1.1 2.3 4.6 7.7 13.8 21.1 13.1 15.2 16.1 14.5
Other n/a n/a 6.7 6.4 10.1 8.3 21.8 26.2 23.5 27 28
TOTAL 63 92.3 140.8 195 286.3 493 712.6 843.4 1173.8 1294.1 1530.2
Year-on-
Year Growth
25% 47% 53% 38% 47% 72% 45% 18% 39% 10% 18%
Chocolate 6.2 9.2 13.7 18.4 23.2 35.8 38.3 88.6 346 413.1 542.4
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Since, the overarching research question is on the systemic shift in the way power relations are 
embedded in the international trading system, all of our case studies have been considered in the 
context of their respective conventional GVCs. Through utilising value chain governance as our 
unit of analysis, we have examined conventional and FT vertical value chain governance and 
power relations at two levels: a. GVC/macro-level, through analysing value chain governance and 
power relations as articulated by lead TNCs and States, and, b. GVC node/micro-level, through 
analysis of firm governance relations between each node of the chains.  
But besides examining vertical chain relations, in line with the previously mentioned feminist 
theorists’ focus on horizontal relations, we have also examined key horizontal relations, such as 
the one between FTI and TNCs/FTOs, and to some extent, smaller and larger cooperatives on 
the basis of FT’s cost of certification, but also the role of marginalised groups, such as women 
within cooperatives. These FT horizontal relations have also been analysed in the context of the 
conventional GVCs horizontal relations, such as farmers and LBC purchasing agents in Ghana.  
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CHAPTER 5 – FINDINGS: COCOA-CHOCOLATE GVCS (GHANA-UK) 
Having introduced our case studies, the associated methodology and the research questions, the 
aim of this chapter is to explore the research questions for the cocoa-chocolate GVCs between 
Ghana and the UK. To this end, after describing the conventional and the two FT GVCs, we 
structure our analysis according to the four key themes that emerged through a combination of 
our literature review and fieldwork that were outlined in the introduction: 
1. Sustainability – Driven by FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and working with TNCs. This was further 
enhanced by our fieldwork, whereby the concept of corporate sustainability was often mentioned 
in relation to FT’s mainstreaming and the sustainability of Fairtrade International.  
2. Political – Driven by the strong role of the nation state as a mechanism that enables capital 
accumulation as per Wallerstein and FT’s notion of empowerment we outlined earlier. This 
dimension was also further enhanced through our fieldwork whereby we were constantly being 
reminded of the strong role of the state and politics across our case studies. 
3. ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ – Articulated by the power that TNCs exercise and derived from GVC’s 
‘‘governance as power’’ concept. 
4. Chain Relations and Coordination – Demonstrated by the types of governance structures 
we earlier outlined through GVC’s ‘‘governance as coordination’’ concept. 
In light of this, we examine the sustainability key theme, firstly through the lenses of corporate 
sustainability and then through FTI’s organisational sustainability. Following this, we examine the 
political dimensions of the GVCs through the various functions Cocobod undertakes, as well as 
the role the Ghanaian government plays in relation to cocoa. In turn, we discuss the opportunities 
to add value in relation to the political dimension and we end the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme with 
a discussion on farmer organisation and empowerment across the conventional and FT chains. 
Also, we look at the ‘‘buyer-driven power structure’’ key theme, through the power mechanisms 
our interviewees most often cited in relation to the GVCs and FT: customer demand, purchasing 
power, value added, profitability and organisation.  Lastly, we look at the ‘‘chain relations and 
coordination’’ key theme through analysing the governance structure between the nodes of each 
chain, from farmer to consumer. 
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF GVCS 
To this end, this section sets off by outlining the conventional value chain followed by the FT value 
chains from Kuapa Kokoo-Divine and Cocoa Life-Mondelez.  
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5.1.1 CONVENTIONAL GVC 
We will first outline the conventional cocoa-chocolate value chain between Ghana and the UK, as 
described through the entirety of our interviews and secondary data in figure 7 below. Building on 
the typical conventional chain we presented earlier, one of the first things we are able to observe 
is the inclusion of the Ghanaian Cocoa Board (Cocobod) in the chain through a variety of activities, 
such as financing, quality control, pricing and external marketing. This is a strong indication of 
Cocobod’s role in the country, but also as the main point of contact to organisations in the UK.  
Figure 7: Ghana-UK Cocoa-Chocolate Conventional GVC 
Source: Author (compiled from interviews, USAID 2014, UNCTD 2008, World Cocoa Foundation 
2012, Fairtrade Foundation 2011, Kaplinsky 2004 and Oxfam 2002) 
In order to contextualise Cocobod’s role, it should be noted that Ghana, unlike other West African 
countries, went only through a process of partial liberalisation in the backdrop of market failures 
advocated by neoliberal policy doctrines that advanced full liberalisation. As such, Cocobod 
maintained institutional control over the functions we will see in more detail during the ‘‘political 
crop’’ key theme (Granleese, 2008). We should also highlight that the complexity of the chain and 
activities undertaken in combination with organisational strategies have generated various chain 
combinations. This complexity derives from vertical integration, since we have international 
traders who may be standalone, integrated forward in processing or backward as a local buying 
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company (LBC). We also have brands who undertake more or less of the manufacturing of 
chocolate themselves. For these reasons, we have simplified the chain by using five main nodes 
and listing a variety of activities below, as per our interviewees’ suggestions. We should note that 
we haven’t included input providers or organisations who exercise horizontal governance, such 
as FTI or the national farmers’ association. We will, however attempt to provide this level of 
analytical rigor through our analysis in the ensuing key themes. 
Although we will elaborate on most processes that take place in this chain during the course of 
the ensuing chapter, at high level, according to figure 7 and FAO (2013), cocoa production is 
based on smallholders who grow cocoa mostly on plots of 2-3 hectares. After harvesting, 
fermentation and drying, the beans are sold to local purchasing agents of the local buying 
companies (LBCs) at village level. Then, quality control is carried out by Cocobod’s Quality 
Control Division (QCD) which undertakes grading and sealing of cocoa into export sacks, which 
are in turn sold by the LBCs to Cocobod. Cocobod then exports them through its subsidiary, the 
Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) Limited. In parallel, prices for farmers are predetermined by 
the government in a process backed by forward sales of cocoa and financing. After beans are 
exported, international processors undertake a process of grinding and roasting that leads to 
cocoa butter/liquor which then is further processed and turned into chocolate for consumers with 
the addition of nuts, sugar or milk depending on the recipe. After this stage, branding and 
marketing takes place whilst chocolates are marketed in retail shops and mainly supermarkets. 
5.1.2 KUAPA KOKOO-DIVINE FT GVC 
Following the description of the conventional value chain, we will now be outlining the FT chain 
that includes Kuapa Kokoo and Divine Chocolate. Divine Chocolate is a chocolate company co-
owned by Kuapa Kokoo’s cocoa farmers that produces and sells FT chocolate in the UK. Social 
Enterprise Coalition (2011) mentioned that in the early 1990s, Kuapa Kokoo, a farmers’ co-op 
was set up by a group of cocoa growers in Ghana, to trade its own cocoa, and thus manage the 
selling process more efficiently than government cocoa agents. Then, the cocoa farmers decided 
to invest in a chocolate bar of their own in 1997 (Divine Chocolate, 2011). In 1998, Kuapa Kokoo, 
Twin Trading, The Body Shop, Christian Aid and Comic Relief came together to launch Day 
Chocolate Company which was later re-named Divine Chocolate (Social Enterprise Coalition, 
2011). Divine’s business model is to produce and sell 100% FT chocolate bars at the mass UK 
market. (Clearly So, 2011). To add to this, interviewee 12-ex-chair of Divine-informed us that 
Kuapa Kokoo have also set up their own LBC, Kuapa Kokoo limited, to buy cocoa off Kuapa’s 
members.  
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As we are able to see from figure 8 below, when compared to the conventional chain above the 
main differences are: 
 Farmer Organisation – The introduction of a chain node between cocoa bean production 
and internal marketing & trading that involves farmer organisation in a democratically-run 
cooperative. We will examine Kuapa’s organisation and associated empowerment 
activities in detail during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme. 
 Setting up a LBC – Instead of selling to other LBCs, the farmers of Kuapa decided to set 
up their own LBC (Kuapa Kokoo Ltd) to purchase their cocoa. 
 Fairtrade Processor – Divine’s chocolate is produced in Germany (Ryan, 2011). 
 Retailing/Branding – Although retailing and branding still takes place, branding is 
undertaken by Divine in the form of a new entrant and 100% FT brand in the market 
accompanied by the FT mark, who sells via conventional UK retailers and their channels. 
Figure 8: Ghana-UK Kuapa-Divine Cocoa-Chocolate FT GVC 
Source: Author (compiled from interviews) 
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5.1.3 COCOA LIFE-MONDELEZ FT GVC 
We will now be outlining the FT chain that involves Mondelez’s Cocoa Life programme. Before 
we discuss this value chain, it would be useful to outline the key elements of the programme. 
Interviewee 17-a director from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-told us that: 
‘‘Cocoa Life is a significant investment worth £400 million, which represents the way we 
approach sustainability and sustainable cocoa sourcing. It has a holistic farmer focus and is 
committed to partnerships across the entire supply chain in order to deliver the programme’’. 
To this end, the holistic focus can be demonstrated by the five key outcomes they strive to 
achieve: 
 Sustainable yield – This is the most important outcome that drives the programme. It 
seeks to increase yield by addressing production and productivity mainly through input 
provision, training and good farming practices. 
 Additional livelihoods – This aims to diversify farmers’ income through agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities. Farmers are encouraged to undertake these activities in 
addition to the cocoa farming.  
 Community development – This is related to building schools, access to health facilities 
and other initiative the community fee are worth undertaking. 
 Youth – This is meant to address the sustainability of cocoa production through 
encouraging and motivating youth to stay in cocoa farming. It also aims to prevent child 
labour. 
 Environment – Aims to maintain the natural resources that guide the development of 
farms (ibid). 
According to interviewees 29-project facilitator & district lead from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-
in order to deliver these ambitious outcomes, Mondelez have pursued a partnership approach. 
Firstly, they have struck partnerships with Care, VSO and World Vision who are Cocoa Life's 
implementing partners in different geographical areas. They are responsible for implementing, 
mobilising partners, coordinating and stakeholder management. They have also partnered with 
Cocobod in two levels: The first one is linked to policy and addresses child labour, while the 
second one relates to improving farming practices though extensions, education curriculum and 
training, and cocoa research. The third partner is the department of co-operatives that trains co-
operative members to organise democratic organisations. Finally, interviewee 32-a corporate 
responsibility and sustainability head of cocoa from a prominent LBC-told us that Mondelez was 
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in the process of collaborating with various LBCs including themselves in order to further secure 
their supply of conventional cocoa. These LBCs are part of international trading groups, such as 
Olam and Armajaro. As such, it is obvious that the Cocoa Life, of which Cocoa Life-Mondelez FT 
GVC is part of, goes ‘‘beyond FT’’ in order to secure Mondelez’s security of supply. 
In relation to Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s value chain, interviewee 19-manager from the Cocoa Life-
Mondelez GVC-told us that Mondelez buy conventional, Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance (RA) 
cocoa through their purchasing arm, Taloko. They buy from international traders who in turn buy 
from Cocobod’s CMC. Taloko sourced 75% of its FT cocoa in 2014 from Kuapa Kokoo and 25% 
from their Cocoa Life cooperative. Since they don’t have their own LBC like Kuapa Kokoo, they 
encourage their farmers to pick one LBC and work with them. The majority of the Cocoa Life 
farmers sell to Produce Buying Company (PBC), which is a Local Buying Company (LBC) with 
the highest market share (35%), according to interviewee 44-an operations manager for PBC. 
Once they buy cocoa, this is shipped to Barry Callebaut who process their cocoa beans into 
chocolate as per Mondelez’s conventional chain.  
As we are able to see from figure 9, when compared to the conventional chain and the FT Kuapa 
Kokoo-Divine chain the main differences are: 
 Farmer Organisation – The introduction of a chain node between cocoa bean production 
and internal marketing and trading that involves farmer organisation in a democratically-
run cooperative. We will examine the difference between Cocoa Life’s cooperative and 
Kuapa Kokoo’s organisation and associated empowerment activities in detail during the 
‘‘political crop’’ key theme. 
 Procuring from various sources – Taloko is sourcing from Kuapa Kokoo and Cocoa 
Life’s cooperative and they are also encouraging farmers to sell to PBC. In the meantime, 
beyond FT, they are implementing programmes with various LBCs to secure their supply 
of conventional cocoa.  
 Retailing/Branding – Branding still takes place in the form of the existing brand name 
and packaging with the added FT label on the product. This is the main difference with 
Divine Chocolate who sell via their own new entrant 100% FT brand. Nonetheless, 
retailing is also undertaken through the same conventional chain and channels. 
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Figure 9: Ghana-UK Cocoa Life Cocoa-Chocolate FT GVC 
Source: Author (compiled from interviews) 
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5.2 SUSTAINABILITY 
The main argument in this key theme on sustainability builds on fair trade’s historical evolution 
and ‘‘mainstreaming’’ discussion we presented in chapter 2. We then suggested that the strategic 
re-orientation of fair trade’s network away from the fair trade movement and an alternative trading 
system to rely on and work within the existing trading system and TNCs (through FT), was critical 
for its future success. Our argument also builds on the drive for capital accumulation advanced 
by world-systems theory also in chapter 2.  
To this end, through the analytical lenses of the GVC approach and our power analyses, we focus 
on the importance of contextual factors and power exercised by TNCs in shaping Fairtrade. As 
such, this key theme builds on what we have discussed in chapter 2, whereby Gereffi (1994) 
utilised the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ concept to describe the vertical power exercised by large buyers on 
the way GVCs, and in this case, FT operate. To the same end, we also refer to our feminist power 
analyses lenses in order to identify and describe the horizontal power relations between the FT 
Foundation, FTI and FTOs or TNCs, as well as to understand the differences between smaller 
and bigger cooperatives at a high level. On the basis of Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011), we 
build on the institutional context that GVCs are embedded in, in particular within local economic, 
social and institutional dynamics that we ought to investigate if we are to comprehensively 
understand the role of FT in the cocoa value chain in relation to the contextual conditions that 
shape existing power relations in the GVCs in question.  
In light of this, during the course of this section we discuss the following: Firstly, we discuss 
corporate sustainability, which is underpinned be a strong profit motivation. Following this, we 
discuss FT in the context of security of supply concerns by TNCs which has led to multiple 
productivity-led sustainability programmes in Ghana. Secondly, we focus on FTI’s organisational 
sustainability through its approach that discusses its scope, top-down approach and cost of 
certification. Following this, we analyse FTI’s licensee-based business model and its shift of focus 
beyond certification. Lastly, we cover the competitive intensity that FT has been experiencing as 
a result of the decision to go ‘‘mainstream’’.   
5.2.1 CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY  
In relation to FT, sustainability has been highlighted as a key theme during our interviews in 
particular by two ex-sustainability directors of big chocolate brands and a logistics manager of an 
international trader/processor4. They highlighted two main facets: the first one refers to positioning 
                                                          
4 Interviewees 9, 11 and 33. 
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FT in relation to a corporate sustainability perspective, whilst the second one puts FT in its context 
by outlining ongoing sustainability programmes that have been taking place in Ghana as a result 
of concerns over security of supply. 
1. Profit-driven Corporate Sustainability – As discussed in chapter 2, fair trade network’s 
choice to work within the existing trading system and its agents-TNCs had important implications. 
As Fridell (2006) explained, this shift meant that the fair trade network would now have a more 
moderate vision aimed at reforming the existing trading system on the basis of voluntary 
commitments from corporations (through FT). Working with TNCs though, who have been 
responsible for structuring an unequal global economy, presents its own challenges (ibid). Fridell 
(2004; p.423) further underlined that ‘‘TNCs are concerned only with the need to protect their 
public image for the sake of profitability’’. This is in line with our discussion in chapter 2 around 
the drive for capital accumulation advanced by the world-systems theory.  
As such, through the course of this section, we argue that big chocolate TNCs (including 
Mondelez and others who source cocoa from Ghana) strive to fulfill commercial objectives and 
have a strong business agenda in place in order to achieve this. Since FT has chosen to work 
with them, FT will inevitably have to mirror their approaches and incur the consequences, which 
are predominantly driven by profit considerations that ultimately have had an adverse effect on 
FT’s relevance to them. In this context, FT was initially viewed by big chocolate TNCs as a 
certification that was focusing on compliance to a set of social standards. As such, it was initially 
positioned as an ‘‘add-on’’ to an already existing business agenda. Later on though, big chocolate 
TNCs broadened their scope and utilised the concept of sustainability in order to essentially test 
every social and environmental initiative against its outcomes through a more prominent 
commercial angle in line with their drive for profit and capital accumulation. This was 
predominantly driven by their stronger considerations about security of supply, brand reputation, 
differentiation and addressing customer trends. As a result, this has further confirmed the primacy 
of the profit motivation of big chocolate TNCs and led in FT being further demoted as a small part 
in a broader sustainability agenda, whereby it was ultimately unfavorably assessed against highly 
commercial-oriented criteria due to its predominantly social orientation. 
On this note, and before providing the evidence that supports this argument, it would be useful to 
briefly contextualise and provide a brief overview of corporate sustainability. Wilson (2003) 
suggested that corporate sustainability is an evolving concept which presents an alternative to 
the traditional growth and profit-maximisation model. While it recognises that corporate growth 
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and profitability are important, it also requires the corporations to pursue social goals, 
environmental protection and economic development. He further suggested that the term is often 
used in conjunction with, and as synonym for, other terms like ‘‘sustainable development’’ and 
‘‘corporate social responsibility’’. In light of this, to address the relationship of corporate 
sustainability with these terms, he argued that the term ‘‘corporate sustainability’’ borrows 
elements from four more established concepts that we can also see on Figure 10 below. Marrewijk 
(2003) went beyond defining corporate sustainability and provided five ambition levels of 
corporate sustainability in combination with the organisational motives for choosing a particular 
ambition. These are: a. Compliance-driven, b. profit-driven, c. caring, d. synergistic and e. 
holistic5. 
Figure 10: The evolution of corporate sustainability 
Source: Adapted from Wilson (2003) 
In this context, whilst none of our interviewees referred to the ‘‘caring’’ aspect of corporate 
sustainability, the argument on TNCs being involved in FT in order to solely protect their public 
image for the sake of profitability, has been confirmed by multiple senior-level interviewees from 
TNCs, a FTSE, the FT Foundation and a civil society sector organisation 6 . For example, 
interviewee 11-an ex-Sustainability Director from a major chocolate brand/manufacturer-told us 
that: 
                                                          
5 See also appendix 2 for more detail on the concepts that shaped corporate sustainability and appendix 3 
for Marrewijk’s (2003) corporate sustainability ambition levels.  
6 Interviewees 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 19 and 41. 
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‘‘The drivers for running Cocoa Life programme have been highly commercial’’. In turn, 
interviewee 41-a Cocoa program officer from Solidaridad-was also explicit: ‘‘the existing 
sustainability programs like Cocoa Life are not the best for farmers’ interests as they are driven 
only by commercial interests’’. Finally, interviewee 9-an ex-Sustainability Director from a major 
chocolate brand/manufacturer-added that Cocoa Life ‘‘is coming as an addition to a business 
agenda involving selling a commodity with a sustainability attribute’’. 
To elaborate, interviewee 11 positioned the commercial interests on the basis of rising cocoa 
prices, mitigation of bad reputation especially from child labour, security of supply and 
differentiation against competitors. The FT Foundation has been also aware of the importance of 
TNCs’ public image and commercial interest in relation to involvement in FT. Hence, interviewee 
10-senior manager in the FT Foundation-mentioned that ‘‘the incentives/drivers for commercial 
organisations to enter the FT chains are: differentiation and brand reputation’’. Finally, interviewee 
4-a cocoa sustainability manager from a major Retailer-suggested that they select their FT 
chocolate suppliers not only on the basis of quality of product and price, but also on the potential 
for a good story that will enhance brand reputation. 
Brand reputation for TNCs involved in cocoa-chocolate GVCs has been deemed increasingly 
important in light of adverse media pressure over the use of child labour in West Africa. IDS and 
the University of Ghana (2006) suggested that the introduction of CSR initiatives by big 
companies came as a result to adverse media pressure and increasing challenges to the future 
sustainability of the cocoa sector. But before we provide the evidence for the argument we 
advanced earlier on the relationship of FT with corporate sustainability, it would be useful to briefly 
discuss child labour and how this has shaped the focus of TNCs on brand reputation. To this end, 
IDS and the University of Ghana (2006) highlighted that the exposure of the use of child labour in 
West Africa in the UK in 2000 and US media in 2001 included allegations of the use of forced and 
bonded child labour and of children engaged in hazardous work. Child labour refers to children 
who are encouraged or made to do work that (i) is mentally, physically, socially and morally 
dangerous and harmful to children; and (ii) interferes with schooling by depriving them to attend 
school, by obliging them to leave school early, or by requiring them to combine school attendance 
with excessively long and heavy work. 
As a response, various initiatives like the International Cocoa Initiative along with legislation in 
the US have been introduced in order to combat child labour. In Ghana, the Ministry of Manpower, 
Youth and Employment has developed a National Plan for the Elimination of Child Labour and is 
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playing a key role in a collaborative programme with Cocobod (ibid). FT standards prohibit 
children from being employed in illegal or harmful work while regular audits are designed to detect 
child labour. Major breaches of Fairtrade standards on child labour can result in suspension of 
the producer group along with corrective actions to be taken to address the problem. However, 
monitoring, certification and adherence of standards is challenging. This is because production is 
dominated by small scale-farming, long tradition in the use of family labour and chronic poverty 
deriving from low cocoa prices, poor availability of education in rural areas and infrastructural 
challenges (Fairtrade Foundation, 2011). 
In this context and given that an increasing number of consumers have expressed concern for 
the conditions faced by farmers and their communities, as demonstrated through the rapid growth 
FT certified chocolate (IDS and the University of Ghana, 2006), TNCs decided to intensify their 
involvement with FT. As a result, in the early stage, Mondelez were heavy users of certification 
and big purchasers of FT as well as Rainforest Alliance (RA) and certification was very important 
to them, according to interviewee 17-a director from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC. In terms of 
the impact that this early involvement with FT had, interviewee 19-a manager from the Cocoa 
Life-Mondelez GVC-emphasised that their FT involvement ‘‘made industry and consumers aware 
of origin story and helped shape Mondelez's thinking around Cocoa Life, whilst certification has 
helped though in bringing the debate forward’’.  
From the empirical evidence above and in relation to Marrewijk’s (2003) five ambition levels of 
corporate sustainability we outlined earlier, we argue that big chocolate TNCs (including 
Mondelez) early involvement with FT we have just described resembles a hybrid between the 
‘‘compliance-driven’’ and the ‘‘profit-driven’’, and certainly not ‘‘caring’’. 
It is ‘‘profit-driven’’ on the basis that it contributes to the bottom line, which takes place through 
the enhancement of the brand reputation. However, since the articulation and integration of social, 
ethical and ecological aspects into the business operations and decision-making hasn’t been fully 
developed yet, we could not position this solely in this grouping. It’s also ‘‘compliance-driven’’, 
since it is providing welfare to society, within the limits of regulations from the rightful authorities, 
which is Fairtrade and the FT standards in this instance. Although, this involvement may have 
been perceived as the correct behaviour at the time, the empirical evidence above suggests the 
primacy of commercial considerations. Hence, we think the hybrid between the two is the right 
grouping. 
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Going forward though, and in light of considerations we mentioned earlier such as security of 
supply and differentiation from competitors, big chocolate TNCs shifted away from FT and 
certification to a broader sustainability agenda, which nonetheless still does not entail balancing 
the ‘‘caring’’ dimension with the ‘‘profit-driven’’ one. Interviewee 8–a Board member of a FTO-
suggested that TNCs involvement in FT is now driven by corporate sustainability and is trying to 
address consumer trends related to brand reputation. Similarly, a senior Manager from the FT 
Foundation underlined that ‘‘the incentive for commercial organisations to enter the FT chains has 
been the need to tick the sustainability box and ethical leadership’’-interviewee 10. The shift to 
corporate sustainability through the emphasis on sustainable development and moral philosophy 
as described earlier on figure 10, can be further demonstrated from the following statement: 
interviewee 11, an ex-sustainability director from a major chocolate brand/manufacturer, told us 
that ‘‘all the decisions around Cocoa Life have been made considering a sustainability strategy 
encompassing social, economic and environmental considerations’’. However, the prominence of 
the economic goals over social and environmental remained. To this end, we repeat interviewee’s 
9 quote that ‘‘Cocoa Life is coming as an addition to a business agenda involving selling a 
commodity with a sustainability attribute’’. 
The consequences of this shift of TNCs towards a broader corporate sustainability agenda have 
been severe for FT. As a result, FT is now seen as a tool in a broader agenda driven 
predominantly by strong commercial considerations, as opposed to its vision to be a ‘‘tool for 
modifying the dominant economic model’’ (Moore, 2004; p.2). To illustrate, interviewee 45-the 
Head of Programme from Cocoa Life-told us that ‘‘the focus of any certification programme should 
be sustainability. FT should be a bonus and not a mandate’’.  
Similarly, interviewee 17, highlighted that the scope is broader than certification scope 
nowadays and that Cocoa Life is expected to be taken across the supply chain with no desire 
to use FT to certify it and managed against KPIs at outcome and assessment level. The same 
interviewee also suggested that the ‘‘FT relationship needs to be examined under different 
premises in the light that the end is not certification, the end should be sustainable supply 
chains. We want to be having sustainable chains and not only a small percentage of FT. There 
is a need to shift to outcomes and impacts and away from compliance to standards’’. To 
confirm, interviewee 42-a technical advisor from the World Cocoa Foundation- maintained that 
‘‘certifications like FT are just means to sustainability’’. 
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On the back of the evidence we presented above and in relation to Marrewijk’s (2003) five 
ambition levels of corporate sustainability we outlined earlier, we have demonstrated that TNCs 
current involvement with FT has shifted from the hybrid between the ‘‘compliance-driven’’ and the 
‘‘profit-driven’’ we described earlier, to solely ‘‘profit-driven’’. Limiting FT and demoting it as a 
small part in a broader sustainability agenda has removed the strong element of compliance that 
was previously driven by the FT standards. In the meantime, the emphasis on outcomes and 
measurement in a conception of corporate sustainability that is underpinned by commercial 
motivations to differentiate, enhance corporate reputation and ensure security of supply, indicate 
a profit-driven orientation. 
2. Security of Supply – In the context of this discussion, we frequently referred to security of 
supply considerations as one of the main commercial drivers of big chocolate TNCs that led them 
to initially get involved in FT, and later utilise the concept of corporate sustainability whilst 
embarking on sustainability programmes on the ground in Ghana in order to secure their security 
of supply. Since the initial involvement in FT hasn’t been particularly fruitful in helping big 
chocolate brands to secure their security of supply, they decided to take the matter into their own 
hands and invest in sustainability programmes on the ground. As a result, FT was further 
undermined by a plethora of sustainability programmes. 
But before providing evidence for the argument above, we need to provide the context that 
illustrates the security of supply concerns that big chocolate brands/manufacturers have been 
facing. On figure 11 below, ICCO (2015) demonstrated the 10 year historical view of supply and 
demand of world cocoa bean production, grindings7 and stocks. This shows a balanced view 
between deficits and surpluses, in which the cocoa market experienced five years with production 
surplus and five years with production deficit. If we look at the stocks to grinding ratio though, it is 
the second lowest over the past ten years. So, this justifies a certain level of sensitivity about 
security of supply at global level. And, if ICCO’s (2014) projections about deficits over the next 
five years are confirmed, this is likely to further compound fears over security of supply. This can 
be justified on the basis of a growing middle class in China, India, and Brazil. While Europe and 
North America are relatively mature markets, increasing household income in developing 
countries is a primary driver in stable demand growth. As demand is projected to continue its 
                                                          
7 Once cocoa beans have been harvested, fermented, dried, and transported, they are processed into 
separate components for commercial consumption. Processor grindings of cocoa beans serve as the key 
metric for market analysts, for an overall view of historical and anticipated demand. Processing is the last 
phase in which demand for cocoa beans can be equitably compared to supply (World Cocoa Foundation, 
2014). 
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stable growth, supply growth may slow due to changing weather patterns in the largest cocoa-
producing areas (World Cocoa Foundation, 2014). 
Figure 11: World cocoa bean surplus/deficit (‘000s tonnes), stocks/grindings (%) 
Source: Adapted from ICCO (2015) 
In this global context of cocoa supply and demand, IDS and the University of Ghana (2006) 
emphasised that low levels of productivity are a significant obstacle to achieving sustainable 
cocoa production in Ghana. The cocoa sector on average obtains 350–400 kg per hectare as 
compared with rates of 1000 kg per hectare and over in some cocoa-producing countries. Dormon 
et al. (2004) suggested that low productivity can be attributed to socio-economic factors and 
biological/technical ones. For example, farmers involved in their study suggested that socio-
economic factors like low producer price paid to them, lack of electricity, expensive labour, 
availability of credit were the causes of low yields. The biological causes identified by the farmers 
were pests and diseases. These factors contributed to inadequate crop management through a 
vicious circle of underinvestment.  
Building on this, IDS and the University of Ghana (2006) advanced that cost of inputs, like seed 
pods, seedlings, insecticides, fungicides and fertilisers, has also been a significant factor of low 
productivity. They have also elaborated on financing, which apart from purchasing inputs, is 
important for farmers to support their households during the off-season when they cannot sell 
cocoa. Before liberalising the domestic purchasing of cocoa, the Produce Buying Company (PBC) 
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could make cash advances to cocoa farmers and these were deducted when cocoa was sold. 
After liberalisation, with multiple buyers it has become difficult to operate a loan scheme by the 
LBCs because of the possibility of ‘‘dribbling’’. On the same note, Cocobod used to have its own 
extension service through its Cocoa Services Division, but under pressure from the World Bank, 
the Government of Ghana decided to combine cocoa extension and general agricultural extension 
under a unified extension service in 2001. As a result, cocoa extension has fallen short of what is 
needed to bring knowledge and innovation to the farmers to increase productivity.  
Finally, when looking at the future sustainability of cocoa production in Ghana, young people do 
not completely discount cocoa farming, but they advanced a preferred model of a commercialised 
enterprise that does not require as much physical labour. If this can be explored and supported, 
cocoa will continue to be part of young peoples’ aspiration. Otherwise, given the low rewards and 
the consequent difficulty of attracting youth into cocoa farming, a paradigm shift is needed to 
attain the longer-term sustainability of cocoa production (ibid). 
In light of the security of supply concerns, BASIC (2014) proposed that because of the growing 
concentration at different levels, there are increasing power struggles for the control of the chain 
between the leading business actors, namely between supermarkets, brands, processors and 
traders. The growing concerns over the supply of key commodities and shrinking number of 
farmers going forward, have generated an intense competition for the control of sourcing. This 
has led to an increased tendency of supermarkets and brands to bypass the other influential 
actors in the chain (in particular traders) in order to acquire vertical control of the chain down to 
producers, similar to Cocoa Life’s case. Controlling supply is directly linked to profitability as there 
are substantial fixed costs in the industry in terms of factories, processing facilities, but also 
marketing budgets. So, as we found out from interviewee 46-the deputy marketing manager with 
Cocoa Processing Company (CPC)-if there wasn’t continuous cocoa supply, processing facilities 
would be running below break-even capacity. Similarly, since marketing budgets and distribution 
space are expensed ahead of the chocolate being in the supermarket shelves, having no product 
to stock the shelves with would be translated into enormous losses. 
On this note, and in relation to the argument we advanced in the beginning of this section 
regarding TNC’s involvement in FT that hasn’t been particularly fruitful in helping big chocolate 
brands to secure their security of supply, interviewee 12-ex-chair of a FTO-suggested that ‘‘there 
are three ways to secure supply: a. Certification (FT, RA), b. Market purist way through supply 
and demand, which hasn't worked as it takes approximately five years for farmers to pick up 
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market signals and for the cocoa tree to be ready for crop (plant to harvest lag time) and c. project 
based’’. In relation to the first option, interviewee 11 told us that security of supply has been 
attempted by Mondelez through market forces in the past, but has clearly failed as there is a 
deficit projected for 2020, as we presented earlier. In relation to the second option, ‘‘Nestle were 
persuaded to go FT because they were reassured that they would have supply of cocoa in 10 
years. They clearly had no interest in farmers’’-interviewee 12. Nonetheless, in line with what we 
argued earlier about the role of FT and its limitations in relation to a broader corporate 
sustainability perspective, interviewee 19 mentioned that FT has been useful, but claimed they 
took this further through not just focusing on money (FT minimum price and premium) but 
sustainability as well. 
Therefore, the decision to pursue the third option and implement a project-based approach 
was made in light of the first two unsuccessful attempts and the looming security of supply 
context we highlighted earlier. Interviewee 19 underlined that ‘‘on top of brand reputation and 
the shift to corporate sustainability, the decision for Cocoa Life has also been made in the 
context of a 2-2.5% increase in cocoa demand per year and the fact that yields have been low. 
These two raised the security of supply question.’’ 
Despite the fact that big chocolate brands shared similar concerns and understanding over 
security of supply, the way they went about implementing their sustainability projects on the 
ground has been different. As such, and in line with the goal to differentiate from competition, 
interviewee 11 explained the difference in Mondelez’s philosophy behind their sustainability 
programmes as opposed to the one that Mars was undertaking. To this end, he elaborated that 
whilst Mars’s and Nestle’s focus is also to increase productivity and secure supply, they go about 
achieving this in a technological approach, whereas Mondelez has put the farmers in the centre 
of their model in a development oriented model. In relation to Mondelez’s model, we have 
previously discussed Cocoa Life’s five desired outcomes that in essence support yield increase 
through farmer-centered outcomes that entail additional livelihoods, community development and 
focus on encouraging youth to stay in the sector. On the other hand, Mars’s focus has been the 
cocoa genome, according to Ryan (2011). Nieburg (2013) explains that Mars have discovered 
the genetic sequence to breed higher yielding, disease tolerant trees that could lead to better 
tasting chocolate. Through making genetic markers for the cacao plant, Mars can improve the 
breeding process and produce clones quicker. Although, this hasn’t been implemented yet, Mars 
expects 500% increase in yields from regular Matina trees. Contrary to these ambitious 
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projections, interviewee 11 suggested that ‘‘Cocoa Life’s holistic sustainability programme has 
resulted to productivity increases of 20-60% vs. 6-8% of others like Mars’’. 
Beyond these two programmes run by big chocolate brands Mondelez and Mars, there have also 
been quite a few sustainability-driven programmes running in parallel. These programmes have 
been run or funded by the World Cocoa Foundation and the Dutch Government (which we will 
examine in more detail in the next key themes) and other organisations in the value chain, like 
the international traders. For example, Ryan (2011) referred to the Sustainable Tree Crops 
Programme (STCP)-a joint initiative of USAID and the chocolate industry-that organises and 
funds farmer field schools. The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (2015) informed us 
that is seeks to generate growth in rural income among tree crop farmers through introducing 
innovations to enhance productivity, increase marketing efficiency and diversify farmer income.  
Moreover, international traders like Armajaro through their Source Trust programme present 
themselves as sustainability experts and supply chain managers to big chocolate brands. 
According to interviewee 26-the head of Sustainability from Armajaro-‘‘Source Trust’’ is a not-for-
profit organisation set-up by Armajaro that help farmers improve their livelihoods through better 
crop yields and quality achieved through sustainable farming practices. We will discuss this 
initiative in more detail during the ‘‘buyer-driven power structure’’ and the ‘‘chain relations and 
coordination’’ key themes later. We should note that all of the programmes we mentioned have 
been also aiming to productivity-led sustainability with more or less developmental or technical 
focus, reflecting in this way the different approaches to achieving greater productivity.  
The increasing focus on productivity hasn’t gone unnoticed from people involved in FT. For 
example, interviewee 47-a manager from FTI-mentioned that ‘‘there has been major concern 
over the concentration of the programme like Cocoa Life on supply-demand sustainability and 
an economic focus on productivity’’.  Interviewee 25-ex-Oxfam manager involved in FT-added 
that ‘‘the focus on yield is major source of concern since if farmers produce cheaper, then the 
intermediaries will also try to push down prices so the net impact for the farmer will be the 
same’’. 
Despite these concerns, Cocoa Life and other sustainability programmes are being implemented 
with strong support, while FT is being undermined as a tool in Cocoa Life’s programme-
interviewees 17 and 19.  
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Interviewee 45 emphasised that due to the holistic nature of Cocoa Life’s programme through 
the five outcomes we described earlier, they went way ‘‘beyond FT’’: ‘‘The programme did not 
start with the aim of achieving fairtrade principles and FT principles were met before FT 
certified it. However, FT has helped them enhance farmers’ capacity through stricter standards 
and audits’’. 
5.2.2 FTI’S ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY  
Having established the profit-driven orientation of big chocolate TNCs, on the basis of their 
security of supply concerns, brand reputation and differentiation from competition, we have 
explained how this has all been brought together by TNCs under a corporate sustainability mantra 
and how this led to FT being increasingly undermined. The implications of this have been quite 
significant in terms of FTI’s organisational viability and FT’s sustainability.  
This was further compounded by the critique articulated against FT by the interviewees below. 
Their critique was directed against FT’s approach, which was characterised as narrow and top-
down, underpinned by its high cost of certification. In light of this criticism and influenced by its 
‘‘mainstreaming’’ decision that mirrors the corporate sustainability mantra of TNC’s, FTI advanced 
a licensee-based model whilst broadening the scope beyond certification. On top of this, FTI’s 
organisational viability and sustainability is under threat in light of the increasing competition from 
other certification schemes. 
1. FT Approach – In light of the corporate sustainability dimensions and sustainability 
programmes like Cocoa Life that incorporate economic, social and environmental considerations, 
FT’s approach articulated through its standards has been deemed too rigid and narrow. This has 
been predominantly attributed to FT’s focus on the social and political dimensions articulated 
through FT premiums used for community development instead of productivity improvements and 
democratic organisation of farmers. 
To illustrate, interviewee 4-a cocoa sustainability manager from a major retailer-advocated that 
FT was lacking in the economic side of sustainability, namely productivity improvement:  
‘‘FT doesn't cover the problem holistically. Hence we decided to work with Solidaridad8 to set 
our sustainability strategy in an overarching project that tackles yield, women, agricultural 
                                                          
8 Solidaridad is a Dutch civil society sector organisation with more than 45 years of global experience in 
facilitating the development of socially responsible, ecologically sound, and profitable supply chains 
(Solidaridad, 2015). 
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practices, empowerment, leadership and access to markets. We are doing this overarching 
project for security of supply, reputational reasons and moral obligation’’. 
Building on this, interviewee 11 questioned FT’s emphasis on the social dimension of 
sustainability instead of the economic one. For example, whilst hinting at Divine’s chain, he 
argued that the level of investment in social development such as building wells was not mirrored 
in farming and in the cooperative at the same level that the market grows. For that reason, he 
argued that the economic side of sustainability has been jeopardised. He further argued that 
having realised this, FTI have now been moving towards the economic side of the sustainability 
spectrum by loosening the rules of FT. This shift has led him to question FTI’s strategy and 
mission and whether they are a certification or a development organisation. We will, however, 
examine FTI’s model shift in more detail in the next section. 
Beyond FT’s narrow approach and in contrast to the feminist authors’ articulation of bottom-up 
power we examined earlier, FT has also been criticised for its top-down approach that doesn’t 
fully take into account the specific development context within it operates. This has been attributed 
to the ‘‘one size fits all’’ nature of certification that's not appropriate for development as context 
matters a lot. As a result, we argue that this has put FTI’s organisational viability and future 
sustainability under great risk. Previously, in chapter 2, we referred to the fact that FT has 
generally been perceived as a top-down approach when considering the reliance on the 
purchasing of Northern customers, the FT conceptualisation from Northern activists, the definition 
that derived from FT organisations in Europe, the fact that Northern organisations decide what 
commodities to certify, which producer groups to work with, and finally, the reliance on Northern 
TNCs (Leclair 2002, Shreck 2005).  
This has been verified by interviewee 41, a cocoa program officer from Solidaridad, who 
claimed that ‘‘certifications including FT are perceived as a white man's top-down approach’’. 
To this end, a corporate responsibility & sustainability head of cocoa from a prominent LBC 
told us that ‘‘the certification criteria of Fairtrade are things that farmers are already doing. 
Fairtrade is only trying to ensure they are done more responsibly, hence certification is a top-
down approach imposed on farmers on things they already do’’-interviewee 32. Lastly, in 
relation to Cocoa Life which as we have seen in the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC earlier includes 
an element of FT, a Manager from FTI questioned whether the big sustainability programmes 
like Cocoa Life consult with the farmers or are they driving the decisions top-down-interviewee 
47. 
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Furthermore, building on what we presented earlier on the production processes including the 
technological and socioeconomic factors that affect farmers’ lives and yields, it is evident that 
situation on the ground is very complex. In that, the role of the government (which we will examine 
in detail in the next key theme), TNCs, farmer themselves and weather conditions is significant 
and often overlapping. On the other hand, interviewee 25 told us that FT has watered down all 
this complexity in its effort to appeal to consumers through simplified marketing. In essence, 
‘‘FT’s messaging and communication have promised God, thus the expectation they created 
has been unrealistic’’. 
FT seems to acknowledge this through their theory of change, whereby they accept that the nature 
and extent of change brought about by Fairtrade interventions will depend on a range of 
contextual factors and that FT is not the sole determinant of change (Fairtrade International, 
2013). Despite this, FT’s top-down manner hasn’t worked very well due to the disconnect between 
what FT has promised the customer and what is the on the ground reality, that FT cannot address 
by itself.  
The bulk of this critique on FT’s promises was also based on the fact that FTI and the FT 
Foundation have not been talking as openly about the hefty price tag they charge to deliver the 
FT certification and the consequent disproportionate cost advantage and access that FT provides 
to bigger cooperatives as opposed to the smaller ones. This relates to the horizontal power 
relations lenses we earlier advanced through our feminist power analyses. For example, 
interviewee 18-a Cocobod marketing manager-criticised FT for its high cost of the certification, 
whilst Kaplinsky (2004) suggested that standards like FT become like trade barriers for developing 
country producers as small and medium scale producers often lack the resources or skills to 
obtain and sustain the necessary certification.   
Fairtrade International (2014) explained the structure of certification fees applicable to small 
producer organisations that consists of the items outlined in appendix 5. These fees vary 
according to the number of members in the organization and whether there are additional 
products or processing/subcontracting facilities. The fees cover all direct and indirect audit costs, 
including transport, accommodation and FLOCERT staff time. Therefore, on the basis of a 50 
people cooperative, with no processing/subcontracting and modifications, the cost of certification 
would be around €50 per farmer for the first year and around €24 per farmer for the second year. 
For a 1000 people cooperative, the respective numbers would be €4 per farmer for the first year 
and around €2.8 per farmer for the second year.  
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2. FTI Business Model and theory of change – In response to the criticism leveled against FT 
about its narrow approach and focus on certification, FTI and the FT Foundation have reviewed 
FT’s business model. This was heavily influenced and driven by their earlier strategic decision to 
work within the existing trading system and its agents, in what was called ‘‘mainstreaming’’. As 
such, the decision to move beyond certification and donations to a self-sustaining organisation 
based on licensee fees reflected not only the move of TNCs toward corporate sustainability that 
resulted in FT being demoted, but also FTI’s conscious effort to survive in a competitive market 
as a mainstream organisation relying on fees from the TNCs who, according to Fridell (2006), 
have been responsible for structuring an unequal global economy, that FT was initially trying to 
transform. At the same time, we argue that this jeopeardises FTI’s organisational viability and 
sustainability, as well as the adherence to the FT principles and ultimately results in the 
undermining of FTOs. 
To illustrate, interviewee 10-a senior Manager from the FT Foundation-told us that: 
‘‘The FT Foundation was in the process of moving beyond certification and donations to a self-
sustained organisation based on licensee fees’’, which are heavily provided by the big volumes 
commercial organisations like Mondelez are purchasing. 
Interviewee 10 also added that one of the main drivers for this shift has been the Foundation’s 
mission to grow and this is why they decided to work with licensees and retailers in the past. ‘‘The 
decision-making then and now has been based on growth than on ideological positions and is 
consistent across products’’. Their ultimate criterion to decide has been impact, which is 
determined by sales since farmers have been asking them for more sales and sales enable 
development programmes.  
This process of change beyond certification was outlined in FT’s theory of change report that 
interviewee 10 often referred to. As we explained earlier, in this report FTI acknowledges that 
‘‘Fairtrade contributes towards change for small producers and workers, rather than being the 
sole determinant of change’’ (FTI, 2013; p.8). FT’s contribution is materialised in two ways: 
 FT Standards – As we have seen in chapter 2, these are practiced through the tools of 
the FT minimum price, FT premium, democratic governance, environmental protection, 
pre-finance and the FT mark. 
 Strategies and Policies – These enable engagement in FT and involve building FT 
markets through consumer awareness and business engagement, development of 
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alliances with small producer organisations and civil society, and campaigning and 
advocacy to change the policies and practices of international trade. 
Whereas in past FT analysis would stop there, now FT acknowledges that on top of their 
interventions lies a complex environment, which in combination to FT interventions will lead to 
certain outputs, such as improved prices, investments using the Fairtrade Premium. In turn, these 
outputs may contribute to a range of short and medium term outcomes, such as more viable and 
resilient small producer businesses, improved infrastructure in communities. Then, these 
outcomes in turn contribute to various long-term impacts, such as improved household income 
and assets. Therefore, the results of Fairtrade include all the outputs, outcomes and impacts 
which Fairtrade interventions contribute to, both directly and indirectly, intended and unintended, 
and positive and negative. It is crucial to highlight that the influence of contextual factors increased 
as we move from interventions to impacts (ibid). For a schematic example of the above, see figure 
12 below.  
Figure 12: Fairtrade theory of change-Simplified example 
Source: Adapted from Fairtrade International (2013) 
So whilst FT is changing, this change is increasingly reflecting the language and practice of 
corporate sustainability we have seen previously through the economic, social and environmental 
angles. Moreover, it underlines the change that FT is going through as a result of their decision 
Intervention Outputs Outcomes Impacts
Improved
prices
Viable and 
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producer 
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Democratic 
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(e.g. weather, market prices, etc.)
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to rely on TNC fees. As such, mirroring the corporate sustainability language and practice of TNCs 
is now even more crucial for FT’s organisational sustainability and self-sufficiency-as indicated by 
the FT’s new licensee-based business model. The downside however is that this model may not 
be sustainable as the partners-TNCs they chose to work with may not be willing to work with them 
in the long-run unless they turn into something different, which is still work in progress. 
As such, the FT theory of change report mentions that beyond impacts, what’s also critical to 
highlight is that the end goal for FT is to achieve the FT long-term goals one of which is to make 
trade fair: ‘‘Create an environment in which small producers are able to develop sound 
businesses; workers are able to exercise their rights and freedoms and earn a living wage; 
consumers are informed and demand fair trading practices; and public and private sector policies 
support and enable economic, social and environmental sustainability’’ (ibid; p. 5). Whilst this 
clearly mirrors the corporate sustainability language and practice we outlined earlier, interviewee 
17 acknowledged the change FT has been going through its theory of change report, but was 
unclear and elusive around the role FT would play in future and its extent.  
In the meantime, and in line with the horizontal power relations articulated through our feminist 
power analyses earlier, it appears there is a complex power dynamic between TNCs, FTI and 
FTOs. FTI’s new model and change have undermined FTOs and their true mission which has 
been articulated in the FT principles. A few FTO interviewees9 have highlighted the adverse 
implications of FT’s shift to the new business model and reliance on TNCs to ensure the 
organisational survival of FTI. To this end, they emphasised this is demonstrating clear inclination 
to ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and full blown commercialisation, while it has come at the cost of sacrificing 
and compromising FT principles. For example, interviewee 12-the ex-chair of a FTO-argued that: 
‘‘The FT Foundation earn their money via licencees so they are more likely to want to satisfy 
their demands more than the ones from the FTOs’’. On this note, Interviewee 8-Board member 
of a FTO-linked the reliance of the FT Foundation on fees by TNCs to the loosening of FT 
standards: ‘‘the loosening of FT standards has been driven by the licencees who exert power 
in order make standards broader. This has been effective as they contribute a higher proportion 
of FT revenue fees for the FT Foundation given the significant volumes they purchase.  
This was further advanced by interviewee 1 and 3, who talked at length about the undermining of 
FT principles as a result of lobbying of TNCs. However, the overall sentiment of the FTOs around 
                                                          
9 Interviewees 1, 3, 7, 8 and 12. 
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FT Foundation’s decision was summarised in what interviewee 8 mentioned: The FT Foundation 
exercise loser governance as times passes by predominantly as manifested by loosening the FT 
principles driven by their goal to grow bigger in a commercial sense, ‘‘which is naive and short-
termist’’. 
To counter criticism, interviewee 5-a manager from the FT Foundation-hinted towards sharing 
responsibility with the FTOs by saying that it's not all about the volume since FTOs have a role to 
play in influencing and pushing the bigger players to act more responsibly. Interviewee 5 also 
tried to draw the line by saying that if they encountered corrupt governance, bad relationships and 
loose commitment to FT, they wouldn't carry on with this commercial organisation despite the big 
volumes they'd bring. This debate clearly highlights what interviewee 12 suggested: that the FT 
Foundation has had limited success in reconciling FTOs and commercial organisations interests, 
mainly driven by its own business model which relies on licensee money. This is a power dynamic 
we will be encountering throughout the remaining key themes when comparing the two different 
chains. We will also later see how the FT Foundation’s business model and change have been 
manifested across the chains and what this has meant for the FT principles. We will also examine 
in detail the mechanisms of the lobbying that TNCs exercised on FTI and the FT Foundation in 
the following sections. 
3. Certification Competition – A mainstream commercial model derives from FT’s choice to 
work and compete within the market that is a highly competitive marketplace. As such, and in line 
with the horizontal power relations articulated through our feminist power analyses earlier, FT has 
had to compete with various other ‘‘ethical bedfellows’’ as Ryan (2011) describes other 
certifications like Rainforest Alliance (RA) and UTZ Certified. Therefore, competition between 
brands and retailers was explicitly mirrored between different certifications and harmonisation 
standards. As a result, we argue that certifications are competing for market share through 
aligning with brands’ corporate sustainability requirements and by focusing on their own 
sustainability niche: social, economic and environmental, or through a combination. In this 
competitive context, FT’s better developmental approach we earlier outlined meant very little to 
the buyers, since for them a certification was yet ‘‘another product in their shop’’ and their rationale 
for purchasing had more to do with cost and ease of implementation. 
To put this argument in context, ICCO (2012) explained that the most relevant certification 
schemes for cocoa are Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified. Whilst, it can be said that 
they all seek improvements in farmers’ livelihoods, focus on developing good agricultural 
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practices and on capacity building, they vary in their main focus for achieving a more sustainable 
cocoa production. For example, FT is focusing on the creation of sustainable trade relations, 
whilst UTZ Certified and RA have greater focus on increasing farmer productivity as a way to 
strengthen farmers.  
As per our previous analysis on the importance of sustainability and productivity for TNCs, it is 
important to highlight that Fairtrade differs in this sense from other schemes, as increases in 
productivity is not its focus. Instead, ICCO (2012) suggested that Fairtrade aims for better and 
more just trade relations, whilst UTZ and Rainforest Alliance are explicit about their objective of 
increasing farmers’ yields. For more information, see table 4 below. In terms of market shares 
and the competitive intensity, based on 2010 figures, we see that the most representative 
schemes in terms of their certification market share are Fairtrade (39%), UTZ Certified (25%) and 
Rainforest Alliance (20%). However, as we are able to see from table 4 below, this has changed 
dramatically since UTZ almost tripled in size in 2011 and overcame FT to hold the first position. 
We will explain why this took place in the ensuing analysis.  
Table 4: Certifications description and market share 
Source: Adapted from ICCO (2012) 
Certification Focus
Volume of certified cocoa (tonnes)
2010 
2010 
Share of
certified 
cocoa
2011
Promote better trading 
conditions and empower 
producers.
106.400 39% 150.000
Biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable livelihoods of 
farmers. Focus on increasing 
productivity 
56.000 20% 98.400
Professionalize agricultural 
practices and operational 
management. Focus on 
increasing productivity
70.000 25% 214.000
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During our discussions with big brands, retailers, LBCs, international traders and civil society 
organisations10, we found out that all of them were managing a portfolio of certifications including 
FT, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ at varying quantities.  
In particular, interviewee 14-the head of sales and marketing from an international trader-
referred to their involvement in FT in the context of other certifications using the analogy of a 
‘‘shop which needs to stock a variety of products’’. 
Interviewee 14 also had detailed rationale for their choices of certification and understanding of 
the impact of each certification. In particular, he emphasised the following dimensions: addressing 
more than one sustainability dimension, easier to implement, cheaper, no minimum price 
restrictions, easier to control, potential for development impact and farmer well-being.  
On this basis and in line with UTZ’s significant increase of market share we covered earlier, 
he suggested they have been buying more UTZ certified cocoa since ‘‘it’s cheaper and easier 
to implement through its less stringent rules’’. Also, unlike FT with the FT minimum price, UTZ 
have gained ground because they don't have minimum price restrictions. This helps with the 
competitiveness of the purchaser as they can buy more volume without being in risk of 
becoming uncompetitive in relation to a competitor who purchased conventional cocoa. 
UTZ was the most preferred on the basis of allowing the subscribers to exercise more control 
during implementation and so was RA-interviewee 14. RA was also considered more 
multidimensional from the sustainability angle, as it has been addressing both the environmental 
and the economic sides simultaneously, according to interviewee 11. Nonetheless, interviewee 
41 offered more support to FT despite acknowledging that most of his clients request UTZ or RA 
certification. To this end, he mentioned that ‘‘FT is solid as it pays attention on farmers and their 
well-being unlike UTZ and Rainforest’’. On this basis and on the fact that it focuses on 
cooperatives and empowerment, he underpinned that FT has more potential for developmental 
impact than the other two as it’s also more structured and entails audit. We will however talk more 
about empowerment later during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme. 
Despite the obvious differences in focus between these three certifications, interviewee 41 and 
interviewees 27-certification manager & deputy from Armajaro-noted that the harmonisation of 
certifications has begun through the German development agency GIZ and the European 
Committee for Standardisation (CEN). GIZ (2012) mentioned they will ‘‘support the process of 
                                                          
10 Through interviewees 14, 19, 32 and 41. 
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drafting a sustainability standard by CEN and work to foster the development of this standard in 
close consultation with representatives of producer countries and existing standards initiatives’’. 
More recently, Nieburg (2014) explained that CEN and the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) have been working on a voluntary framework including joint standards for 
sustainable cocoa that will be introduced by the end of 2016. In the meantime, there are LBCs on 
the ground like Armajaro delivering a multi-level training with three levels/modules designed for 
all certifications including FT, UTZ and RA. The modules are the following: a. Social-Where FT 
focuses on, b. Environmental-Where RA is focusing on, c. Good farming practice-Where UTZ is 
focusing-Interviewees 27. 
5.2.3 CONCLUSION  
The main argument in this key theme was founded on FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ decision. FT’s 
reliance on TNCs means that FT has to withstand and work with the ultimate motivation of TNCs, 
which is the profit drive. As such, we argued that FT was initially seen as an add-on, compliance-
driven certification to an already existing business agenda, and then was further demoted as part 
of a corporate sustainability agenda. The corporate sustainability agenda of TNCs is profit-driven 
by nature as it is underpinned by TNCs considerations about security of supply, brand reputation, 
differentiation and addressing customer trends. In particular, security of supply and low levels of 
productivity have emerged during our fieldwork in Ghana. Since FT’s focus is not on productivity, 
it hasn’t been particularly useful in helping big chocolate brands to ensure their security of supply. 
Therefore, they decided to take matters into their own hands and invest in sustainability 
programmes on the ground. As a result, FT was further undermined by a plethora of sustainability 
programmes, like Cocoa Life. Its role has been further limited and its impact was only perceived 
to be the strict standards and auditing. 
FT’s undermining was further ‘‘cemented’’ on the basis of its narrow and rigid approach that 
focuses on social development and democratic organisation instead of the productivity-led 
economic dimension. Its top-down approach was also criticised for its failure to take into account 
the context within it operates and the influence this has on impact. This was contrasted to what 
FT is promising the consumers through simplified marketing. Also, FT was criticised for the high 
cost of certification and the consequent disproportionate cost advantage and access that FT 
provides to bigger cooperatives as opposed to smaller ones. In response to this, FTI have 
reviewed their business model and decided to move beyond certification and donations to a self-
sustained organisation based on licensee fees. This mirrored not only the move of TNCs to go 
beyond certification and towards corporate sustainability, but also FTI’s conscious effort to go 
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‘‘mainstream’’ and consequently having to survive in a competitive market as a mainstream 
organisation. Having to rely on TNCs for its organisational viability and growth in a competitive 
market with plenty of ‘‘ethical bedfellows’’ meant that FT would have to compromise some of its 
principles. This has ultimately been severely criticised by FTOs, who felt they were being 
undermined since their business models were founded and run on the basis of the FT principles.  
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5.3 ‘‘POLITICAL CROP’’ 
The main argument in this key theme builds on Wallerstein’s position (1995) we presented in 
chapter 2 on the State as one of the institutional structures and arrangements that have allowed 
and defended capital accumulation over 500 years. The accumulation of capital depends upon 
the ability to defend its concentration both against predators and against the demands of the 
workers that have produced it. On this note, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) referred to the power 
of states over the lives of their citizens. They argued this power has expanded in a geographical 
manner along with a deepening of its power over the life of its citizens.  
Therefore, despite the significance of the nation state, FT chose a different path. To illustrate, in 
chapter 2 we suggested that the strategic re-orientation of the fair trade network away from the 
fair trade movement signified abandoning the original vision of the network as an alternative 
trading system based on international market regulation with the nation state as a primary agent 
in development, in favour of a more moderate vision aimed at reforming the existing trading 
system on the basis of voluntary commitments from TNCs and consumers (Fridell, 2006). These 
commitments were to a certain extent translated into efforts to empower the farmers in a way that 
mirrored our feminist power analyses in chapter 2, whereby we outlined power seen as 
empowerment in the sense of a capacity or ability to empower or transform oneself and others.  
In light of this, the following sections explore the Ghanaian Government’s central and dominating 
role in cocoa underpinned by the partially liberalised cocoa market in Ghana and the various 
functions Cocobod undertakes, such as financing, external marketing, quality and pricing. The 
partially liberalised structure of the chain facilitates a political process of negotiation, lobbying and 
conflict between various stakeholders and the government. For example, during the pricing 
process, LBCs, hauliers and the Farmers Association are the main participants debating over 
their share of the FOB price.  
Beyond these specific functions and power mechanisms, the role of the Ghanaian Government 
is also often highlighted in relation to the importance it attributes to cocoa as one of the main 
earners of foreign exchange as well as the system it has put in place in order to maintain control. 
In order to put this in perspective, we then discuss the government’s role in relation to the 
currency’s depreciation, the lack of broader infrastructure investment, as well as the limitations of 
Government policy, strategy and execution in relation to value added in country. But, Cocobod’s 
role also has an international dimension when considering they are the sole seller of Ghanaian 
cocoa beans abroad and that Ghana is the second largest producer of cocoa in the world. The 
international dimension is enhanced by the role of foreign governments in tariff escalation that 
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limits opportunities for value addition in Ghana in combination with the foreign direct investment 
into sustainability programmes in Ghana in order to ensure the security of supply for raw cocoa 
beans.  
In this context and beyond the traditional forms of politics undertaken by nation-state governments 
in a top-down manner, there is a bottom-up perspective which the FT principles attempt to address 
through farmer organisation, democratic process and collective decision making. This has been 
implemented in different ways in Kuapa-Divine’s and Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s chains and 
consequently has produced different outcomes depending on organisational motivations, 
business model and contextual factors. 
5.3.1 COCOBOD POWER MECHANISMS/FUNCTIONS 
In line with Wallerstein’s (1995) reference to the powerful role of the state in capital accumulation 
and despite the market reform in 1992, Cocobod still plays an extensive and significant role in 
Ghana and internationally in relation to cocoa quality, financing, external marketing and pricing.  
These functions are such significant power mechanisms that made interviewee 18-a Cocobod 
marketing manager-question the reason for the existence of FT and other certifications, given 
Cocobod’s a strong role in the social and economic development of farmers. 
To this end, figure 13 on the next page provides a high level overview of the functions Cocobod 
undertakes. Granleese (2008; p.33) confirmed that ‘‘despite beginning a process of partial reform 
in 1992, Cocobod remains one of Ghana’s largest and most important bureaucracies’’. 
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Figure 13: Cocobod Functions 
Source: Adapted from Granleese (2008) 
1. Financing – Financing is one of the most significant power mechanisms that Cocobod 
exercises in relation to the smooth functioning of the internal marketing function undertaken by 
LBCs. This is because the cost of finance for LBCs is higher when they borrow directly from 
private banks as compared to Cocobod raising finance and lending them. Since both FT GVCs 
operate within Ghana, they have no option but to comply with this and work within these financing 
parameters, which effectively means that the FT and conventional GVCs overlap at financing 
level. But even if they wanted to do so, it would be highly unlikely to emulate the scale required 
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to undertake such an exercise and especially Divine due to its significantly smaller purchasing 
power compared to Mondelez. 
From a theoretical standpoint, we refer back to Gereffi (1994; p.215) in chapter 2 whereby he 
linked financing (financial resources) to power relations and governance structure through 
defining governance as ‘‘the authority and power relationships that determine how financial, 
material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain’’. To illustrate, Interviewee 
38-the executive manager to the CEO of Cocobod-and interviewee 37-a CMC marketing 
manager-underlined the importance of the financing mechanism. To this end, interviewee 37 
explained that ‘‘CMC does forward selling which backs loan from a syndication of foreign banks 
in order to finance LBCs to purchase cocoa’’. Granleese (2009) added that the majority of LBCs 
gain ‘‘seed-fund’’ financing from Cocobod to purchase cocoa at an interest rate of around 10-
15%, however, this is not sufficient to fund all of their cocoa purchases which leads them to seek 
between 30-70% of their financing from external sources including bank overdrafts or parent 
company financing. It should be noted that bank loans increase significantly the cost of capital of 
LBCs as banks often charge around 20-23% interest.  
In this context, and as we have seen in the chains description earlier, both FT chains are operating 
within this significant power mechanism. Kuapa has set up their own LBC in Kuapa Kokoo Ltd, 
whilst in the Cocoa Life-Mondelez chain, farmers are encouraged to sell to Produce Buying 
Company (PBC) or Armajaro, according to interviewee 39-the Head of Cocoa Life Farmers’ 
Cooperative in Amansie West district. Given the existing market structure and financing 
mechanism set up by Cocobod, all these LBCs in both FT GVCs need to operate within Cocobod’s 
parameters as per the functioning of the conventional GVC.  
Beyond this, the financing mechanism is also essential and seemingly irreplaceable due to the 
scale of financing requirements and the market limitations. To this end, Ryan (2011) confirmed 
that the ‘‘seed fund’’ loan is roughly $1 billion per year whilst Granleese (2009) highlighted that in 
the absence of this power mechanism driven by Cocobod, LBCs would struggle to finance their 
purchases due to their low collateral base, limited capacity of the Ghanaian banking sector and 
increased completion with multinationals on the basis of their superior credit ratings and access 
to low cost finance. As a result, at macro-level neither Divine nor Mondelez would aspire to 
challenge or limit Cocobod’s financing power mechanism within their respective chain. This is, 
however, natural since FT focuses only on farmer and consumer level, whilst financing takes 
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place in the middle of the chain due to Cocobod’s central role to ensure that 835,466 tonnes of 
cocoa will be bought from 865,000 farmers, as per figures for 2012/13 from interviewee 38.  
But, if they did, which does not derive from our interviews, firstly with FTOs11 and secondly with 
Mondelez-interviewees 17 and 19-they could not emulate the scale required. To give an indication 
of scale, in the conventional cocoa chain, interviewee 19-manager from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez 
GVC-advised that a typical brand/manufacturer like Mondelez, Mars or Nestle purchase around 
0.5 million tonnes of raw cocoa beans per year, which accounts to around 60%12 of Ghana’s raw 
cocoa bean production in 2012/13. At a significantly smaller scale, Divine has bought 900 FT 
certified tonnes in 2012 (Divine, 2013), which accounts to just 0.1% of Ghana’s raw cocoa bean 
production in 2012/13 and 0.18% of Mondelez’s (Cocobod, 2014). 
2. External Marketing – It is important to highlight that the external marketing and financing 
power mechanisms are interdependent, since forward selling of cocoa enables backing of loans 
that finances cocoa purchases. As such, the monopoly of the external marketing of cocoa beans 
by CMC is also a significant power mechanism that further allows Cocobod to deal directly with 
cocoa buyers on behalf of the cocoa farmers. As a consequence, similar to the financing above, 
the two FT GVCs have no option but to comply with this and work within CMC’s parameters, which 
effectively means that the FT and conventional GVCs overlap at the external marketing level. This 
is also underpinned by the better relative performance of Cocobod and Ghana to Nigeria and the 
Ivory Coast. 
In chapter 2, we noted Wallerstein’s (1995) reference to the State as one of the institutional 
structures that have enabled capital accumulation through defending its concentration both 
against predators and against the demands of the workers that have produced it. To illustrate, 
Granleese (2008) explained that although the internal marketing of cocoa between farmer and 
Cocobod was liberalised to LBCs, the external marketing of Ghanaian cocoa was not liberalised 
as they didn't want anyone to deal with farmers directly. Interviewee 18-a Cocobod marketing 
manager- confirmed that Cocobod through its subsidiary, the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), 
exports 100% of the Ghanaian cocoa, whilst interviewee 37-a CMC marketing manager-informed 
us that ‘‘70% of Ghanaian cocoa is sold forward to international traders/processors in and out of 
country, a fact that backs financing, and 30% on the spot market’’.  
                                                          
11 Interviewees 3, 7, 8, 12. 
12 Ghana produced 835,466 tonnes in crop year 2012/13 (Cocobod, 2014). 
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As such, interviewee 18 maintained that CMC are the sole seller of cocoa abroad and buyer 
of all cocoa from LBCs internally creating effectively a monopoly through their unique position 
in the chain. He also justified this on the basis that ‘‘benefits are spread better this way in the 
chain and farmers get more as opposed to other fully liberalised African countries’’. To this 
end, table 5 indicates that Ghana’s farmers through CMC’s monopoly have achieved better 
prices than the ones achieved in the fully liberalised markets of Ivory Coast and Nigeria. 
Table 5: West African Real Producer Prices 
Cocoa 
Season 
ICCO Daily Price 
 ($/tonne) 
Producer Prices in constant terms:  
1995/96 = 100 
Ghana Ivory Coast Nigeria 
1995/96 1438 100 100 100 
1996/97 1556 111 104 103` 
1997/98 1711 130 123 103 
1998/99 1298 143 161 194 
1999/00 919 121 90 61 
2000/01 990 137 100 64 
2001/02 1580 152 166 74 
2002/03 1873 228 175 69 
2003/04 1534 210 89 62 
2004/05 1571 183 79 59 
2005/06 1557 164 80 59 
2006/07 1854 151 87 59 
Source: ICCO (2008) quoted in Granleese (2008) 
As a consequence of CMC’s monopoly, and despite what we explained in chapter 2 on FT’s direct 
purchase criterion that buyers need to fulfill in order to carry the FT mark, both FT GVCs have no 
option but to operate within this marketing structure as legislated by the Ghanaian Government 
and exercised by CMC. As such, interviewee 37, a CMC marketing manager, emphasised that 
‘‘FT cocoa cannot be sourced directly’’, so Kuapa Kokoo Ltd or the LBC that bought cocoa beans 
from the Cocoa Life farmers sells to CMC, CMC sells to international traders/processors who then 
in turn sell them to Divine and Mondelez. IDS and the University of Ghana (2006) suggested that 
the only difference within the COCOBOD system, is a separate channel and warehouse which 
has been designated for Fairtrade cocoa exported by Kuapa, to separate it out from conventional 
cocoa.  
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3. Quality – The interdependency of power mechanisms is also important to highlight here, since 
Ghana’s reputation for good quality beans has enabled price premiums and forward contracting 
for CMC. This has been achieved with great success by the Quality Control Division (QCD) in a 
proactive manner but also through sanctions. This has led to both FT GVCs to work within the 
parameters of QCD. Beyond the product quality element in which FT has a marginal and 
complimentary role to the QCD, FT has previously focused on process quality through traceability, 
which was abandoned in commercial FT GVCs, like Cocoa Life-Mondelez but maintained in 
Kuapa-Divine’s FT GVC. This has resulted in more sales, but also led to the disruption of the 
direct link between consumer and producer in what clearly reflected the dilution of FT principles 
because of FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and the licensee-based model we discussed in the previous 
key theme. 
In chapter 2, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) asserted that governance has to do with the exercise 
of control along the chain articulated by a set of questions including how it is to be produced or 
the definition of production processes (which may include the technology to be used, quality, 
labour and environmental standards). To this end, Granleese (2009) highlighted the Quality 
Control Division’s (QCD) exercise of control that allowed Ghana to establish a reputation for 
quality which has in turn enabled it to achieve price premiums and the stability of forward 
contracting. The maintenance of quality cocoa exports has been one of the key advantages of 
Ghanaian cocoa in international markets. Quality attracts the price premium, and allows Ghana 
to sell more of its cocoa forward thus providing greater export stability and information on the 
likely revenue expected. On this basis Cocobod is able to set the minimum producer price, 
protecting farmers from seasonal volatility (IDS and University of Ghana, 2006). 
According to interviewee 24-an executive logistics assistant from a prominent LBC-and 
interviewee 32-a corporate responsibility and sustainability head of cocoa from a prominent LBC- 
QCD exercises power and ensures quality in two stages. Firstly, QCD grades and seals cocoa 
beans initially at district level and secondly through second quality check when it’s been delivered 
at warehouses/port. Also, despite the absence of price differential incentives from QCD to LBCs 
between grade 1 and grade 2 cocoa beans, according to Granleese (2009), QCD encourages 
good quality and exercise power through the threat of cocoa rejection, and the risk of sanction. In 
this case, the LBC will either receive only 50% of the cocoa’s value, or the cocoa will be 
confiscated. Beyond sanctions, QCD has also been proactive in maintaining high quality. 
According to IDS and the University of Ghana (2006), QCD has been involved in pre-buying 
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activities, particularly training LBC staff and increasing awareness amongst farmers regarding 
quality issues.  
In this context, it is apparent that the conventional chain through QCD performs at a high level 
and at great scale in relation to quality. Therefore, as mentioned previously in the financing and 
external marketing primary themes, both FT GVCs are overlapping with the conventional GVC at 
quality level. To this end, interviewee 2-a programme manager from the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine 
GVC, suggested that: 
‘‘It's really positive that Cocobod is still involved in terms of the quality of cocoa’’. On top of 
this, interviewee 2 and interviewees 28, 29-from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-mentioned 
that good farming practices training (including quality) takes places in both FT chains, 
complementing in this way the existing quality set up by QCD. Interviewee 9-an ex-director of 
a big chocolate brand/manufacturer-when asked about the role of FT proogrammes in cocoa 
bean quality in Ghana suggested that the ‘‘Ghanaian government is ensuring quality and puts 
a stamp on cocoa’’. 
But beyond the product quality element in which FT has a marginal and complimentary role to the 
QCD, FT has previously focused on process quality through traceability. IDS and the University 
of Ghana (2006) advised us that traceability is one means of ensuring quality that has not 
generally been used in cocoa production, except for designated lines of certified cocoa like FT. 
However, interviewee 2 and interviewee 1-a Director of Policy from a FTO-informed us that 
traceability was abandoned 5 years ago in cocoa in favor of mass balance practice13, whereby 
cocoa from ordinary farms and FT farms is mixed in the manufacturing process (but FT farmers 
still receive the FT price and premium for the e.g. 10% of the overall volume they have provided 
as FT). We will examine the specific reasons why this took place during the ‘‘buyer-driven power 
structure’’ key theme through examining the role of FTI, FTOs and licensees.  
For the purposes of this section though, interviewee 2 insisted that: 
‘‘Traceability is important because it highlights the physical link between consumers and 
producers, which is however, broken with mass balance’’. In fact, interviewee 3-a FTO Board 
                                                          
13 There are two types of Mass Balance: a) Single mass balance-When a producer or company delivers a 
quantity of Fairtrade ingredients to a factory or site, only the equivalent amount of processed Fairtrade 
product leaving that site may be sold as Fairtrade, b) Group Mass Balance-The amount of Fairtrade product 
a company buys must match the amount of the processed product it sells as Fairtrade. The company will 
be audited on the total amount bought and sold from all of their production sites instead of each individual 
site (FTI, 2011). 
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Director-told us that for FTI to move away from traceability is ‘‘a mockery of transparency and 
many FTOs are unhappy because FT and FT principles are diluted’’. On the other hand, 
interviewee 4, a cocoa sustainability manager from a major retailer, told us that traceability is 
not feasible in cocoa due to the market selling structure and that moving to mass balance has 
helped with selling more volume. But, interviewee 2 countered that ‘‘despite increased sales 
the broken link problem between consumer and producer remains now and in the long run. 
This fact is very difficult to explain to consumers’’.  
This development stands in stark contrast to the expectation that FT has generated to consumers, 
as we articulated in the sustainability key theme earlier, whereby consumers expect to be 
connected to farmers through their purchase of FT certified chocolate, without realising that this 
link is not as straightforward as they may think. 
4. Pricing – The interdependency of power mechanisms is also present here, since quality allows 
forward selling (external marketing) thus providing greater export stability and certainty on the 
likely revenue expected, which in turns facilitates the setting of the minimum producer price. 
Setting the minimum price is yet another significant power mechanism implemented by the multi-
stakeholder producer (price) review committee and chaired by the ministry of finance, during 
which the power play around the distribution of the revenue of cocoa bean exports takes place. 
As a result of this process all cocoa farmers obtain a price, which has been consistently above 
the minimum FT price. As such, the FT minimum price has been irrelevant for a number of years, 
a fact that again demonstrates the overlapping character of both FT GVCs with the conventional 
GVC at pricing level. In case this changes in the future, this would further highlight FT’s limited 
scale as only 11% of the farmers would be protected by the FT minimum price, leaving the other 
89% with a lower price. 
In chapter 2, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) suggested that governance has to do with the 
exercise of control along the chain articulated by a set of questions including what is to be 
produced and at what price. Interviewee 38-the executive manager to the CEO of Cocobod-
indicated the lead role Cocobod has in pricing as yet another key power mechanism in its disposal. 
On this basis Cocobod is able to set the minimum producer price, which is set at the Producer 
(Price) review committee through a variety of stakeholders chaired by the ministry of finance and 
including a farmer representative from the national farmers’ association, cocoa hauliers, LBCs, 
Institute of social statistics, the Bank of Ghana and the standards body (who conduct cocoa scale 
inspections). The starting point to kick off this process are the forward sales which determine the 
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end of year FOB projected price. Then, research to determine the crop size follows. Based on the 
previous two factors, the total amount expected in $USD is calculated. In turn, the Bank of Ghana 
provides the rate to covert in cedis and following this, the committee deducts the costs of cocoa 
bags, disease/sprayment, high-tech costs, and scholarships from the previous amount and get 
the net FOB money at their disposal. 
This is when the key power play for the distribution of the ‘‘pie’’ begins among the key commercial 
players including the hauliers, LBCs and the ministry of finance. Interviewee 36, a professor from 
the University of Ghana, informed us that ‘‘the national association of farmers and their 
representative only represent farmers on paper as they are heavily embedded in national politics 
through a Board position in Cocobod and through funding from Cocobod in order to undertake 
major programmes’’. The lack of independence and impartiality from the main political mechanism 
and structure does not allow for proper farmer representation and consequent proper negotiation 
and bargaining power. On the other hand, whilst interviewee 38 told us that all stakeholders are 
supportive of the farmers because they wouldn't exist without them, interviewee 35-a Cocobod 
Director-revealed that hauliers and LBCs lobby hard and usually get what they want in the end. 
Despite Cocobod running cost of production exercises to contest the claims of the participants, 
hauliers tend to leverage the fact they finance political parties in Ghana whilst, according to 
interviewee 38, LBCs often end up with some concessions like lower interest rates (related to the 
seed funding the receive from Cocobod) or reduced time to port (in order for them to effectively 
reduce their cost base).  
The outcome of this process often results in farmers receiving minimum 70% of the net FOB, 
LBCs getting the second highest after the farmers which was around 8% in 2012, Cocobod getting 
10% to pay for staff costs, hauliers around 3.5%, standards authority, QCD-2%, CMC-2% (for 
storing and trading cocoa), stabilisation fund (when prices go up and they have sold low, so that 
the farmers can maintain their income)-2%-interviewee 38. The fact that farmers get the most in 
this process, in comparison to what farmers get in fully liberalised systems as per table 5 earlier, 
has encouraged interviewees 37 and 38 from Cocobod to praise their work and present 
themselves and Cocobod as the institution who acts on behalf of the farmers and protects them 
from market forces in a paternalistic manner.   
In this context, FT has advanced the FT minimum price to combat price volatility and provide the 
farmers with a safety net. In practice though, interviewee 20-a research officer from IDS-
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suggested that ‘‘although FT principles have been articulated in a way to combat problems that 
producers face, they haven't altered power distribution within the value chain’’.  
Interviewees 28, 29-from Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC- and interviewee 2-a programme manager 
from the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC-complimented Cocobod’s involvement in the minimum price 
set In particular, interviewee 28 highlighted that: 
‘‘The minimum FT price is irrelevant as it is set by Cocobod and because it's higher than the 
FT price’’. On top of this, even if FT minimum prices were relevant, it is clear that only 95,900 
FT certified farmers would benefit (FTI, 2014). However the price set by the Ghanaian 
Government covers all 865,000 Ghanaian cocoa farmers, which would inevitably leave 89% of 
farmers receiving a lower price than the FT certified ones. 
5.3.2 GHANAIAN GOVERNMENT ROLE 
Beyond the specific roles that Cocobod undertakes in relation to cocoa, interviewee 35-a Cocobod 
Director-and interviewee 36-a professor from the University of Ghana-suggested there are two 
key broader roles worth highlighting for the Ghanaian Government in relation to cocoa. The first 
one relates to the monetary policy and the second is linked to the lack of infrastructure investment. 
In line with Wallerstein’s (1995) position on the role of states in capital accumulation, Chase-Dunn 
and Grimes’s (1995) reference to the power of states over the lives of their citizens and as 
indicated by FT’s theory of change we have examined in the previous key theme, it’s beyond FT’s 
limited scale, nature and scope to intervene, influence or change these roles that drive impact 
across both FT chains.  
1. Monetary Policy – Cocoa is central to the Ghanaian economy through earning foreign 
exchange (FX) and CMC’s monopoly in the external marketing of cocoa beans is key in securing 
it. This is underpinned by the pricing mechanism we described earlier through the producer (price) 
review committee that may provide 70% of the FOB to the farmers, but the rest goes to maintain 
the system of bureaucratic control around securing the much needed FX. In addition, the share 
of FOB the farmers receive is further undermined when considering the significant depreciation 
of the Ghanaian cedi against the USD. 
In chapter 2, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) mentioned that GVCs are embedded within 
local economic, social and institutional dynamics. In light of this, we have already analysed the 
extent of Cocobod’s financing, external marketing, quality and pricing power mechanism and 
hinted for the central role cocoa plays in the economy through the fact that the Producer (Price) 
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review committee is chaired by the ministry of finance. On this note, interviewee 36, highlighted 
that: 
‘‘Cocoa is the main currency exchange earner so they don't want to change the structure, 
whereby 70% of the price goes to the farmer with the remaining going to pay the structure in 
order to maintain the system of power’’. This was echoed by interviewee 35, who argued that 
‘‘the remaining 30% goes to Cocobod and others in order to maintain the system in place that 
allows control of a main source of income for the country and maintains the power over 
farmers’’. 
The importance of cocoa in the Ghanaian economy in relation to FX can be demonstrated from 
table 6 below, whereby we see the consistent contribution of cocoa exports as a percentage of 
the total export revenue in Ghana. FAO (2013) further added that cocoa is the most important 
export crop in relation to its GDP contribution, which stood at 8.2% in 2010. 
Table 6: Cocoa exports as share of Ghanaian export revenue 
Year 1990 1995 1999 2003 2005 2007 
Cocoa Export 
Share 
40% 46% 27% 39% 36% 32% 
Source: Tiffen et al, ICCO, Economic Intelligence Unit quoted in Granleese (2008) 
The extent of political influence in relation to FX through cocoa trading was made explicit during 
our discussion with interviewee 37-a CMC marketing manager. He admitted there is significant 
pressure when making trading decisions as they realise the importance this has for the broader 
macro-economy but also for the farmers on a micro level through the FOB price they will receive 
through the workings of the producer (price) review committee. This pressure is carefully 
managed through a hedging strategy that spreads the risk through having buyer diversity and 
selling at different timeframes in order to smooth return and provide stability. But even 
sophisticated hedging and trading strategies had to be put aside in the past due to a political 
decision that forced them to make a sale.  
Also, as we have seen earlier, despite the better prices farmers receive in relation to their 
counterparts in fully liberalised markets and the associated enthusiastic claims of Cocobod 
officials, interviewee 35 chose to counter them by highlighting the significant depreciation of cedi 
against the USD, as per figure 14. So, although the farmers were getting more cedis, their relative 
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value was lower against the USD compared to previous years. Consequently, interviewee 42-a 
technical advisor in the World Cocoa Foundation-advanced that ‘‘the cedi value has dropped over 
the past few years prompting the prices of inputs to go higher’’, putting in this way the high FOB 
% farmers received in perspective.  
Figure 14: Cedi (GH¢) per $USD Exchange Rate-Dec. Interbank Market 
Source: Bank of Ghana Statistical Bulletin (2010, 2015) 
2. Lack of Infrastructure Investment – Beyond the depreciation of the cedi against the dollar, 
the lack of infrastructure investment by the government, especially across transport, was visible 
and detrimental for farmers’ well-being. This has also been the case for investment related to the 
cocoa supply chain, such as stocking infrastructure. In relation to this, FT has been limited given 
its scope and resources to address large scale infrastructural challenges. In particular, in the 
Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC, the FT premium has been directed exclusively to farm improvement 
and not broader infrastructure investment, limited by their productivity-led corporate sustainability 
approach in response to their security of supply concerns. On the other hand, in the Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine’s GVC, some of the FT premium has been used in health services, and education, but the 
investments do not reach the whole membership. 
In chapter 2, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) outlined the five main dimensions the GVC 
approach explores which included the institutional context and the infrastructure availability within 
GVCs are embedded. In light of this, farmers cited infrastructure as one of the main challenges, 
including transport and access to schools-interviewing groups 30 and 31. Indeed, the first visible 
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infrastructure challenge we faced was transportation and good roads on the way to conduct 
interviews with farmers in the main farming region, Ashanti. Interviewee 35-a Cocobod Director-
admitted that the ‘‘Government hasn't done much for farmers. They haven't catered for 
infrastructure (roads, transportation), education (schools are far away), so these issues magnify 
and contribute to the issue of child labor’’.  
IDS and the University of Ghana (2006) added that the lack of transport related infrastructure has 
a tremendous impact on cocoa and non-cocoa activities and on market access, accessibility of 
services and other facilities. The lack of good transport links was related to the second most often 
cited infrastructure challenge related to cocoa, lack of schools, lack of accessibility or lack of 
teachers/equipment, that has been driving child labour in cocoa farms. Interviewee 36 explained 
that since schools are not available or inaccessible, parents tend to take their kids with them in 
the cocoa farms to help them out as the cocoa production process is a highly labour intensive 
process and it’s expensive to hire labour. In this context, he emphasised that: 
‘‘It's easy to understand that it's not just about the FT price that FT offers or Cocobod’s FOB 
price, farmers need a fair price that allows them to pay for all the extensive steps involved in 
the production process and proper infrastructure to be in place’’. 
Other interviewees, like interviewee 42-a technical advisor in the World Cocoa Foundation-
focused more on the lack of government investment related to the cocoa supply chain. To this 
end, he referred to the stocking infrastructure as means to control world cocoa prices and increase 
the amount of farmers will be getting for their cocoa. Since the price of cocoa is based on stocks 
and since Ghana is currently selling forward without warehousing, Ghana would be able to benefit 
more if they were able to provide more infrastructure for stocking cocoa beans. Stocking will help 
in the control of world prices and eventually increase the amount farmers will be getting for their 
cocoa. The Dutch cocoa processing industry, for example, are thriving because of their good 
system of stocking. 
In this context, interviewee 19-a manager from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-mentioned that 
Mondelez have been having policy discussions with Cocobod as part of their involvement in 
Cocoa Life, as well as looking at infrastructure challenges within their holistic programme in their 
communities. However, it has been made clear to us by interviewee 28-programme manager from 
the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-that: 
134 | P a g e  
 
‘‘The FT premium needs to be used for farm improvement only as per Mondelez's demands’’. 
On the other hand, according to Nelson et al. (2013), Kuapa Kokoo has invested some of the 
Fairtrade premium in health services and education (e.g. school refurbishment/construction), 
but the investments do not reach the whole of Kuapa’s membership. 
5.3.3 VALUE ADDED 
Beyond the national dimension we have already articulated through Cocobod’s power 
mechanisms and the specific roles, motivations and actions (or the lack of) that the Ghanaian 
government undertakes in relation to cocoa, there is also a strong international political 
dimension. This is often exercised through foreign governments’ tariff escalation and foreign direct 
investment which are underpinned by the lack of genuine Ghanaian ambition or success 
regarding in-country value added policies. In this section, we will therefore argue that whilst 
processing and marketing add value, most developing countries including Ghana tend to export 
raw cocoa beans, unlike the developed ones that add value. Whilst FT’s scope does not allow 
involvement in this, the main drivers for this have been tariff escalation, foreign direct investment 
and national policies. 
Therefore, the following analysis is in line with Wallerstein’s (1995) position on the role of states 
in defending capital accumulation and monopolising capitalists against competition. It also builds 
on the systemic approach of GVCs and world-systems theory that focuses on the core-periphery 
power relations as the real development dynamic whereby core states are outcomes of this rather 
than units (McMichael, 2000). In relation to FT, as indicated by FT’s theory of change we have 
examined in the previous key theme, it’s beyond FT’s limited scope to intervene and influence 
impact related to upgrading from the political angle. In light of this, we earlier referred to upgrading 
through Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) who described it as the movement within the value 
chain by examining how producers can shift between different stages of the chain. This could 
take place through product, process or functional upgrading. Here, we will only focus on upgrading 
from a political/national government angle. Upgrading will also be further discussed in the ‘‘buyer-
driven power structure’’ and in the ‘‘chain relations and coordination’’ key themes from Divine’s 
and Mondelez’s point of view within their FT chains. 
To illustrate our argument on value added above, Oxfam (2002) noted that processing and 
marketing add value along the supply/value chain. Since most commodities from developing 
countries are exported in unprocessed form, only a tiny share of final value stays in the exporting 
country. On the other hand, value added by processing and marketing remains in industrialised 
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countries.  With regards to cocoa, FAO (2004) indicated that developing countries concentrate on 
exporting over 80% of unprocessed cocoa beans instead of adding value through processing and 
marketing. Ghana exacerbates this pattern since, as per figure 15 below, raw cocoa beans on 
average accounted for 93% of the average total export of raw, semi-finished and finished cocoa 
products from 2005-10. We examine the main drivers of this trend below. 
Figure 15: Ghana raw/processed cocoa share of exports - (2005-2010) average in tonnes
Source: Calculated from FAO (2013) 
1. Tariff Escalation – Tariff escalation contributes to the large percentage of raw cocoa beans 
exported as opposed to adding value in Ghana and exporting semi-finished products or chocolate. 
This is largely taking place as a result of EU’s exercise of power in order to protect the extensive 
European (mainly driven by the Dutch) chocolate processing industry. Since FT’s scope is to work 
within the existing trading system, it is not within its scope to challenge tariff escalation or similar 
power mechanisms that are disadvantaging developing countries and their farmers.  
To illustrate, interviewee 36, explained that: 
‘‘Although they try to add value in Ghana as indicated by Ghanaian government’s target on 
paper to process 60% of cocoa in country, there is tariff escalation in place by the EU on the 
basis that they have an extensive processing industry in the Netherlands, which they want to 
protect from competition’’.  
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Building on this FAO (2008) added that cocoa beans face 0% tariff facilitating in this way their 
export in raw form, whilst FAO (2004) suggested that tariff escalation is particularly pronounced 
and stands at 9% for cocoa butter and 22% for chocolate. In order to further justify the significance 
of the European processing industry in the tariff escalation power mechanism, we note the World 
Cocoa Foundation’s cocoa market update (2014) whereby it’s suggested that the Netherlands is 
the largest processing country by volume, handling about 13% of global grindings and Europe as 
a whole comprises nearly 40% of the processing market. On top of this, it is evident from figure 
16 below why the EU has a strong incentive to maintain the tariff escalation mechanism in place, 
since they imported around 58% of the raw cocoa beans from Ghana. 
Figure 16: Main cocoa trade partners of Ghana by volume (tonnes) in 2005-2011 
Source: Cocobod quoted in FAO (2013) 
2. Foreign Investment/Support – Foreign governments are also trying to protect their industries 
in ways beyond tariffs, that involve direct investment on-the-ground where cocoa is produced. In 
mirroring the corporate sustainability agenda of TNCs we referred to in the previous key theme, 
national governments of developed countries, like the Netherlands, are investing in Ghana in 
order to ensure security of supply. In relation to FT, the scale and nature of support of this kind of 
initiatives is vastly different to the one provided by DFID for Divine’s chocolate set-up. 
To illustrate the ambition, IDH (2010) suggested that the Dutch cocoa sector is very dynamic and 
puts a lot of effort in becoming sustainable. The Netherlands, being a prominent player in the 
cocoa sector, want to contribute to that by giving a clear signal towards this objective. Therefore, 
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in collaboration with the Dutch Initiative for Sustainable Trade (IDH), the Dutch Ministries of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs have been preparing 
a letter of intent to be signed by national and international players in the Dutch cocoa market. By 
signing this letter, they commit to strive for the achievement of full sustainability by the year 2025.  
Following this, interviewee 33-a logistics manager from a major cocoa processor/trader-
elaborated that ‘‘the Dutch Government pledged $7million in 2013 in support of cocoa 
sustainability and other social issues in cocoa’’. Solidaridad (2013), a major civil society 
organisation providing sustainability services, confirmed that they have secured a major funding 
deal worth €7 million through the Dutch Embassy in Accra to implement the Cocoa Rehabilitation 
and Intensification Programme (CORIP) over four years. This programme will enable them to go 
beyond certification, through laying the foundations for long-term sustainability so that farmers 
can earn their way out of poverty. To this end, a consortium of Ghanaian government partners, 
key private sector partners and knowledge institutions will develop new production models that 
will emphasise on the economic benefits of sustainable production. 
In this context and in relation to support from foreign governments at a more modest scale and 
nature, interviewee 12-an ex-chair of a FTO-highlighted that Kuapa Kokoo in the past has 
received DFID’s £400,000 loan guarantee to set up Divine Chocolate. This took place whilst 
underlining the success and uniqueness of Divine’s model to the extent no else could replicate 
their farmer ownership model in a commercial way. However, he acknowledged the limitations of 
Divine deriving from its limited scale and capital scale. In fact, it was suggested that the difficulty 
lies in getting the investment without diluting farmer ownership and argued that if political support 
was in place through DFID-just like in the past-could support and fund Divine at Mondelez’s scale. 
3. National Policies – As we have already discussed, both tariff escalation and foreign direct 
investment do not encourage further value-added processing of raw cocoa beans in Ghana. 
Nonetheless, this is underpinned by a genuine lack of ambition and willingness for a value-added 
in-country strategy. Despite the potential to fill this gap, at FT principle level, FT is also geared 
towards exporting raw cocoa beans instead of adding value on the basis of the financial resources 
required. Contrary to FTI’s stance, at implementation level in Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC, value 
added has been acknowledged as a shortcoming.   
Despite the earlier claim of interviewee 36, that Ghanaian government’s target is to process 60% 
of cocoa in country, interviewee 46-a deputy marketing manager in CPC-provided us with a 
different reality. CPC is the local processing company, whose majority shareholder is Cocobod, 
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which manufactures semi-finished products and sells mainly to European 
wholesalers/international traders. CPC operates with very small margins and require to do 
transactions in large volumes in order to make reasonable profit. However, they are forced to 
operate at 50% capacity when they actually require at least 80% operation in order just to break 
even. This is due to security of supply issues, or to put it simply, multinational processing 
companies are providing very stiff competition as they compete for the same beans, thus making 
it difficult for CPC to compete via securing the right amount of beans required to run a profitable 
business at over 80% capacity. The key to this is CMC’s preference to selling beans to 
multinational processors. ‘‘Although both CPC and multinational processors pay in USD, which 
fulfills the government’s monetary FX goals, CMC still prefers to sell cocoa beans to the 
multinationals on the basis of wanting to be the rich man’s friend and potentially larger scale of 
purchasing’’-ibid. 
As a result, CPC has been loss-making for many years and now that the local demand is picking 
up they cannot recapitalise due to poor historical financial performance. Furthermore, previous 
government policy was towards adding value to semi-finished and not to the end product due to 
limited local demand. Consequently, CPC’s previous expansion was geared towards semi-
finished products and not end product as they failed to account for good future income analysis 
that would allow investment in the end product-interviewee 46. Although internal demand for 
chocolate has been low in the past, interviewee 45-the Head of Cocoa Life programme-cited the 
opportunity to curb the power of international processing companies through the growth of internal 
demand. Hence, she called for the government to revise its decision not to invest in exploiting the 
local market, stimulate internal demand and limit its focus on selling raw cocoa beans for foreign 
exchange.  
The above narrative could potentially present an attractive opportunity for FT or other schemes 
to support or facilitate a shift to value added in country. However, FT’s sole focus on raw beans 
and lack of any value added related principles, as we have seen in chapter 2, does not help 
towards this end. To counter this, interviewee 47-a manager from FTI- highlighted the significant 
scale and financial muscle required to add value and the difficulty with adding value through 
processing cocoa as opposed to tea. She also argued that ‘‘horizontal integration through 
fermenting and drying adds value and it’s more realistic due to the zero capital required’’. 
However, interviewee 45 stated that: 
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‘‘Farmers remain dependent if they only export raw beans and advocated for the creation of a 
brand which looks at local manufacturing, whilst asking what would happen if big brands 
lobbied for only 1% of the chocolate to come from cocoa beans’’. 
5.3.4 FARMER ORGANISATION AND EMPOWERMENT 
Despite FT’s severe limitations in value added and the areas we discussed earlier, farmer 
organisation and empowerment has been noted as one of the areas that FT is making great and 
true difference. As such, in the following paragraphs we will develop this through building on our 
feminist power analyses we presented in chapter 2, whereby we outlined power seen as 
empowerment in the sense of a capacity or ability to empower or transform oneself and others. 
Consequently, Temperley (2013) suggested focusing on power emerging through cooperation 
between the dominated in order to acquire a fuller understanding of different strands of power 
and a bottom-up view of power. On this note, all of the cocoa farmers we have interviewed in 
Ashanti, from interviewing groups 30 and 31, stated that empowerment to them is paramount. 
They linked empowerment to political empowerment and farmer organisation and suggested that 
it is more important than economic empowerment. They also highlighted this is the case as: 
‘‘Political empowerment gives them the ability to negotiate for better economic incentives and 
that political empowerment is important for them in order to sustain any benefits going 
forward’’. On this basis, the certification and deputy certification manager from Armajaro-
interviewee group 27-highlighted the importance of FT in ‘‘ensuring sustainability through the 
strengthening of the farmer organisation which will remain in place when certifications like FT 
might not be in place’’. 
1. Conventional GVC Farmer Empowerment – So far in this key theme, we have argued that 
Cocobod, the Ghanaian government, hauliers, LBCs and foreign governments are well organised 
and have great power in the conventional chain as compared to farmers. In particular, at national 
level, this ‘‘power over’’ is often articulated in a paternalistic and highly political manner and 
utilised in order to gain political edge. To counter this, farmers can only rely on some profit-driven 
LBCs who run FT certification but do not truly help farmers organise themselves, or the National 
Farmers’ Association, which is embedded in the political structure itself. 
To illustrate the political manner that power is exercised in Ghana in relation to cocoa farmers, 
interviewee 41-a cocoa program officer from Solidaridad-told us that: 
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‘‘Cocoa in Ghana is a political crop as it is the main foreign exchange earner, but is also 
leveraged as a mechanism to collect votes through distribution of fertilisers and road 
construction ahead of elections’’. 
This has been further underlined by a highly disempowering and paternalistic culture cultivated 
mainly by Cocobod officials who claim that farmers cannot do it themselves as they don't know 
where to spend money on-interviewee 47. This has been verified by interviewee 18-a Cocobod 
marketing manager-who made a series of statements about farmers that display the lack of 
empowerment prevalent: ‘‘All efforts to help farmers including certification and sustainability 
schemes must be coordinated with Cocobod as farmers are not educated’’… ‘‘Big companies 
cannot understand the sociopolitical context; farmers will go ahead and get married with the 
additional certification money’’… ‘‘Cocobod did not fully liberalise because they don't want anyone 
to deal with farmers directly’’. 
As discussed above when interviewing cocoa farmers, from interviewing groups 30 and 31, it 
quickly became apparent that farmer organisation and stronger unions are an essential demand 
of farmers. This is particularly striking when considering that the majority of farmers are not 
members of the farmers’ association, they are members of LBCs though, according to interviewee 
36-a professor from the University of Ghana. Within LBCs, we were often told that farmers are 
not empowered at all and have a rather transactional relationship with mainstream LBCs, 
something we will talk about in more detail later. This relationship is slightly different though when 
farmers are involved with LBCs who are undertaking FT certification like Armajaro. Due to the FT 
requirement of setting up a farmer cooperative, the LBCs have to facilitate the formation of farmer 
groups. Although interviewee 26-the head of sustainability from Armajaro-claimed that their 
farmer groups are more efficient than others because they always have LBC representatives at 
their meetings, interviewee 41 reminded us that often such LBCs do not formally register the 
farmer group as a co-operative. This is taking place due to the high cost of registration but also 
so that the farmers have less power and carry on selling to them whilst having less of say where 
the FT premiums go.  
In our attempt to understand whether there was any organisation that farmers could rely on in 
terms of proper representation and empowerment, interviewee 36 pointed to the National 
Farmers’ Association, which we briefly talked about earlier. Interviewee 43, the National Chief 
Farmer of the Association, suggested that some of the advantages of his Association were its 
national remit, access to Cocobod and its bottom-up representation approach. However, the 
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disadvantages, cited by interviewee 36, pointed to the fact that it’s embedded in the existing highly 
politicised structure to the extent that it can’t adequately represent farmers and that farmers don’t 
feel a sense of belonging. Instead they feel they belong to district/community level whilst the 
government deals directly with the association however. In this context, farmers unions are unable 
to get assistance for farmers unless there is political motivation. As a result, interviewee 35, a 
Cocobod Director, explicitly told us that: 
‘‘Farmers are the weakest, they have no voice, but if they had more political power they could 
rattle the system’’. 
2. Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC Farmer Empowerment – On the other hand, Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine’s GVC has unanimously being acknowledged to be the best for farmer empowerment, 
including farmer ownership, a bottom-up approach, forward integration, close relationships and 
women empowerment, underpinned by strong democratic processes and governance. As a 
result, we argue that this chain went above and ‘‘beyond FT’’ principle level and the result of this 
could be classed as upgrading. To elaborate, the key ingredients of this success relating to 
empowerment that were often mentioned during our interviews are:  
a. Ownership of Divine – We earlier saw that Kuapa Kokoo’s farmers decided to invest in a 
chocolate bar of their own and launched Divine Chocolate in order to capture more value from 
the retail price of chocolate and not because of the FT principles we earlier examined in chapter 
2. Nonetheless, this has further advanced and promoted FT as a key example of a successful FT 
case study, although its uniqueness cannot be fully attributed to FT. On this note, interviewee 9-
an ex-director of sustainability from a major chocolate brand/manufacturer-noted that: 
‘‘Divine is characterised by farmer ownership, while empowerment is the main difference 
between FTOs and commercial organisations as this is the true value of FT that derives from 
the FTO model of ownership’’. 
To support this, interviewee 10-a senior Manager from the FT Foundation-and interviewee 11-an 
ex-sustainability director from a major chocolate brand/manufacturer-informed us that Divine’s 
belief in FT is manifested through farmer ownership. Interviewee 12-ex-chair of a FTO-further 
advanced that their model on farmer ownership has attributed a different meaning to the 
relationship between farmers and consumers. As a result of this, Nelson et al. (2013) suggested 
that the 45% part-ownership of Divine also allows for dividend payments when profits are made 
and a producer support levy is paid by Divine to the Farmers Trust. 
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b. Bottom-up and collective approach to empowerment – Interviewee 35 pointed to the fact 
that the main feature of Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s GVC is the bottom-up approach. In turn, 
interviewee 12, highlighted that Divine has been enabling people to think in a different way, 
through giving farmers the freedom to make their own decisions on how to spend a. the price of 
cocoa, b. FT premium, c. Divine’s supply chain investment through 2% of turnover and d. dividend. 
As such, ‘‘Divine doesn’t fit the Northern intellectual model-they utilised a bottom-up model 
instead’’. Interviewee 45-the Head of Cocoa Life programme-added that with regards to the 
payment and decision-making on FT premiums, although Kuapa system’s was initially at national 
level after consultation with farmers they have decided to decentralise. 
c. Forward integration – In the conventional GVC context we have set out earlier, LBCs buy 
farmers’ cocoa beans. In Kuapa-Divine’s GVC though, interviewee 26-the head of Sustainability 
from Armajaro-told us that Kuapa Kokoo Ltd was set up by the farmers as an LBC to buy their 
own cocoa. This is also an initiative that did not take place solely because of the FT certification 
that does not entail provisions for forward integration. Nelson et al. (2013) suggested that 97% of 
Kuapa Kokoo Ltd is owned by the Kuapa Kokoo farmers’ union, whilst confirming that Kuapa 
Kokoo continues to be the only farmer-owned producer organisation with a license to buy cocoa 
in Ghana, partly as a result of Fairtrade and the support from partner organisations such as Twin. 
In addition, interviewee 2-a programme manager from the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC-suggested 
that the ‘‘set up through the LBC buying the farmers cocoa allows for traceability’’, which boosts 
quality as we have explained earlier. 
d. Kuapa Kokoo-Divine relationship – The in-depth relationship between Kuapa Kokoo and 
Divine has already been established through Divine’s set up we talked about earlier. This 
relationship has been maintained and strengthened in the ensuing years, according to interviewee 
19-a manager from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-who argued that ‘‘Divine is closer to Kuapa so 
they know where the FT money goes and are involved in the day-to-day operations’’. On the same 
note, interviewee 9, informed us that ‘‘Divine is specifically characterised by an in depth 
relationship with Kuapa Kokoo, through mutual risk sharing and accountability’’. Beyond this, at 
operational level, interviewee 8-a Board member of a FTO-referred to the close working 
relationship between Divine and Kuapa through the partnership with Twin. As such, Nelson et al. 
(2013) explained that since Divine started to turn a profit it has dedicated 2% of its annual turnover 
to a Producer Support and Development (PS&D) programme, implemented by Twin with Kuapa 
Kokoo.  This programme has facilitated farmer empowerment through recruitment and mentoring 
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of senior managers, facilitating farmers’ involvement in FT consultation processes and education 
and information campaigns. 
e. Democratic governance and processes – Kuapa Kokoo has invested in developing a 
democratic organisation, run by farmers, with regular meetings that take place at different levels 
and opportunities for farmers to rise to management. This has led to an established governance 
structure that holds elections and an AGM. On top of this, Twin has been supporting education 
and information campaigns with members on democratic principles, training for newly elected 
representatives of the national, district and society executive councils to understand their roles 
and responsibilities as leaders, and reviews of organisational governance and structure and 
exposure to good practice in other cooperatives (ibid). Interviewee 2 suggested that: 
‘‘The level of empowerment achieved in Divine’s chain has urged them to view upgrading form 
the angle of supporting democratic governance, operational systems and empowerment 
though organisation in cooperatives. This is on the basis that democratic organisation is more 
important than certification and volumes sold’’. 
In relation to the bottom-up and collective approach to empowerment we described earlier, 
interviewee 7, an ex-Chair of a FTO, underlined that farmers determine how to spend the FT 
premium through democratic procedures. 
f. Women empowerment – In line with our gender-aware approach in chapter 2, FT in Kuapa-
Divine’s GVC has been instrumental in facilitating women empowerment. To this end, interviewee 
8 suggested that the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC with the support of Twin are aiming for broader 
development indicators such as female emancipation. Therefore, Kuapa Kokoo has a clear policy 
on gender equality and women’s empowerment underpinned by a genuine commitment to 
supporting women smallholders. This can be illustrated by the fact that clear quotas for women’s 
representation at different levels are set and at least two executive positions are reserved for 
women. The most notable example is that the President of Kuapa Kokoo’s union is currently a 
woman (Nelson et al., 2013). Another example comes from a woman who was elected in 
management as a society recorder, which allowed her to mobilise women farmers into forming 
group to manage an income-generating project (Twin, no date). These initiatives have led 
interviewee 3-a FTO Board Director- to link women empowerment to upgrading.  
3. Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC Farmer Empowerment – In contrast to Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s 
GVC that is more established and has been there since 1997, Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC has 
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been only established recently, in 2012. This has resulted in limitations when trying to identify the 
exact nature and extent of empowerment. What has become apparent though, is that despite the 
formal democratic procedures and decentralised approach to FT premiums, farmer empowerment 
in this chain has been top-down, excluded farmer ownership and was driven by security of supply 
considerations, which have been guiding the programme, as per our sustainability key theme 
earlier. 
In our chains description earlier, we outlined the five outcomes that Cocoa life is striving to 
achieve, that also demonstrate Cocoa Life’s intention to go beyond the confines of FT as 
articulated by its principles. Although political empowerment was not mentioned as part of the list, 
interviewees 29- the project facilitator & district lead from Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC-informed 
us that in terms of a formal process, the department of cooperatives was involved in registering 
farmers as a cooperative whilst membership has been increasing in the unions. With regards to 
democratic processes and governance, they highlighted that AGM and elections take place, whilst 
they audit adherence to democratic procedures and facilitate farmers’ forums at district and 
national level. Beyond this, we were told that farmers are required to develop action plans at 
community, district and national level and they ensure that at least the community action plan is 
working. Finally, they have been empowering farmers through negotiation skills improvement so 
they can deal better with input dealers and hold government officials accountable. 
In terms of gender empowerment, interviewee 45-the Head of Cocoa Life programme-highlighted 
the need to go beyond farmer level and mobilise farmers around development issues including 
gender and voice. As such, Cocoa Life (2014) first established a baseline which indicated that 
female farmers have levels of income and productivity 25-30% below those of male counterparts. 
On this basis, they identified that interventions across Cocoa Life’s five desired outcomes that 
effectively address gender gaps in farmer training and access to finance could have large positive 
impacts on productivity and income levels for female farmers and sharply reduce gender 
inequality in the sector. In contrast to Kuapa Kokoo’s interventions on women and the quotas for 
women’s representation, the explicit focus on productivity of the overall programme including 
gender interventions, as well as the lack of focus on political empowerment, was confirmed by 
interviewee 45. Interviewee 1, a director of policy from a FTO, confirmed that: 
‘‘Mondelez invest in FT, but that's to ensure their security of supply. As such, they launched 
Cocoa Life to improve sustainability and productivity’’, whilst interviewee 35-a Cocobod 
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Director-stated that ‘‘Mondelez go about their security of supply motivation in a subtle way 
through helping the community and without focusing on the political dimension’’. 
Besides the lack of focus on political empowerment, interviewee 45 suggested a subtle difference 
between Cocoa Life and Divine regarding empowerment: ‘‘Cocoa Life operates at the district level 
and is much closer to the farmers than Kuapa who had national system and is now trying to further 
decentralise like we have’’. She further added that Cocoa Life’s approach is more beneficial with 
regards to payment of FT premiums to the farmers as decision are being made closer to the 
farmer level. Nonetheless, this has been undermined by the focus on productivity we mentioned 
before, since interviewee 28-programme manager from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC, 
mentioned that: 
‘‘The FT premium is going only towards farm improvement for productivity purposes’’. 
This leads us to the other key differences noted which are related to ownership and the bottom-
up approach to empowerment that Divine has practiced extensively. Interviewee 35 has labeled 
Cocoa Life as ‘‘top-down’’ as it doesn’t involve ownership or forward integration to LBC driven by 
their farmers’ cooperative and, as we have seen earlier, decisions are made on the basis of 
productivity and security of supply concerns from the top. Instead, farmers only get advice 
regarding the best LBCs to buy their cocoa with the main buyer being PBC. Interviewee 45 also 
suggested that, in Cocoa Life, farmers got together in 3 ways. Firstly, the first 100 communities 
were chosen by the partners of the programme. This resulted in 10 - 12 percent of the 
communities having little interest in the programme. Secondly, farmers came together through 
applying and responding to media advertisements through which 109 communities were selected. 
Lastly, another 130 undeserved communities from the Volta region were indicated from Cocobod 
and selected by Cocoa Life. Therefore, on the basis of the top-down approach and lack of political 
focus, interviewee 9 questioned Cocoa Life’s definition of empowerment and true motivation, 
whilst explicitly saying that: 
‘‘The difference between Divine and Mondelez is farmer empowerment’’. 
4. Limitations – Despite the differences in relation to the nature, definition, motivations and 
features of empowerment between the FT chains described above, both chains face certain 
limitations that haven’t allowed them to fully effect large scale change and true power shift. These 
limitations can be grouped into: Contextual, scale, demand and cooperatives specific.  
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We argue that the contextual limitations arise from the historical mistrust of cooperatives in 
Ghana, as well as the infrastructural challenges and gender norms. As such, the farmer 
empowerment through democratic organisation in cooperatives and gender-focused initiatives we 
described earlier across both GVCs, has been limited to a certain extent. As such, we have build 
on what we earlier discussed in chapter 2, whereby Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) outlined 
the five main dimensions the GVC approach explores which included the institutional context and 
the infrastructure availability within GVCs are embedded. To this end, interviewee 35 highlighted 
the historical dimensions related to farmer empowerment through organisation in cooperatives in 
Ghana. He referred to the traditional mistrust of cooperatives in Ghana especially from the 1960s 
when co-operatives were imposed to farmers and their leadership exploited the farmers. The fact 
that Kuapa had corrupt leaders at some stage-who they managed to get rid of -verified the 
historical view. Interviewees 27-certification manager & deputy from Armajaro-further pointed to 
the embedment of cooperatives in Ghanaian politics due to political parties utilising cooperatives 
in their partisan politics, but also because of the political ambitions of the cooperatives leaders. 
This underpins the weakness of cooperative power in Ghana in representing farmers’ interests 
and marks a stark difference with cooperatives in Ivory Coast and Latin America which are 
stronger. The embedment in Ghanaian politics has also been verified through our experience of 
the National farmers’ association we discussed earlier. 
The embedment in Ghanaian politics and the adverse impact on business can be illustrated from 
the following narrative around Kuapa’s past involvement in politics that allegedly contributed to 
Kuapa’s business decline since 2006 when it was the 3rd best LBC in Ghana. The then president 
of Kuapa’s union belonged to the opposition party at the time in Ghana and attempted to convince 
farmers to vote for the opposition party in the upcoming elections. At the same time, he had 
financed his son to contest as MP of the opposition party. So, when the then Kuapa’s president 
lost the union elections in 2006-which was flawed with lots of controversies-this eventually led the 
union and the entire company into a legal tangle. As a result, many of the farmers lost hope in the 
union whilst it lost most of its buyers because of the legal battle and the inability on the part of 
Kuapa to provide the target for buyers and perform (ibid). 
In relation to gender and the associated initiatives we mentioned earlier, Nelson et al. (2013) 
conveyed that despite the initiatives that took place in the Kuapa-Divine’s GVC, there has been 
no significant change in gender relations manifested through the control of income and assets or 
the gender division of labour within households, although women’s representation has increased.   
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Historically, women generally have had less access to and control of land compared to men and 
the entrenched socially ascribed gender norms in farming have not been overturned. 
Another important contextual consideration was brought to our attention when interviewee 36-a 
professor from the University of Ghana-reminded us that: 
‘‘It is challenging to achieve proper representation when farmers are hampered with the 
education, health and infrastructure issues’’, as we outlined earlier. ‘‘Despite the legitimate 
efforts for farmer organisation and political empowerment that FT facilitates, farmers are 
inevitably interested more in the FT incentives, like the FT premium’’. 
This is because they see the route through being members of farmers association costly and 
impractical, as they would likely need to travel to district level to join meetings. However, 
associations at this level are not strong enough; only national-level unions are strong if they are 
not embedded in the existing political structure. This demonstrates the scale challenge that 
interviewee 4-a cocoa sustainability manager from a major retailer-and interviewee 8-a Board 
member of a FTO-posed for FT when discussing farmer empowerment and organisation. 
According to them, FT through both Divine and Cocoa Life are niche. In particular, interviewee 35 
quantified the limited upgrading potential of FT it for us. Using volume as the only criterion, he 
highlighted that only 1% of volume sold is in FT terms ‘‘and even if you add up volumes from all 
certifications, it wouldn't go beyond 5% of the overall volume’’.  
The third type of limitation derives from the choice of FT to ‘‘go mainstream’’ that inevitably means 
having to align to the profit-driven motives of the TNCs. To this end, both FT GVCs have been 
limited with regards to their potential to enhance farmer empowerment due to business 
imperatives and demand that depends on a purchasing decision of a buyer abroad. For example, 
interviewee 4 expressed concerns about the scalability and the business rationale of FT on the 
basis that it is very costly and cumbersome to run democratic processes in a context whereby 
farmers are so geographically spread. In particular, she expressed her willingness to source FT 
cocoa and chocolate from Latin America as opposed to Africa and Ghana since she thinks that 
democratic organisation into co-ops is not feasible and practical.  
The fourth type of limitation was brought to our consideration by interviewee 32-a corporate 
responsibility and sustainability head of cocoa from a prominent LBC. Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of political empowerment, he emphasised the significant role of motivations in farmer 
organisation and empowerment. He stressed that 40% of these cocoa farmer organisations are 
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dysfunctional as many of these are formed and run on wrong motives and this threatens their 
survival. FT premiums are supposed to motivate farmers, but farmer organisations tend to focus 
and depend too much on the money from premiums, which is bad for the sustainability of the 
farmer organisation. Furthermore, the size of the farmer cooperative was cited as one of the 
success factors as benefits are spread thinly in case of large membership and leadership often 
loses direct contact with farmers (Nelson et al., 2013). To this end we were informed that the 
majority of Kuapa's problems stem from their large membership-interviewee 35.   
5.3.5 CONCLUSION 
The main argument in this key theme was founded on Wallerstein’s position (1995) around the 
role of states in defending capital accumulation, in relation to FT’s choice to work with TNCs 
instead. This was underpinned by a situation whereby Cocobod exercises extensive power 
mechanisms like financing of cocoa purchases, external marketing of cocoa beans, quality control 
and pricing. In this context, both FT GVCs had no option but to comply and work within these 
parameters, which effectively means that the FT and conventional GVCs overlap at financing, 
external marketing, quality and pricing level.  
As such, across these levels, FT was deemed redundant due to the strong role of the state in a 
partially liberalised market structure and the scale of the undertaking. However, FT could 
potentially provide a complimentary role in quality control through traceability, but this was 
abandoned in commercial FT GVCs, like Cocoa Life-Mondelez in what clearly reflected the 
dilution of FT principles because of FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. At pricing level, the FT minimum price 
has been consistently below than the price set by the producer (price) review committee and even 
if it wasn’t it would have been applicable to only 11% of the farming population unlike the price 
set by Cocobod that applies to all farmers. 
Beyond the specific roles that Cocobod undertakes in relation to cocoa, we further argued that 
FT’s role continued to go unnoticed as we analysed the importance of cocoa as a foreign 
exchange earner for the Ghanaian economy in the context of a constantly depreciating cedi and 
consistent underinvestment in infrastructure that adversely affects the lives of farmers. In relation 
to infrastructure, the role of FT at macro-level has been undermined due to the scale of 
requirement and that it was out of FT’s scope. But, at micro-level it should be noted that despite 
some of the FT premium has been invested in health services and education, the investments did 
not reach the whole Kuapa Kokoo membership in Kuapa-Divine’s GVC. On the other hand, in 
Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC, the FT premium has been directed exclusively to farm improvement 
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and not broader infrastructure investment. In relation to upgrading, FT has also been marginalised 
especially in relation to tariff escalation and direct investment from foreign governments. And, 
despite the potential to fill the gap regarding in country value-added processing of cocoa beans, 
FT’s orientation towards exporting raw cocoa beans further exacerbated the existing primary 
product export tendency, contrary to this been acknowledged as a shortcoming by the Cocoa Life-
Mondelez’s GVC.  
But, despite FT’s shortcomings we have argued so far, our FT chains have initiated true qualitative 
differences in farmer organisation and empowerment, albeit not fully because of FT. This took 
place by going beyond the FT principles due to the goals and motivations of Kuapa and its farmers 
(e.g. forward integration) and Mondelez’s holistic focus (driven by it security of supply 
considerations that undermined farmer empowerment to some extent). So, whilst farmers in the 
conventional chain are powerless in a context underpinned by a paternalistic and highly politicised 
approach, FT farmers in the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC are better off through farmer ownership, 
a bottom-up approach, forward integration, close relationships and women empowerment 
underpinned by strong democratic processes and governance. On the other hand, in Cocoa Life-
Mondelez’s chain, despite the formal democratic procedures and decentralised approach to FT 
premiums, farmer empowerment has been top-down, excluded farmer ownership and was driven 
by security of supply considerations.  
Nonetheless, despite the differences in relation to empowerment between the two FT chains, the 
extent of farmer empowerment has been limited due to the historical mistrust of cooperatives in 
Ghana, the infrastructural challenges, gender norms, the profit-driven motives of the TNCs that 
consider democratic processes costly, FT’s overall limited scale, and the size as well as the 
motivations of the cooperatives. 
  
150 | P a g e  
 
5.4 ‘‘BUYER-DRIVEN’’ POWER STRUCTURE  
The argument in this section is developed on the basis of Gereffi’s (1994; p.215) definition of 
governance in chapter 2 as the ‘‘authority and power relationships that determine how financial, 
material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain’’. To this end, and in what we 
termed ‘‘governance as power’’, Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) stated 
two distinct governance structures described as ‘‘buyer-driven’’ or ‘‘producer-driven’’ chains.  
Having already examined the lead role of the Government in Ghana, literature on commodities 
has often characterised the cocoa-chocolate as a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVC whereby 
brands/manufacturers and processors are the lead buyers (Talbot 2002, Haque 2004, and Fold 
2002). Gibbon (2001) added a third type of governance, the international trader-driven one. In 
agreement with this, our fieldwork also indicated that the lead buyers are the big 
brands/manufacturers like Mondelez and the international traders/processors like Cargill, ADM 
and Barry Callebaut. Therefore, below, we will be examining the power of lead buyers as 
articulated and defined by our interviewees. This will be examined in relation to FT’s 
‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach we examined in chapter 2 that involved working with TNCs within the 
system instead of operating an alternative trading system. 
On this note, in the following pages we analyse the most often cited power mechanisms in relation 
to FT. These are customer demand, purchasing power, value added, profitability and 
organisation. Within customer demand, we examine the prominent role that was attributed to the 
FT mark along with the positioning in the chain related to demand. In turn, we look at the 
importance of purchasing power in a typical ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVC in which scale and concentration 
are vital to profitability especially at trading, processing and branding stage and vertical integration 
is key to value added. Whilst these power mechanisms are important they are often exercised by 
individual buyers in isolation. To compliment them, lead buyers try to pool their power and 
influence together in platforms like the World Cocoa Foundation, in order to promote their 
common interests in productivity-led sustainability programs. 
5.4.1 CUSTOMER DEMAND 
Customer demand is perhaps the most important driver and power dynamic since, as we 
emphasised in the introduction earlier, cocoa is a typical ‘‘buyer-driven’’ value chain, and hence 
power lies with the buyers and their demand.  In turn, buyers’ demand is driven by consumer 
demand, which is a key element on what FT’s approach is premised on. Demand was earlier 
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mentioned in chapter 2 from Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) who explained that governance has 
to do with the exercise of control along the chain in relation to how much needs to be produced.  
1. FT Mark & Standards – FTI and the FT Foundation in the UK exercise their power on the basis 
of their FT mark through the associated significant customer recognition and demand translated 
into purchasing, which has triggered a trickle-down effect down the chain. As such, FT’s 
sustainability hinges on the customer demand this label generates. On a buyer level though the 
trickle-down effect has been seriously moderated, since carrying the FT label is associated with 
complying with FT’s set of standards. However, as we have already argued in the farmer 
empowerment section previously, the implementation of this FT standard has been significantly 
different between the two FT GVCs, despite the FT label being the same on product packaging 
across both GVCs at consumer level. The explanation for this lies in the analysis on FT’s business 
model we explained earlier, but we will further illustrate as we progress into this and the next key 
theme.  
On the basis of FT mark’s significant customer recognition and trust we referred to in chapter 2, 
the sales generated were significant. According to table 3 we presented earlier, FT chocolate 
sales have grown from £6.2m in 2002 to £542.4m in 2012. In 2013, the Fairtrade Foundation 
(2014) recorded a 30% on 2012 sales as a result of the first full year of chocolate brands switching 
to Fairtrade – including Mars’ Maltesers, Cadbury Dairy Milk, Bubbly and Hot Chocolate and 
Nestlé finger Kit Kat.  
The claims above were verified during our interviews with interviewee 7-an ex-Chair of a FTO- 
and interviewee 45-the head of Cocoa Life-who despite expressing some concerns about FT 
overall, they were consistent in their assessment of the FT label as a marketing tool that drives 
recognition and demand.  
As such, interviewee 7 confirmed that big chocolate brands were ultimately participating in FT on 
the basis of what the FT label brings in terms of customer recognition, demand and ultimately 
sales. Interviewee 45, also suggested that ‘‘Cocoa Life is a solid program on its own but it won’t 
completely shift from FT as consumers like the FT label’’. On this note, interviewee 10-a senior 
manager in the FT Foundation-argued that FT ‘‘has been successful and influential at customer 
level as consumers know more through FT and they apply pressure downwards’’. 
Therefore, whilst the FT label is the main mechanism recognised by consumers, FTI and the FT 
Foundation in the UK also exercise their power through a set of principles and standards we 
152 | P a g e  
 
outlined earlier in our theory. To this end, interviewee 20-a research officer from IDS-highlighted 
that ‘‘FT standards codify FT principles at producer level but they are oriented towards market 
needs to achieve the desired objectives’’. As such, although the FT mark on Divine’s and 
Mondelez’s chocolates at consumer level is the same and consumers may recognise and buy on 
the basis that these two different products and brands carry the same qualities and values as 
articulated by FT and its communication to consumers, this is simply not the case. As we have 
already pointed out in the previous key theme, the implementation of some of the FT principles 
like farmer organisation and empowerment, has been different in Divine’s chain compared to the 
Mondelez’s chain. On this note, FLO Cert exercises governance through conducting audits and 
organisations that fail to comply with the FT principles are suspended pending the implementation 
of corrective action within a given time frame. Failure to execute corrective measures attracts de-
certification of the organisation/party. But, interviewee 3, a FTO Board director suggested that 
whilst ‘‘suppliers are being audited by FLO auditors against set FLO standards I am not sure if 
the commercial organisations are audited as well’’. We will examine more of these differences in 
implementation as we progress in this and the next key theme, but the root cause lies in the 
licensee-based model of FTI underpinned by its ‘‘mainstreaming’’ we have explained earlier.  
2. Positioning – FT’s focus on consumer recognition through the FT mark has been premised on 
the fact that positioning in relation to demand is paramount. This is because demand drives 
activity down the chain while there is opportunity to influence what the customer wants through 
marketing. As we have seen earlier, FT’s focus on the customer end of the chain has been 
successful in terms of sales, but the sole alignment with big brands as part of its ‘‘mainstreaming’’ 
and its licensee-based model has resulted in limited power redistribution across the chain. 
Because of FT’s lack of systemic approach through the lenses of the GVC framework, the power 
of other chain actors has not been curbed, whilst FT was undermined in a plethora of sustainability 
programmes, as we have seen in the sustainability key theme. Similarly, whilst Kuapa’s approach 
to set up Divine in order to be closer to customer demand has been useful, it has been 
overshadowed due to Mondelez’s significantly greater marketing budget. 
To illustrate the previous argument, interviewee 33-a logistics manager from a major cocoa 
processor/trader, interviewee 5-a manager from the FT Foundation, interviewee 7-an ex-Chair of 
a FTO and interviewee 9-an ex-sustainability director of a major chocolate brand/manufacturer- 
highlighted that international traders/processors and brands/manufacturers have the lead roles in 
the conventional GVC in what appears to be a balance of power. However, they also all 
acknowledged that proximity to customer demand is key, in what was encapsulated in 
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interviewee’s 33 words: ‘‘the customer is the king of the chain’’. They further explained that 
proximity to demand helps brands/manufacturers understand what the customer wants or puts 
them in position to influence what they want through marketing activities.  
In this vein, FT’s focus on the customer end of the chain through the FT mark has some merit 
articulated through the sales figures we presented earlier and the logic that interviewee 25-ex-
Oxfam manager involved in FT-developed. Whilst acknowledging that demand is a major power 
dynamic, he suggested that: 
‘‘How much the farmer benefits from a co-operative depends on how much the co-operative 
buys from the farmer (which may only be 10%), which in turn depends on consumer demand’’. 
Nonetheless, ‘‘FT Foundation’s alignment with the brands to counter the power of international 
traders’’, as per interviewee 5 was questionable as interviewee 7-an ex-Chair of a FTO-
suggested that ‘‘international traders/processors and brands/manufacturers don't have any 
intention to change the chain and the distribution of power’’. 
This challenge has been further supported through our analysis in the sustainability key theme, 
whereby we argued that FT was undermined as a result of its ‘‘mainstreaming’’ in the context of 
corporate sustainability programmes that big brands run in order to address security of supply, 
reputational and differentiation goals. This has also been manifested by the fact that international 
traders who also have LBCs in Ghana like Armajaro launched their own sustainability 
programmes or run FT programmes for their clients who are brands/manufacturers with the 
associated limitations that derive from the profit-driven nature of these TNCs.  
As a result, interviewee 20-a research officer from IDS-pointed that despite FT’s positioning on 
customer demand and producer level ‘‘it is ultimately oriented towards market needs hence FT 
haven't altered power distribution within the value chain’’. 
This reflected criticism for FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ whilst underlining the great 
competition that Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC presents for Divine. To this end, although Kuapa 
Kokoo has moved closer to consumer demand through setting up Divine, Divine still have to 
compete with Mondelez for their chocolate products with the same FT mark, but with Mondelez 
having a significant advantage deriving from their huge marketing budget as opposed to Divine’s. 
5.4.2 PURCHASING POWER 
In a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain in which demand is paramount, the purchasing power of lead firms plays 
a vital role. In the context of the significant purchasing power of big brands in the conventional 
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chain, the volumes of FT purchased are too small to significantly impact the purchasing power of 
large TNCs. This also highlights the uneven playing field between Divine and Mondelez when 
considering Divine’s significantly smaller scale, which is attributed to FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. Scale 
and consequent purchasing power have also been omitted in FT’s communication around the 
direct links between consumer and farmers. As such, the limited purchasing power and capacity 
of farmers’ cooperatives and Divine in essence means that brands/big manufacturers can only 
buy at scale from someone who is equivalent to their size, like the international 
traders/processors. 
To this end, and in line with explaining the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ nature of the GVCs in question as per 
Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011), interviewee 1-a director of policy from a 
FTO, interviewee 5-a manager from the FT Foundation-and interviewee 3-a FTO Board Director-
referred to purchasing power as a key power mechanism in relation to the conventional chain but 
also regarding the FT chains we are examining. Purchasing power was defined as the volume of 
raw cocoa beans purchased. To give an indication of scale, interviewee 5 suggested that a typical 
brand/manufacturer like Mondelez, Mars or Nestle purchase around 0.5 million tonnes of raw 
cocoa beans per year in the conventional cocoa chain. This is almost 60% of Ghana’s production, 
which was 835,466 tonnes in crop year 2012/13, according to interviewee 38-the executive 
manager to the CEO of Cocobod. This is significant when considering that the global cocoa bean 
production was around 4.8m tonnes in 2012 and Ghana was the second largest producer in the 
world after Ivory Coast (World Cocoa Foundation, 2014). In other words, a TNC of the size of 
Mondelez, Mars or Nestle could buy 10% of the global cocoa bean production in 2012/13. 
In this context, interviewee 19-a manager from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-informed us that 
Mondelez bought around 20,000 tonnes of cocoa in FT terms in 2013, which is just 4% of their 
overall cocoa purchased. In terms of the breakdown of the FT tonnes, 15,000 were purchased 
from Kuapa Kokoo and the remaining 5,000 were purchased from the Cocoa Life cooperative. 
On the other chain, according to Divine’s 2012-2013 Annual Report (2013), Divine bought 900 
tonnes of FT cocoa from Kuapa Kokoo in 2012 which are only 4.5% of Mondelez’s FT 
purchases and 0.18% of Mondelez’s overall cocoa purchasing per year. 
Therefore, FT does not curb in any case the absolute purchasing power of big 
brands/manufacturers, it has only marginally altered the mix of this power, which in Cocoa Life-
Mondelez’s FT GVC can be quantified to 4% of their overall cocoa purchased in a Mondelez’s 
conventional GVC (see figure 17 on the next page). We will examine why this number is so low 
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during the profitability section, however for now, according to our interviewees within the Cocoa 
Life-Mondelez GVC, it’s safe to say that this is not likely to change going forward.  
Also, when considering Divine’s chain and the impact it may be having on the conventional chain’s 
lead brands and their purchasing power, it is obvious that the impact is very small, at 0.18% only 
(see figure 18 on the next page). As such, Divine as a new entrant in the chain hasn’t managed 
to shift the purchasing power of conventional lead buyers. Finally, the last conclusion we can draw 
is around the FT purchasing power that Mondelez has over Divine’s chain which is around 22 
times greater. This analysis justifies what interviewee 4-a cocoa sustainability manager from a 
major retailer-and interviewee 8-a Board member of a FTO-said earlier about FT being niche and 
hence too small to compete with the lead firms. As we saw earlier, this is further facilitated by the 
fact that the FT Foundation has been openly moving towards full blown commercialisation whilst 
compromising the FT principles. We will fully explore this though in the profitability section later. 
Figure 17: Mondelez purchasing power split in 2013-Conventional and FT (tonnes) 
Source: Author’s calculations from Divine (2013), interviewee 19 
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Figure 18: Divine vs. Mondelez purchasing power in 2013 (tonnes) 
Source: Author’s calculations from Divine (2013), interviewee 19 
The previous analysis also underlines the limitations of FT on the communication around the 
direct links between consumer and farmer in relation to the scalability of FT. These are related to 
the limited purchasing power of Divine and capacity of cooperatives like Kuapa. For example, 
when considering the previously mentioned excessive cost of finance that LBCs incur including 
Kuapa, it is hard to envisage trades at the level (0.5 million tonnes) that lead traders and brands 
require. This becomes even harder when considering that Divine does not have the same scale 
or profitability as Mondelez or an international trader in order to be able to secure cheap finance. 
Also, Kuapa’s production capacity is limited and according to the Fairtrade Foundation (2013) 
stood at 48,283 tonnes in 2013, almost at 10% of the required volume of one lead buyer. 
The direct link between consumer and farmer is also becoming problematic due to the 
concentration of traders/processors whose purchasing power and capacity is so great that, 
according to an interviewee 37-a CMC marketing manager-‘‘when Cocobod wants to move lots 
of volume without collapsing the market, the power is shared between them and international 
traders’’. This justifies what interviewee 12-ex-chair of a FTO-told us regarding Divine’s 
unsuccessful attempt to register as traders in Ghana which was short-lived due to limited 
resources. Therefore, the purchasing power, along with the preference of big brands to buy on 
the spot market rather than buying through the long-term contracts, is why big brands like Mars 
and Nestle prefer to buy off the international big traders-interviewee 5. 
Divine, 900 0.18%
Mondelez, 
500,000 
99.82%
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5.4.3 VALUE ADDED 
TNCs have more power than farmers as a result of adding value to cocoa beans. Beyond 
trading/processing level, adding value is mainly related to cocoa processing, chocolate 
manufacturing as well as branding and marketing. Whilst TNCs may decide to undertake all of 
these GVC activities themselves, Mondelez have decided to outsource the majority of 
conventional and FT chocolate processing to international traders/processors and maintain 
branding and marketing, which, in essence, describes their overlapping FT and conventional 
chains at processing and marketing/branding level. On the other hand, Divine outsourced the 
processing entirely and maintained branding and marketing, but the value added compared to 
Mondelez is proportional to their vastly different purchasing power. 
As such, the focus here is on value added from Divine’s and Mondelez’s point of view within their 
FT chains beyond trading/processing. Interviewee 44, an operations manager for PBC-and 
interviewee 18-a Cocobod marketing manager-argued that international traders/processors and 
brands deservedly have greater power than producers as they add more value to cocoa in the 
conventional chain. As we saw earlier, this is firstly manifested through their purchasing power 
that determines the volume of cocoa bought to be included in semi-finished products or chocolate 
through specific recipes (since usually only 25% of the chocolate is cocoa). Other value enhancing 
mechanisms include cocoa processing, adding other ingredients such as sugar, nuts and milk as 
well as marketing and branding on the brand/manufacturer end.  
In terms of the extent of value added in the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC, this has mirrored the 
outsourcing trends in the chocolate industry. UNCTAD (2008) explained that the large consumer 
chocolate brands/manufacturers used to be vertically integrated, but by the mid-1990s, many had 
decided to outsource the less profitable processing of cocoa into intermediate products14 from 
their core activities. By mid-2000s, there has been a trend towards chocolate 
brands/manufacturers outsourcing even their couverture needs, which eventually reached the 
final consumer product, as they shifted their focus towards marketing and sourced chocolate from 
third parties. In this context, according to interviewee 11-an ex-sustainability director of a major 
chocolate brand-most big brands/manufacturers now only process between 10-20% of their 
overall volume. This has been the case with Mondelez as well, whose conventional GVC overlaps 
                                                          
14  Like, cocoa liquor, cocoa butter, and cocoa powder. See appendix 4 for more information on the 
cocoa/chocolate processing stages and intermediate products. 
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with FT at processing and branding/marketing level, in a way that FT chocolate is approached as 
yet another product in the shop. 
In Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s chain, processing takes place in Germany by the Cord family who are 
one of the biggest FT chocolate manufacturers in Europe (Ryan, 2011). Whilst Divine’s 
processing reflects the trend in the conventional chain to outsource processing, its limited 
volumes we saw earlier justify this action on the basis of the economies of scale required in the 
business in order to add value profitably. Similarly, Divine undertakes branding and marketing but 
due to the limited purchasing power and processing into chocolate, the value added is expected 
to be a tiny fraction of Mondelez’s. 
1. Vertical Integration – The outsourcing trend that led big chocolate brands to outsource 
processing was mirrored by international traders’ vertical integration to undertake processing. 
This has significantly increased their power and intensified the power play between chocolate 
brands and international traders who were now processors as well, in a market structure that 
carries oligopsonistic features. In this context, as we have seen earlier, FT has consciously only 
been engaging with chocolate brands omitting in this way to engage with international 
traders/processors, whilst some international traders decided to integrate backwards at LBC level 
and offer competitive to FT sustainability programs. 
To this end, we earlier talked about the outsourcing trend that chocolate brands/manufacturers 
went through in their effort to concentrate on marketing and branding. On the back of this, 
UNCTAD (2008) confirmed that the cocoa-chocolate chain is characterised by vertical integration 
as the main trading companies have decided to engage in cocoa processing too. Interviewee 13, 
an independent FT consultant, further explained that traders by themselves ‘‘don’t have as much 
power as the brands since their margins are low and volume large. However, when traders are 
also doing processing like Barry Callebaut, this has a great role to play in power as it adds value’’.  
UNCTAD (2008) further added that the vertical integration of the trading companies to processing 
activities and the horizontal concentration, in combination with the operation of these companies 
in both producer and consuming countries have led to oligopsonistic structures. As such, Talbot 
(2002) mentioned that international traders/processors have undergone consolidation since the 
1970s, resulting in three firms now dominating this stage of the chain, accounting for over 35 
percent of total worldwide cocoa grinding capacity. These three are Archer-Daniels-Midland 
(ADM), Cargill, and Barry Callebaut. Therefore, according to interviewee 18-a Cocobod marketing 
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manager- ‘‘international traders/processors are very strong and they leverage this power to lobby 
the government’’.  
In this context of oligopsonistic market structure and increased power by the international 
traders/processors driven by their strategy to integrate forward, FT has chosen to align itself with 
the big chocolate brands, as we have seen earlier. Building on the systemic approach of the world-
systems theory that focuses on power relations as the real development dynamic, and the 
analytical lenses of GVC, FT has clearly failed to acknowledge the importance of power across 
the international trading/processing node of the chain, by only focusing on marketing/branding. 
This became evident when interviewee 33, a logistics manager from a major cocoa 
processor/trader told us that ‘‘processors can and should give more back to farmers, not 
necessarily through cash but also through the supply of chemicals, fertilizers and inputs’’, or when 
interviewee 10-a senior manager from the FT Foundation-acknowledged that: 
FTI haven’t done conventional value chain research and despite FT’s focus and consequent 
influence on consumer and producer level, ‘‘FT has had very limited influence on the rest of 
the chain. For example, FT hasn't been important in influencing the traders in the value chains’’. 
On this note, as we briefly mentioned earlier, besides international traders that moved forward 
into processing, there are also international traders who integrated backwards to LBC level. This 
has been accompanied by the development of a sustainability offering to their clients who are big 
brands/manufacturers. Although we will talk about this in more detail in the next key theme, this 
has clearly posed competition for FTI and the FT Foundation from an established lead player in 
the chain-the international traders. 
5.4.4 PROFITABILITY 
Strategies like vertical integration were ultimately driven by TNCs profitability goals. Inevitably, 
this argument builds on the basis of FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ and work with TNCs in the 
existing international trading system on the back of FTI’s licensee-based business model. As a 
result, chocolate brands have been using their purchasing power to lobby FTI for changes to its 
principles and standards around the FT minimum price and traceability in order to suit their 
profitability objectives. This has led to further demands around other ingredients included in 
chocolate in what eventually took shape in the ‘‘FT sourcing programme’’. So, whilst chocolate 
brands have successfully lobbied FTI to loosen its FT principles and FTI earned more licensee 
fees, Divine have been delivering profits proportional to their small scale and in line with their 
focus to go ‘‘beyond FT’’. 
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Before providing evidence for the argument above, it would be useful to clarify the difference 
between the terms ‘‘profitability’’ and ‘‘profit’’. Although the terms ‘‘profit’’ and ‘‘profitability’’ are 
often used interchangeably, there is a difference between them. Tulsian (2014) explained that 
whilst profit is an absolute term, profitability is a relative concept. Profit reflects the net total income 
earned when deducting total expenses from total revenue or sales during a specified period of 
time. The word profitability is composed of two words, namely, profit and ability. ‘‘Ability indicates 
the power of a business entity to earn profits or its operating performance. As such, profitability 
may be defined as the ability of a given investment to earn a return from its use’’ (ibid; p.1). This 
definition raises a few questions around the different expectations shareholders have on what is 
the optimal return. This was acknowledged by interviewee 13, an independent FT consultant, who 
claimed that: 
‘‘TNCs are limited by their public listing and their shareholders’ expectations’’. 
In this context, to give an indication of scale and distribution, interviewee 14-the head of sales 
and marketing from an international trader-referred to profit margins and the percentage of the 
retail price each organisation in the chain captures. For example, he highlighted that international 
traders get 7% of the retail price which is £5-10 per tonne, whereas chocolate brands capture 
around 50% whilst being able to pass on any additional rising costs to consumers without reducing 
prices when cocoa price goes down. This also reflects what UNCTAD (2013) suggested through 
its world investment report; that ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs are typically focused on reducing sourcing 
costs. 
Beyond profit margins, profitability was referenced as a manifestation of power but also as a key 
driver for decision-making regarding FT. As such, interviewee 13 argued that profitability along 
with competitive intensity and ownership of big brands by shareholders are the main limitations 
big chocolate brands face for implementing the FT principles as articulated by FTI. For example, 
interviewee 11-an ex-sustainability director of a major chocolate brand cited profitability as the 
main reason for not buying more volume of FT. He argued that: 
‘‘FT’s current model is restrictive because of the minimum FT price. This means that if 
conventional cocoa market price goes down, a chocolate brand would become uncompetitive 
if they’d sourced more FT cocoa than their competitors’’. On this basis, interviewee 19-
manager from the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC-informed us that they lobbied FTI to lower or 
abolish the minimum price FT principle, whilst citing other certification like UTZ which has 
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gained scale as we have seen in the sustainability key theme because they don't have 
minimum price restrictions. 
Another typical example of the power big brands exercise on FTI on the basis of their profitability 
and purchasing power is the abandonment of traceability and the shift to mass balance we briefly 
mentioned earlier, alongside the introduction of the ‘‘FT Sourcing programme’’. Interviewee 9-an 
ex-sustainability director of a major chocolate brand/manufacturer-explained that: 
‘‘The driving force behind moving to mass balance has been economics. Mondelez could not 
scale up because it was unaffordable to procure every ingredient in FT terms and segregate 
between FT and not FT in the manufacturing process. Thus, they approached Fairtrade 
International asking them to shift the traceability principle to mass balance. This decision has 
helped unlock the supply chain and allow more brands to come in’’. 
As we earlier stated, although this has allowed for more volume sold, it has broken the physical 
link between farmer and consumer which has been a central theme in FT communication to 
consumers. However, this was just a start for more compromises to come in the name of more 
sales for the FTI and fees as per the licensee-based business model, and reduced costs for 
chocolate brands. As interviewee 1-a director of policy from a FTO-informed us, Mondelez and 
others lobbied the Fairtrade Foundation for not all the ingredients included in chocolate to be FT, 
in what was called by FTI the ‘‘Fairtrade sourcing programme’’. This has led to a 30% increase of 
FT sales with the consequent benefit for cocoa farmers. Nonetheless, it has resulted in an 
immediate reaction from interviewee 7-an ex-Chair of a FTO-who said that 100% of the final 
product should be FT and that upholding the FT principles is paramount at the cost of smaller 
scale and the other way around.  
So, whilst FTI and the FT Foundation were seriously criticised by FTOs for diluting FT principles 
in order to accommodate the profitability objectives of big brands, the FT Foundation argues that 
more money flows back to the farmers this way. Interviewee 5-a manager from the FT Foundation- 
further argued that although they have now moved to mass balance, they intend to return to 
traceability in the long run, something we challenge given our analysis earlier around FTI’s new 
licensee self-sustaining-based model. As such, it appears that loosening FT standards has not 
only been driven by the licensees who exert their purchasing power in order make standards 
broader and ultimately serve their profitability goals, it has also been driven by FTI’s new business 
model.  
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So, in other words, instead of FT curbing the power of lead buyers’ through the adoption of the 
FT principles in their conventional chains, the lead buyers have been using their purchasing 
power (which is 22 times greater than Divine’s) to curb the FT principles and provide the FT 
Foundation with a ‘‘lifeline’’ as per their business model. 
On the other hand, Divine still strives for profitability as they recorded £318k operating profit in in 
2014 up from £144k in 2013 and £45k in 2012 (Divine 2013, 2014). Its limited profitability could 
be partly attributed to their limited scale, the increased competition from Mondelez and other lead 
brands as well as their model which not only adheres to FT principles but goes ‘‘beyond FT’’ 
through farmer ownership of Divine and investing 2% of turnover in supply chain activities, as we 
have seen earlier. Despite Divine’s limited profitability, Divine and other FTOs are value-driven 
and innovative and try to influence lead buyers by example to source in an open and transparent 
way and cut intermediaries within the chain, according to interviewee 3-a FTO Board Director. 
However, as we have seen through the discussion above, in practice it appears that the lead 
buyers are influencing the FT principles and the FT Foundation whilst squeezing Divine out of the 
market through their purchasing power and profitability. 
1. Concentration – Along with lobbying FTI in order to effectively reduce their cost base and 
increase their profits, lead buyers including international traders/processors and 
manufacturers/brands have been consolidating in an effort to further maximize profitability through 
leveraging branding, marketing budgets and optimising costs through greater scale. These 
elements in combination with the consequent oligopsonistic market structures comprise 
significant power mechanisms that justify the limitations that Divine faces in order to scale up and 
compete with the lead TNCs.  
To this end, UNCTAD (2008) confirmed that horizontal concentration has been evident at two 
levels: 
 Branding/Marketing – As we have seen earlier, chocolate brands/manufacturers 
outsourced cocoa grinding in their effort to concentrate on marketing and branding. 
UNCTAD (2008) explained the importance of global brand recognition and commercial 
marketing strategies. In the consumer market, a strong brand name is an element of 
market power. New entrants need significant marketing campaigns to promote new 
brands. The high advertising budgets necessary for promoting brand recognition translate 
into barriers to entry. Heavy investment in product development and brand marketing is 
also needed to maintain a strong position. These requirements may explain why Divine 
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has been recording modest profits, as we discussed in the previous section. As a result, 
following a series of mergers and acquisitions, BASIC (2014) suggested the leading 
branded manufacturers-Mars, Mondelez, Nestlé, Ferrero and Hershey-account for almost 
50% of the world confectionary market. Already in the mid-1990s, Cadbury, Mars and 
Nestle accounted for approximately 75–80 per cent of the UK chocolate confectionery 
market (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 Trading/Processing – As discussed earlier, the boundaries between trading and 
processing companies have become blurred, as the international traders–in part to 
compensate for the erosion in trading margins–are now also engaged in cocoa 
processing. This also took place as brands outsourced the less profitable part of 
processing in order to focus on marketing and branding. Concentration at processing 
stage has increased in response to the need to gain scale in order to be more cost efficient. 
Cocoa processing is capital intensive and since processing equipment is expensive, it 
requires a large tonnage throughout and must operate on a continuous basis in order to 
be profitable. Moreover, cocoa processing is becoming more and more sophisticated, in 
response to increasingly stringent quality requirements by the chocolate brands 
(UNCTAD, 2008). To this end, BASIC (2014) suggested that the three largest international 
traders/cocoa-processing companies–ADM, Cargill and Barry Callebaut–account for 45% 
of the market. 
On the basis of concentration, UNIDO (2006) argued that profits gravitate to points of 
concentration on the value chain especially when there is fragmentation upstream. Although our 
discussion in this chapter showed the fragmentation of farmers derived from the nature of the 
crop that requires smallholding, the role of Cocobod through CMC is a focal point where value 
concentrates as well. This highlights a structural imbalance upstream in the cocoa chain, between 
cocoa smallholders and LBCs (which we discuss in detail in the next key theme) with the 
emergence of oligopsonistic market structures. This is followed by a monopsonistic market 
structure whereby CMC is the only buyer, followed by the concentrated trading/processing and 
the marketing/branding level, whereby there seems to be some form of balance between 
successive oligopolies, balanced by the strength and purchasing behaviour of customers to some 
extent. (UNCTAD, 2008).  
On this note, UNIDO (2006; p.36) also highlighted what we can conclude from the analysis of 
concentration above through the branding/marketing and trading/processing levels: ‘‘the 
emergence of concentration and large firms at one point in the chain quite often creates further 
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concentration at other points’’. In this context of structural imbalance underpinned by 
oligopsonistic and monopsonistic market structures driven by concentration and state 
intervention, UNIDO (2006) suggested that producers may consolidate in producer or marketing 
associations in order to gain market power as a response to concentration among buyers. As we 
have seen before FT has attempted to do exactly this through setting up cooperatives with the 
success and limitations we analysed.  
What’s important to highlight though is the immense power of lead companies that is 
compounded with concentration and the consequent oligopsonistic structures, within which FT 
has chosen to operate. 
5.4.5 ORGANISED BUYER POWER 
We earlier highlighted farmer organisation as means for farmer empowerment so that they can 
be in position to advance their demands to cocoa buyers through their collective power. In our 
previous discussion we have also referred to the individual power of lead buyers whether this 
derives from their purchasing power, profitability or vertical integration. Beyond this, lead buyers 
also advance their security of supply considerations in an organised manner under international 
organisations like the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF). In this context, FT’s role has been 
marginal since it doesn’t focus on productivity. 
As such, in line with Gereffi’s (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) ‘‘buyer-driven’’ 
chains, through interviewee 42-a technical advisor in the World Cocoa Foundation-we have 
discovered that lead buyers act as a group in order to control aspects of the GVC. Hence, they 
formed World Cocoa Foundation as a platform comprising of more than 100 member companies 
including all the major international traders/processors and brands, like ADM, Barry Callebaut, 
Cargill, Mondelez, Nestle and Mars among others, with presence in over 6 continents in order to 
advance their goals. As interviewee 42 said, ‘‘the World Cocoa Foundation promotes a 
sustainable cocoa economy through economic and social development and environmental 
stewardship in cocoa-growing communities’’. As such, the Foundation has been undertaking 
projects in Ghana since 2000 related to direct investment in productivity, technical skills and youth 
sustainability among others. 
In particular, a prominent programme characteristic of the World Cocoa Foundation and the goals 
of its members is Cocoa Action. The World Cocoa Foundation (2015) suggested that ‘‘Cocoa 
Action is a strategy that brings the world’s leading cocoa and chocolate companies together to 
sustain the cocoa industry and improve the livelihoods of cocoa farmers’’. Cocoa Action was 
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launched in 2015 and through developing meaningful partnerships between governments, cocoa 
farmers, and the cocoa industry will aim to boost productivity and strengthen community 
development in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana – the largest cocoa producing countries in the world. 
This will take place through training and delivering improved planting material and fertilizer to 
300,000 cocoa farmers, empowering communities through education, child labor monitoring and 
women's empowerment. As such, it appears that TNCs are pulling their resources together in an 
organised manner through projects on the ground in order to advance their security of supply 
objectives. Beyond this, they are involved in lobbying activities as well, as interviewee 35-a 
Cocobod Director-confided that: 
‘‘The WCF is so powerful that they have access to the Ghanaian President at will unlike other 
stakeholders’’. 
In this context and in relation to FT’s role, interviewee 42 hinted that FT is not particularly relevant 
to the scope of WCF or its members as it focuses on the quality of the product and not exactly on 
the quantity. He further argued that the private sector makes up 90% of the value chain and that 
sustainability of supply is the biggest focus for the private sector. In contrast, FT’s principles cover 
productivity only to a limited extent through the use of the right agrochemicals. Similarly to 
Mondelez’s approach to FT and RA, the World Cocoa Foundation also do not adhere to one 
certification and they ensure to educate stakeholders of their training programmes on some 
certification principles. However, in the end, they approach FT as means to sustainability. 
5.4.6 CONCLUSION 
The argument in this key theme was based on Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s 
(2011) ‘‘buyer-driven’’ governance structure. The cocoa-chocolate GVC driven by international 
traders/processors and chocolate brands, hence power lies with the buyers and their demand, 
which is in turn driven by consumer demand. On this note, FTI rely on their FT mark in order to 
stimulate customer recognition and demand which is ultimately translated into sales. Whilst this 
has been successful in terms of sales, its effect down the chain has been moderated due to the 
varying implementation of the FT standards by the two distinct FT GVCs associated with carrying 
the same FT mark. Whilst FT’s positioning close to demand in alignment with brands has 
increased sales, it hasn’t allowed proper power re-distribution across the chain, due to the 
dominant roles of lead buyers in pursuing their objectives.  
The purchasing power of lead buyers is key in allowing lead buyers to achieve their objectives. 
As such, the volumes of FT purchased are too small to significantly impact the purchasing power 
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of large TNCs, as highlighted by FT being only 4% of Mondelez’s overall purchasing volume and 
Divine having only 0.18% of Mondelez’s purchasing power. The niche potential of FT along with 
the unrealistic claims around the direct links between consumer and farmer were mirrored further 
down the chain when it became apparent that the limited capacity of farmers’ cooperatives as 
well as Divine’s limited purchasing power means that brands/big manufacturers can only buy at 
scale from someone who is equivalent to their size, like the international traders/processors. 
Adding value to cocoa through processing, marketing and branding has been also a key power 
mechanism. This has been underpinned by the outsourcing of chocolate processing in both FT 
GVCs and the realisation that Mondelez has overlapping FT and conventional chains at 
processing and marketing/branding level. The outsourcing trend was mirrored by international 
traders’ vertical integration backwards and forward which led to oligopsonistic market structures. 
In this context, FT hasn’t been important in influencing traders’ power due to their focus on 
consumer level and the alignment with brands.  
Strategies like vertical integration were ultimately driven by TNCs profitability goals. On this note 
and on the back of FTI’s licensee-based business model, chocolate brands have been using their 
purchasing power to lobby FTI for changes to its principles and standards around the FT minimum 
price, traceability and sourcing of other ingredients on a non-FT basis in order to cater for their 
profitability objectives. So, whilst chocolate brands have successfully lobbied FTI to loosen its FT 
principles and FTI earned more licensee fees, Divine have been delivering profits proportional to 
their small scale and in line with their focus to go ‘‘beyond FT’’. But, beyond lobbying FTI in order 
to effectively reduce their cost base and increase their profits, lead buyers have also been 
consolidating in an effort to maximise profitability through leveraging branding, marketing budgets 
and optimising costs through greater scale. These elements, in combination with the consequent 
oligopsonistic market structures comprise significant power mechanisms that justify the limitations 
Divine is facing in order to scale up and compete with the lead TNCs.  
Whilst these power mechanisms are important, they are often exercised by individual buyers in 
isolation. To compliment them, lead buyers also advance their security of supply considerations 
in an organised manner under international organisations, like the World Cocoa Foundation 
(WCF). In this context, FT’s role has been marginal since it doesn’t focus on productivity. 
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5.5 CHAIN RELATIONS & COORDINATION 
The argument in this key theme is building on Gereffi et al. (2005) and Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark’s (2011) ‘‘governance as coordination’’. Granleese (2009) earlier reminded us that the 
conceptualisation of ‘‘buyer-driven’’ or ‘‘producer-driven’’ governance structures has been further 
advanced to reflect the distinct features of the governance structures of each chain. Although the 
concept of buyer ‘‘driven-ness’’ is still applicable, this ‘‘driven-ness’’ is manifested in different 
ways, degrees and has different drivers. To this end, Gereffi (2001) advanced that governance 
structures evolve according to trends and innovations and thus, in any particular time period or 
within a given industry, new governance structures co-exist and interact with earlier forms of 
governance. As such, Gereffi et al. (2005) provided a more elaborate typology of five governance 
structures described in chapter 2 and depicted in figure 2 earlier. These are: markets, modular, 
relational, captive, and hierarchy.  
Therefore, in this key theme we will attempt to outline the relations between nodes of the chain 
and contrast the conventional with the FT chains in order to examine if and to what extent FT has 
affected the existing governance structures. As discussed earlier, since FT focuses at farming 
level, the core of the discussion will be concentrated there.  
5.5.1 FARMER-LBC RELATIONS 
BASIC (2014) described the governance structure between cocoa farmers and their buyers in the 
conventional chain as ‘‘captive’’. Ryan (2011) justified this on the basis of their transactional 
dependency on LBCs to buy their produce and limited number of buyers (LBCs) who often 
exercise great power through, for example, providing them with equipment and other incentives 
in order to buy their produce. In assessing whether and to what extent this type of governance 
has shifted in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s and Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s FT chains, we have utilised the 
following dimensions that were frequently emphasised during our interviews. 
1. Purchasing Agents – Perhaps the most significant direct power imbalance the farmers face 
in the conventional chain derives from their interaction with LBC purchasing agents, who cheat 
farmers through wrongly calibrated scales. However, farmers in the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine FT GVC 
are not cheated because purchasing clerks double as farmers too. This is also the case with ¾ of 
cocoa sourcing in Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC since they source from Kuapa, but the issue hasn’t 
been resolved for ¼ of their FT cocoa coming from Cocoa Life. Nonetheless, both FT GVCs are 
also offering better terms than the conventional chain in terms of training, inputs and prompt 
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payment in cash, however the main limitation is still scale, as together they reach 95,900 farmers 
which is around 11% of the cocoa farming population in Ghana. 
As we have seen in the beginning of the chapter, LBCs buy cocoa beans from farmers through 
their local purchasing agents. During our field visits in cocoa farming communities in Ashanti, our 
discussions with interviewee groups 30 and 31 comprised of farmers and purchasing agents, 
demonstrated that purchasing agents are embedded in the farming community. In light of this, we 
have leaned on our power analyses in order to identify and describe the horizontal power relations 
between farmers and purchasing agents. To this end, interviewee groups 30 and 31, interviewee 
24-an executive logistics assistant from a prominent LBC, interviewee 39-the Head of Cocoa Life 
Farmers’ Cooperative in Amansie West district, interviewee 44-an operations manager for PBC, 
told us that this relationship has been predominantly characterised transactional in the 
conventional chain. Beyond buying and selling cocoa, there is limited interaction between farmers 
and purchasing agents in the conventional chain. At the same time, it’s critical to understand that 
trust and relationship building mainly through incentives and readily available cash are important 
factors in this relationship.  
In this context, interviewee 44 highlighted that ‘‘the real power asymmetry for farmers in the 
conventional chain is with local purchasing clerks since they use wrongly calibrated scales in 
order to cheat the farmers’’. This has been highlighted as a widespread phenomenon to the extent 
that Cocobod has introduced new measures to identify and sanction LBCs who recalibrate scales 
and cheat farmers. To this end, security personnel have been deployed to the field to monitor and 
report LBCs who conduct wrongdoing. Interviewee 39 added that measures have also been 
undertaken from the National Farmers’ Association who distributed scales to farmers, as well as 
more responsible LBCs such as PBC who, according to interviewee 44, have deployed scale 
mechanics in farming areas to ensure that all of PBC’s scales are accurately calibrated. Despite 
these efforts, interviewee 39 argued that ‘‘LBCs still cheat the farmers at great scale’’. Farmers 
from interviewee groups 30 and 31 also expressed mistrust towards purchasing clerks who, 
despite receiving Cocobod bonuses and other incentives from the LBCs, they fail to deliver. 
Farmers though are not the only ones who mistrust purchasing clerks, as interviewee 24 
suggested that they themselves don't trust their purchasing clerks regarding their integrity with 
cash. 
On the other hand, the issue of trust in purchasing clerks, has been eliminated in Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine’s GVC, since Kuapa Kokoo has purchasing clerks who double as famers too, according to 
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interviewee 32-a corporate responsibility and sustainability head of cocoa from a prominent LBC. 
He further added that ‘‘these clerks are selected by the farmers themselves in the certified areas, 
hence Kuapa purchasing clerks often go the extra mile to help farmers by themselves’’. As we 
have seen in the beginning of the chapter, this is also the case with ¾ of cocoa sourcing in Cocoa 
Life-Mondelez’s GVC since they source from Kuapa, but the issue hasn’t been resolved for ¼ of 
their FT cocoa coming from Cocoa Life, who source from other conventional chain LBCs.  
The only limitation for both FT GVCs is that this takes place only for the 87,907 Kuapa 
members which comprises only around 10% of 865,000 farmers cocoa smallholder farmers in 
Ghana (Fairtrade Foundation, 2013). If we also add another 7,993 farmers from Cocoa Life, 
this would bring the total number of FT farmers for both GVCs to 95,900, which is around 11% 
of the cocoa farming population in Ghana (FTI, 2014). 
Furthermore, in conventional chains, some LBCs tend to provide infrequent training on farming 
practices and how to improve their finances and open a bank account, according to the farmers 
in interviewee group 31. At times, interviewee 24 advised that they also try to motivate farmers 
by giving them inputs and fertilisers in advance which farmers need to repay in installments. They 
also often give the farmers petty stuff, like machetes, so they can buy from them given the 
competition with other purchasing clerks and LBCs. This is part of the relationship building 
purchasing clerks undertake in order to buy as much cocoa as possible, since farmers tend to sell 
when someone helps them. Similarly, interviewee group 30 informed us that farmers tend to sell 
when the purchasing agent has readily available cash but most LBCs have cash availability 
problems, thus are not able to pay for the cocoa beans sold to them on the spot of delivery. This 
is mainly due to the lack of liquidity that derives from the high external cost of finance we explained 
earlier in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme. Therefore, most farmers prefer to sell to PBC, who have 
the highest market share (around 35%)15, and ready cash to pay them. 
On the other hand, interviewees 28, 29-from Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC-suggested they have 
been organising programmes to educate farmers on good farming practices, but they also went 
beyond that to organise monthly meetings through the cooperative to discuss issues on payment 
of dues and good catering of farms. In turn, interviewee 39 indicated that ‘‘Cocoa Life has 
educated the entire farming communities in general’’. On a similar positive note, interviewees 28, 
29 advanced that Cocoa Life has been financing farm inputs and have been advising most of its 
farmers to sell to PBC who promptly pay cash. Similarly, Divine’s chain has been very active 
                                                          
15 According to interviewee 44, an operations manager for PBC. 
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through Kuapa in relation to training and have also been motivating their farmers with inputs, 
bonuses, exercise books and soaps. We have been told though that Kuapa sometimes pays two 
weeks later-interviewee 32.  
2. FT Principles Implementation – During the course of the previous key themes as well as in 
chapter 2 on Fairtrade, we referred to the FT principles and their implementation in the two FT 
chains. In particular, we talked about farmer organisation and the FT minimum price, how they 
are implemented in each chain and the reasons why. We will now discuss if and to what extent 
the implementation of some of the key FT principles could shift the captive governance structure 
prevalent in the conventional chain at farmer-LBC level. As such, the main FT principles are: 
a. FT Price – Despite FAO’s (2004), Le Mare’s (2008), Imhof and Lee’s (2007) and Raynolds’s 
(2004) claims in chapter 2 around FT farmers achieving higher prices than conventional farmers, 
the reality we have encountered in Ghana was different. As per our analysis earlier in the ‘‘political 
crop’’ key theme, our argument is based on FT operating in Ghana’s context with a specific 
governance structure that in essence marginalises FT’s minimum price standard. This was 
founded on Wallerstein’s position (1995) around the role of states in capital accumulation and 
Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) reference to the power of states over the lives of their citizens.  
As such, we then indicated that the FT minimum price for both FT GVCs has been irrelevant, 
since the FT minimum price has been consistently below than the price set by the producer (price) 
review committee. As a result of this process, all Ghanaian cocoa farmers obtain a minimum of 
70% of the net FOB. This demonstrates the overlapping character of both FT GVCs with the 
conventional GVC at pricing level. In the unlikely scenario that Cocobod’s price was lower, the FT 
price would only benefit around 11% of the entire cocoa smallholders in Ghana, as we have seen 
earlier. However, given our analysis on the supply/demand balance in the sustainability key theme 
and interviewee’s 33-a logistics manager from a major cocoa processor/trader-assertion that 
‘‘there is a deficit projected for 2020’’, this is not likely to happen.  
b. Farmer organisation, empowerment and FT Premium – The notion of empowerment was 
identified in our power analyses during chapter 2, whereby we outlined power seen as 
empowerment in the sense of a capacity or ability to empower or transform oneself and others. 
Building on this, it has been made clear that farmers in the conventional chain are neither 
sufficiently organised, empowered, nor they get FT premiums, according to our previous analysis. 
On the other hand, and in line with Le Mare (2008), Imhof and Lee (2007), who emphasised 
improved institutional capacity and sustainability at cooperative level as a result of FT in chapter 
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2, the relations between farmers and LBCs have shifted substantially in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s 
GVC. This took place on the basis of the bottom-up approach underpinned by democratic 
processes that allows farmers to make their own decisions on how to spend the FT premium. On 
the other hand, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC despite the formal democratic procedures and 
decentralised approach to FT premiums, promotes farmer empowerment in a top-down manner 
driven by security of supply considerations. Despite the criticism against Kuapa’s use of FT 
premium for community development, to fund training and the corrupt leadership in the past, we 
argue that it has led to significant farmer empowerment at the level of its GVC, albeit with limited 
potential to expand further.  
To illustrate, as discussed earlier, most farmers in the conventional chain are members of LBCs 
since the unions who represent farmers, like the National Farmers’ Association, are not strong 
enough and they are embedded in the political structure and national politics. In this section, we 
have also discussed the transactional nature of the relationship between farmers and LBCs as 
well as the limited training that do not foster farmer empowerment. Also, there is no FT premium 
or FT certification unless farmers are part of a programme run by an LBC, such as Olam or 
Armajaro that are part of international trading groups which have the financial capacity and pre-
existing client relationships. In this case, as we said earlier, the international trading arms provide 
their clients, who are the chocolate brands, a sustainability offering which may also include FT 
certification as per their client’s wish. In this case, although interviewee 26-the head of 
sustainability from Armajaro-told us that all the FT principles are implemented, interviewee 41-a 
cocoa program officer from Solidaridad-argued that such LBCs tend to maintain the FT premium, 
part of the FT premium, or make the decisions regarding its utilisation. ‘‘This is driven by the fact 
that they want farmers to remain dependent on them so that they sell their cocoa to them and 
avoid the so called ‘‘dribbling’’ through selling to another LBC’’. To this end, we earlier mentioned 
that such LBCs don’t register the farmer cooperative formally with the Department of co-
operatives as this entails a significant cost which the LBCs are not willing pay. Also, since they 
have already paid the high cost of FT certification, they tend to use the FT premium funds to 
recoup their investment.  
On the other hand, the situation in Divine’s chain is much different to the extent that we argue that 
the previous relationship and dependency exercised in the conventional chain between farmer 
and LBC has shifted substantially in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s GVC. To illustrate, as we have 
explained in detail in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, the main pillars of their approach have been 
farmer ownership, a bottom-up approach, forward integration, close relationships and women 
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empowerment underpinned by strong democratic processes and governance. Because of the 
bottom-up approach and collective approach to empowerment underpinned by democratic 
processes, farmers have the freedom to make their own decisions on how to spend a. the price 
of cocoa, b. FT premium, c. Divine’s supply chain investment through 2% of turnover and d. 
dividend. 
As we have also seen in in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC despite 
the formal democratic procedures and decentralised approach to FT premiums, it promotes 
farmer empowerment in a top-down manner driven by security of supply considerations, whilst 
excluding farmer ownership. To this end, interviewee 9-an ex sustainability director of a major 
chocolate brand/manufacturer-argued that: 
‘‘Empowerment for commercial organisations is coming as an addition to a business agenda’’. 
Furthermore, interviewee 41 told us that their clients, who are big brands, when offered a FT 
certification service model like Divine’s model or the LBC model like Armajaro, they tend to choose 
the latter one. This is on the basis that the LBC model is able to organise farmers easier and 
quicker as they have already a large pool of farmers they work with. Also, LBCs like Armajaro 
tend to have financing available through their international trading parent company. 
‘‘Although a model like Divine’s would ensure true bottom-up empowerment, big brands decide 
to go with the faster, cheaper but less empowering model’’. 
Besides the lack of focus on political empowerment, as we have explained in the previous key 
theme, interviewee 45-the head of Cocoa Life-suggested Cocoa Life’s district-level approach is 
more beneficial with regards to payment of FT premiums to the farmers, as decisions are being 
made closer to the farmer level.  
Nonetheless, this has been undermined by the focus on productivity we mentioned before, 
since the ‘‘FT premium is going only towards farm improvement for productivity purposes’’, 
according to interviewee 28. On the other hand, in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s chain, ‘‘farmers are 
not benefiting enough from the premiums because the premiums are being enjoyed by the 
whole community instead’’, according to interviewee 42. 
Interviewee 28 also mentioned that in Kuapa Kokoo’s case, part of the FT premium has been 
used to fund training, so not all of all the FT premium flows back, which is not the case in Cocoa 
Life, whereby Mondelez has already pre-financed training. On the basis of Cocoa Life-Mondelez 
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GVC’s increased focus on sustainability-driven productivity and volume of cocoa versus 
empowerment, he further argued that FT premiums should be directed toward the supply of inputs 
instead of community development.  
Also, as discussed in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, interviewee 35 pointed to the corrupt 
leadership of the cooperative in the past which ensured the FT premium never reached the 
farmers, but swiftly mentioned that Kuapa was quick and strong enough to replace them. Finally, 
as we have seen earlier, Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s chain and FT as a whole have further limitations 
due to scale and profitability considerations. As such, only 11% of the entire Ghanaian cocoa 
farming population and their communities enjoy the benefits of FT premium which amounted to 
€4.8m in 2012-13, according to FTI (no date), as manifested through empowerment, lack of 
dependency on other LBCs and community development projects. 
c. Pre-Financing – We earlier explained that Cocobod was pre-financing cocoa purchases at 
LBC level. On farmer-LBC level though, pre-financing is limited and is only applicable to inputs 
and not to the crop itself. Although pre-financing of crop has been oﬃcially suspended by the FTI, 
in both FT GVCs there has been evidence of pre-financing of inputs, but this may have been 
funded to some extent by FT premiums in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s GVC. Also, despite the scale of 
investment in Cocoa Life, the fact that only 7% of the cocoa is purchased in FT terms 
demonstrates limited appetite for crop pre-financing. 
As discussed earlier in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, Cocobod holds a central role in financing 
cocoa purchases in the conventional chain at LBC level through selling cocoa forward. They then 
disburse seed funds to LBCs to facilitate their capital raising and kick off the process of purchasing 
cocoa for farmers. At farmer-LBC level though, farmers from interviewee groups 30 and 31 
indicated that pre-financing is limited and it’s only applicable to the level of inputs and not to the 
crop itself. As such, some LBCs supply input and fertilisers on credit and farmers pay in 
installments. However, they also noted that most farmers only payback half of the cost on 
fertilisers loaned out to them. According to interviewee 32, usually, the LBCs who are in position 
to pre-finance inputs are the ones who are better funded through access to cheaper capital often 
with the help of the parent companies which are international traders, like Armajaro and Olam.  
In this context, in chapter 2 we mentioned that Doherty et al. (2013) highlighted that the FTI 
Standards Unit has oﬃcially suspended the requirement for pre-ﬁnancing in a number of 
commodity areas in 2008. On this note, interviewees 28 and 29 informed us that Mondelez have 
set up a voluntary service and loan association and pre-financed all the inputs without having to 
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deduct money from the FT premium in order to do so. Similarly, interviewee 43-the National Chief 
Farmer of the Farmers’ Association-explained that Kuapa distribute at the end of every year, 
cutlasses, fertilizers and pesticides to their farmers, but as we mentioned earlier, this may be 
financed by part of the FT premiums.  
Although we haven’t managed to firmly establish whether Divine pre-finances cocoa purchases 
from Kuapa, or whether Mondelez was pre-financing the purchased crop, interviewees 28 and 29 
instead highlighted that Mondelez has committed $400m in Cocoa Life in terms of long term 
financing. In response to this, interviewee 35 warned us that ‘‘Mondelez’s financing goes beyond 
FT for a good marketing story’’, something that was verified during our interview with interviewee 
28, who stated that ‘‘only 7% of the cocoa purchased from Cocoa Life was in FT terms’’.  
d. Long term commitment – We earlier explained the way the conventional chain works and 
then developed in detail the role that Cocobod plays through its monopsony position. Although 
this analysis indicated a long term commitment and stability in the relationship between buyer and 
sellers, there have been mixed results in our FT GVCs. To this end, although the Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine GVC has had an established, trusted and long-term relationship, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez 
GVC hasn’t provided the cooperatives they source FT cocoa from with any certainty regarding 
future purchasing.  
To illustrate, in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme we discussed Cocobod’s role in financing, external 
marketing, quality and pricing, as well as described LBCs role in cocoa’s internal marketing. To 
this end, the described governance structure provides a great degree of certainty, trust and 
sustainability based on an established track record of smooth functioning around the purchasing 
and selling of cocoa beans. On the other hand, in relation to what we referred to as ‘‘long-term 
relationships and supply contracts’’ in chapter 2, interviewee 26-the head of Sustainability from 
Armajaro-noted that ‘‘Armajaro have challenged the long-term relationship FT principle since it 
doesn't provide assurances to Armajaro as they might invest in this relationship and then the 
farmer may sell their cocoa to someone else (dribbling)’’.  
This is in line with our literature review in chapter 2, whereby Doherty et al. (2013) suggested that 
contracts only extend for one growing season in practice, or are completely ignored by major 
retailers involved in FT. On this note, although interviewee 47-a Manager from FTI-acknowledged 
that Mondelez have shown some sort of long term commitment to farmers through the fact that 
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the CCP16 programme has maintained communities they have worked in from the past into Cocoa 
Life, she admitted that: 
‘‘There is however no sort of commercial commitment from the programme’’. Interviewee 39-
the Head of Cocoa Life Farmers’ Cooperative in Amansie West district-confirmed that ‘‘there 
is no guarantee of a long term relationship or supply contract’’. 
This is the case for Mondelez’s relationship with Kuapa, since Cocoa Life and Divine’s chains are 
interlinked to some extent through Mondelez’s FT cocoa sourcing by 75% from Kuapa, especially 
when considering that there are plans already to cut this by 25% going forward, according to 
interviewee 19-a manager from the Kuapa Kokoo-Mondelez GVC. This was further compounded 
by the vagueness of Mondelez interviewees regarding the role of Mondelez in purchasing FT 
cocoa going forward-interviewee 17. The long term commitment and sustainability of Cocoa Life 
has been challenged further by interviewee 35, who suggested that the programme is new and 
not self-sustaining yet. He also suggested that due to the lack of bottom-up ownership and 
empowerment of farmers, the impacts may not be sustainable in the long-run when Mondelez 
leaves. On the other hand, he mentioned that: 
‘‘The Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC has been sustainable for a long time and Divine has developed 
a trusted relationship with Kuapa that will carry on’’. 
e. Environmental protection – FT is not as geared towards achieving environmental goals when 
compared to other certifications like RA, as we have seen in the sustainability key theme. To this 
end, Doherty et al. (2013) suggested ‘‘there is little information to suggest how this works’’. None 
of our interviewees for both the conventional and the FT chains was familiar with the 
environmental aspects. This has been demonstrated by Cocoa Life’s performance, for which 
interviewee 39 confided that: ‘‘among the five pillars of the programme, the most achieved is the 
farming and the least is the environment’’. 
3. Competitive market structure & business performance – Beyond the role that the 
implementation of FT principles holds in shifting power relations in the conventional chain at LBC-
Farmer level, the market structure and business performance of incumbents also play a crucial 
role.  To this end, LBCs operate in a highly competitive market structure driven by Cocobod in 
which they face high financing costs and limited margins that do not allow establishing strong 
                                                          
16 CCP is Cadbury Cocoa Partnership (CCP) – an investment programme launched by Cadbury in Ghana 
prior to Cocoa Life, worth £30 million over a ten-year period aiming to transform the lives and livelihoods of 
more than half a million cocoa farmers (IDS and University of Ghana, 2006). 
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relationships with farmers. To this end, the following analysis builds on the crucial role that States 
play as per Wallerstein (1995), and also the systemic conception of world-systems and GVCs that 
highlight that governance exercised from lead buyers dictates outcomes across the chain. In 
relation to FT, both FT GVCs are operating within the same limiting market structure, but have 
also been facing difficulties internally, arising from their business performance.  
Although interviewee 43 suggested there are 28 LBCs registered in the country, this number goes 
down to 3-4 LBCs per community as per farmers from interviewee groups 30 and 31, which limits 
the options farmers have to sell their cocoa. Although this oligopsonistic market structure is 
countered on the basis of the price uniformity, set by Cocobod, that allows that farmers all over 
the country to benefit equally, it is worth explained (FAO, 2013). To this end, it could be explained 
on the basis that one of the conditions for getting a LBC license from Cocobod is to be able to 
operate in at least two of the six cocoa regions. LBCs are also required to buy at least 2,000 
tonnes of cocoa in a cocoa season (IDS and University of Ghana, 2006). Interviewee 20-a 
research officer from IDS-also suggested that ‘‘farmers are geographically dispersed, which 
makes it costly to reach them’’. Also, as we have explained earlier in the ‘‘political crop’’ key 
theme, LBCs get a % of the FOB price, which was around 8% in 2012, but they also have high 
financing cost.  
Although we will examine the LBC-Cocobod relations in more detail later, for now we need to 
point out that in this fierce competitive market structure mainly driven by Cocobod, in their quest 
to make profits, fierce competition has been arisen among the LBCs (IDS and University of 
Ghana, 2006).  In light of this, Nelson et al. (2013) suggested that ‘‘LBCs are locked into a system 
with few incentives for high performance and little financial scope for establishing strong relations 
with farmers’’. In this context, Kuapa Kokoo Ltd could not be an exception as its activities are 
concentrated in certain areas only. Farmers from interviewee groups 30 and 31 told us that they 
have heard about Kuapa and FT but they could not join as Kuapa Kokoo Ltd is mainly based in 
towns that are far from their community. Equally, we saw earlier that Mondelez has targeted only 
certain communities and it only works with existing LBCs. On the other hand, LBCs like PBC, who 
have the greatest share of farmers due to the Cocobod legacy, are located in almost every farming 
district and hence cannot afford to run many social intervention programmes-interviewee 44-an 
operations manager for PBC.  
177 | P a g e  
 
Therefore, in their attempt to affect the farmer-LBC chain relationships at scale, both FT GVCs 
chains are limited by Cocobod’s legacy and the competitive industry structure that has shaped 
their geographical footprint and resources. 
Beyond the problems arising for LBCs due to this competitive market structure, and as we briefly 
mentioned earlier in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, LBCs are also limited by their organisational 
and business performance. In particular, interviewees 27-certification manager & deputy from 
Armajaro-highlighted the severe financial struggles that Kuapa Kokoo Ltd has been facing, due 
to increased overheads and limited managerial capability which ultimately might lead to shutting 
it down. In response to this, interviewee 47-a Manager from FTI-argued that Kuapa Kokoo Ltd 
trades fairly, unlike other LBCs who cheat farmers and this is why their business performance 
may have been going through difficulties. In Cocoa Life’s case, interviewee 35-a Cocobod 
Director-indicated that despite the competent management and resource from the UK working on 
the ground, the programme is still new, unproven and has been having some difficulties already 
in hitting their targets. 
4. Value Added/Upgrading – We have earlier referred to upgrading from a political angle in the 
‘‘political crop’’ key theme, but also through Divine’s and Mondelez’s point of view within their FT 
chains beyond trading/processing in the previous key theme. Through building on Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) product, process or functional upgrading, here, we will focus on value 
added below trading and processing at farmer and cooperative level. Whilst there is no upgrading 
in the conventional chain, the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC has achieved intra-chain functional 
upgrading and process upgrading through forward integration and political empowerment, which 
may however be restricted to some extent due to Kuapa Kokoo Ltd.’s business performance and 
the potential to scale up. In the meantime, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC has achieved process 
upgrading whilst pursuing functional upgrading through economic diversification. 
To illustrate, from the previous discussion in this theme, it has been established that there is no 
value added and upgrading in the conventional chain at farming level, since the relationships have 
been at best characterised transactional by all of the interviewees. However, when examining 
Divine’s chain, we have earlier mentioned that it involved forward integration from the 
farmers/cooperative level to setting up their own LBC. According to Gereffi et al. (2001) and 
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011), this comprises intra-chain functional upgrading as it involved 
acquiring new functions in trading, financing, logistics-that all LBCs need to undertake-on top of 
the existing skills in farming, production and farmer organisation. Also, although the theoretical 
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definition we have from Gereffi et al. (2001) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) is more 
geared towards engineering and business terminology, as we have seen earlier, we can also 
argue that Divine have also achieved process upgrading due to the bottom-up empowerment and 
farmer organisation. This has also been advanced from interviewee 2-a programme manager 
from the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC-who emphasised that ‘‘upgrading involves democratic 
governance, operational systems and empowerment through organisation in cooperatives’’. As 
explained earlier, the limitations derive again from Kuapa’s limited scale and the poor business 
performance of their LBC. This may in turn limit the benefits from functional upgrading, but also 
provide difficulties to run empowerment activities and democratic process which may be deemed 
costly in light of the financial pressure they are facing. 
In parallel, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC has primarily focused and achieved process upgrading 
through their productivity-driven programme. As discussed in the sustainability key theme, they 
have achieved this by putting farmers are at the centre of their model, which has led to productivity 
increases of 20-60% vs. 6-8% of others. And, although Cocoa Life don’t have their own LBC like 
Divine, they have in some way been pursuing functional upgrading for their farmers through their 
‘‘additional livelihoods’’ second programme outcome. To justify, interviewee 45-the head of Cocoa 
Life explained that: 
‘‘Farmers are dependent if they only export cocoa beans. This is why they have decided to 
help farmers diversify to other crops and become in this way more independent’’. Clearly, 
Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s GVC has been focusing more on political empowerment whereas the 
Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC has been focusing more on the economic dimension of 
empowerment. 
5. ‘‘Captive’’ and ‘‘Relational’’ Governance – In the beginning of this farmer-LBC relations 
section, we have described the governance structure in the conventional chain at this level as 
‘‘captive’’ as per Gereffi et al.’s (2005) typology. We have justified this on the basis of BASIC’s 
(2014) report and Ryan’s (2011) explanation, which we verified and enhanced through our 
ensuing analysis on the conventional chain’s features, namely; farmers’ transactional 
dependency on buyers (LBCs), limited training, lack of farmer organisation and the competitive 
market structure driven by Cocobod that does not allow meaningful relationships between farmers 
and LBCs. 
In this context, and in relation to the governance in the FT GVCs, we argue that the Kuapa 
Kokoo-Divine GVC has changed this type of governance at farmer/farmer cooperative-LBC 
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level to ‘‘relational’’, on the basis of mutual dependence and accountability between the LBC 
(Kuapa Kokoo Ltd) and Kuapa Kokoo. 
Whilst BASIC (2014) confirmed that mutual dependence and personal ties are key elements in a 
‘‘relational’’ governance structure, in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme we talked at length about how 
these ties are fostered through farmer ownership, a bottom-up approach, forward integration and 
women empowerment, underpinned by strong democratic processes and governance. Also, 
interviewee 9-an ex-sustainability director of a major chocolate brand/manufacturer-confirmed 
that ‘‘Divine is specifically characterised by an in depth relationship with Kuapa Kokoo, through 
mutual risk sharing and accountability’’. Interviewee 35 added that this relationship has been 
sustainable for a long time and managed through personal ties. On the same note, Gereffi et al. 
(2005) agreed that relational linkages take time to build. Furthermore, through our analysis in the 
section, the ‘‘relational’’ governance structure has been justified on the basis that Kuapa 
eliminated the purchasing clerk-farmer mistrust issue. Having said that, on the basis of what we 
explained about the LBC’s financial woes and its impact, this ‘‘relational’’ structure may be 
constrained. 
On the other hand, Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s governance mirrors the conventional chain and 
remains ‘‘captive’’ on the basis that there is no true political empowerment, longevity of 
relationships and personal ties. 
For example, despite sourcing 75% of their FT cocoa from Kuapa Kokoo, interviewee 19 told us 
that ‘‘the relationship with Kuapa is transactional’’. For the 25% of the FT beans sourced from 
Cocoa Life, he suggested ‘‘they have more influence and oversight since they have operation on 
the ground’’. However, we must acknowledge that the intensity of Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s 
‘‘captive’’ structure is not as high to the one in the conventional chain due to the fact that farmers 
have been supported towards diversifying and being given advice on farming practices and best 
LBC to sell to.  
In terms of the potential of both FT GVCs to scale up and shift the governance structure in the 
conventional chain, we argue this is impossible on the basis of Divine’s limited scale we examined 
previously, the existing market structure at LBC level as set up by Cocobod, but also because of 
Kuapa Kokoo Ltd.’s business performance limitations we have discussed earlier in this section. 
In Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s case, this is also not possible given that the objective of the programme 
has been clearly to ensure productivity and security of supply and not to change the existing 
governance arrangements. For a summary of this discussion, see table 7 below. 
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Table 7: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Farmer-LBC level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional Captive-High 
 Farmers’ transactional dependency on LBCs 
 Limited training, lack of farmer organisation 
 Competitive market structure driven by Cocobod that does not allow 
meaningful relationships between farmers and LBCs 
FT Kuapa 
Kokoo-Divine 
Relational 
 Mutual dependence, accountability, personal ties 
 Farmer ownership, bottom-up approach, forward integration, women 
empowerment, democratic processes and governance, elimination 
of purchasing clerk-farmer mistrust issue 
FT Cocoa 
Life-Mondelez 
Captive-Low  No true political empowerment, longevity of relationships and 
personal ties 
Source: Author, BASIC (2014), Ryan (2011) 
5.5.2 LBC-COCOBOD RELATIONS 
The multi-level relationship between LBCs and Cocobod highlights the fact that LBCs operate 
with a very high operational risk underpinned by the need to turn around money quickly amidst 
quality, delivery, liquidity, trust and high cost of finance concerns. This pressure is key to 
understand in relation to the issues that trickle down the chain at farmer level, such as cheating 
through wrongly calibrated scales. To this end, FTI’s focus on farming and consumer level only 
highlighted its lack of systemic understanding advanced by world-systems and the GVC 
approach. As such, both FT GVCs overlap at this level with the conventional chain and maintain 
the existing ‘‘captive’’ governance structure, as Cocobod’s relationship with most LBCs, except 
for the very well-funded ones, is highly transactional. 
To illustrate, the relations between LBCs and Cocobod can be grouped into the following 
categories: 
a. Financing – As we have discussed in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, financing is the main 
power mechanism Cocobod is using to fund cocoa purchasing and control LBCs. Control comes 
from the fact that the seed funding Cocobod provides is not sufficient, yet it’s the cheapest money 
most LBCs can access. As a result, interviewee 24-an executive logistics assistant from a 
prominent LBC-highlighted that ‘‘LBCs have to turn around money quite quickly so they can fund 
additional purchases’’.  
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b. Quality – As we have also discussed in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, QCD exercises power 
and ensures quality at district level, whereby QCD grades and seals cocoa beans and at 
warehouse/port level through a second quality check when delivered. For this reason, interviewee 
32-a corporate responsibility and sustainability head of cocoa from a prominent LBC-told us ‘‘it’s 
critical to have good relationship with the QCD especially at district level as the quicker QCD 
grades and seals, the earlier the LBC gets the cocoa and can buy more cocoa-have a quicker 
cash turnaround’’.  
c. Trading – LBCs work with CMC during the shipment of cocoa beans through offloading cocoa 
to CMC warehouses. Whilst, for conventional cocoa, CMC informs them about when to ship their 
cocoa beans, for FT, CMC need to consult with the LBC first. After international traders contact 
Cocobod for FT cocoa, Cocobod communicates to the LBC the quantity of cocoa they need and 
the LBC either gives the go ahead to Cocobod to sell or not to sell their beans to them-interviewee 
32. To this end, interviewee 44-an operations manager for PBC-explained that LBCs make profit 
after delivering the cocoa to Cocobod on the basis of their market share and the % FOB that was 
determined in the Producer Price Committee. However, when LBCs fail to deliver the cocoa by 
the deadline they need to pay a penalty to Cocobod.  
d. Policy – Interviewee 44 added that Cocobod undertakes rule setting and sanctioning whilst 
LBCs try to influence rule setting when executing. In terms of influencing, all LBCs come together 
to form an association called LICOBAC, which is responsible for giving Cocobod feedback on 
policies in relation to cross border trade activities, inter LBC trade prohibition and recording of 
data. They also discuss how to improve quality and input provision. The relations at this level are 
very collaborative.  
‘‘However, Cocobod is particularly strong and powerful when it comes to policy enforcement 
and sanctioning LBCs. Cocobod can enforce share of FOB, blacklist LBCs on the basis of 
smuggling, wrong scales and misapplication of seed money’’. 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that LBCs operate with very high risk. As a result of the 
cheap but limited finance and the sanctioning ability of Cocobod, most LBCs are under severe 
pressure to deliver whilst turning around cash quickly. But, as IDS and University of Ghana (2006) 
suggested, LBCs face bottlenecks in the cocoa delivery system and sometimes it takes weeks to 
receive payments from Cocobod. However, during this period Cocobod charges interest on 
monies provided, leading LBCs to take out overdrafts from banks, hence increasing costs, 
reducing their profitability and their ability to help farmers. If we add on top of this what we have 
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explained earlier in this section around the trust issues LBCs have with their purchasing clerks, it 
becomes clear what interviewee 47-a Manager from FTI-mentioned:  
‘‘Running an LBC in Ghana is very difficult considering the risks involved and variable 
operational costs, prompting most LBC to trade unfairly’’. Interviewee 44 confirmed that ‘‘in 
essence, Cocobod has shed most of its operational risk unto the LBCs who in turn apply 
pressure on farmers through cheating them often through re-calibrated scales’’. 
This pressure is key to understand as it generates challenges down the chain at farmer level 
which FT has been seeking to resolve. Also, as a result of this pressure, most LBCs -except for 
the well-funded ones with the international trading arms like Olam and Armajaro, or the ones with 
great market share like PBC-have challenging relationships with Cocobod as the core of their 
relationship is highly commercial and transactional. For these LBCs, Cocobod is seen as a 
monopoly creating problems in warehousing, margins and delays that hit their bottom line. From 
Cocobod’s point of view, these LBCs tend to default on seed loans and usually fail to deliver the 
quantity and quality of cocoa required to earn the much needed foreign exchange-interviewee 44. 
On the basis of the discussion above, the governance structure prevalent is ‘‘captive’’. 
In this context, both FT GVCs have no option but to operate within these power mechanisms and 
‘‘captive’’ governance structure exercised by Cocobod in the conventional GVC. In fact, Kuapa 
Kokoo Ltd and the LBCs that Cocoa Life is working with are subject to the same power 
mechanisms. In this sense, interviewee 32 told us that, ‘‘even with Kuapa, the same commercial 
considerations prevail’’. Hence, the relations in the FT chains remain ‘‘captive’’ underlying the way 
that the conventional and FT GVCs overlap at this level. This is depicted in table 8 below. 
Table 8: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, LBC-Cocobod level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Both FT GVCs 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Captive-High  Highly transactional at financing, trading, quality and 
policy level involving sanctions 
Source: Author 
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5.5.3 COCOBOD-INTERNATIONAL TRADERS/PROCESSORS RELATIONS 
Despite CMC’s monopoly position, the power between them and the international 
traders/processors in the forward market is balanced and is based on mutual commercial 
dependence, since Cocobod relies on them for FX. Who has the edge in this relationship is usually 
determined by liquidity requirements, market conditions, security of supply and preferential 
treatment. On this basis, the governance structure regarding forward sales at this level is 
‘‘relational’’. Similarly to the previous section, FTI’s focus on farming and consumer level only 
highlighted the lack of systemic understanding advanced by world-systems and the GVC 
approach. As such, both FT GVCs also overlap at this level with the conventional chain and 
maintain the existing ‘‘relational’’ governance structure. 
As we explained in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, CMC are the sole seller of cocoa abroad and 
buyer of all cocoa from LBCs internally creating effectively a monopoly through their unique 
position in the chain. With 70% of Ghanaian cocoa sold forward to international 
traders/processors, the relationship between them and Cocobod is key to the Ghanaian economy 
for FX earning, to LBCs for financing and to farmers in order to get paid.   
Interviewee 37, a CMC marketing manager, suggested this is a highly transactional relationship 
underpinned by two key criteria: Price and conditions of trade: Price is determined by market but 
also type of crop (main crop, light crop, small crop), as they entail different percentage of fat. 
Conditions of trade include trade claims, shipment quality and payment on time. As far as their 
overall relationship goes, interviewee 33-a logistics manager from a major cocoa 
processor/trader- highlighted that ‘‘Cocobod’s role has ensured some high level of uniformity in 
the Ghanaian cocoa sector’’. For them, this has been manifested through the provision of personal 
account management, whereas in the past they had to deal directly with the farmers’ association. 
In this regard, he emphasised that Cocobod makes trading in cocoa easier than in other countries 
like the Ivory Coast. 
In terms of the power play between Cocobod and the international traders/processors, the power 
is fairly balanced and the edge is determined by cash, market conditions, security of supply and 
preferential treatment. For example, when Cocobod needs to raise money quickly they sold cocoa 
beans to its domestic processors/traders in a pre-financed model (ibid). Interviewees 27-
certification manager & deputy from Armajaro-also told us that supply and demand determine 
who has the edge in this relationship. For example, when there is oversupply, international 
traders/processors have the edge, but when there is high demand, CMC has the upper hand. 
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Similarly to the branded manufacturers, security of supply underpins the purchasing of 
international traders/processors, hence cocoa beans are purchased from CMC three months in 
advance to ensure sustainability of production, whilst they tend to sign annual contracts with their 
suppliers regarding the quantity of beans they require for that year. Furthermore, they purchase 
most of the cocoa from CMC at a specific period in the year where they get up to 20% discount-
interviewee 33. Lastly, interviewee 33 mentioned that international traders/processors get 
preferential treatment from CMC as opposed to the local ones, manifested through the payment 
timeframe. As we said earlier, whilst internal processors were asked to pre-finance their 
purchases of cocoa, this was not the case with international traders/processors. It seems that this 
is driven by CMC as a negotiating tool on the basis of buyers’ concerns about security of supply. 
The discussion above indicates that despite’s CMC’s monopoly position and the consequent 
power mechanisms it’s using, like discount on crop, playing off local against international 
traders/processors, the power is fairly balanced. This is also because CMC heavily relies on them 
to raise money and FX and the international traders/processors have the option to buy from 
another producing country. The mutual dependence, complex interactions and personal ties 
indicate that the governance structure regarding forward sales at this level is ‘‘relational’’. 
However, in spot selling, the structure naturally resembles a market structure.  
Similarly to the relations between Cocobod and LBCs earlier, both FT GVCs have no option but 
to operate within this marketing structure. Hence, as far as shifting relations and governance 
structure are concerned, FT does not have any impact at all. The relations in the FT chains remain 
‘‘relational’’ underlying this way that the conventional and FT GVCs overlap at this level. This is 
depicted in table 9 below. 
Table 9: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Cocobod-International 
Trader/Processor level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Both FT GVCs 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Relational-High 
 Mutual dependence 
 Complex interactions 
 Personal ties 
 Long-term relationship 
Source: Author 
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5.5.4 INTERNATIONAL TRADERS/PROCESSORS-MANUFACTURING BRANDS RELATIONS 
The relationship between the international traders/processors and manufacturing brands is based 
on price, quality and product development, which results in strong collaboration, mutual 
dependence and good balance between the parties involved. Despite this resembling a 
‘‘relational’’ governance structure, the proximity to consumer demand in combination with making 
products according to a customer’s specifications, turns this into ‘‘modular’’ governance. FTI’s 
focus on farming and consumer level only highlighted FT’s lack of systemic understanding 
advanced by world-systems and the GVC approach. As such, although FT has helped raise 
awareness, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez FT GVC overlaps with its conventional chain at this level, 
whilst maintaining the existing ‘‘modular’’ governance structure. And, although the Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine GVC mirrors the conventional chain’s ‘‘modular’’ governance, its intensity is certainly 
weaker as opposed to Mondelez’s due to Divine’s significantly smaller size. 
To this end, according to interviewee 33 and interviewee 19, it appears that whilst price is 
important, the relation goes far beyond. The brands’ demand determines the price of each product 
the international trader/processor sells to them. For example, if there is a higher percentage of fat 
in the chocolate, the customer has to pay more. Consequently, quality, in terms of meeting the 
specific quality demands of the brands in the products, plays a significant role. These include 
taste, colour, texture, fat and moisture content. This works in a collaborative manner whereby, 
the international traders/processors provide the standard recipe and the brand provides feedback 
for adjustments. Following this, product development is also important in enhancing the 
collaborative relationship, as the international traders/processors often develop new recipes for 
the brands to try out and the other way around. Lastly, delivery underpins the things we have 
already discussed above, hence logistics are also paramount in a good relationship between 
them. Beyond these areas, as we mentioned earlier, there are some international traders who 
have been offering a sustainability proposition to brands as means to mitigate their on the ground 
reputation risk and reassure them about their security of supply. 
Therefore, according to the discussion above, it appears that the relations are fairly balanced and 
both parties are interdependent. Interviewees 19 and 33 also confirmed the commercial 
interdependency by stating that traders need brands to buy their products and brands need 
continuous supply of raw material and products. This is why the relationships are long-term and 
are based more on trust. Although, they agreed there was a balance of power between them 
broadly, as we have seen in the ‘‘buyer-driven power structure’’ key theme, they also 
acknowledged that the demand and positioning power mechanism the brands have in their 
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disposal gives them an edge in this typical ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain. Interviewee 33 further added 
that buyers also have an additional advantage due to the perishable nature of the product that 
forces them to sell at some point. Although the relations are highly interdependent and resemble 
those within a relational governance structure, the proximity to consumer demand in combination 
with making products according to the customer’s specifications, turns this into ‘‘modular’’ 
governance. BASIC (2014) also confirmed the ‘‘modular’’ governance structure at this level. 
Similarly to the sections before, FT has not changed these relations and the consequent 
‘‘modular’’ governance structure. As we have explained earlier though, FT has been useful in 
raising awareness. As interviewee 11, an ex-sustainability director of a major chocolate brand, 
told us, ‘‘previously international traders did not want to give away any power to the farmers 
operating in a neo-colonial manner, however due to the pressure that brands exercised, they 
started sourcing FT certified cocoa’’. At FT GVC level, as we have discussed in the previous key 
theme, FT chocolate is treated as yet another product in the shop. As such, the Cocoa Life-
Mondelez FT GVC overlaps with its conventional chain at this level, whilst maintaining the existing 
‘‘modular’’ governance structure. And, although the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC mirrors the 
conventional chain’s ‘‘modular’’ governance, its intensity is certainly weaker as opposed to 
Mondelez’s due to Divine’s significantly smaller size. This discussion is depicted in table 10 below. 
Table 10: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, International Trader/Processor-
Manufacturing Brands level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Cocoa Life-
Mondelez FT GVC 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Modular-High 
 Strong collaboration and mutual dependence based 
on price, quality and product development 
 Proximity to consumer demand and making products 
according to customer’s specifications 
FT Kuapa Kokoo-
Divine 
Modular-Low 
 As above, but less intensive due to Divine’s smaller 
size compared to Mondelez and the international 
traders/processors 
Source: Author 
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5.5.5 MANUFACTURING BRANDS & RETAILERS17-CONSUMERS RELATIONS 
Despite the introduction of FT branded chocolate products by supermarkets in order to address 
the demand of their socially/ethically aware consumers, price remained the main driver in retailers 
and consumers purchasing decisions. Consequently, and on the basis of the price prominence, 
the governance structure in the conventional chain is based on ‘‘market’’ relations. To this end, 
FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ through conventional distribution channels meant that relations 
between brands-retailers and retailers-consumers would remain the same, mirroring those in the 
conventional chain. 
To illustrate, on the basis of the discussion we had with interviewee 4-a cocoa sustainability 
manager from a major retailer-it has been made clear to us that the main criteria for purchasing 
chocolate in order to retail are price and quality. On top of this, FT was introduced in order to 
capture the niche customer segment of the consumers, who are more socially/ethically aware 
regarding their purchases. On this note, she confided that beyond price and quality, they are 
retailing FT chocolate on the basis of the ‘‘good story’’ factor. Nonetheless, it was made clear to 
us that high prices can deter consumers from buying FT, hence price is critical in both their 
purchasing relationship with their suppliers but also in the retailer’s relationship with the 
consumer. 
On this note, it’s hard for Fairtrade brands, with higher cost prices to maintain their market position 
and achieve supermarket listings. Supermarkets are increasingly holding tough negotiations on 
price and pursue strategies like open book accounting which enables them to pressure for price 
cuts. FT’s higher prices can be partly explained as a result of larger conventional supermarket 
own brands using economies of scale and vertical integration in their value chains to reduce costs. 
For own brand products, retailers can also cross-subsidise from other parts of their business. But, 
the higher prices of Fairtrade brands are often also a result of the close relationships they have 
with FT producers like Divine spending 2% of their turnover in Kuapa Kokoo, as we have earlier 
described.  
However, it’s hard to communicate the importance of these close value chain relationships to 
supermarket buyers and mainstream consumers, ‘‘for whom the FLO mark is assumed to 
                                                          
17 The reason we brought brands and retailers together as a group and did not examine the relation between 
them separately is that for independent Fairtrade products, like Divine’s and Mondelez’s, the brands act as 
an interface between supermarkets and the rest of the GVC, with most supermarkets having limited/no 
control over the GVC. As such the relationship downstream with the customer was more meaningful to 
examine in light of FT’s focus on consumer level (Smith, 2009). 
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distinguish products as having been fairly traded and beyond this price becomes an important 
factor in purchasing decisions’’ (Smith, 2008; p.9). This has also been the case with 
interviewee 33, who questioned ‘‘whether the consumer should be footing the FT bill’’, and 
interviewee 45-the head of Cocoa Life-who emphasised that ‘‘I don’t support the idea of buying 
things expensive just because it has a fairtrade stamp’’. 
As such, since price has been suggested as the driving force, the governance structure here, and 
as confirmed by BASIC (2014) is based on ‘‘market’’ relations. Hence, despite the introduction of 
FT in Divine’s or Mondelez’s products, relations between brands-retailers and retailers-
consumers have remained the same mirroring those of a conventional chain. As mentioned 
previously, although FT has been useful in raising awareness, its decision to rely on conventional 
distribution channels like retailers and supermarkets could not effect change in the existing 
governance structure. This discussion is depicted in table 11 below. 
Table 11: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Manufacturing Brands & Retailers-
Consumer level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Both FT GVCs 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Market-High 
 Price drives retailers and consumer decision over FT 
‘‘good story’’. 
 
Source: Author 
5.5.6 CONCLUSION 
The argument in this key theme was based on Gereffi et al. (2005) and Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark’s (2011) ‘‘governance as coordination’’. As such, according to Gereffi et al.’s (2005) typology 
of governance structures, namely; markets, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy, we have 
examined the relations between nodes of the conventional and both FT GVCs in our attempt to 
determine the governance structure. Importantly, due to FTI’s sole focus on the consumer and 
farmers ends of the chain, this analysis highlighted FTI’s lack of appreciation in relation to the way 
the international trading system works through the systemic approach of world systems and 
GVCs, which put power relations in the centre of the analysis. To this end, existing governance 
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structures in a node of the chain often drive impact further down the chain, especially when driven 
by the most powerful institutions, like Cocobod, the international traders/processors or brands. 
This was illustrated by the fact that both FT GVCs failed to change the relations and governance 
structure in all but one of the nodes of the GVC. But even when this was achieved at farmer-LBC 
level in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s FT GVC, the potential to affect change in the conventional chain 
at scale for all Ghanaian farmers was deemed unrealistic due to Divine’s limited scale, but also 
due to the existing market structure at LBC level set up by Cocobod. This further illustrates 
Wallerstein’s (1995) point on the role of states in the process of defending capital accumulation, 
which we have developed in detail during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme. This way, FT does not 
take into account the impact that existing relations and governance structures in the middle of the 
chain driven by Cocobod would have down the chain at farming level. 
Beyond this, and in order to summarise in a systematic manner, at farmer-LBC level, the 
conventional governance structure is ‘‘captive’’ on the basis of the transactional dependency of 
farmers on LBCs, which has been driven to a great extent by Cocobod’s market structure. This 
has however shifted in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s FT GVC to ‘‘relational’’ on the basis of mutual 
dependence, elimination of purchasing clerk-farmer mistrust issue, accountability and bottom-up 
empowerment. The Cocoa Life-Mondelez FT GVC remained ‘‘captive’’, due to the lack of true 
political empowerment as a result of the organisational goal to secure supply in a top-down 
manner. Despite this, the intensity of the ‘‘captive’’ governance structure was less than the one in 
the conventional chain due to fact that farmers have been receiving more training, advice and 
support towards diversification. 
At LBC-Cocobod level, the highly intensive ‘‘captive’’ governance exercised by Cocobod is based 
on a highly transactional relationship with LBCs at multiple levels including financing, trading, 
quality and policy, whilst having provisions for sanctions. The highly risky environment LBCs 
operate is the market structure that both FT GVCs are subject to, hence the ‘‘captive’’ governance 
structure remains intact. Similarly, FT is subject to the ‘‘relational’’ governance structure prevalent 
in the conventional chain at Cocobod-International Traders/Processors level. This structure is 
based on mutual dependence, complex interactions, personal ties and a long-term relationship.  
At international Traders/Processors-Manufacturing Brands level, since FT is treated as yet 
another product in the shop for Mondelez, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez FT GVC overlaps with 
Mondelez’s conventional chain. As such, the ‘‘modular’’ structure prevalent is based on the 
proximity to consumer demand and making products according to customer’s specifications. This 
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is also the case for Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s FT GVC, but at lower intensity given Divine’s 
significantly smaller scale compared to Mondelez and the international traders/processors. Lastly, 
at Manufacturing Brands & Retailers-Consumer level, despite the introduction of FT branded 
chocolate products by supermarkets, price remained as the main driver in retailers and consumer 
purchasing decisions, which in essence is translated in a ‘‘market’’ governance structure. This 
has been inevitable given FT’s strategic decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ through conventional 
distribution channels. 
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CHAPTER 6 – FINDINGS: COTTON-GARMENT GVCS (INDIA-UK) 
Having examined the cocoa-chocolate GVCs between Ghana and the UK, the aim of this chapter 
is to examine the research questions for the cotton-garment GVCs between India and the UK. In 
contrast to the previous chapter, whereby FT certified cocoa has been well-known in Ghana, this 
has not been the case in India. To this end, SSI (2014) suggested that FT certified cotton has 
negligible or no contribution relative to India’s national cotton production, which has also been 
manifested during our interviews as only 8 out of our 22 interviewees in the field (India) have 
heard of FT. This, in combination with the fact that FT cotton was introduced much later than 
chocolate, have resulted in significantly less data for FT cotton in India as compared to FT 
chocolate in Ghana. 
Despite this, after describing the conventional and the two FT GVCs, similarly to the previous 
chapter, we structure our analysis according to the four key themes that emerged through a 
combination of our literature review and fieldwork that were outlined in the introduction: 
1. Sustainability – Driven by FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and working with TNCs. This was further 
enhanced by our fieldwork, whereby the concept of corporate sustainability was often mentioned 
in relation to FT’s mainstreaming and the sustainability of Fairtrade International.  
2. Political – Driven by the strong role of the nation state as a mechanism that enables capital 
accumulation as per Wallerstein and FT’s notion of empowerment we outlined earlier. This 
dimension was also further enhanced through our fieldwork whereby we were constantly being 
reminded of the strong role of the state and politics across our case studies. 
3. ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ – Articulated by the power that TNCs exercise and derived from GVC’s 
‘‘governance as power’’ concept. 
4. Chain Relations and Coordination – Demonstrated by the types of governance structures 
we earlier outlined through GVC’s ‘‘governance as coordination’’ concept. 
As such, we discuss sustainability, through the corporate sustainability concept and then through 
FT’s organisational sustainability. In turn, we analyse the role of the Indian government, the key 
role the cotton-textile GVC plays in the Indian economy, along with upgrading and protectionism 
from a political economy angle. Lastly, we describe FT’s approach to the political dimension 
through farmer organisation and empowerment across conventional and FT chains. In turn, we 
will look at the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ power structure, through the power mechanisms our interviewees 
most often cited in relation to FT: customer demand, quality, profitability, purchasing power and 
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value added. Finally, we look at the chain relations through the analysis of the governance 
structure between nodes of the chain, from farmer to consumer. 
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF GVCS  
To this end, this section starts by outlining the conventional value chain followed by the FT value 
chains from Chetna-No Nasties and Agrocel-M&S.  
6.1.1 CONVENTIONAL GVC 
We will first outline the conventional cotton-garment value chain between India and the UK as 
described through our interviews and secondary data in figure 19 below. One of the first things 
we are able to observe is that, unlike the previous cocoa-chocolate GVCs, most of the activities 
take place in-country, in India, and only marketing and branding takes place in the UK. This is not 
only a strong indication of the value added in India, but also of the associated relatively improved 
power balance between vertically integrated manufacturers in India and retailers/brands in the 
UK. 
Figure 19: India-UK Cotton-Apparel Conventional GVC 
Source: Author (compiled from interviews, Cotton Connect 2014, Environmental Justice Foundation 
2009, UNCTAD 2010, Hutson et al. 2005) 
We should also note that the length of the chain, complexity of the industry and organisational 
strategies have generated various possible chain combinations. The complexity arises from the 
fact that there are chains which are vertically integrated from ginning to manufacturing, including 
our preliminary processing, processing, manufacturing nods in one. Alternatively, there are 
disaggregated chains whereby traders are separated from spinners and spinners from vertically 
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integrated manufacturers. In the meantime, we could have independent agents or direct selling 
between every node of the chain. For these reasons, we have simplified the chain by using five 
main nodes and listing a variety of activities below, as per our interviewees’ suggestions. Finally, 
we should state that we haven’t included agents or the Cotton Corporation of India (CCI) who are 
heavily involved in trading across the chain. On the same note, due to time and resource 
limitations, we haven’t included input providers. We will, however attempt to provide this analytical 
rigor during the analysis in the key themes, that follow. 
6.1.2 Chetna-No Nasties FT GVC 
Following the conventional chain, we will now be outlining the FT chain that includes Chetna and 
No Nasties, as per figure 20 below. No Nasties present themselves as a 100% organic FT clothing 
brand. According to interviewee 66-CEO of No Nasties-they sell directly to consumers online 
internationally, which is 80% of their business, whilst 20% is exports made to wholesalers. Their 
recent plans include expanding in the Indian market.  
In relation to their links down the chain, interviewee 66 told us that when they started they worked 
with Chetna and followed Chetna's factory partner, Rajlakshmi Cotton Mills Private Limited 
(RCML), for t-shirt manufacturing. So, they initially bought from one factory only and they 
marketed these products. Later though, as they have expanded, they realised they couldn’t just 
rely on one factory and one cotton supplier.  Hence, they have added Pratima Organic and 
Pratima Organic and Suminter Organic. However, according to the No Nasties website (2015), 
since Chetna provides the majority of the cotton for the No Nasties printed t-shirts, we will be 
focusing on the Chetna-No Nasties chain in this analysis. Also, at manufacturing level, beyond 
Rajlakshmi Cotton Mills Private Limited, they have also added Armstrong Knitting Mills, who are 
considered one of India’s leading sustainable textile companies. In addition, they also work with 
smaller factories who have been working with conventional cotton and are now trying to transition 
to FT and organic.  
As a result, interviewee 66 told us that they have lost direct contact with the ground level and they 
rely solely on the FT certification process to audit and oversee impact. The only way to stay in 
touch with ground level is some projects they are doing to empower women, but their main focus 
is to increase scale and volume at this stage. Instead, the ones who have the relationship with 
farmers and their cooperatives are their manufacturers, like Armstrong Knitting Mills. He further 
suggested that their on the ground impact has been minimal since they are very small. To this 
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end, interviewee 54-CEO of a cotton FTO-justified No Nasties’ small impact also on the basis that 
they only do certification and little beyond this, unlike FTOs like Pants to Poverty and People Tree. 
Besides this, a bottom-up view of the chain shows that farmers are firstly organised in farmer self-
help groups, which, in turn, are arranged into 13 co-operatives. The Board members from each 
of these cooperatives form the Board of the Chetna Organic Famers Association (COFA) and 
Chetna’s Organic Agricultural Producer Company Limited (COAPCL). COFA is a not-for-profit 
farmer support organisation engaged in technical training, social improvement, capacity building, 
policy and advocacy work. COAPCL, on the other hand, is a commodity trading company that 
works on developing sustainable national and international market linkages for smallholder 
farmers’ agricultural products (Fairtrade Foundation, 2015). 
Figure 20: India-UK Chetna-No Nasties Cotton-Apparel FT GVC 
Source: Author (compiled from interviews) 
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As we are able to see from figure 20, when compared to the conventional chain the main 
differences are: 
 Farmer Organisation – The introduction of a chain node between cotton production and 
preliminary processing, or between farming and ginning level, that involves farmer 
organisation in a democratically-run cooperative. We will examine Chetna’s multilayered 
structure and associated activities in more detail during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme. 
 Sub-contracting preliminary processing – Although, the preliminary processing node 
hasn’t been eliminated, in effect it has been by-passed through Chetna maintaining 
ownership of the cotton and lint through this node via subcontracting ginners to undertake 
processing, according to interviewee 67-FTI’s Manager. 
 Vertically integrated manufacturers – After receiving the lint from ginners, it’s been 
delivered to vertically integrated manufacturers (mostly to RCML) and not to spinners only 
(processing node) like in the conventional chain.  
 Retailing/Branding – Although retailing and branding still takes place, it’s been 
undertaken by No Nasties in the form of a new entrant in the market, who sell directly to 
consumers online under the No Nasties brand including the FT label, and to wholesalers 
on the basis of their clients’ branding requirements and the same FT label. 
6.1.3 AGROCEL-M&S FT GVC 
As discussed earlier, M&S’s FT chain is part of a broader sustainability strategy named Plan A. 
Also, according to Traidcraft (2009), Marks & Spencer (M&S) was the first high street retailer to 
become involved with Fairtrade cotton in the UK. They have initially committed to purchasing 
volumes of cotton from Agrocel, which was an unprecedented step in commodity supply chains.   
Following this, interviewees 65-the managing director and senior vice president of marketing of a 
major vertically integrated manufacturer-told us that on the back of their relationship for 
conventional garments, they have also been instructed by M&S to procure FT lint from the ginners 
that Agrocel took the cotton to, and then process it according to their quality specifications so they 
can market it in the UK with the FT mark. As such, at the vertically integrated manufacturer level, 
M&S’s conventional and FT chains overlap. On this note, interviewee 63-CEO of FT India-noted 
that the Chetna-No Nasties FT GVC overlaps too at this stage as they procure some of the 
garment from the same garment factories as M&S. 
In relation to their links down the chain, interviewees 65 told us that M&S and similar 
retailers/brands do not have visibility below vertically integrated manufacturer level. We will 
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examine why this is the case later, but for now we need to note that the relationships down the 
FT chain are in essence controlled by the manufacturers. On this note, a bottom-up view of the 
chain involves farmer organisation under contract production, which has evolved into a formal 
cooperative in Agrocel Pure & Fair Cotton Growers’ Association under the guidance of Agrocel 
industries, which has been the promoting body that helped farmers organise and bought their 
produce (Fairtrade Foundation, 2015). We will, however, examine contract production in relation 
to both Agrocel and Chetna during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme.  
Figure 21: India-UK Agrocel-M&S Cotton-Apparel FT GVC 
Source: Author (compiled from interviews) 
As we are able to see from figure 21, when compared to the conventional and Chetna’s FT chain, 
the main differences are:  
 Farmer Organisation – The introduction of a chain node between cotton production and 
preliminary processing, or between farming and ginning level, that involves farmer 
organisation in a democratically-run cooperative. We will further examine and contrast 
Agrocel’s nature of farmer organisation and empowerment to Chetna’s during the ‘‘political 
crop’’ key theme. 
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 Preliminary processing – Although, the preliminary processing node has been 
subcontracted in Chetna’s case earlier, in this case it is maintained in its initial form as in 
the conventional chain, whilst some volume is processed through Agrocel’s ginning 
facilities. 
 Vertically integrated manufacturers – After receiving the lint from ginners, it’s been 
delivered to vertically integrated manufacturers and not to spinners only (processing node) 
like in the conventional chain. This is where the two FT chains overlap. 
 Retailing/Branding – Branding still takes place in the form of the existing brand name 
and packaging with the added FT label on the product. This is the main difference with No 
Nasties who sell via their own new entrant 100% FT brand online, or with another brand 
as per client’s branding requirement. In M&S case, retailing is also undertaken through 
the same conventional chain and channels. 
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6.2 SUSTAINABILITY  
Similarly to the sustainability key theme in cocoa, the main argument in this key theme also builds 
on FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ we presented in chapter 2. As such, the strategic re-orientation of the 
fair trade network away from an alternative trading system in order to work within the existing 
trading system and TNCs (through FT), was critical. Our argument also builds on the drive for 
capital accumulation advanced by Wallerstein (1995) in chapter 2.  
In light of this, through the analytical lenses of the Global Value Chain (GVC) and our power 
analyses, we have focused on the importance of contextual factors and power exercised by TNCs 
in shaping Fairtrade. As such, this key theme builds on what we have discussed in chapter 2, 
whereby Gereffi (1994) utilised the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ concept to describe the vertical power 
exercised by large buyers on the way GVCs, and in this case, FT operate. To the same end, we 
have also referred to our feminst power analyses lenses in order to identify and describe the 
horizontal power relations between the FT Foundation, FTI and No Nasties or M&S, as well as to 
understand the differences between the upstream ends of their chains. We have also built on the 
institutional context, in order to understand the economic, social and institutional dynamics that 
shape existing power relations in the GVCs in question in relation to FT (Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark, 2011).  
To this end, during the course of this section we discuss corporate sustainability underpinned by 
a strong profit motivation and the role of FT within corporate sustainability strategies like M&S’s 
Plan A. Following this, we elaborate on FT’s organisational sustainability through its top-down 
approach and cost of certification. Consequently, and on the basis of the criticism articulated 
against FT, we present FTI’s new business model that aims to address some of its limitations and 
compete with BCI in light of a reduced certification market share. 
6.2.1 PROFIT-DRIVEN CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY 
Similarly to the previous chapter, sustainability has been noted as one of the important things to 
consider in relation to FT cotton, according to interviewee 63-CEO of Fairtrade India, interviewee 
6-sustainable materials specialist for a major retailer, and interviewee 9-CEO of a cotton 
sustainability consulting firm. Building on this, we argue that, whilst most garment retailers in the 
UK have been exercising power through a strictly transactional and commercial-driven approach, 
others like M&S saw an opportunity to maintain the same commercial focus whilst also enticing a 
customer segment that wanted to know more about the way their garments were made. In order 
to do this, FT was initially heavily utilised by M&S until they decided to introduce and embed 
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sustainability across their organisation with the ultimate aim to extract as much commercial value 
as possible from every product they sold through their reputation as an ethical and sustainable 
retailer. This process was underpinned by strong reporting, measurement and communication 
mechanisms that recorded and communicated not only sustainability commitments and 
achievements to the public, but also delivered commercial value from pursuing an all-
encompassing sustainability business strategy. 
However, M&S’s drive for profitability through a sustainability strategy inevitably had 
consequences for FT. This can be explained on the basis of FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ that involved 
working within the existing trading system and TNCs, and Wallerstein’s (1995) position on the 
primacy of capital accumulation. So, although FT was initially viewed by M&S as a good starting 
point to address the needs of this specific customer segment, they later realised that expanding 
the scope was necessary in order to boost brand reputation and extract more value. 
Consequently, this has further confirmed the primacy of the profit motivation of TNCs and 
demoted FT as a small part in a broader sustainability business-driven strategy. 
In order to illustrate the argument above, we use Wilson’s (2003) corporate sustainability definition 
as well as Marrewijk’s (2003) five ambition levels of corporate sustainability, which we articulated 
in the previous chapter. In this context, the strictly commercial approach of major garment retailers 
in the UK was confirmed by interviewee 48, the Head of the Central Institute for Research on 
Cotton Technology. He suggested that ‘‘retailers’ decision to purchase garments from textile 
manufacturers is only based on price’’, whilst interviewee 21-the Head of Business Development 
for a major garment manufacturer-verified that ‘‘most UK retailing brands only relate to them 
based on price’’. Having said that, we have earlier referred to Traidcraft (2009), who claimed that 
M&S was the first high street retailer to become involved with Fairtrade cotton in the United 
Kingdom in 2006. The driver that led a major retailer, like M&S, to introduce FT garments from 
farmers in the Gujarat region of India supported by Agrocel, was related to shoppers’ purchasing 
behaviour. A survey commissioned by M&S showed that almost a third of shoppers had put 
clothes back on the rails because of concerns about their origins. In addition to this, 78% of 
shoppers wanted to know more about the way clothes were made, including use of chemicals 
and conditions in factories producing the goods (BBC, 2006). 
On this basis, M&S made the first forward contract for cotton and offered £600k pre-finance 
agreement to fund FT premium and input costs (M&S, 2005). FT labeling on clothes was deemed 
to address the shoppers concerns that affected their purchasing behaviour, as according to 
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interviewee 6 ‘‘FT is very well recognised by consumers and they have a great story behind it’’. 
The commercial rationale’s prevalence over any ethical and social considerations that FT is 
raising, was repeatedly confirmed by various interviewees. For example, interviewee 25-ex-
Oxfam manager involved in FT-suggested that he’s encountered situations whereby a major 
brand has committed to buy FT certified clothes and then backed down, or situations where a 
brand has tried to squeeze them on price despite the fact the product was FT certified. He further 
added that ‘‘retailers don't even know about cotton, yarn, or fabric, they just want to know how 
much the t-shirt costs’’. Interviewee 34-the founder of a cotton FTO-added that:  
‘‘Conventional buyers only want the FT label and they buy based on price’’. 
The priority of commercial considerations ahead of what FT really stands for was also evident 
from M&S themselves. As such, the CEO of M&S did not express a long-term commitment to FT 
by stating that it was unlikely that the chain's whole clothing range would become Fairtrade (BBC, 
2006). This has led interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-to argue that:  
‘‘Conventional players like M&S display lack of commitment for FT cotton, as demonstrated by 
their move to BCI cotton, which has affected the FT farmers due to the loss of the FT premium’’. 
Therefore, based on this evidence and similarly to the previous chapter, in relation to Marrewijk’s 
(2003) five ambition levels of corporate sustainability, we argue that M&S’s early involvement with 
FT we have just described resembles a hybrid between the ‘‘compliance-driven’’ and the ‘‘profit-
driven’’. It is ‘‘profit-driven’’ on the basis that it aimed to address shoppers’ purchasing behaviour. 
However, since the articulation and integration of social, ethical and ecological aspects hasn’t 
been fully developed yet, we could not position this solely in this grouping. It’s also ‘‘compliance-
driven’’, since it is providing welfare to society, within the limits of regulations from the rightful 
authorities, which is Fairtrade and the FT standards in this instance. Although, this involvement 
may have been perceived as the correct behaviour at the time, the evidence above suggests the 
primacy of commercial considerations. Hence, we think the hybrid between the two is the right 
grouping. 
Going forward though, M&S shifted away from FT, on the basis that although ‘‘FT is a good 
baseline, still there is more we can do over and above FT rules’’ (M&S, 2005). Interviewee 4-a 
sustainability manager from a major Retailer-criticised FT for not covering the problem holistically 
as they do not consider all sustainability angles, such as yield, women, agricultural practices, 
empowerment, leadership and access to markets. To this end, she claimed that big retailers, like 
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M&S, undertake sustainability strategies for security of supply, reputational reasons and moral 
obligation. On this note, interviewee 63-CEO of Fairtrade India-emphasised that: 
‘‘The shift away from FT certification to sustainability has taken place in the context of the entire 
global business community which has been evolving and developed concepts like 
‘‘sustainability’’, which was not there as a notion 25 years ago’’. 
In this context, M&S (2010) suggested that Plan A was launched in 2007, just a year after M&S 
introduced FT garments. We have previously explained in chapter 3 that Plan A is a sustainability 
strategy that encompasses commitments across five different areas: Climate change, waste, 
natural resources, health and wellbeing and Fair partner. In relation to FT though, it is critical to 
highlight that FT remained part of Plan A. But, whilst the FT Foundation (no date) mentioned that 
Fairtrade is a key part of Plan A, interviewee 6 highlighted that:  
‘‘FT cotton sourcing in M&S represents only 10-15% of their overall volume’’. 
The low percentage of FT cotton with Plan A was justified on the basis of a highly commercial 
strategy which was going beyond Plan A and lied with the buying department, who hold the real 
decision-making around sourcing. M&S Plan A report (2015; p.2) confirmed that ‘‘Plan A is a 
business plan’’. As a result, buying decisions are dictated by price and the purchasing is usually 
done on a quarterly and not long-term basis. On this basis, interviewee 6 underlined that: 
‘‘M&S do not face any loyalty issues in picking FT over others. Price dictates which category 
cotton to buy from including BCI, Organic, FT or recycled. M&S don't believe they should be 
charging their customers a premium for products especially in the current recession 
environment’’. 
Interviewee 15, a sustainable materials specialist for a major retailer, further highlighted that 
beyond price they also pick suppliers on the basis of quality, innovation, service, on time delivery 
and good relationship. As such, even ‘‘Plan A and sustainability are only one part of a whole range 
of criteria’’ (ibid). Whilst these criteria have been verified by interviewee 21-the Head of Business 
Development of major garment manufacturer-he claimed that although M&S are a better brand 
than other UK Retailers who only negotiate based on price, M&S also require a competitive price 
along with the fulfilment of certain sustainability criteria, like an ECO factory status. This has led 
interviewee 9 to question big retailers’ genuine interest in sustainability since their ‘‘model is based 
on selling a commodity with a sustainability attribute’’. The highly commercial nature of M&S’s 
corporate sustainability advanced through Plan A, as well as FT’s demotion with a wide-ranging 
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Plan A can be illustrated from figure 22 below. To this end, we can see that Plan A has been 
underpinned by £625m net benefit since 2007, whilst FT has only been limited in 1 of the 6 main 
themes of Plan A (within ‘‘products’’), also as a sub-theme within this area. 
Figure 22: Plan A Scope and Impact 
Source: Adapted from M&S (2015) 
On the basis of the evidence above and in relation to Marrewijk’s (2003) five ambition levels of 
corporate sustainability, we argue that M&S’s current involvement with FT has shifted from the 
hybrid between the ‘‘compliance-driven’’ and the ‘‘profit-driven’’ we described earlier, to solely 
‘‘profit-driven’’. Limiting FT and demoting it as a small part in a broader sustainability strategy has 
removed the element of compliance that was previously driven by the FT standards. In the 
meantime, the emphasis on outcomes and measurement, as indicated by figure 22 above, in a 
conception of corporate sustainability that is underpinned by commercial motivations to enhance 
corporate reputation, clearly indicate a profit-driven orientation.  
• 2.8bn carrier bags saved
• £15m raised for Oxfam and £50m for other 
charities
• 1m customers engaged with Plan A 
Engaged customers in a range of 
Plan A activities that beneﬁt them, 
their communities and the 
environment
• 64% of our products have at least one Plan A 
social or environmental quality
• 32% of cotton used to make clothing comes from a 
sustainable source, including Fairtrade
Built Plan A into M&S products, 
reducing their impact on the 
environment and helping the 
people involved in making them
• 32% of M&S food comes from suppliers that meet 
the M&S Silver Sustainable Factory Standard 
• 652,000 workers in M&S General Merchandise 
supply chains have received training since 2010
Worked with suppliers to help 
them become more efficient, 
reduce environmental footprints & 
provide good working conditions 
for employees
• Zero net emissions
• World’s only retailer with carbon neutral operations
Improved the way we design and 
operate stores, warehouses and 
transport ﬂeets in the UK & Ireland 
to increase efficiency and reduce 
waste
• 5000 volunteering days taken in 2014
• 38% of M&S Board are women
M&S employees have made it all 
happen – with great leadership 
from Plan A Champions
Customers
Products
Suppliers
Operations
Scope Impact
• £625m net benefit generated by Plan A since 2007
• £160m net benefit generated by Plan A in 2014
M&S shareholders have seen Plan 
A deliver ﬁnancial beneﬁts and 
transform the quality of information 
they receive
Theme
Employees
Shareholders
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6.2.2 FTI’S ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY  
Having established the profit-driven motivation of big retailers in their involvement with FT, which 
has ultimately led to FT being increasingly undermined within Plan A’s sustainability strategy, we 
will now focus on the implications of this which have been quite significant in terms of FTI’s 
organisational viability and sustainability. Similarly to the previous chapter, this was further 
compounded by the critique articulated against FT’s top-down approach which was underpinned 
by FT’s high cost of certification. Consequently, the FT Foundation and FTI advanced a licensee-
based model whilst broadening the scope beyond certification and loosening the FT standards in 
order to increase sales. In parallel, FT’s organisational viability and sustainability are under threat 
in light of the increasing competition from BCI certification. 
1. FT Approach – Similarly to the previous chapter, FT has been criticised for its top-down 
approach that doesn’t take into account the specific development context in India within which it 
operates. This is in line with Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) and feminist power analyses’ 
reference to the importance of the context, in order to understand the economic, social and 
institutional dynamics that shape power relations in GVCs. On this basis, we argue that FT have 
advanced a uniform and top-down solution to a context which is highly multidimensional and 
consists of sustainability of production concerns, cotton farmers’ suicides, ginners squeezing 
farmers on price, adverse weather that affects the crop, low productivity cotton farming areas, 
input prices and farmer indebtedness. Despite FT’s efforts to resolve some of these issues, the 
scale and multiple facets of the problem have been overwhelming for FT’s scope, scale and 
approach. Also, in relation to FT’s cost of certification and in line with our feminist power analyses 
that focus on horizontal power relations, we argue for the cost advantage and access that FT 
provides to bigger producer organisations as opposed to smaller ones. 
For example, farmers’ suicides were frequently referred to as a serious problem for the Indian 
cotton industry, according to interviewee 49-the deputy general manager of the Cotton 
Corporation of India, and interviewee 53-a cotton industry consultant. To this end, The Guardian 
(2014) quantified the problem by suggesting that more than 270,000 Indian cotton farmers have 
killed themselves since 1995. This is an alarming number when considering there are 4 million 
cotton farmers in India. Interviewee 54-the CEO of a cotton FTO-added that if we also take into 
account the number of people dropping out of cotton because of the dire conditions that lead to 
farmer suicides, the sustainability of cotton production is under great risk. He further estimated 
that with the numbers he’s encountered on the ground, there may be no cotton production in 30 
years from now. Campaigners linked suicides to the high price of genetically modified seeds 
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flooding the market, which is piling pressure on poorly paid growers, forcing many into a cycle of 
unmanageable debt (The Guardian, 2014). Whilst this assertion has some merit, interviewee 49 
also offered additional explanations, such as family problems, and interviewee 53 suggested that 
farmers are being squeezed on price by ginners. 
In this context, at FTI and FT principle level, interviewee 25-an ex-Oxfam manager-suggested 
that: 
‘‘FT has a blanket approach across value chains and this is why it hasn't been working’’, whilst 
interviewee 4 criticised FT for not addressing the problem holistically as they do not consider 
all sustainability angles. Nonetheless, interviewee 63, the CEO of FT India, acknowledged that 
‘‘Fairtrade is not a magic bullet’’. 
This is in line with FT’s theory of change that recognises that the nature and extent of change 
brought about by Fairtrade interventions will depend on a range of contextual factors, as we have 
explained in the previous chapter. On GVC level, No Nasties (2015) mentioned on their website 
that farmers’ suicides were too disturbing for them to ignore. As a result, this led them to launch 
a business that would attempt to solve the problem through FT certification. On the other hand, 
interviewee 54 and interviewee 67 argued that M&S do not have any visibility of the chain below 
vertically integrated manufacturer/spinner level and, hence did not even demonstrate awareness 
of the problem.  
Beyond farmers’ suicides, interviewee 59-the head of a cotton farmer association-and 
interviewees 62-the president and owner of a vertically integrated manufacturer-told us that living 
in a low productivity area can also be detrimental for farmers and unfortunately uncontrollable. 
Also, despite living in a low productivity area, farmers don’t tend to want to leave their land and 
families behind. Weather is also a major risk, so, if there is no rain or late rain, the volume of 
production and quality will be adversely affected. As interviewee 67 highlighted though, in order 
to mitigate adverse weather, Agrocel have been delivering irrigation systems and ponds to 
conserve water, funded by FT premium. On the same note, interviewee 48 and interviewee 54 
suggested that in case of failed crop due to adverse weather conditions, the Government is 
providing crop insurance at scale. Furthermore, in terms of input costs, GM cotton seeds are 2-3 
times more expensive so poor farmers can’t afford them. In this instance, Agrocel provides pre-
financing inputs and extension training-interviewee 67. So, although some of these initiatives at 
FT GVC level are helpful, as we will see from our analysis in the next key themes, they are only 
taking place at small scale for members of Agrocel’s association and could not be scaled up for 
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the majority of the farmers in the conventional chain. In contrast, the crop insurance from the 
government could reach significantly more farmers, not just the FT ones. 
It should also be highlighted that access to finance has also been highlighted as one of the main 
issues farmers face. Interviewees 65-the managing director and senior vice president of 
marketing of a vertically integrated manufacturer-informed us ‘‘at the time of sowing farmers will 
borrow money form moneylenders at excessive rates, as high as 36% per annum’’. Along with 
interviewee 53, they have added that private money lenders should be eliminated as they 
significantly contribute to farmers’ indebtedness and potentially to the suicides we referred to 
earlier. On this note, although both Chetna and Agrocel help reduce farmers cost of inputs and 
financing, they are only still able to do this for the farmers who are part of their cooperatives and 
their FT chains. If they wanted to scale this up they wouldn’t be able to do so for reasons we will 
cover later, but also because, according to interviewee 53, ‘‘there is no political will to eradicate 
this power imbalance as politicians, bankers or their network of people are often involved in these 
profiteering money lending practices’’.  
Also, similarly to the previous chapter and in line with the focus of our feminist power analyses on 
horizontal power relations, FT was criticised for the cost of certification and the consequent 
disproportionate cost advantage and access that FT provides to bigger organisations as opposed 
to smaller ones. For example, interviewee 51-a project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-
suggested that: 
‘‘All organisations in the chain need to go through the same certification process and cost 
regardless of their size, activities, which creates an uneven level playing field between big and 
small organisations’’. 
In addition, interviewee 54 suggested that ‘‘FT certification is expensive and this is penalising the 
whole chain and ultimately the farmers and consumers who do not get a fair share’’. As such, 
according to FloCert (2014), and the items outlined in appendix 6, on the basis of a 50 people 
producer organisation, with the producer organisation paying the application fee and the 
promoting body paying fees for itself without transferring the cost of certification to the farmers, 
and without processing/subcontracting and modifications, the cost of certification would be around 
€29.6 per farmer for the first year and around €14.7 per farmer for the second year. For a 1000 
people producer organisation, the respective numbers would be €2.3 per farmer for the first year 
and around €1.2 per farmer for the second year.  
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2. FTI Business Model – In response to the criticism leveled against FT above and as we have 
argued in the previous chapter, FTI and the FT Foundation have reviewed FTI’s business model, 
which was heavily influenced and driven by their earlier strategic decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’. As 
such, the decision to move beyond certification and donations to sustainability and a self-
sustained organisation based on licensee fees reflected not only the move of TNCs toward 
corporate sustainability that resulted in FT being demoted, but also FTI’s conscious effort to 
survive in a competitive market as a mainstream organisation relying on fees from the TNCs. So, 
whilst FTI have developed more flexible models to address the needs of TNCs and their own 
commercially-driven organisational needs, this has come at the cost of sacrificing FT principles 
and alienating FTOs, whilst the jury is still out as to what extent consumers will understand the 
difference between the resulting FT labels. 
So, whilst we have demonstrated the rationale for FTI’s shift to the new business model 
underpinned by FT’s theory of change in the previous chapter, there have been some additional 
elements that reflected the increasing influence of corporate sustainability in FT cotton and FT 
cotton’s unsuccessful track record. To this end, interviewee 63-CEO of Fairtrade India-
emphasised that ‘‘sustainability is key in the business community, especially in cocoa, and it may 
quickly follow in cotton’’. In response to this, ‘‘FT has been evolving as well. Initially, FT 
communicated the certification and label only but now FT is going beyond this in providing 
producer services, institutional capacity building, child labour, sustainable supply chain and 
premium use. All these things haven't been communicated previously but they are now’’. This 
shift was also articulated in official FT communication, whereby FT is attempting to demonstrate 
their contribution in the sustainability agenda. As such, FTI (2010) suggested that FT plays an 
important role in the sustainability agenda as a promoter of sustainable practices. This is taking 
place through economically supporting producers through the FT price and premium, advancing 
FT’s environmental standards, and empowering farmers to invest in long-term social development 
projects. 
In relation to FT cotton’s track record, we have already mentioned in chapter 4 that in 2012 FT 
cotton sales contracted by 3.5% over 2011 and by 50% since their peak in 2008 (Fairtrade 
Foundation, 2013). Interviewee 6 indicated this may have been because of the high cost of FT’s 
previous model and the logistical headache that derived from the cotton traceability requirement. 
But, FT’s previous business model has also attracted criticism from FTOs, albeit from a different 
angle. For example, interviewee 54: 
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Criticised FT for focusing directly and solely on farming level standards whilst disregarding the 
rest of the chain. To this end, he questioned whether organisations, like major retailers in the 
UK, who claim to be 100% FT through the FT label can rightfully be 100% FT when they work 
with companies across the value chain who they do not adhere to any FT standards. As such, 
he stated that the ‘‘fairness’’ attribute of FT communicated through the label of FT isn’t really 
fair. 
In response to this criticism, FTI have recently developed two new models (see table 12). 
According to interviewee 63, the new models are the Fairtrade Cotton Programme which mainly 
addresses the commercial organisations’ criticism and the Fairtrade cotton mark, which will be 
more suitable for organisations who are 100% FT across the chain. So, commercial organisations 
on the Fairtrade Cotton Programme will carry a mark with that name, whilst 100% FT 
organisations will carry the traditional FT mark. In essence, the FT Cotton Programme removes 
the traceability requirement for commercial organisation and makes it cheaper for them to buy FT 
certified cotton in larger volumes.  
Table 12: FT Cotton models 
Source: Adapted from Fairtrade Foundation (2015) 
This shift was welcomed from interviewee 6, who claimed ‘‘this will reduce cost from spinner 
through to retailer, remove the logistical headache whilst mitigating communication problems’’. 
He further argued that the decision was made by the FT Foundation and was influenced ultimately 
by economics, rather than the pressure by a specific retailer. On the other hand, and in line with 
the horizontal power relations lenses advanced by our feminist power analyses earlier,  
FT cotton label
FT cotton 
model
Description
Fairtrade 
Certified Cotton 
Mark
Provides physical traceability of the cotton 
from a labelled end garment back to the 
farmers who grew it, with
the assurance to consumers that all cotton in 
a finished product is Fairtrade certified.
Fairtrade Cotton 
Programme
Provides flexibility and scalability to 
businesses to achieve their sourcing 
commitments to sustainable cotton
volumes on Fairtrade terms. It is in line with 
their CSR goals with options for corporate 
and consumer communications.
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interviewee 1-a Director of policy from a FTO-suggested that the FT principles are undermined, 
despite the different FT mark carried by 100% FT organisations and commercial organisations on 
the FT Cotton Programme. As we stated in the previous chapter as well, this is a power dynamic 
we will be encountering throughout the next key themes when comparing the two different chains.  
3. Certification Competition & ‘‘mainstreaming’’ – In line with the horizontal power relations 
articulated through our feminist power analyses earlier, FTI’s and the FT Foundation’s decision 
to launch the FT cotton programme, pursue a licensee-based business model and go beyond 
certification to sustainability, was also driven by competition from other certifications, like BCI, 
who they were losing significant market share to. As such, FT’s developmental approach through 
the standards of traceability and FT premium meant very little to the buyers, since for them a 
certification is yet ‘‘another product in their shop’’ and their rationale for purchasing has more to 
do with cost, retail price and ease of implementation. 
To put this argument in context, a few interviewees 18  often referred to BCI as FT’s main 
competitor. According to BCI’s website (2015), BCI operates as a not-for-profit organisation. 
Through a cooperation with a multi-stakeholder group of organisations and backed by companies 
such as Levi Strauss, Marks & Spencer, IKEA, H&M and Adidas, BCI believes it can transform 
the textile market and make it more sustainable (The Guardian, 2011). This takes place through 
a series of Better Cotton Production Principles and Criteria, that underpin a holistic approach to 
sustainable cotton production which covers all three pillars of sustainability: environmental, social 
and economic (BCI, 2015). To this end, SSI (2014) explained that BCI draw heavily from 
integrated pest management and good agricultural practices and lean heavily on technical 
assistance as part of their strategy through its partners, including Solidaridad. In fact, as a result 
of the training farmers have received there has been a significant reduction in the use of pesticides 
and increased profits, since chemicals can account for up to 60% of farming costs. On this note, 
M&S is funding a BCI project with WWF in India and its first harvest has shown an 80% reduction 
in pesticides and cut water usage by half (The Guardian, 2011). 
In relation to FT, whilst according to SSI (2014), BCI permits GMO cotton, Fairtrade do not. Also, 
The Guardian (2011) suggested that, unlike Fairtrade, there is no formal product labelling system 
for consumers and no premium paid to the farmers, hence there is a much higher chance of the 
initiative reaching scale because it will not be seen as a niche premium product. These differences 
have been ultimately manifested in BCI’s and FT’s market shares, which have not been at all 
                                                          
18 Interviewees 6, 13, 21, 48, 53 and 63. 
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favorable for FT cotton. As such, SSI (2014) highlighted that Fairtrade cotton production 
accounted for just 0.1% of global production in 2012, with 18,000 metric tons of cotton lint 
produced. In 2012, about 37% of the FT production was sold as certified, and sales were down 
to 7,000 metric tons from 19,000 metric tons in 2009. On the other hand, BCI accounted for 2% 
of global cotton production in 2012, with 305,000 metric tons sold in 2012 or 49% of BCI 
production. Importantly, this static view has been underpinned by BCI’s 326% annual compound 
certified production growth from 2010-12, whereas FT’s respective number was -9% for 2008-12 
(ibid). These figures suggest that FT cotton is insignificant and declining as well. This analysis is 
summarised in table 13 below.  
Table 13: 2012 Global FT Cotton certification market share 
Source: Adapted from SSI (2014) 
In this context and similar to the previous chapter, the following interviewees treat FT and BCI as 
two different product qualities that are part of their portfolio in varying percentages. When we 
asked them to outline the difference between them, they pinpointed the following: 
 Cost – Interviewees 6 and 15 suggested that BCI is better for them as, in line with The 
Guardian’s (2011) note above, it doesn’t come with a premium attached to the price of 
cotton. Therefore, it’s cheaper for them than FT. 
 Ease of sourcing – BCI is easier to procure than FT due to FT’s traceability requirements 
and BCI’s overall less stringent requirements. However, he also noted now that FT have 
been losing market share to BCI, they have decided to shift to mass balance through FT 
cotton programme we outlined earlier-interviewee 6.  
Certification
Production Annual Compound Growth
Certified 
Production 
(mt)
Certified 
production 
market share 
of global 
production
Certified 
Production
Certified sales
623,000 2%
326%
(2010-12)
613%
18,330 0.1%
-9%
(2008-12)
-29%
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 Customer recognition – FT is more recognisable by consumers than BCI and it has a 
great story behind it. On the other hand, BCI is more subtle than FT, as it doesn’t entail 
any formal labeling-interviewee 15. 
 Focus – BCI is looking at farm level and has more of an environmental focus, whilst FT 
looks at farmer level, with limited environmental focus-interviewee 53. 
As a result, interviewee 70-the sustainability assistant manager of a vertically integrated 
manufacturer-verified the analysis above by saying that ‘‘BCI has expanded whilst FT shrunk’’. 
Interviewees 65-the managing director and senior vice president of marketing of a vertically 
integrated manufacturer-emphasised that: 
‘‘There was no demand for FT this year from the buyers, whilst BCI has been more in demand, 
with the main driver being cost. FT has the FT premium in place, whilst BCI don’t have a 
premium, hence they are cheaper. Therefore, retailers/brands do not want to pay a premium 
which mainly derives from the fact that consumer no longer wants to buy a FT t-shirt with a 
premium partly due to recession and partly because of the scale of the premium’’. 
On this note, M&S that have historically represented a major buyer of FT cotton and garment 
shifted as well to BCI. So, at the moment, according to interviewees 6 and 15, M&S purchase 
75% from BCI and only 10-15% of FT, on the basis of price and that M&S don't believe they 
should be charging their customers a premium for products especially in the current recession 
environment. We will however, cover the issue of the FT premium and price compounding in detail 
in the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ power structure key theme. 
6.2.3 CONCLUSION 
The main argument in this key theme was founded on FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’. FT’s 
reliance on TNCs led to FT being initially seen as an add-on certification to entice a segment of 
shoppers’ to buy and then was further demoted as part of a corporate sustainability agenda. In 
particular, the corporate sustainability strategy of M&S, Plan A, is profit-driven by nature as it is 
underpinned by M&S’s considerations about brand reputation, a range of commercial criteria and 
sustainability, of which FT is only a small part of, comprising only 10-15% of the overall cotton 
volume sourced. 
FT’s undermining was further supported on the basis of their uniform and top-down solution to a 
highly multidimensional context consisting of sustainability of production concerns, cotton 
farmers’ suicides, ginners squeezing farmers on price, adverse weather that affects the crop, low 
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productivity cotton farming areas, input prices and farmer indebtedness. Despite FT’s efforts to 
resolve some of these issues, the scale and multiple facets of the problem have been 
overwhelming for FT’s scope, scale and approach. Also, we argued that FT certification is 
expensive for farmers, and in line with our power analysis that focuses on horizontal power 
relations, we highlighted the cost advantage and access that FT provides to bigger producer 
organisations as opposed to smaller ones. 
So, similarly to the previous chapter, FTI have reviewed its business model and decided to move 
beyond certification and donations to sustainability and a self-sustaining organisation based on 
licensee fees. This was further pronounced by the development of a more flexible model for TNCs 
that would enable them to buy more volume, albeit with a slightly different FT label, which however 
led to the compromise of the traceability principle and the alienation of FTOs. Nonetheless, in a 
marketplace whereby retailers buy on the basis of price and ease of implementation, FT’s decision 
was also driven by its strategy to compete within the mainstream market with other certifications, 
like BCI who they were losing significant market share to. This was underpinned by FT cotton’s 
irrelevance manifested by their insignificant and rapidly declining market share. 
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6.3 ‘‘POLITICAL CROP’’ 
The main argument in this key theme builds on Wallerstein’s position (1995) we presented in 
chapter 2 on the State, as one of the institutional structures and arrangements that have allowed 
and defended capital accumulation. On this note, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) referred to the 
power of states over the lives of their citizens, which has expanded in a geographical manner 
along with a deepening of its power over the life of its citizens. On the same note, the Government 
of India has had significant involvement in cotton production, trading and value added. As a result, 
their activity has influenced the life of cotton farmers as well as workers and manufacturers. 
Hence, the role of the Indian Government was often mentioned in relation to the minimum support 
price and the extensive bureaucracy they have put in place in order to maintain a level of control 
given cotton’s/yarn’s/textile’s central role in the economy.  
To compliment this, in line with Wallerstein’s (1995) reference to sovereign states pursuing 
protectionist policies in order to defend capital accumulation in their territories, the international 
political dimension was also highlighted as a major power dynamic in cotton value chains. To this 
end, the subsidies of developed country governments were frequently mentioned as the main 
protectionist mechanism that favors cotton farmers in developed countries over the farmers in 
developing countries including India.  
Despite the significance of the nation states, as we have seen in chapter 2 and in Ghana’s case 
through Cocobod, FT chose a different path, away from international market regulation with the 
nation state as a primary agent in development, in favour of reforming the existing trading system 
on the basis of voluntary commitments from TNCs and consumers (Fridell, 2006). These 
commitments were to a certain extent translated into efforts to empower farmers in a way that 
mirrored our feminist power analyses from chapter 2, whereby we outlined power seen as 
empowerment in the sense of a capacity or ability to empower or transform oneself and others. 
This has, however, been implemented in different ways in the two FT GVCs and consequently 
has produced different outcomes. 
In light of this, we start this key theme through analysing the role of the Indian government in 
relation to the minimum support price and the administrative structure it has put in place. Following 
this, we examine the key role the cotton-textile GVC has in the Indian economy and how the 
government has helped shape the GVC, along with the role of foreign governments in shaping 
and protecting their industries through subsidies. Lastly, we describe FT’s approach to the political 
dimension through farmer organisation and empowerment and the way this has been 
implemented across each FT GVC. 
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6.3.1 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA POWER MECHANISMS 
In line with Wallerstein’s (1995) reference to the powerful role of the state in capital accumulation, 
the main power mechanisms the Government of India undertakes in relation to the conventional 
cotton-garment GVC include the minimum support price (MSP) for farmers, along with an 
extensive administrative function that entails input financing. 
1. Pricing: Minimum Support Price (MSP) – Similarly to the previous chapter, the minimum 
support price has been used as a tool by the government in order to attract farmer votes. This 
was achieved by providing a ‘‘safety net’’ for the farmers in case the price offered by the local 
traders was lower than the MSP. In this context, although the FT minimum price was also meant 
to provide a ‘‘safety’’ net to farmers, market prices and the MSP have been consistently higher 
than the FT minimum price. As well as FT’s minimum price being irrelevant, FT’s underestimation 
of the real production costs and scale limitations were also widely acknowledged. 
To illustrate, numerous interviewees19 referred to MSP from various angles, but they were all in 
agreement about its importance to the farmers. With regards to the nature of the MSP and the 
underlying motivation, interviewee 49-the deputy general manager of the Cotton Corporation of 
India (CCI)-which is the biggest buyer of cotton, confirmed that the MSP represents a safety net 
for farmers. More emphatically, interviewee 50-the CEO of a major cotton seed trader-told us that 
‘‘cotton is a political and not an economic crop. MSP was set up due to farmers voting power’’. 
IDS and University of Greenwich (2011) explained that the MSP is usually based on expected 
production costs and not on market price, and represents the rate at which the parastatal Cotton 
Corporation of India (CCI) will purchase seed cotton from farmers if the price offered by local 
traders is lower. On the other hand, where the market price is above the MSP, farmers get the 
market price. To quantify this, the MSP in 2010 was INR 27.5 per kg and the market price was 
between INR 32-36. To put this in perspective, the FT minimum price was at 26 INR per kg, whilst 
Agrocel have been paying between INR 32.75-36.75 (ibid). Interviewee 48, the Head of the 
Central Institute for Research on Cotton Technology, also confirmed that the ‘‘MSP has been a 
good step in place for some time now but farmers usually get more through the market mechanism 
than the MSP’’. 
Although we have been unable to obtain consistent primary quantitative data to allow comparison 
across our FT chains, interviewee 50 suggested that:  
                                                          
19 Interviewees 48, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62 and 68. 
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‘‘The MSP in 2014 was 40 INR per kg, whilst the MSP and market price have often been higher 
than the FT minimum price historically’’. 
This has also been verified through IDS and University of Greenwich (2011), who mentioned that 
in the last two years the minimum support price (MSP) has been higher than the FT minimum 
price. Furthermore, the Fairtrade Foundation itself (2012; p.13) confirmed these findings by 
suggesting that the ‘‘FT Minimum Price has had less impact in India as market prices have 
generally been higher’’. In addition to this, interviewee 10-senior manager in the FT Foundation-
praised the pricing role of the Government of India by characterising it ‘‘instrumental’’. 
Nonetheless, the way that the MSP has been calculated and whether it covers the real cost of 
production incurred by farmers, was challenged. As such, interviewee 59-the head of a farmer 
association-told us that the MSP has been calculated on the basis of an average yield, so if the 
yield is lower MSP won't cover the real cost. He also added that the MSP doesn't cover financing 
costs or interest rate payments, which is a significant component of cotton farmers’ dire financial 
situation. If we consider this in combination with the fact that the FT minimum price is usually 
lower that the MSP, we argue that when the farmers get the FT minimum price, it is also likely to 
be insufficient considering their real costs of production.  
On top of this, FT’s scale limitation was often highlighted even by Fairtrade India officials. For 
example, interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-added that: 
‘‘90,000 FT cotton farmers do not constitute a significant enough scale in order to be dealing 
with and be respected by the Indian government’’. To put this in perspective, Traidcraft (2009) 
mentioned there are 4 million farmers growing cotton in India, which means that FT farmers 
are only 2.25% of the total Indian cotton farmers. 
Interviewee 50 has estimated this number to be even lower, at less than 1% of the Indian cotton 
farmers. Nonetheless, in a scenario whereby the FT minimum price would be higher than the 
MSP and market price, both estimates underpin the scale limitations and consequent limited 
impact of a voluntary and market-based mechanism like FT as opposed to a government one with 
universal scale. 
2. Administrative Control and subsidies – In line with Chase-Dunn and Grimes’s (1995) 
reference to the power of states over the life of its citizens, the Government of India, beyond the 
MSP, also undertakes various other activities in relation to cotton and textiles under an extensive 
array of administrative structures. One of the most important activities undertaken is subsidising 
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inputs, especially GM cotton variety. On the other hand, limited financing takes place in FT GVCs, 
with Chetna using part of FT premium to procure seeds and Agrocel providing interest free loans 
for inputs. 
To this end, interviewee 49 and interviewee 52-the director of the Ministry of Agriculture: 
Department of Cooperation-highlighted the extensive bureaucracy, administrative structures and 
number of departments dealing with the cotton chain in India. As we have explained earlier, CCI 
is involved in the marketing of cotton, whilst undertaking MSP’s operational management. They 
also undertake cotton exports to fulfill export quotas-interviewee 49. Also, the Ministry of 
Agriculture-Department of Cooperation is focusing on input subsidies and training by 
demonstration in relation to fertilisers and pesticides. To this end, interviewee 52 explained that 
government power is decentralised as each ministry have different responsibilities and remit 
which makes government coordination very difficult. Interviewees 55-the deputy director and 
senior scientific officer of the Institute for Rural Industrialisation-admitted the great administrative 
power and underlined the extensive decentralisation, whilst interviewee 49 and interviewee 68-
the director of the Bombay Textiles Research Association-admitted the somehow inefficient 
bureaucracy and the lack of an overarching strategy and coordination. Lastly, the political nature 
of the crop was further highlighted by the interviewee 62- the president and owner of a vertically 
integrated manufacturer-who reminded us of the extensive prevalent corruption as ‘‘bureaucrats 
are appointed by politicians, thus most government programs end up in bureaucrats pockets 
instead of the farmers’’. 
Building on this administrative structure and in relation to the activities undertaken, CCI also offers 
advice and communication to the farmers how to go about securing the best price through papers 
and other means of communication. They also undertake CSR activities related to inputs, 
however, he advised that these are only projects and limited to small scale-interviewee 49. But, 
perhaps, the most important activity undertaken other than the MSP, has been the financing of 
inputs. For example, interviewee 52 suggested they strive towards national security through 
subsidising inputs such as seeds, pesticides and irrigation devices. Most notably, interviewee 48 
highlighted that state and national Government provide extensions like Bt variety. Bt cotton has 
had quite significant penetration in India now. Sadashivappa and Qaim (2011) informed us that 
Bt cotton is one of the first genetically modified (GM) crop technologies with wide distribution in 
developing countries like India. According to interviewee 48,’’Bt has been introduced and 
subsidised at great scale due to the goal of increasing productivity and improving yields. However, 
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Bt is destroying the quality of the soil, whilst it cannot be re-used so it has to be bought every 
year’’. 
Furthermore, farmers from the Maharashtra region we have interviewed informed us of subsidised 
fertilisers for farmers who have below 5 acres of land with those who are backward in the cast 
system getting more than others-interviewees 56. At the same time, interviewee 54-the CEO of a 
cotton FTO-told us that credit is available from government approved lenders as well as insurance 
for their crops, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter. Although, these are not available 
on national scale, they need to be further communicated. In this context, FT has been playing a 
limited role in relation to financing. Interviewee 51-a project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-
informed us that Agrocel provide interest-free credit for inputs and help farmers save water in 
case of bad weather that may affect their crop. Although we haven’t been able to collect in-depth 
information from Chetna, we have learnt that part of the FT premium has previously been used to 
procure non-GM cotton seeds. Nonetheless, the scale issue of Agrocel and Chetna with only 
around 20,000 and 15,000 (Fairtrade Foundation, 2015) farmers was mentioned again. 
6.3.2 NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 
Beyond the specific power that Indian Government departments exercise in relation to cotton and 
textiles, there are three key broader roles worth highlighting. The first one refers to the importance 
of cotton and textiles in the broader Indian economy and society and the second one is linked to 
the value-added strategies and policies. The third one addresses the international power play 
deriving from developed countries governments’ protectionism articulated through cotton farmer 
subsidies. Similarly to the previous chapter, it’s beyond FT’s limited scale, nature and scope to 
intervene, influence or change these elements, that drive aspects of both FT chains. Having said 
that, it’s important to outline them for this study as they describe the context within FT operates 
and underpin the existing power relations in the conventional GVC. 
1. Central to Indian economy and society – Cotton and textiles are central to the Indian 
economy in variety of ways. The main reason derives from the fact that textiles are among the 
biggest foreign exchange earners for the Indian government, whilst adding significantly in terms 
of employment. The significance of this industry to the economy may also explain the extensive 
administrative control we described earlier as well as the significant power of the organised 
spinning sector, which we will often refer to during the course of the ensuing analysis. 
For example, Devaraja (2011) stated that India is the world’s second largest producer of textiles 
and garments after China. SSI (2014) suggested that in 2012 it was also the second largest 
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producer of cotton with 23%, whilst China was first with 28%. India was also the second largest 
exporter of cotton with 24% after the USA that exported 26% of the global exports. At the same 
time, Dun & Bradstreet India (2006) mentioned that India is the largest exporter of yarn in the 
international market with a share of 25%. With regards to the Indian economy and society, 
the Indian textile industry is one the largest and oldest sectors in the country and among the mo
stimportant in the economy in terms of output, investment and employment. It accounts for 
around 4% of Gross Domestic Product, 14% of industrial production, 9% of excise collections, 
and 18% of employment in the industrial sector. It’s also employing nearly 35 million people and 
after agriculture, is the second highest employer in the country (ibid). Devaraja (2011) also 
referred to the fact that textiles and garments accounted for 18% of export earnings in 2009, whilst 
the Economic Services Group of the National Productivity Council (2010) provided a historic 
account of the share of the export earning in table 14 below. These figures clearly demonstrate 
the major foreign exchange earning power the industry has for the Indian Government, which may 
also justify the great administrative power and control we discussed earlier in relation to MSP and 
input subsidies in order to boost productivity. 
Table 14: % Textile exports to total 
Year 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Textile Export 
Share 
28.7% 24.6% 16.3% 17% 14.8% 15.1% 
Source: National Productivity Council (2010) 
Whilst the industry covers a wide range of activities including the production of natural raw 
materials such as cotton, jute, silk and wool, as well as synthetic filament and spun yarn 
(Devaraja, 2011), Dun & Bradstreet India (2006) added that cotton textiles form the predominant 
base of the Indian textile industry comprising 2/3 of total textile exports. The industry structure is 
fully vertically integrated across the value chain, extending from fibre to fabric to garments. At the 
same time, it is highly fragmented, comprising of small‐scale and unorganised non‐integrated 
spinning, weaving, finishing, and apparel‐making enterprises. The organised mill sector consists 
of spinning mills involved only in spinning activities and composite mills undertaking spinning, 
weaving and processing activities under a single roof. The importance of the organised spinning 
sector has been emphasised by Devaraja (2011) who said that the Indian textile industry 
accounted for about 24% of the world’s spindle capacity, making it the second highest after China. 
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2. Value-Added – In line with Wallerstein’s (1995) position on the role of states in defending 
capital accumulation and monopolising capitalists against competition, the prominence and power 
of the organised Indian spinning sector has been facilitated by the policies of the Indian 
government. Whilst this came as a blow to the small-scale industry, it has also highlighted FT’s 
limitations arising from the lack of any standards related to value-add.  
To this end, Devaraja (2011) suggested that the power of the organised spinning sector has been 
partly driven or facilitated by the Indian Government’s policies that involved liberalisation of trade 
and industrial delicensing in the 1990s. Although, initially, policies were drawn to provide 
employment with a clear focus on promoting the small‐scale industry, this changed after 1995 
with policies being designed to encourage investments in installing modern weaving machinery 
as well as gradually eliminating the pro‐decentralised sector policy focus (Dun & Bradstreet India, 
2006). This explicit centralised and value-added strategic approach towards the enhancement of 
the organised mill sector has been challenged by interviewees 55, who have called for a change 
in policy. Their aim has been to accelerate the process of rural industrialisation through 
downsizing value-adding technology and making it affordable. They told us that ‘‘unless politicians 
align with technology, India and the masses will not develop’’, whilst claiming that rural technology 
can bring self-sufficiency at village level in a piece-meal approach. This way, they have posed a 
legitimate challenge to the centralised top-down organised industry approach and government 
policy to adding value though a bottom-up decentralised alternative that was occurring until the 
mid-1990. 
Whilst upgrading will be also further discussed later on a FT GVC level, the discussion above 
implicitly stressed FT’s lack of focus on value added though technology and its sole orientation 
on unprocessed cotton seeds. As such, and despite the availability and low cost of technology to 
add value, interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-was still reluctant on the basis of the investment and 
capability required. He argued that:  
‘‘Value addition is difficult for some products because of the investment required and ability to 
manage, market it themselves and tailor it for the needs of certain customers (e.g. spinners)’’. 
This highlights that FT’s mindset is oriented towards large scale forward integration, whilst 
there have been no consideration of small-scale technologies at village if not farmer level. 
3. Subsidies – Beyond the national dimensions of power exercised by the nation state and the 
power relations that take place in-country, there is also a strong international power dimension. 
As such, in line with Wallerstein (1995) argument on sovereign states’ protectionism as means to 
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defend capital accumulation from competition, subsidies by developed nations have contributed 
to an uneven playing field and have also led to FT’s lack of success. 
To this end, interviewee 13-an independent FT consultant-explained that whilst vertical power 
through value added is important, the international horizontal power dimension is equally, if not 
more, important. As such, she told us that there are two different markets which interact and 
compete against each other; the commercial farmers in the developed world (EU, US) who are 
heavily subsidised and the smallholders in the developing world. To justify, she mentioned that 
there are more brands compared to the chocolate industry, thus vertical power relations are more 
diffuse. Therefore, power struggle is also about state subsidies. To this end, she highlighted the 
paramount role of states when analysing the cotton value chains.  
The Fairtrade Foundation (2010) acknowledged the importance of subsidies and mentioned that 
in the 10 years since the initiation of the Doha Development Round of world trade talks over $40bn 
has been allocated by the EU, US, China and India to a significantly lesser extent, to supporting 
their own cotton production. As we have seen earlier, the Indian government has been subsidising 
inputs to some extent and set the MSP, but the Fairtrade Foundation (2010) mentioned the 
average Indian government assistance per pound to its farmers was no more than $0.03 – 15 
times less than in the US. Nonetheless, interviewee 13 argued that India is better off than other 
developing countries as it has a sizeable internal market that they can sell to. As a result, they 
will not be greatly uncompetitive due to the subsidies in the international market. She further 
argued that:  
‘‘One of the main reasons of the FT and BCI’s lack of success in India has been the already 
existing subsidies which support farmers at scale’’. 
6.3.3 FARMER ORGANISATION AND EMPOWERMENT 
Despite FT’s limitations in areas related to activities traditionally undertaken at scale by nation 
states, farmer organisation and empowerment has been noted as one of the areas that FT has 
the potential to make great difference. In the following paragraphs we will develop this through 
building on our feminist power analyses from chapter 2, whereby we outlined power seen as 
empowerment in the sense of a capacity or ability to empower or transform oneself and others. 
This has been however treated with significantly more caution in the Indian context compared to 
Ghana due to contract production20 . In FT GVCs, this allows small producers who are not 
                                                          
20 Contract production represents the partnership between a promoting body and a producer group. A 
producer group is a group of individual farmers, who are registered as members of the new producer 
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organised but gathered in informal structures, to have access to the market and to FT once they 
join a promoting organisation (exporter, processor, private company, NGO or others) to market 
their product. Therefore, farmer organisation and empowerment in FT GVCs depend on this 
additional power asymmetry between the promoting body and the farmers, in combination with 
the ability and willingness of the promoting organisation to help producers get organised and 
become autonomous, as verified by individually achieving the Small Producer Organisation (SPO) 
status by FT (Boscher et al., 2012). As such, in the following paragraphs we will develop this 
through building on the power analyses from chapter 2, whereby we outlined power seen as 
empowerment in the sense of a capacity or ability to empower or transform oneself and others. 
This takes place by focusing on power emerging through cooperation between the dominated 
(Temperley, 2013). 
On this note, most of the interviewees, including farmers in Maharashtra, acknowledged the 
importance of farmer organisation. For example, interviewee 54 went as far as to suggest that 
‘‘farmer organisation is more important than the MSP or the FT minimum price because of the 
power that allows them to negotiate better’’. Interviewee 48 added that this way farmers can 
achieve lower input costs though bulk buying, because when they are on their own they tend to 
do distressed sales. However, he also warned that given their dire situation, farmers would prefer 
money over political organisation. Similarly, interviewee 25-ex-Oxfam manager involved in FT-
told us that ‘‘farmers like solidarity but they focus on having something to eat’’. He further claimed 
that farmers were leaving organic farming as it wasn't viable financially and they will leave FT too 
if it doesn’t give them money. 
Nonetheless, farmers emphasised that farmer organisation is more important than economic 
incentives. Farmers from interviewee group 56 argued that when there is no rain and crop isn’t 
good, whilst they have already borrowed money at high rate, they won’t eventually be able to pay. 
Hence, the lenders will take their land. But, if they are part of an association, the association will 
negotiate with the bank and make sure their voice counts. Otherwise, banks tend to take over 
their land in individual farmer cases.  
                                                          
organisation. At the start of the project the producer organisation does not need to have a legal status, but 
must have defined democratic structures.  The promoting body must organise the producer group in a way 
that enables the producer organisation to gain autonomy and individual Fairtrade certification against the 
Generic Fairtrade Standard for Small Producer Organisations (SPO) in a realistic period of time (FloCert, 
2014). 
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1. Conventional Chain Empowerment – As we have already discussed earlier in this key theme, 
it appears that the Government of India, foreign governments and the organised composite mills 
are well organised and have great power through utilising various mechanisms such as value 
added, pricing, subsidies and administrative structures. On the other hand, farmers in the 
conventional chain are highly disempowered due to their smallholding, geographical distribution, 
commitment, the fact that they are operating in a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain, and the limited help they 
receive from the government. 
To illustrate, interviewee 25 and interviewee 48 suggested there is great lack of farmer 
organisation in India and cotton farmers are incredibly disempowered. In order to justify the 
situation though, our interviewees focused on different generating mechanisms. For example, 
interviewee 49-the deputy general manager of the Cotton Corporation of India-advanced 
smallholding as the main deterrent for allowing political organisation of farmers. This is because 
smallholding does not generate sufficient cash to allow for better farming practices and 
organisation. Interviewee 9-the CEO of a cotton sustainability consulting firm-focused on the 
impracticalities and cost to organise farmers into groups because of the various geographic 
locations farmers are concentrated in India, whilst interviewee 48 noted the lack of farmer 
commitment to use their land to cotton only purposes. 
The Fairtrade Foundation attributed the lack of farmer organisation to structural reasons. For 
example, interviewee 10-senior manager in the FT Foundation-suggested that ‘‘farmers are in a 
heavily disadvantaged position as they are price-takers, not price-makers’’. On this note, 
interviewee 49 suggested the relationship between farmers and buyers is highly transactional and 
reflects the price which prevails in the market. In the meantime, interviewee 52 added that the 
Government tries to help increase farmers power indirectly through training to improve quality and 
increase production through subsided inputs.  
2. Chetna Organic-No Nasties FT GVC Empowerment – In contrast to the lack of empowerment 
and farmer organisation in the conventional GVC, the Chetna Organic-No Nasties GVC has 
demonstrated great practice in terms of farmer organisation and empowerment. The key elements 
related to their approach to empowerment have been: a. farmer ownership, technical capability, 
democratic governance and bottom-up approach, and women empowerment. To elaborate, the 
key ingredients of this success relating to empowerment that were often mentioned are included 
in table 15 below. 
 
222 | P a g e  
 
Table 15: Chetna Organic-No Nasties FT GVC Empowerment Dimensions 
Dimension Description 
Farmer 
Ownership 
Chetna Organic’s manager pointed that Chetna Organic has a multi-tiered structure 
owned wholly by the small and marginal farmers at all levels, who almost all of them 
(94%) own below 2 hectares of land.  In their structure, small and marginal farmers 
who form the base of their model are organised in 979 Self-Help Groups (SHGs). 
These SHGs are legally grouped in 13 cooperatives and the board members from each 
of these cooperatives, as we mentioned earlier, form the board of Chetna Organic 
Farmers Association (COFA) and Chetna Organic Agricultural Producer Company 
Limited (COAPCL) (Lahankar 2014).. Fairtrade Foundation (2013) added that these 
two organisations operate at national level. 
Technical 
capabilities 
Technical support is provided from technical teams that exist in cooperatives and in 
COFA, whilst several cooperatives manage funds from contributions of the members 
and part of the FT premium to finance the production and the purchase of seeds 
(Boscher et al., 2012). As such, interviewee 63-the CEO of FT India-added that 
‘‘Chetna raises awareness in a sense that the farmers can enter discussion with 
operators collectively and get better results, which are translated in better economics 
in terms of cost of inputs and use of FT premium’’. 
Democratic 
governance & 
bottom-up 
approach 
Elections are taking place in order to elect the Board members of cooperatives, and as 
we have mentioned earlier, there is an appointment of a member of the Board of every 
cooperative in the Board of COFA and of the COAPCL. As such, and on the back of 
farmer ownership, farmers have a direct role in decision making during production and 
marketing processes, as well as during the distribution and allocation of the premium 
(Fairtrade Foundation, 2015). Interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-confirmed that ‘‘farmers 
are more empowered in the production, marketing and FT premium stage’’. As a result, 
the FT premium is distributed by the COAPCL according to criteria voted in BD not to 
exclude cooperatives with small volumes, whilst the repartition of the premium is 
decided by cooperatives in a democratic way. (Boscher et al., 2012). 
Women 
empowerment 
FT in Chetna-No Nasties GVC has been instrumental in facilitating women 
empowerment. As such, Boscher et al. (2012) highlighted that of the 10,000 producers 
involved in the project, 30% of them are women. In particular, at cooperative level, 
participation of women sometimes reaches 50 % of the members. 
Source: Author 
As a result, whilst Chetna Organic was initially under FT’s contract production in 2005, by 2009 
Chetna Organic Farmers Association (COFA) has evolved into an autonomous Small Producer 
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Organisation (SPO) and gained individual FT certification according to SPO Standards. This 
outcome has urged interviewee 66-the CEO of No Nasties-to emphasise that ‘‘the main motivation 
for working with Chetna has been their developmental and sustainable farming focus’’. On this 
note, interviewee 20-a research officer from IDS-confirmed that ‘‘Chetna are more development 
oriented than the typical contract production organisation’’, which we will examine below.  
3. Agrocel-M&S FT GVC Empowerment – In contrast to Chetna’s case, Agrocel have received 
extensive criticism in relation to their impact on genuine farmer empowerment. This has come 
despite formally establishing Agrocel Pure & Fair Cotton Growers’ Association (APFCGA), 
increasing membership and running formal democratic processes. To this end, criticism derived 
from the lack of full representation, capacity to represent farmers, limited women empowerment 
and minimal input on production and marketing decisions, due to their reliance on Agrocel 
Industries. This has been ‘‘nurtured’’ by the contract production framework itself as well as 
Agrocel’s profit orientation that prevents farmers from becoming independent and gaining 
individual FT certification, like COFA above. 
In order to put this into context, the Fairtrade Foundation (2013) informed us that informal groups 
like the Agrocel cotton farmers have been able to join Fairtrade under the Contract Production 
Standards since they are contracted to a Promoting Body such as Agrocel Industries which is 
committed to mentoring the development of their organisation into an autonomous Fairtrade 
partner and to undertaking functions such as marketing and export on behalf of the producers. 
For the Agrocel farmers this means that with support and business training provided by Agrocel 
Industries, they have the potential to develop into a strong and independent organisation capable 
of dealing directly with international buyers. Whilst there are five Fairtrade certified organic cotton 
farmers’ groups, Agrocel Pure & Fair Cotton Growers’ Association from Rapar in Gujarat was one 
of the earliest participants. With guidance from Agrocel, this previously unorganised group of 50 
farmers was formalised into a legal entity in 2005. 
IDS and University of Greenwich (2011) confirmed that organisational development has been 
significant with Agrocel Industries helping to formally establish Agrocel Pure & Fair Cotton 
Growers’ Association (APFCGA), whilst membership has grown from 50 in 2005, to 1930 in 2009. 
On the same note, interviewee 51-a project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-claimed that 
APFCGA is an independent, registered organisation with democratically elected leaders, whilst 
Agrocel Industries help them with advice and technical implementation (certification support and 
legal activities) in order to run independently. Lastly, he reminded us that farmers are members 
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of Agrocel Industries’ board, hence they decide what to do with the FT premiums as well as 
making decisions regarding inputs and who to sell to.  
Nonetheless, IDS and University of Greenwich (2011) presented a different reality through their 
fieldwork. To this end, they argued that APFCGA is still some way from becoming an independent 
and fully democratic organisation. There have been some ongoing changes in governance to 
ensure all villages are represented, whilst the producer group is still fairly weak in being able to 
represent members in negotiations with Agrocel let alone in wider fora. It’s also heavily reliant on 
Agrocel Industries for many of the necessary services like inputs, ginning and export, whilst they 
indicated that they do not think the farmer organisation could operate independently in the near 
future. Furthermore, interviewee 67 suggested that: 
‘‘Farmers are more dependent on Agrocel model as they have only recently organised and 
make decisions around use of FT premium but they have less/no input on production and 
marketing as Agrocel does this for them’’. 
The lack of independence was also attributed to the fact that Agrocel Industries, unlike Chetna 
Organic’s non-profit motivation and farmer ownership, are profit-oriented and they are not owned 
by farmers-interviewee 66. 
Other interviewees attributed the lack of independence to the contract production model itself, 
which creates an asymmetrical power relationship between farmers and the promoting body. For 
example, interviewee 63 framed the argument by explaining that whilst Chetna is clearly a small 
producer organisation model through their independence, Agrocel remained under the contract 
production model, which is restrictive for farmers’ autonomy. Although interviewee 10-senior 
manager in FT Foundation-justified the certification of contract production and not cooperatives 
on the basis that it would take long time to set up cooperatives and with the promise to turn them 
into cooperatives in the future, the Fairtrade Foundation (2012) has admitted that FT has not been 
able to reduce high levels of dependence that producer organisations have on the promoting 
body.  
Interviewee 54 highlighted that ‘‘contract production holds all the power away from farmers as 
farmers are deprived of their choice’’. On the same note, interviewee 20-a research officer from 
IDS-told as that the contract production model has lots of weaknesses and ‘‘relationships are 
set up to maintain producers to be dependent on them’’. Interviewee 48 agreed that this is the 
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case since ‘‘contract farming is top-down and took the freedom away from farmers in terms of 
choosing the most profitable variety for them but also choosing who to sell their cotton to’’. 
The choices have been made by the promoting body who in turn has been following the quality 
parameters of the spinners. For example, the varieties selected for the type of quality the spinners 
are after may not necessarily be the most profitable for the farmers. 
Beyond contract farming’s weaknesses, in terms of women empowerment in this GVC, women 
represent just 4% of APFCGA members and this hasn’t changed since the association was 
formed, whilst at gender power relations-level there was no change as men take all decisions 
about farm-related operations and women follow their instructions. In fact, there were examples 
of exclusion noted in terms of who can be a member of the APFCGA, since only those with land 
titles can be members and this excludes many women from membership as they are less likely 
to hold titles to land.  
4. Limitations – Despite the vast differences in contract production and the small producer 
organisation model as practiced by Agrocel and Chetna respectively, there are limitations for both 
chains. The first one is related to scale. According to Fairtrade Foundation (2015), Chetna Organic 
is supporting 15,000 (234 in 2004) cotton farmers. At the same time, Agrocel Pure & Fair Cotton 
Growers’ Association is a group of 1,930 farmers, whilst Agrocel Industries works with more than 
20,000 farmers across India. And, although the success of the group has enabled them to extend 
membership to farmers in neighbouring Surendranagar district, the overall numbers of FT farmers 
through both Chetna and Agrocel represents less than 0.5% of the overall cotton farming 
population in India, when considering there are 4 million cotton farmers in India, according to 
Traidcraft (2009).  
As we have previously mentioned in the description of the chains, the low number explains not 
only FT’s niche character and limited potential to effect change at scale through empowering 
farmers, but also the fact that around 6 out of 10 of our interviewees in the field in India haven’t 
even heard of FT cotton. 
Beyond these two FT GVCs under examination, interviewee 54 further highlighted that except for 
these two chains, the rest FT farmers in India are under the contract production model, which as 
we have seen does not allow for true empowerment, farmer organisation and consequent shift of 
power to take place. Similarly, he highlighted that for proper organisation to take place 
sustainably, extensive resources will be required for a long period of time in terms of money and 
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time, which are often not available from either commercial organisations like M&S or smaller 
FTOs. Hence, the farmers will have to rely on spinners, who often approach the relationships in 
a commoditised manner, or the INGOs like GIZ and Helvetas, who are in better place to help them 
organise, but still need to be funded by a third party. 
6.3.4 CONCLUSION 
The main argument in this key theme was founded on Wallerstein’s position (1995) around the 
role of states in defending capital accumulation. This was demonstrated by the Indian 
Government’s provision of MSP that offered a ‘‘safety net’’ for the farmers in case the price offered 
by the local traders was lower than the MSP. In this context, the FT minimum price was deemed 
irrelevant as market prices and the MSP have been consistently higher. As well as FT’s minimum 
price being irrelevant, FT’s scale limitations were obvious as FT farmers comprise only 2.25% of 
the total Indian cotton farmers. Beyond the MSP, the Government of India has also marginalised 
FT further through subsidising inputs and having an extensive array of administrative structures, 
whilst limited financing takes place in FT GVCs, with Chetna using part of FT premium to procure 
seeds and Agrocel providing interest free loans for inputs. 
The vast array of administrative structures may be explained on the basis that textiles is among 
the biggest foreign exchange earners for the Indian government, whilst adding significantly in 
terms of employment. This has been accompanied by the prominence and power of the organised 
spinning sector, which has been facilitated by the value-add policies of the Indian government. 
Whilst this came as a blow to the small-scale industry, it has also highlighted FT’s limitations 
arising from the lack of any standards related to value-add. But, beyond the national dimensions 
of power exercised by the nation state and the power relations that take place in-country, there is 
also a strong international power dimension, which is illustrated through the subsidies by 
developed nations that have contributed to an uneven playing field and to FT’s lack of success in 
India. 
In this context, which describes the power relations prevalent in the conventional GVC from the 
political angle, farmer organisation and empowerment has been noted as one of the areas that 
FT has the potential to make great difference. This was however manifested in different ways in 
the two FT GVCs and it was also treated with more caution due to contract production. To this 
end, the Chetna Organic-No Nasties GVC has demonstrated great practice in terms of farmer 
organisation and empowerment, as demonstrated by farmer ownership, technical capability, 
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democratic governance, bottom-up approach and women empowerment. This has ultimately 
resulted in COFA’s evolvement into an autonomous SPO.  
In contrast, Agrocel have received extensive criticism in relation to their impact on genuine farmer 
empowerment, due to the lack of full representation, capacity to represent farmers, limited women 
empowerment and minimal input on production and marketing decisions, due to their reliance on 
Agrocel Industries. This has been ‘‘nurtured’’ by the contract production framework itself as well 
as Agrocel’s profit orientation. But, despite the differences between the two FT GVCs, the 
common limitations include limited financing and their limited scale, which reaches less than 0.5% 
of the overall cotton farming population in India. 
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6.4 ‘‘BUYER-DRIVEN’’ POWER STRUCTURE 
The argument in this section builds on the basis of Gereffi’s (1994; p.215) definition of governance 
in chapter 2 as the ‘‘authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material and 
human resources are allocated and flow within a chain’’. To this end, and in what we earlier 
referred to as ‘‘governance as power’’, Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) 
stated two distinct governance structures described as “buyer-driven” or “producer-driven” chains.  
Similarly to the previous chapter and according to what we have also mentioned in chapter 2, the 
cotton value chain is ‘‘buyer-driven’’ as well (Gibbon, 2004). Hutson et al. (2005) agreed and 
highlighted that there has been a shift in power from textile manufacturers into the hands of 
retailers (including department stores, specialty retailers like The Gap, and large discount chains 
such as Wal-Mart and Target) and branded marketers (including Nike). As we will see later, this 
has been confirmed during our interviews, as the lead buyers were often cited to be the big 
retailers/brands, like M&S, and the vertically integrated manufacturers, like Alok and various 
others based in India. Therefore, below, we examine the power of these lead buyers as articulated 
and defined by our interviewees, in relation to FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach we examined in 
chapter 2 that involved working with TNCs within the system instead of operating an alternative 
trading system. 
In light of this, in the following pages we explore the most often cited power mechanisms in relation 
to FT. These are customer demand, quality, profitability, purchasing power and value added. 
Within customer demand, we examine the prominent role that was attributed to the FT mark along 
with the positioning in the chain related to demand and the demand itself. Following this, we look 
closely at the key role that quality has in driving demand, hence we examine the quality 
requirements that lead buyers advance, through which they control their chains. We also examine 
the role of FT in product and process quality through traceability.  
In turn, we are investigating the role of profitability, which has been a key concern as FT 
participants have utilised FT as a tool to profiteer rather than to allow shift of power and distribution 
of benefits to cotton farmers. But, whilst the previous power mechanisms are important, they have 
been underpinned and shaped by the sheer purchasing power of the lead buyers as well as the 
high value-adding activities that take place in India.  
6.4.1 DEMAND 
On the basis that cotton is a typical ‘‘buyer-driven’’ value chain, customer demand is the most 
important driver and power dynamic. Therefore, power lies with buyers and their demand.  In turn, 
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buyers’ demand is driven by consumer demand, which is a key element on what FT’s approach 
is premised on. This is in line with what was earlier mentioned in chapter 2 from Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2001), who explained that governance has to do with the exercise of control along the 
chain in relation to how much needs to be produced. 
1. FT Mark & Standards – Similarly to the previous chapter, the FT mark is the manifestation of 
power exercised by FTI and the FT Foundation, as demonstrated through the associated 
customer recognition and demand translated into purchasing. But, whilst FT heavily relies on the 
customer demand this label generates, the implementation of the associated standards that go 
with the same label has been different across the two FT GVCs. Although, in line with their 
‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach, FT has launched the Fairtrade Cotton Programme label to firstly 
address reduced sales and then this concern, it’s too early to say whether this will substantially 
change customers’ understanding between the two labels. 
To this end, we have previously illustrated that the FT label is highly recognisable and trusted in 
the UK with 96% and 89% respectively (FTI, 2013). However, contrary to FT chocolate in the 
previous chapter, this has not been translated into sales throughout the lifecycle of FT cotton. 
According to table 3 we saw earlier in chapter 4, in 2012 FT cotton sales have contracted by 3.5% 
over 2011 and by 50% since their peak in 2008. The value of the FT mark has been acknowledged 
by interviewee 6-sustainable materials specialist for a major retailer-who told us that: 
‘‘The FT mark is highly recognisable by consumers and is driving demand because of its great 
story and narrative’’. 
Hence, this very fact in itself was sufficient for them in order not to pull out from purchasing FT 
cotton completely. So, although he expressed some concerns about FT overall, the FT mark’s 
value as a marketing tool remained unquestioned.  
But, whilst the FT mark is the main mechanism driving consumer demand, FTI and the FT 
Foundation in the UK also exercise their power through a set of principles and standards we 
outlined earlier in our theory. As we have explained in the previous chapter and as we have started 
to explore in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme in the current chapter, although the FT label on M&S’s 
and No Nasties t-shirt is the same and consumers may recognise and buy on the basis that these 
two different products and brands carry the same qualities and values as articulated by FT and 
its communication to consumers, this is simply not the case. This is because the implementation 
of some of the FT standards, like farmer organisation and empowerment, has been different in 
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the Chetna-No Nasties GVC compared to the Agrocel-M&S GVC. Although, this has been 
anticipated to some extent due to the difference in SPO and contract production standards we 
have explained, No Nasties and M&S are still carrying the same FT mark and, most importantly, 
consumers buy them thinking they are equally impactful and beneficial for cotton farmers. We will 
examine more of these differences in implementation as we progress in this and the next key 
theme. Nonetheless, the issues with carrying the same label have recently been addressed, as 
we saw in the sustainability key theme, with the introduction of the Fairtrade Cotton Programme 
label. However, as we saw earlier from table 12, the extent to which consumers will be able to 
differentiate between the two and understand the variance in the implementation of FT standards 
down the chain is still questionable. 
2. Consumer Demand & Positioning – Although the FT mark comprises an important power 
mechanism in relation to driving demand, it is the consumers who ultimately decide to buy FT 
labeled garments. To this end, global demand for FT cotton has dropped by 65% between 2008 
and 2012, whilst the situation in India hasn’t changed in 2013 and 2014. The lack of buyer and 
consumer demand has been manifested down the chain, whereby only 36% of the FT cotton 
produced was sold in FT terms. This showcases the niche character of FT cotton that relies on 
unpredictable buyer demand driven by fashion and lack of sustainable buyer commitment, which 
ultimately adversely impacts the overall profit of farmers and their cooperative. In light of this, it 
has been established that it’s paramount to be close to consumer demand and influence 
purchasing decisions through marketing and branding which deliver the greatest profit in the 
chain, whilst allowing control down the chain. 
To this end, as per SSI (2014) in figure 23 below, we need to note that overall FT cotton demand 
and consequently production have dropped significantly in 2009-2012. According to this, between 
2009 and 2012, FT cotton production has dropped by 58% and FT sales by 65%.  We will examine 
the root causes in detail as we progress in the profitability section later, but at high level, according 
to IDS and University of Greenwich (2011), this has been attributed to the FT premium for FT 
cotton sold. The drop in production and sales has further been confirmed for 2013 and 2014 by 
interviewee 70-sustainability assistant manager in a FT vertically integrated manufacturer-who 
mentioned that: 
‘‘Demand for FT has declined over the past two years’’. In parallel, interviewees 65-the 
managing Director and senior vice president of marketing of a vertically integrated 
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manufacturer-who have been involved in FT since its launch, noted that there was no demand 
in 2014 from their buyers, whilst in 2006, they sold 20-25% of their entire volume in FT terms. 
Beyond this, figure 23 also demonstrates that not all the FT certified cotton produced ends up 
being sold in FT terms. So, whilst only 43% of the FT certified cotton was sold in FT terms in 
2009, this percentage further dropped to 36% in 2012. To this end, at FT GVC level, interviewee 
69-project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-informed us that: 
‘‘Only 40-50% of the cotton produced in FT terms in Gujarat has been sold in FT terms’’. 
Similarly, Chetna’s manager mentioned that ‘‘only 30-35% of their cotton was sold in Organic 
Fairtrade markets and the rest was sold in the conventional market (Lahankar 2014)’’. 
This demonstrates a serious limitation of FT cotton, which hinges on its limited consumer uptake. 
In terms of the impact of this at farmer level, interviewee 25-ex-Oxfam manager involved in FT-
explained that ‘‘how much the farmer benefits from a cooperative depends on how much the 
cooperative buys from the farmer, which in turn depends on consumer demand’’. Therefore, the 
lack of demand, as articulated by the FT production to sales ratio in figure 23 below, means that 
organisations like Agrocel and Chetna down the chain cannot sell all of the cotton they certified 
in FT terms. So, although they have already incurred the cost of certification we have explained 
in the sustainability key theme, they may have not been able to receive sufficient returns in order 
to recoup it.  
Although the absolute scale of demand is important, its sustainable nature is equally, if not, more 
important. To this end, interviewee 13-an independent FT consultant-referred to the inevitably 
short term nature of any cotton-garment GVC and volatile demand driven by the fickle, unstable 
and unpredictable nature of fashion. As a result, cotton farmers may make money one year and 
not much the year after. Others though, like interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-focused on the lack of 
commitment from conventional players, like M&S. 
‘‘M&S have largely shifted to BCI cotton, which has resulted in a fluctuation of demand for FT 
cotton that has ultimately affected the FT farmers. As such, FT cotton farmers who have 
previously used the FT premium to build a school, now this meant that they had no resources 
to carry on operating the school. This is due to the lack of commitment and sustainable demand 
from big brands’’. On the other hand, he argued that FTOs like No Nasties and Pants for 
Poverty, who buy from Chetna are having more of a sustainable impact (but at much smaller 
scale) compared to M&S whose impact has been one-off. 
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Figure 23: FT Global Cotton Production and Sales (tonnes) during 2009-2012 
Source: Adapted from SSI (2014) 
The previous discussion indicates that positioning in the chain in relation to demand and the 
consumers plays a significant role for the power exercised to other participants of the chain. As 
such, similarly to the previous chapter, interviewee 68-the Director of the Bombay Textiles 
Research Association-told us that proximity to consumer demand is paramount. This is illustrated 
from the fact that ‘‘retailers/brands dictate the activity down the chain on the basis of consumer 
demand in a typical buyer-driven chain whereby customer is the king’’. Interviewee 6 confided 
that once he transitioned from a major retailer in order to work for a vertically integrated 
manufacturer, but he quickly understood that the retailer’s positioning closer to consumer demand 
has been driving everything down the chain, therefore he decided to return to the major retailer. 
UNIDO (2003) explained that companies that develop and sell brand-named products close to 
demand have considerable control over how, when and where manufacturing will take place, and 
how much profit accrues at each stage. In order to achieve profitability, retailers and brands focus 
on the high-value design, marketing, retail and sales ends of the value chain.  
In light of the importance of the marketing end of the chain, interviewees 65, who run a vertically 
integrated manufacturer who M&S bought FT garments from, suggested that M&S have 
significantly pushed FT in its early days though extensive advertising and communication budget. 
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Although, this hasn’t been fully successful-for reasons we will examine later in detail-if we 
consider the quotes earlier about current demand, it does highlight the difference in the two FT 
GVCs chains, as No Nasties are very small and do not have the luxury to spend this amount of 
money in advertising, according to interviewee 66-CEO of No Nasties. 
6.4.2 QUALITY 
Whilst demand is a significant power mechanism, it’s important to understand that quality is also 
important as it often determines demand and the price. As such, in line with Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2001) who earlier asserted that governance involves the exercise of control along the 
chain on quality specifications, retailers/brands exercise their power on the vertically integrated 
manufacturers on the basis of their quality specifications. Following this, the vertically integrated 
manufacturers or composite mills attempt to source the right quality of cotton from ginners through 
five key quality parameters of cotton. But, whilst FT doesn’t play a role in product quality, they 
have previously been involved in process quality through traceability, which has been abandoned 
through the Fairtrade Cotton Programme in order to increase FT cotton sales. Whilst this has not 
been successful enough to entice greater volumes from big retailers like M&S, FT’s process 
quality element (traceability) was replaced by M&S Plan A’s sustainability strategy which includes 
several process quality dimensions. 
As such, starting from the top of the chain, interviewee 10-senior manager in the FT Foundation-
told us that: 
‘‘Retailers/brands in the UK exercise their power on vertically integrated manufacturers in India 
through the articulation of a set of quality parameters’’. 
Interviewee 61-quality assurance manager of a vertically integrated manufacturer-elaborated that 
retailers/brands in the UK set their fabric requirements directly, via an agent or through a 
wholesaler/importer. These usually are: a. Blend – percentage of cotton and polyester, b. 
Technical parameters – for example, ‘‘20s’’, which is thicker and can be used for jeans, or ‘‘28s’’ 
which is finer yarn used for shirts. They also provide various parameters in relation to variation of 
diameter, strength and twist, c. Colour. Although the power balance in relation to quality is usually 
top-down, from the retailer/brand to the vertically integrated manufacturer, interviewee 64-general 
manager of a vertically integrated manufacturer-informed us that niche products could provide 
vertically integrated manufactures with more power in this relationship. For example, a special cut 
of jeans do that is hard to be copied by other manufacturers and is high in demand is currently 
providing them with a better bargaining position against the retailers/brands. 
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In turn, the vertically integrated manufacturers or composite mills, try to respond to the stringent 
quality requirements of the retailers/brands through sourcing the right quality from ginners at the 
best price possible. Interviewee 50-CEO of a major cotton seed trader-told us that they buy on 
the basis of quality and price with 90% of the decision based on quality and 10% on price, as 
quality largely determines price. Having said that, interview 48-the head of the central institute for 
research on cotton technology and interviewee 61 argued that prices rise if demand is high and 
then quality takes a back seat. On this note, they explained that quality depends on the time of 
the year. Hence, the first and second picks are better than the third and fourth, although they 
need to consider that in the beginning of the season length is great but moisture content is high 
so they may buy more water than cotton. The difference in these quality features will ultimately 
justify the price differentials. They then listed their 5 key quality parameters: 1. Length, 2. 
Uniformity ratio, 3. Strength, 4. Microfiness, 5. Trash21. So, after ginning they assess these 5 
properties and pay ginners accordingly. Interviewee 53 warned that ginners often add moisture 
content so they can sell at higher price. We will explain the rationale behind this later, but this 
often results in consumers paying higher price albeit at lower quality. We should also note that 
quality agencies are often involved in this process through determining quality and consequently 
price for their clients who are ginners and traders-interviewee 50. 
In this context and as discussed in the previous chapter, beyond the product quality element in 
which FT cotton doesn’t have a role, FT has previously focused on process quality through 
traceability. However, as we discussed in the sustainability key theme, FTI have shifted to mass 
balance through the recently launched Fairtrade Cotton Programme, which mainly reflected the 
commercial organisations feedback on traceability’s high cost and extensive time consumed. On 
this basis, FTI removed this barrier to enable sales through allowing mixing FT cotton with 
conventional cotton as needed. Although, FTI have also set up and differentiated this model from 
the original model which reflects organisations who are 100% FT across the chain, interviewee 
1-director of policy from a FTO-mentioned that: 
‘‘The abandonment of traceability signifies an important shift that, similarly to cocoa’s case, 
breaks the physical link between consumers and farmers’’. 
Despite this shift to facilitate scale purchasing from organisations like M&S, we should note that 
according to interviewee 6, M&S limited their purchasing of FT cotton to just 10-15% of their total 
                                                          
21 Trash is a measure of the amount of non-lint materials in cotton, such as leaf and bark from the cotton 
plant-interviewee 61. 
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sustainable sourced volume whilst maintaining a process quality dimension on top of the product 
quality dimensions we mentioned earlier. This process quality dimension goes ‘‘beyond FT’’ and 
is part of the overarching sustainability strategy we described earlier, which involves a plan to 
convert all cotton products to be sourced from sustainable sources such as FT (15%), BCI (75%), 
recycled (5%) and organic (5%). This sustainability strategy is managed by a range of KPIs 
including metrics around fibre, manufacturing way and the process the garment has been dyed. 
6.4.3 PROFITABILITY 
We have already touched upon profitability indirectly through TNCs feedback on the traceability 
standard due to its high cost. Similarly to the previous chapter, this argument on profitability builds 
on the basis of FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ and work with TNCs in the existing international 
trading system on the back of FTI’s licensee-based business model. As a result, whilst spinners 
and vertically integrated manufacturers exercise profitability through lobbying and holding stocks, 
they have also used FT as a mechanism to increase their profits through excessive price mark-
ups. On a similar note, brands have utilised their pricing and branding in combination with FT. In 
this context, FTI have no control whatsoever over pricing and commercial decisions of the 
participating companies, who only participate in FT on the basis of their ability to make money on 
the back of it. Whilst this is the case for conventional TNCs participating in FT, the Chetna-No 
Nasties GVC is nowhere near gaining market share from retailer like M&S or shifting the power 
balance, because of their size. 
To this end, and in light of the difference between profit and profitability we explained in the 
previous chapter, interviewee 62-the president and owner of a vertically integrated manufacturer-
and interviewee 49-deputy general manager of CCI-attempted to give an indication of profit 
margins. Although, they were not able to quantify or explain the retailers/brands or the vertically 
integrated manufacturers margins, interviewee 62 confirmed that the margins of traders and 
manufacturers are significantly higher than the farmers’, whilst interviewee 49 added that 
retailers/brand are more profitable compared to vertically integrated manufacturers. 
But, besides comparing the profit margins of the lead buyers in the chain, our interviewees 
attempted to explain how they actually achieve it. For example, interviewee 68-the director of the 
Bombay Textiles Research Association-suggested that spinners, who are often part of vertically 
integrated manufacturers, strive for profitability in three ways. On the cost side, when they 
purchase from the market, they hold cotton stocks to manipulate and reduce price to the 
disadvantage of farmers. As we have explained in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme earlier, they also 
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leverage the importance they have in the Indian economy in order to lobby the Indian Government 
through their organised association in order to get cotton at the lowest possible price so they can 
compete with Pakistan. On the revenue side, interviewee 67 advised that spinners have a 
sustainability attribute to their overall offering if they are involved in FT:  
‘‘Since they are like a shop, they need to offer as many products as possible (including FT) in 
order to deliver more revenue’’. 
On the same note, retailers/brands capitalise on their position near to consumer demand and 
exercise their profitability on the back of their pricing. To illustrate, interviewee 34-founder of a 
cotton FTO-and interviewee 25-ex-Oxfam manager involved in FT-told us that: 
‘‘Retailers don't even know about cotton, yarn and fabric. Instead, they just want to know how 
much the t-shirt costs, so they see whether it fits within their profit margins’’. 
In this context, FT has done very little to curb the profitability of the key buyers and achieve 
redistribution of the benefits to the farmers. In fact, it has achieved exactly the opposite. Numerous 
interviewees22 highlighted the profiteering that goes on in the middle of the chain on the back of 
FT, which ultimately ends up in the increased price of the end product, which explains the reduced 
retail demand for FT cotton certified products we have examined earlier. Interviewee 62, the 
president and owner of a vertically integrated manufacturer, quantified the scale of profiteering by 
saying ‘‘it can be can be 2-3 times more expensive by the time it gets to the consumer’’. A more 
conservative estimate was provided by interviewees 65-the managing director and senior vice 
president of marketing of a vertically integrated manufacturer-who have been involved in FT 
cotton since its launch. They claimed that: 
‘‘Consumers are sometimes paying 30% more for the price of a garment due to the price 
compounding when FT is involved’’. 
This has been verified by IDS and University of Greenwich (2011), who suggested that retail mark-
ups on prices of Fairtrade cotton items are generally about 20–40%, but occasionally up to 100%. 
Whilst interviewees 63 and 67 from FTI admitted that price compounding has been a major 
concern, a few interviewees23 suggested that the main culprits are spinners or vertically integrated 
manufacturers, as well as the promoting bodies and ginners who profiteer as well.  
                                                          
22 Interviewees 50, 51, 54, 63, 65, 67 and 69. 
23 Interviewees 50, 51, 54, 65 and 69. 
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‘‘The way they profiteer is through adding a markup on top of the total price of seed 
cotton/lint/yarn/garment and FT premium depending if it’s the promoting body, ginner, spinner, 
and manufacturer’’. 
Therefore, although the FT premium is only 8% of the cotton price and 15% of garments price 
according to interviewees 65, interviewee 50 told us there is 25% price difference between 
conventional cotton seed and FT and goes up to 40% as you progress with processing. Hence, it 
appears that the mark up is between 15-17% on top of the total price of seed 
cotton/lint/yarn/garment and FT premium during each of these two stages.  
FT price compounding at every stage of an extensive chain has been the main reason why M&S 
and other retailers/brand would try and source FT garments from vertically integrated 
manufacturers who have control down the chain, according to interviewees 65. Despite the lack 
of granular data in Chetna’s end of the chain, the CEO of No Nasties told us that they have lost 
touch with the ground level due to scale, hence the purely rely on FT certification. On the other 
hand, interviewee 51-a project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-claimed that ‘‘FT has helped 
educate spinners and garment manufacturers and argued that in order for power shift to take 
place, the FT mark ups should only cover their costs without adding extortionate margins, whilst 
farmers should get their equal share’’. Despite this, after a long discussion, he admitted that 
promoting bodies like Agrocel Industries also add a mark-up of 5-7% when they sell to spinners.  
On the back of the widespread phenomenon of price compounding, interviewees 63 and 67 
expressed hopes that the Fairtrade Cotton Programme, we referred to earlier, will mitigate this 
problem. Nevertheless, they also highlighted that  
‘‘FTI have no control whatsoever over pricing and commercial decisions of the participating 
organisations’’. FT’s lack of control has become apparent to us when interviewees 65 told us 
that when the retailer/brand were not able to sell their FT garments in the past, they asked 
them to mix conventional and FT so that the price could go down and allow consumer demand 
to pick up.  
This has been undertaken since the basic raw material is the same and despite FT’s previous 
traceability requirements and audits. When questioned about this, interviewees 63 and 67 from 
FTI told us that they were not aware. On the other hand, interviewee 50 told us he would not 
receive the FT premium if he blended FT with conventional. Therefore, it appears this has not 
been a widespread practice. Nonetheless, striving for profit has definitely been a widespread 
238 | P a g e  
 
practice that has only intensified through the use of FT, which has been approached as a tool to 
provide more profit rather than a tool that would shift the balance of power and curb the profitability 
of lead buyers. To this end, interviewee 50 argued that: 
‘‘FT does not shift the power balance in India as the spinners get way more than the farmers’’, 
whilst FT has a long way to go to change this. In Turkey for example, farmers get more and 
spinners get less’’. He then highlighted why motivations matter as well as a proper system that 
allows equal distribution by saying that ‘‘I would not participate in FT if I had to forego profits 
and that I do not want to give back to farmers unless I have a benefit’’. 
To this end, although FTOs like No Nasties represent a new entrant in the industry and could in 
theory gain market share from M&S, this has been disproven in practice by interviewee 66-the 
CEO of No Nasties-who claimed they only exist because M&S opened up the market for them. 
He also repeatedly suggested that their limited scale does not facilitate or allow any comparisons 
or claims regarding challenging retailers/big brands profitability. To support this, Hindustan Times 
(2012) suggested that No Nasties have recovered the money they have invested in 2011 but 
haven’t made any profit by 2012. 
6.4.4 PURCHASING POWER 
In a conventional ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain in which demand and profitability are important, the 
purchasing power of lead firms plays a vital role. In this context, the volumes of FT purchased are 
too small to significantly impact the purchasing power of large TNCs. This also highlights the 
uneven playing field between M&S and No Nasties when considering No Nasties significantly 
smaller scale and FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. Beyond the absolute scale of purchasing power, FTI 
have not been successful in convincing big retailer/brands to commit long term to FT, as they 
have been using their purchasing power in order to squeeze suppliers on price and appear to be 
non-committal purchasers of FT. On the same note, whilst FT has raised awareness at spinner 
and vertically integrated manufacturer level, they haven’t shifted their business practices and 
power exercised through their purchasing power and organisation. 
To illustrate, The Guardian (2012) suggested that a big retailer/brand like H&M would typically 
use 200,000 tonnes per year. To put this in perspective, this is just 3.2% of India’s annual 
production, when considering that India is the third biggest cotton producer in the world, with just 
over 6.25 million tonnes in 2012, according to SSI (2014). In this context, M&S’s Plan A report 
(2014) mentioned their goal of sourcing 25% of their conventional cotton from sustainable sources 
by 2015. Interviewee 6 told us that FT comprises 10-15% of M&S’s volume sourced from 
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sustainable sources such as BCI, organic and recycled. Therefore, we have estimated M&S’s FT 
cotton purchasing to be in the range of 5,000-7,500 tonnes per year from Agrocel and others, 
which is just 2.5-3.75% of their overall cotton usage.  
Therefore, similarly to the previous chapter, FT does not curb the absolute purchasing power 
of big brands/manufacturers, it only marginally altered the mix of this power, which in M&S’s 
can be quantified to 2.5-3.75% of their overall cotton usage (see figure 24 below). 
Although similar data weren’t made easily available to us for No Nasties, the CEO of No Nasties 
has repeatedly emphasised their small size compared to M&S, which was further compounded 
by the fact that only 20% of their t-shirts are sold in FT and organic terms. Interviewee 63-CEO of 
Fairtrade India-confirmed that: 
‘‘M&S purchase around 2% of their overall volume in FT, but this still gives them significantly 
more volume than No Nasties’’. 
As such, when considering the Chetna-No Nasties GVC and the impact it may be having on the 
conventional chain’s lead brands and their purchasing power as a new entrant, it is obvious that 
the impact is insignificant. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, interviewee 66-CEO of No Nasties-
added that M&S’s purchasing power and volume opened up the market for them. This way, small 
firms like them find their niche and position themselves as 100% FT and organic. 
Figure 24: M&S purchasing power split in 2014-Conventional and FT (tonnes) 
Source: Author’s calculations from M&S’s Plan A (2014), The Guardian (2012) and interviewee 6 
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In parallel, earlier in this key theme we mentioned that while the scale of demand is significant so 
is its sustainability and nature. To this end, interviewee 25-ex-Oxfam manager involved in FT-told 
us that: 
Through his involvement in FT, he has experienced retailers/brands utilising their purchasing 
power in order to squeeze smaller FT organisations on price. Furthermore, despite their initial 
commitment to buy, they have later backed down from this commitment. 
On this note, interviewees 63 and 67 from FTI mentioned their strategic orientation to working 
with retailers/brands as they ‘‘want to tilt their power by making them commit’’. When challenged 
on this position, they acknowledged ‘‘there is plenty more we still need to do in terms of curbing 
their power, but we need to grow in size too through sales in order to become sizable enough and 
make retailers/brands change’’.  
At spinner/vertically integrated manufacturer level, we have already articulated how extensive the 
spinning and manufacturing sector is as well as its role in the Indian economy and society. In this 
context, although interviewee 51-a project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC mentioned the 
role that FT has played in educating them regarding the issues that farmers face further down the 
chain, he has also highlighted that in practice their purchasing power and the way it has been 
exercised hasn’t shifted at all. He further told us that: 
‘‘Spinners are the worst in the chain, as they drive a race to the bottom when it comes to price. 
They go around asking ginners about quotes and then they bargain hard whilst playing off 
ginners against each other’’. 
Finally, interviewee 68-the director of the Bombay Textiles Research Association-added that their 
purchasing power is further pronounced since they are highly organised through their 
associations. 
6.4.5 VALUE ADDED 
Similarly to the previous chapter, retailers/brands and vertically integrated manufacturers have 
more power than farmers as a result of adding value to cotton. As such, beyond ginning, value is 
added through ginning, spinning, knitting, dyeing and finishing, garment stitching and retailing. 
Since retailing can provide 20-40 times greater value add than the second most value-add activity, 
both M&S and No Nasties focused there. In this sense, both FT chains overlap with the 
conventional one at manufacturing level, but as discussed No Nasties is less powerful and 
consequently impactful than M&S compared to the garment manufacturer, due to their limited 
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size. And, whilst the M&S FT chain also overlaps with its conventional at retail level, both FT 
GVCs impact on the overall value added at retail and manufacturing level is marginal given the 
low FT volumes purchased. 
As such, in line with Gereffi (1994) who defined governance as the power relationships that 
determine how financial resources are allocated and flow within a chain in chapter 2, the focus 
here is on value added from No Nasties and M&S’s point of view within their FT chains beyond 
ginning. Similarly to the previous chapter, interviewees argued that vertically integrated 
manufacturers and retailer/brands ‘‘deservedly’’ have greater power than producers in the 
conventional chain as they add more value to cotton. For example, interviewee 49-deputy general 
manager of the Cotton Corporation of India suggested that ‘‘significant value is added beyond 
farmer level, whilst cotton farming is only a small % of the value of the end product’’. At the same 
time, interviewee 52-the Director of the Ministry of Agriculture-Department of Cooperation-
explained that ‘‘textile manufacturers have more power as they add value, while farmers do very 
little to add value’’. 
As we saw earlier, the value added process is shaped as retailers/brands set their quality 
requirements that determine the volume of cotton bought to be included in their garments and the 
consequent designs. On the back of this, value added takes place across in varying degree across 
all the steps we earlier outlined in the lengthy conventional chain: farming, ginning, spinning, 
knitting, and dyeing and finishing, garment stitching and retailing (which includes marketing and 
branding). On this note, interviewee 64-general manager of a vertically integrated manufacturer- 
suggested that: 
‘‘$1 worth of cotton is equal to $2.5 worth of yarn and $3.5 worth of garment. This ramps up 
after wholesale and retail/brand level at $8-10 when buying from a supermarket’’. 
On this note, as per table 16, an elaborate value chain analysis from Rieple and Singh (2010) 
showed that the greatest value-add takes place at retailing stage through marketing and branding, 
which can be 30 times greater than the second most value-add activity (garment stitching). They 
have justified this on the basis of customers’ preparedness to pay premium for what they perceive 
to be ethical, but also because retailers like M&S are particularly skilled in building a good 
reputation around their ethical credentials. Given this stark difference in value add, interviewee 
64 added that their power derives from vertical integration that allowed them to bring together all 
the activities from ginning to garment stitching, whilst backward integration provided them with 
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better cotton price, standard of production, security of supply and independence without having 
to rely on agents. 
Table 16: Net added value ($) at each stage to make a 0.25kg ethical t-shirt retailing for $44 
Activity Farming Ginning Spinning Knitting 
Dyeing & 
Finishing 
Garment 
stitching 
Retail 
Net 
value 
added 
0.06 0.29 0.34 0.15 0.26 0.67 20.4 
Source: Adjusted from Rieple and Singh (2010) 
In relation to the role of both FT GVCs in value-added activities, both M&S and No Nasties have 
no involvement at manufacturing level and their FT chain overlaps with the conventional one, as 
interviewee 63-CEO of FT India-informed us that: 
‘‘No Nasties and M&S have overlapping value chains at manufacturing level as No Nasties 
procure some of the garment from the same garment factories as M&S’’. 
However, due to the purchasing power and the FT volumes we discussed earlier, it’s quite clear 
that in quantitative terms M&S’s chain has more impact in terms of value added orders that take 
place in India. On the same note, he told us that: 
‘‘Since No Nasties is very small, the garment manufacturer has more power, whereas in the 
M&S chain, M&S has more power than the garment manufacturer’’. This means that No 
Nasties is limited in terms of the sustainable impact they can affect down the chain due to their 
weaker position relative to the garment manufacturer.  
Similarly, as we saw earlier, at retail level, No Nasties undertake branding and marketing but due 
to their size and their focus on the online channel, the value added is considered to be a tiny 
fraction of M&S’s. It’s worth mentioning, that M&S’s FT chain also overlaps with their conventional 
chain at retail level and is approached as yet another garment in a shop-interviewee 6. Similarly, 
given the low FT volumes we earlier outlined for both FT GVCs, the overall value-added is 
marginal and refers only to its composition and not to its absolute scale. 
6.4.6 CONCLUSION 
The argument in this key theme was built on Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s 
(2011) “buyer-driven” governance structure. Cotton is a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVC driven by vertically 
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integrated manufacturers and retailers/brands, so power lies with them and their demand. Whilst 
FTI rely on the FT mark in order to stimulate demand, FT cotton sales have been poor and the 
implementation of associated standards has been different across the two FT GVCs. In order to 
resolve this and in line with their ‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach, FTI have launched the Fairtrade 
Cotton Programme label, but the extent to which this will substantially change customers’ 
understanding between the two labels is questionable. 
Although the FT mark comprises an important power mechanism in relation to demand, it is the 
consumers who make purchasing decisions. However, global demand for FT cotton has dropped 
significantly and this has been also manifested down the chain, whereby only 36% of the FT 
cotton produced was sold in FT terms. This showcases the niche character of FT cotton that relies 
on unpredictable buyer demand driven by fashion and lack of sustainable buyer commitment, 
which adversely impacts the profit of farmers and their cooperative. In light of this, brands and 
retailers exercise their power by being close to consumer demand and influencing purchasing 
decisions through marketing and branding which deliver the greatest profits in the chain. 
Although demand is a significant power mechanism, quality is also important as it often 
determines demand and the price. As such, retailers/brands exercise their power on the vertically 
integrated manufacturers on the basis of their quality specifications, whilst the vertically integrated 
manufacturers do the same to ginners. In this context, FT doesn’t play a role in product quality or 
process quality as they have abandoned traceability through the Fairtrade Cotton Programme in 
order to increase FT cotton sales. Whilst this has not been successful enough to entice greater 
volumes from big retailers like M&S, FT’s process quality element (traceability) was replaced by 
M&S Plan A’s sustainability strategy which includes several process quality dimensions. 
Whilst the abandonment of traceability is also related to profitability, the argument on profitability 
builds on the basis of FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ and work with TNCs. As a result, vertically 
integrated manufacturers and brands/retailers have used FT as a mechanism to increase their 
profits through huge price mark-ups. In this context, FT have no control whatsoever over 
commercial decisions of the participating companies, who only participate in FT on the basis of 
their ability to make money on the back of it. Whilst this is the case for conventional TNCs 
participating in FT, the Chetna-No Nasties GVC is nowhere near gaining market share from 
retailers like M&S or shifting the power balance, because of their size. 
In a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain in which demand and profitability are important, the purchasing power 
of lead firms plays an equally important role. In this context, the volumes of FT purchased are too 
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small to significantly impact the purchasing power of large TNCs. This also highlights the uneven 
playing field between M&S and No Nasties when considering No Nasties significantly smaller 
scale and FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. Beyond the absolute scale of purchasing power, FTI have not 
been successful in convincing big retailer/brands to commit long term to FT, as they have been 
abusing their purchasing power and are non-committal purchasers of FT. At manufacturing level, 
whilst FT has raised awareness at spinner and vertically integrated manufacturer level, they 
haven’t shifted their business practices and power exercised through their purchasing power and 
organisation. As well as purchasing power, retailers/brands and vertically integrated 
manufacturers have more power than farmers as a result of adding value to cotton through 
ginning, spinning, knitting, dyeing and finishing, garment stitching and retailing. Since retailing 
can provide 30 times greater value add than the second best most value-add activity, both M&S 
and No Nasties focused there. In this sense, both FT chains overlap with the conventional one at 
manufacturing level, but No Nasties is less powerful and consequently impactful than M&S 
compared to the garment manufacturer, due to their limited size. And, whilst M&S FT chain also 
overlaps with its conventional at retail level, both FT GVCs impact on the overall value added at 
retail and manufacturing level is marginal given the low FT volumes purchased. 
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6.5 CHAIN RELATIONS & COORDINATION 
Similarly to the previous chapter, the argument in this key theme is based on Gereffi et al. (2005) 
and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) ‘‘governance as coordination’’. Although the concept 
of buyer ‘‘driven-ness’’ is still applicable, this ‘‘driven-ness’’ is manifested in different ways, 
degrees and has different drivers (Granleese, 2009). As such, we will be enhancing it through 
Gereffi et al. (2005) five governance structures (as explained in chapter 2 and depicted in figure 
2) to reflect their evolution according to trends, innovations and their further sophistication. 
Therefore, in this key theme we will outline the relations between chain nodes and contrast the 
conventional with the FT chains in order to examine if and to what extent FT affects the existing 
governance structure. As discussed earlier, since FT focuses at farming level, the core of the 
discussion will be concentrated there. 
6.5.1 FARMER-BUYER RELATIONS 
Similarly to the previous chapter, BASIC (2014) described the governance structure between 
cotton farmers and buyers in the conventional cotton chain as ‘‘captive’’. This has been 
determined on the basis of the farmers’ transactional dependency on buyers to buy their produce 
through controlling the price paid and providing them with the necessary inputs. Also, during the 
previous key themes as well as in chapter 2 on Fairtrade, we referred to the FT standards and 
their implementation in the two FT chains. In particular, we talked about farmer organisation and 
the FT minimum price and how they are implemented in each chain. To this end, we will examine 
whether and to what extent the implementation of some of the key FT standards in the FT GVCs 
has shifted the ‘‘captive’’ governance in the conventional chain at farmer-buyer level. 
1. ‘‘Captive’’ conventional chain governance – BASIC’s (2014) assessment of the governance 
structure between farmers and their buyers as ‘‘captive’’ has been confirmed during our fieldwork. 
This is due to the fact that although farmers can sell directly to independent agents, ginners or 
sell to the local markets, all these relationships are highly transactional and commoditised with 
the buyers offering little or no support to farmers. But, farmers are also captive to moneylenders 
that contribute to farmers’ indebtedness and are caught up in a situation, whereby they sell mostly 
to ginners in a distressed situation underpinned by financial problems, market structure and 
necessity. In this context, the relationship between farmers and ginners is characterised by great 
power imbalance, whereby farmers always need money and are price-takers in a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ 
chain. 
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To illustrate, numerous interviewees24 indicated that cotton farmers in the conventional chain can 
sell directly to independent agents, ginners or sell to the local markets whereby traders, local 
ginners, commission agents, spinners as well as government agencies such as the Cotton 
Corporation of India (CCI) purchase cotton through an open auction/tender system, following the 
prevalent market practices in the various yards. Interviewees 56-cotton farmers from Nagpur, 
Maharashtra and interviewees 57-ginner and farmers in Nagpur, Maharashtra-explained that all 
these relationships are highly transactional and commoditised with the buyers offering no support 
to farmers. Support comes only from the Government in the form of MSP and input subsidy, as 
we discussed earlier. In fact, interviewee 25-ex-Oxfam manager-emphasised that:  
‘‘This is the greatest power imbalance that farmers face as they are held hostage to the buyers 
of their cotton’’. 
He also highlighted financing as another important power mechanism that generates power 
imbalance. In the sustainability key theme, we referred to interviewees 65-the managing director 
and senior vice president of marketing of a vertically integrated manufacturer-who informed us 
that ‘‘at the time of sowing farmers will borrow money form moneylenders at excessive rates, as 
high as 36% per annum’’. Although, along with interviewee 53, they added that private money 
lenders should be eliminated as they significantly contribute to farmers’ indebtedness and 
potentially to the suicides we referred to earlier, interviewee 53 suggested that: 
‘‘There is no political will to eradicate this power imbalance as politicians, bankers or their 
network of people are often involved in these profiteering money lending practices’’. 
Beyond financing, interviewees 56 and 57 clarified that despite these three options they mostly 
end up selling directly to ginners as there is only one local market per district as opposed to 12-
15 ginners. In addition, farmers tend to sell to agents-albeit at lower prices than the local market-
who come to pick up their cotton, due to the vast distances they would need to cover in order to 
reach the local market or the ginners and the associated transportation cost. If we consider this 
in combination to the dire financial situation farmers are in, it’s easy to understand why farmers 
do so in what has been termed as ‘‘distressed’’ sale-interviewee 48-head of the Central Institute 
for Research on Cotton Technology. On this note, interviewee 64-the general manager of a 
vertically integrated manufacturer-mentioned the key role that agents have in the chain through 
commanding 15-20% profit margin.  
                                                          
24 Interviewees 48, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 68. 
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On the other hand, interviewee 58-owner of a ginning business-told us that farmers only get 1-
2% more if they go to the local market instead of going directly to a ginner, but they bear the 
transportation cost. Nonetheless, interviewee 61-quality assurance manager of a vertically 
integrated manufacturer-informed us there is less of a power imbalance in local markets than in 
direct relationships with ginners or agents due to the rate transparency and buyer options. On this 
note, interviewees 56 and 57-cotton farmers from Nagpur, Maharashtra-were also positive about 
local markets and told us ‘‘they are fairer compared to agents or ginners as grading is impartial 
and they don’t cheat through faulty scales’’. As we explained earlier, other interviewees like 
interviewee 68 were more sceptical and referred to price fixing by traders through holding stocks. 
In parallel, interviewee 53-a cotton industry consultant-referred to the 4% tax the farmer has to 
pay to the government as well as the transportation cost to get to the local market. 
In parallel, interviewees have been highly critical of the direct selling to ginners. Interviewees 57-
ginner and farmers in Nagpur, Maharashtra-told us that their transactional relationship is based 
on cost and quality. Cost and price are determined as the ginner assesses the grade of cotton 
and quotes accordingly. If farmers agree they sell the cotton and if they disagree they sell to 
another ginner. On top of this, we should note that farmers pay the transportation cost. In terms 
of quality, as mentioned earlier, it’s dependent on the time of year with the first 4 months providing 
superior quality and the next 2 months average quality. Beyond price and quality, ginners try to 
purchase cotton with low moisture content so that they can pay less per kg.  
However, in order to understand the drivers of the way ginners operate and exercise their power 
on farmers, we need to carefully examine their context. Interviewee 58 explained that the 
government was previously undertaking ginning and consequently were the main cotton 
purchaser from farmers, but they were running losses. As a result, they have liberalised the 
market in 2006-07 to private ginners, who have been recording +/-5% margins on average in a 
highly commoditised market. Importantly, we were also informed that ginning is a volume 
business which runs only for 8 months, so inevitably ginners will be trying to procure at the lowest 
cost possible as the profit margins are tight. Although, interviewees 57 and 58 we spoke to refused 
that they are trying to squeeze the farmers in price, the analysis above confirms the price pressure 
farmers incur from ginners. 
2. FT Farmer Empowerment – In line with the notion of empowerment in chapter 2 and in the 
context of the ‘‘captive’’ relations we have just described in the conventional chain driven by 
financiers and buyers, farmers are highly disempowered. In contrast, both FT chains introduce a 
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promoting body and farmer cooperative in the relationship between farmers and ginners, which 
improves the previous farmer-ginner power imbalance. Nonetheless, this has been markedly 
better in Chetna’s case on the basis of the true autonomy of the cooperative, farmer ownership 
and bottom-up approach, which was further enhanced by the fact that Chetna farmers maintain 
ownership of the cotton through subcontracting the ginner. On the other hand, in Agrocel’s case, 
since ginners provide finance and both Agrocel and them do not truly believe in farmers’ 
autonomy, farmer empowerment has been limited. 
To illustrate, we have previously explained during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme that  farmers in 
the conventional chain are highly disempowered due to their smallholding, geographical 
distribution, commitment, the fact that they are operating in a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain, and the limited 
help they receive from the government. As well as this, we have also just argued that farmers are 
in ‘‘captive’’ relations with the ginners. In contrast, both FT chains introduce farmer cooperatives 
and a promoting body in the relationship between farmer and ginner. So, as we have explained 
in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, in Agrocel’s case, this is Agrocel Pure & Fair cotton grower 
association and Agrocel Industries. In Chetna, we have the Self-Help Groups (SHGs), which are 
legally grouped in Cooperatives and the board members from each of these cooperatives forms 
the board of Chetna Organic Farmers Association (COFA) and Chetna Organic Agricultural 
Producer Company Limited (COAPCL). To this end, interviewee 25 suggested that: 
‘‘The FT co-operative-farmer power imbalance is much better than the farmer-ginner 
imbalance’’, whilst adding that ‘‘Chetna is a true co-operative but Agrocel isn't’’. 
As discussed earlier during the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, this was explained through Chetna’s 
bottom-up sophisticated and multilayered approach, farmer ownership and developmental focus, 
as opposed to Agrocel’s top-down approach than maintains farmer dependency. 
Beyond this, interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-explained Chetna’s approach in more detail. Farmers 
who are members of COFA deliver cotton to ginners on a price that was agreed collectively by 
farmers through COFA. Then, COFA pays farmers the FT minimum price or the market price and 
distributes to cooperatives based on volumes.  
The sophistication of Chetna’s model in eliminating the farmer-ginner power imbalance goes 
beyond this, as the ginner is only subcontracted so Chetna maintains ownership and delivers 
lint to spinners who decide whether to purchase on FT terms on the basis of an order by a big 
brand. 
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On the other hand, as we have explained in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, farmers are more 
dependent on Agrocel’s model as they have only recently organised. So, whilst they make 
decisions around use of FT premium, they have less/no input on production and marketing since 
Agrocel does this for them. Also, interviewee 63-CEO of FT India-suggested that  
‘‘Despite Agrocel having their own ginning facility, ginners have more power over negotiation 
because they provide finance to farmers. Although FT tries to control and regulate this through 
certification, Agrocel and ginners fundamentally do not believe in truly empowering farmers’’. 
3. FT premium and profiteering – Empowering farmers is also particularly relevant when 
discussing the FT premium, as it facilitates and may in part finance empowerment projects and 
processes. As such, building on the systemic conception of world-systems, Gereffi’s (1994) and 
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs, along with FT’s decision to ‘‘go 
mainstream’’, we argue that despite the small absolute scale of the FT premiums across both FT 
GVCs, the process of the FT premium distribution is questionable regarding its monitoring and 
enforcement, whilst it has seriously been limited by the motivations and business imperatives of 
the participants. 
To this end, in contrast to the FT minimum price, which has been sidetracked on the basis of the 
MSP and often better market prices, numerous interviewees25 often cited FT premiums during our 
discussions around the implementation of the FT principles. The following numbers reflect the low 
2012 FT production and sales figures we referred to in in the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ power structure key 
theme. To this end, as per table 17 below, M&S purchases around 5,000-7,500 tonnes per year, 
whilst Fairtrade (2015) informed us that Agrocel’s members produced around 4,232 tonnes of 
seed cotton in 2012, of which 526 tonnes were sold in the Fairtrade market. Considering that the 
Fairtrade Premium stands at €0.05/kg, the total FT premium for 2012 paid to Agrocel was 
€26,300. According to our discussion with interviewee 6, we expect the bulk of it to be from M&S. 
On the same note, Chetna’s farmers produced 6,300 tonnes in 2012 and sold 800-1000 tonnes 
of Fairtrade organic per year. Although this may be attracting higher premium due to its organic 
nature, for comparison purposes we used the FT premium above at €0.05/kg, which gives us a 
total of €40,000-50,000 in 2012. Of this, we only expect an insignificant percentage to be attributed 
to No Nasties clients. Although we haven’t been able to obtain information on the exact volume 
that No Nasties purchases from Chetna in FT terms, this is expected to be insignificant compared 
                                                          
25 Interviewees 20, 21, 25, 51, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69 and 70. 
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to M&S given that only 20% of their range is organic FT and they are very small in the first place-
interviewee 66. 
Table 17: 2012 Total FT Premium per FT GVC 
FT GVC/ 
Dimension 
FT 
produced 
(tonnes) 
FT Sold 
(tonnes) 
FT Premium 
(€) 
FT % bought by 
end buyer 
Agrocel-M&S 4,232 526 26,300 Majority by M&S 
Chetna-No 
Nasties 
6,300 
800-1000 (FT & 
Organic) 
40,000-
50,000 
Minority by No 
Nasties 
Source: Author’s calculations from Fairtrade (2015) 
This is therefore in line with Le Mare (2008), Imhof and Lee (2007) who suggested in chapter 2 
that FT has improved the economic position of the FT producers. Nonetheless, beyond the 
absolute scale of the FT premium, there were concerns regarding the process of the FT premium 
payment to the farmers’ cooperative. On this note, interviewee 67 assured us that there are 
mechanisms to ensure that FT premium will be paid by spinners to farmers within 15 days. If not, 
they get a penalty and may get expelled from FT. In the meantime, FT is conducting audits every 
year to ensure this is taking place.  
Despite this, he confided that spinners are trying to capture part of the value of the FT premium 
by using exchange currency averages throughout the year to give less back to farmers. To 
counter this, FT has asked them to use the day of the purchase exchange rate. 
But, despite the mechanisms FT has in place to ensure that the premium will reach the farmers 
and to what extent they are enforceable, it is important to understand what contributes to the 
uncertainty around the distribution of the FT premium. Firstly, interviewee 15-sustainable 
materials specialist for a major retailer-stressed that the sheer size of organisations like M&S 
across products, geographies, in combination with their drive for profitability we mentioned earlier 
does not allow them to monitor the chain down to this level. This is also being discouraged by the 
chain itself which is incredibly complex, long and geographically dispersed-interviewees 10 and 
25. On the flip side, despite No Nasties’ small size and focused operational and geographical 
remit, interviewee 66-CEO of No Nasties-told us that they have to rely on FT since they do not 
have the capacity or resources themselves to monitor if the FT premium is reaching the farmers. 
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Secondly, the motivations, chain relations, nature and drive for profitability of participants are 
equally important. Interviewee 54, CEO of a cotton FTO, reminded us that ‘‘ginners and spinners 
are not part of the certification process, hence they treat it only as a commodity’’. Also, despite 
the fact that vertically integrated manufacturers are certified, interviewees 65-the managing 
director and senior vice president of marketing of a vertically integrated manufacturer-openly told 
us that: 
‘‘They do not monitor or know whether the ginner they bought FT cotton lint from will in turn 
pay the FT premium to the farmers’’. 
This not only demonstrates that the motivations of FT participants are important for the success 
of FT, but also showcases the lack of FT’s systemic approach (as provided by the GVC 
framework) manifested by the systemic nature of chain reactions caused by the drive for 
profitability. As interviewee 63-CEO of FT India-told us, 
‘‘Retailers/brands squeeze spinning mills/vertically integrated manufactures on price and 
consequently spinning mills try to squeeze ginners and farmers on price’’. 
Therefore, this is why they may not want to commit additional resources and spend money to 
monitor, or try to withhold part of the FT premium from farmers through illegitimate ways like the 
one we mentioned earlier. Also, as we said earlier, although they position themselves as 100% 
FT, the drive for profitability is also applicable in No Nasties. Interviewee 66-CEO of No Nasties-
told us that when they started, they were working closely with Chetna, but now they have 
expanded they are no longer able to do so, hence they rely on the vertically integrated 
manufacturer to work with them on the ground. 
Thirdly, the business imperative of profitability has also been manifested in the previous key 
theme when we discussed profitability through FT price compounding. To this end, FT’s 
mechanism itself was questioned by our interviewees for allowing this to take place. Although, 
Agrocel charges a premium of 5-7% to spinners on top of the cotton price and FT premium, 
interviewee 69-project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-admitted that profiteering on the 
back of the FT premium is not justifiable unless farmers could receive some of the proceeds. 
Therefore, he proposed that ‘‘the FT premium should come directly from the brand to FLO, who 
will then assess and distribute according to who provides what % of the value’’. 
4. Value Added/Upgrading – Beyond the scale and the process of the FT premium payment, 
what also matters is how this has been invested. We have earlier referred to upgrading in the 
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‘‘political crop’’ key theme, but also through No Nasties and M&S’s position within their FT chains 
beyond trading/processing in the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ power structure key theme. As we found in the 
previous chapter, through building on Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) ‘‘product, process or 
functional upgrading’’, here, we focus on value added below ginning at farmer and cooperative 
level. Whilst there is no upgrading in the conventional chain, Agrocel’s use of premium and notion 
of farmer empowerment could be characterised as process upgrading, driven more by the 
productivity-oriented use of premiums than the weak top-down farmer organisation. On the other 
hand, Chetna’s bottom-up approach, farmer ownership, genuine farmer empowerment in 
combination with the warehouse construction and the diversification project, have led to process 
and inter-chain functional upgrading.  
To illustrate, from the previous discussion in this key theme, it has been established that there is 
no value added and upgrading in the conventional chain at farming level, since the relationships 
have been at best characterised commoditised and transactional. On the other hand, for the FT 
GVCs, although we have already discussed the decision-making process manifested through the 
definition of empowerment practiced in each chain, FT Foundation’s (2015) website provides an 
extensive list of projects for each chain. For example, Agrocel FT premium has been 
predominantly used to fund the following: 
 Productivity related projects – Short-term loan scheme for farmers to finance 
agricultural improvements, rehabilitation of degraded farm land, drip irrigation and 
rainwater conservation. 
 Community projects – Solar street lamps in villages, community hall provision for 
meetings, relief fund to pay medical costs for farmers. 
 Training – Farmer education and training programs, technical assistance to create 
compost pits. 
On the other hand, Chetna have been using their premiums to fund the following: 
 Warehouse construction – At the co-operative level where cotton from the farmers is 
aggregated and stored in a safe manner until the low season, when cotton prices are 
higher. 
 Infrastructure diversification Projects – Intended to create viable income generating 
opportunities for the different co-ops, and to improve the productivity and the livelihoods 
of smallholder farmers. These projects include, among others, the construction of dhal 
mills and a bio-fertiliser unit. 
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 Input financing – Procurement of non-GM cotton seeds, which are often difficult or even 
impossible to find during the critical sowing season. 
Although, the above comprise just some examples of the projects that Agrocel and Chetna fund 
through FT premium, they are also indicative of the orientation of these organisations as well as 
the structural impact they have on farmers. From the discussion above, we can conclude that 
Agrocel projects are useful and essential from a productivity and community point of view, 
however they do not enable structural transformation of the farmers’ position and their consequent 
relations with value chain participants. This is in line with the argument we articulated earlier in 
the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme around the lack of genuine farmer empowerment in Agrocel-M&S’s 
FT chain. On the other hand, structural transformation and true farmer empowerment have been 
facilitated more through Chetna’s farmer ownership, empowerment and their income 
diversification projects away from just cotton, as well as through warehouse construction. The 
latter one would allow farmers to be in stronger position when taking their cotton to ginners and 
then the lint to spinners. At the same time, the previous one would allow more independence from 
the cotton chain and diversified income and livelihoods. 
5. ‘‘Captive’’ and ‘‘Relational’’ chain governance – Through using Gereffi et al.’s (2005) 
typology and on the basis of our interviews and BASIC’s (2014) report, we earlier suggested that 
the governance structure between cotton farmers and their buyers in the conventional chain is 
‘‘captive’’. This has been justified by the fact that ginners, agents, traders or spinners control the 
price paid, whilst it’s proven impractical for farmers to have more options other than selling directly 
to ginners. At the same time, they are dependent on the Government of India for the inputs at a 
subsidised rate.  
On the basis of our discussion later, we explained that the Chetna-No Nasties FT chain has 
changed this type of governance at farmer/farmer cooperative-ginner level to ‘‘relational’’. Whilst, 
BASIC (2014) confirmed that mutual accountability and personal ties are key elements in a 
relational structure, we have earlier demonstrated that Chetna went ‘‘beyond FT’’ by advancing 
bottom-up farmer organisation that allowed the farmer cooperative to lead negotiations and even 
maintain ownership of the cotton and lint through subcontracting the ginning process. This was 
further facilitated by the use of FT premium to build warehouses and diversify income, which led 
to the increase of farmer power and their upgrading. In this context, the previously transactional 
buyer-led relations have been transformed to personal ties and relations of mutual accountability. 
Interviewee 20-a research officer from IDS-explained the shift in governance on the fact that:  
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‘‘Chetna is a deviation, as they were an NGO and are more development oriented than the 
typical contract production organisations’’. 
On the other hand, the Agrocel-M&S FT chain governance remains ‘‘captive’’ at this level, since 
there is not true political empowerment, longevity of relationships and personal ties. As we also 
showed earlier, it’s still geared towards productivity whilst very little focus has been attributed to 
helping make farmers truly independent. To illustrate, in the ‘‘political crop’’ key theme, we 
mentioned that Agrocel in combination with contract production framework it operates within, 
deprives farmers of their choice, it’s top-down and it has failed-interviewee 63, 54, 20 and 48. 
However, we must acknowledge that the intensity of the ‘‘captive’’ structure is not as high as the 
one in the conventional chain, since farmers have been supported through the FT premium and 
through forming a co-operative. To this end, interviewee 62-the president and owner of a vertically 
integrated manufacturer told us that ‘‘contract farming has been less exploitative than what traders 
do with farmers in the conventional chain’’. 
In terms of the potential of both FT GVCs to scale up and shift the governance structure in the 
conventional chain, we argue this is unlikely on the basis of FT’s and Chetna’s limited scale we 
examined earlier, the existing market structure at trading and ginning level as set up by the Indian 
Government’s liberalisation of ginning and the role of agents and moneylenders. In Agrocel-
M&S’s case, this is also not possible given the contract production framework as well as the 
motivations and beliefs of participants, which do not facilitate farmers’ independence. For a 
summary of this discussion, see table 18 below. 
Table 18: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Farmer-Buyer level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional Captive-High 
 Farmers’ transactional dependency on buyers 
 Commoditised approach 
 Money-lenders and agents role 
FT Chetna-No 
Nasties 
Relational 
 Mutual dependence, accountability, personal ties 
 Farmer ownership, bottom-up approach 
 Sub-contracting ginning process whilst maintaining ownership 
 Income diversification 
FT Agrocel-
M&S 
Captive-Low 
 No true political empowerment, longevity of relationships and 
personal ties 
 Better than conventional chain’s relations through FT premium use 
and set up of cooperative 
Source: Author, BASIC (2014) and fieldwork 
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6.5.2 GINNER-SPINNER/VERTICALLY INTEGRATED MANUFACTURER RELATIONS  
This relationship reflects a typical ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain, with highly transactional relations and 
‘‘captive’’ governance structure, whereby spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers determine 
the price on the basis of supplier availability, quality parameters and their purchasing power. To 
this end, the pressure ginners receive is key to understand why they in turn squeeze farmers on 
price, as explained earlier. As such, FT’s sole focus on farming level highlighted its lack of the 
systemic understanding advanced by world-systems and the GVC approach. In this context, the 
Agrocel-M&S FT GVC overlaps at this level with the conventional chain and maintain the existing 
‘‘captive’’ governance structure, despite Agrocel having their own ginning facility. On the other 
hand, Chetna’s ownership of lint after ginning and their strong collaboration with RCML, who is a 
prolific Fairtrade buyer and also have a stake in Chetna, have shifted governance to ‘‘relational’’. 
To this end, interviewees 57-ginner and farmers in Nagpur, Maharashtra-and interviewee 58-
owner of a ginning company-explained that after the farming stage and the separation of cotton 
seeds from lint during the ginning process, ginners can sell to agents or spinners/vertically 
integrated manufacturers directly. Mirroring the transactional relations earlier, the interactions 
here are also typical of a highly commoditised market based on a ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain. Therefore, 
the buyer and the prevailing market prices at the time determine the price ginners will normally 
get. Also, quality requirements are set by the buyer and determine the price. We have earlier 
explained that quality depends on the time of the year and that the key five quality parameters 
spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers seek are: 1. Length, 2. Uniformity ratio, 3. Strength, 
4. Microfiness, 5. Trash. 
At this stage, it would be important to highlight the role of agents. Similarly to the farmer-ginner 
relationship earlier, interviewee 50-CEO of a major cotton seed trader-told us that often there are 
independent agents between spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers and ginners. Their role 
is quite significant according to interviewee 64-general manager of a vertically integrated 
manufacturer-who only uses agents to buy cotton. Once they give them specific quality 
requirements, agents send them samples, they test it and decide to buy or not based on quality 
but also on quotes from other agents. Interviewees 57 explained that agents capture value 
through striving for a lower purchase price form ginners than the one that the spinner/vertically 
integrated manufacturer is willing to pay. 
Similarly, according to interviewee 49-deputy general manager of the Cotton Corporation of India-
in the direct relations between ginners and spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers,  
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‘‘the spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers drive a race to the bottom by comparing 
quotes from different ginners and picking the lowest that gives them the quality they require’’. 
It is evident that power lies with the buyers for a variety of reasons. Since it’s a buyer market, the 
quality and price requirements are set by the buyers and spinners have greater power than 
ginners as they are united and have quite large requirements, so they buy from a number of 
ginners. On the other hand, the power of ginners can improve when the quality of lint is good and 
have more holding power but this would depend on their financial position and cash flow, which 
is usually not great as we have seen earlier due to their thin profit margins. Similarly, agents can 
command more power and better price if they have the quality they require-ibid.  
As such, on the basis of Gereffi et al. (2005) typology, since relations are transactional and ginners 
face only a few buyers whereas spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers have significantly 
more sources, the governance structure is ‘‘captive’’ in the conventional chain. In relation to FT, 
interviewee 67-FTI’s manager-suggested that Agrocel have their own ginning facility, but despite 
this, the Agrocel-M&S FT chain operate within the same ‘‘captive’’ set of relationships and 
governance structure that are prevalent in the conventional chain. To this end, interviewee 51-
project manager from the Agrocel-M&S GVC-suggested that although FT raised awareness with 
some spinners, it’s been extremely difficult to deal with most of them as they drive a race to the 
bottom to ensure their profitability.  
On the other hand, interviewee 67 advanced that Chetna has maintained ownership of the lint 
since they have only subcontracted ginning. Following this, Chetna’s manager informed us that 
they sell lint to Rajlakshmi Cotton Mills Private Limited (RCML), who have been a prolific Organic 
& Fairtrade cotton lint buyer from Chetna Organic, whilst holding a 10% stake in Chetna Organic. 
This relationship is highly collaborative as they support Chetna Organic in lots of development 
activities like donating sewing machines, funds for research activities in agricultural lands 
(Lahankar 2014). Besides RCML, interviewee 66-CEO of No Nasties-suggested they also work 
with Armstrong Knitting Mills and other smaller factories, which may limit the effect of the 
relationship with RCML. On the basis of the relationship with RCML though, which clearly goes 
‘‘beyond FT’’ standards, the Chetna-No Nasties FT chain has changed the ‘‘captive’’ governance 
to ‘‘relational’’ (see table 19).  
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Table 19: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Ginner-Spinner/Vertically 
integrated manufacturer level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Agrocel-M&S 
FT GVCs 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Captive-High 
 Highly transactional underpinned by ‘‘buyer-driven’’ 
chain, whereby buyers determine price on the basis of 
supplier availability, quality parameters and their 
purchasing power 
Chetna-No 
Nasties FT GVC 
Relational-Medium 
 Collaborative relationship, based on personal ties, 
ownership in Chetna organic and development 
activities. 
 Intensity limited to medium, since No Nasties also 
procure from others beyond RCML 
Source: Author 
6.5.3 VERTICALLY INTEGRATED MANUFACTURER-RETAILER/BRAND RELATIONS 
This relationship is based on a number of criteria including price, quality, product innovation, 
service, timely delivery and good relationships. Although this, in combination with an equal 
number of options for both sides, resemble ‘‘relational’’ governance, retailers/brands’ emphasis 
on price, indicates a ‘‘modular’’ governance structure. Similarly to the previous section, FT’s focus 
on farming only highlighted the lack of systemic understanding advanced by world-systems and 
the GVC approach. As such, although FT through the Agrocel-M&S FT GVC has allowed further 
engagement with manufacturers beyond price, the ‘‘modular’’ structure remains intact, since 
business imperatives prevail. At the same time, No Nasties small scale and RCML’s marketing 
support has not affected any change as well. 
During the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ key theme earlier, we have highlighted that retailers/brands in the UK 
exercise their power on vertically integrated manufacturers in India directly or via an agent through 
the articulation of a set of quality parameters. These usually include blend of cotton and polyester, 
technical parameters in relation to variation of diameter, strength and twist, and colour. Beyond 
quality, interviewee 6-sustainable materials specialist for a major retailer-explained that they pick 
suppliers and relate to them also on the basis of product innovation, low cost, good service, on 
time delivery and good relationships. 
Nonetheless, interviewee 21-head of business development for a vertically integrated 
manufacturer-emphasised that ‘‘most retailers/brands pay excessive attention on price and they 
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end up relating to them exclusively on this basis’’. On this note, interviewee 54-CEO of a cotton 
FTO-told us that department stores and big brands relate differently to their suppliers.  
‘‘Department stores like M&S put more pressure on price and time whilst having less 
involvement in the chain compared to big brands’’. 
Also, interviewee 13, an independent FT consultant, reminded us that the power of 
retailers/brands in garments is diffused as there are many of them and there is little concentration, 
unlike the chocolate chain. Similarly, there are many vertically integrated manufacturers. So, 
although the last remark could lead us to believe there is a balance of power and ‘‘relational’’ 
governance according to Gereffi et al. (2005) typology, if we consider our previous analysis 
regarding positioning closer to demand and the quality requirements above, we can conclude that 
retailers/brands have the edge over the manufacturers in a ‘‘modular’’ governance structure. 
However, when considering the Agrocel-M&S FT chain, we earlier mentioned in the ‘‘political 
crop’’ key theme that M&S is maintaining a process quality dimension on top of the product quality 
dimension. Although, this process quality dimension goes ‘‘beyond FT’’ as part of their 
overarching sustainability strategy in Plan A, it has facilitated further engagement with the 
manufacturers in topics beyond price. This has been further supported by the manufacturer who 
works with M&S. To this end, interviewee 21 told us that they work in partnership with them, 
especially in relation to new products. Despite this, interviewee 54 cautioned that: 
‘‘M&S is a department store who are not very ethical although they portray themselves to be 
ethical’’. 
He further explained what we have already described in our sustainability key theme, that their 
Plan A is underpinned by profit considerations. In Chetna-No Nasties GVC, Chetna’s manager 
told us that RCML have been instrumental in helping Chetna Organic to make a brand of its own 
within the international cotton buyers and they have been supportive in the marketing side 
(Lahankar 2014). However, interviewee 63-CEO of FT India-told us that: 
‘‘No Nasties size was prohibitive for a shift in relationships and changing the buying behaviour 
of retailers/brands and their focus on price’’. As such, relations remain ‘‘modular’’ (see table 20). 
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Table 20: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Vertically integrated manufacturer-
Retailer/Brand level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Both FT GVCs 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Modular-Moderate 
 Strong collaboration and mutual dependence based 
on price, quality, service, product development 
 Quality requirements, proximity to consumer demand 
and price-focused 
Source: Author 
6.5.4 RETAILERS/BRANDS-CONSUMER RELATIONS 
Similarly to the previous chapter, despite the introduction of FT premium priced garments by 
retailers in order to address the demand of their socially/ethically aware consumers, price 
remained the main driver in retailers and consumers purchasing decisions. On the basis of the 
price prominence, the governance structure in the conventional chain is based on ‘‘market’’ 
relations. To this end, FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ through conventional distribution 
channels meant that relations would remain the same, mirroring those in the conventional chain. 
To illustrate, in the previous chapter, Smith (2008) explained that supermarkets in the 
conventional chain are increasingly holding tough negotiations on price and pursue strategies like 
open book accounting which enables them to pressure for price cuts. As such, the prominence of 
price has demonstrated ‘‘market’’ relations, as per Gereffi et al. (2005) typology. In relation to FT, 
interviewee 6 suggested that retailers market FT garments because of the ‘‘good story’’ that 
accompanies FT and the customer recognition of its label. On this note, interviewee 10-senior 
manager in FT Foundation-stressed that ‘‘FT has influenced value chains at the customer level’’. 
More specifically, FT has raised consumer awareness through No Nasties t-shirts and M&S’s 
range of garments regarding cotton farmers’ situation in India. This consumer awareness was 
meant to fund farmers so that they can apply pressure upwards the chain trough having more 
meaningful discussion and forming better contracts with the buyers of their produce. 
Nonetheless, on the back of the analysis in the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ power structure key theme, we 
have also showed the significant drop in FT sales whilst quantifying the mark-ups consumers 
have been asked to pay for FT garments, as a result of the profiteering in the middle of the chain 
as well as consumers’ preparedness to pay higher price for ethical products. In this context, price 
remained the most prominent criterion in purchasing decisions according to interviewee 6, who 
argued that ‘‘M&S don't believe they should be charging their customers a premium for products 
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especially in the current recession environment’’. Since price has been suggested as the driving 
force despite the introduction of FT in M&S or No Nasties products, the governance structure has 
remained the same mirroring the ‘‘market’’ relations of a conventional chain. As mentioned 
previously, although FT has been useful in raising awareness, its decision to rely on conventional 
distribution channels like retailers and supermarkets could not effect change in the existing 
governance structure. This discussion is summarised in table 21 below. 
Table 21: Conventional vs. FT GVC Governance types, Retailers/Brands-Consumer level 
GVC 
Governance 
Structure/ 
Intensity 
Rationale 
Conventional 
(Both FT GVCs 
overlapping with 
conventional) 
Market-High 
 Price drives retailers and consumer decision over FT 
‘‘good story’’ 
 
Source: Author 
6.5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The argument in this key theme was built on Gereffi et al. (2005) and Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark’s (2011) ‘‘governance as coordination’’. As mentioned in the previous chapter, due to FT’s 
sole focus on the consumer and farmers ends of the chain, our analysis highlighted FT’s lack of 
appreciation in relation to the way the international trading system works through the systemic 
approach of world systems and GVCs, which put power relations in the centre. To this end, 
existing governance structures-underpinned by their ‘‘buyer-driven’’ nature-in a node of the chain 
often drive impact further down the chain, driven by the most powerful organisations, like 
retailers/brands and the spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers. 
This was demonstrated by the fact that both FT chains failed in shifting the relations and 
governance structure in all but the farming and ginner-spinner/vertically integrated manufacturer 
nodes of the GVC. But even when this was achieved only in the Chetna-No Nasties FT GVC, the 
potential to affect change in the conventional chain at scale for all cotton farmers was deemed 
unrealistic due to their limited scale, but also due to the existing market structure at trading and 
ginning level as set up by the Indian Government’s liberalisation of ginning, the role of agents and 
moneylenders. Whilst this illustrates Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) and Wallerstein’s (1995) 
reference to the State’s vital role, it also highlights the importance of Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark’s (2011) reference to understanding the context that GVCs operate within, which we have 
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developed in detail during chapter 2. This way, FT did not take into account the impact that 
existing relations and governance structures across the chain have down the chain at farming 
level. 
But, in order to summarise in a systematic manner, at farmer-buyer level, the conventional 
governance structure is ‘‘captive’’ on the basis of the transactional dependency of farmers on 
buyers and money-lenders, which has been driven to a great extent by the context and the ‘‘buyer-
driven’’ nature of the chain. Nonetheless, this has shifted in Chetna-No Nasties’ FT GVC to 
‘‘relational’’ as a result of Chetna going beyond the FT standards, which led to mutual dependence 
through farmer ownership, bottom-up approach, income diversification and sub-contracting the 
ginning process. The Agrocel-M&S FT GVC remained ‘‘captive’’, due to the lack of true political 
empowerment as a result of the contract production framework as well as the motivations and 
beliefs of participants. Despite this, the intensity of the ‘‘captive’’ governance structure was less 
than the one in the conventional chain due to the set-up of the cooperative and the FT premium 
use. 
At ginner-spinner/vertically integrated manufacturer level, the highly intensive ‘‘captive’’ 
governance exercised by the spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers is based on the highly 
transactional manner underpinned by the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain, whereby buyers determine price 
on the basis of supplier availability, quality parameters and their purchasing power. Although, 
‘‘captive’’ relations remained intact in Agrocel-M&S’s chain, the Chetna-No Nasties GVC have 
shifted to ‘‘relational’’ on the basis of the strong collaborative relationship with RCML who also 
own Chetna’s 10%. On the other hand, at vertically integrated manufacturer-retailer/brand level, 
the relations remain ‘‘modular’’ across conventional and FT chains, despite strong collaboration 
beyond price, to service, product development and sustainability qualities. This is because of 
M&S’s profit-driven Plan-A, quality requirements and proximity to consumer demand, in parallel 
to No Nasties lack of scale. Lastly, at retailers/brands-consumer level, despite the introduction of 
FT garments, price remained the main driver in retailers and consumer purchasing decisions, 
which in essence is translated in a ‘‘market’’ governance structure. This has been inevitable given 
FT’s strategic decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ through conventional distribution channels. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to understand the extent that Fairtrade may lead to a systemic shift in the way 
power relations are embedded and exercised in the international trading system. To this end, this 
chapter provides a closing discussion based on the literature review, analytical framework, 
methodology and empirical analysis. The first part uses the fieldwork findings to answer the four 
main research questions: 
1. How does Fairtrade’s ‘’mainstreaming’’ relate to TNCs corporate sustainability and what 
are the implications for Fairtrade International’s organisational sustainability? 
2. How does Fairtrade shift the power held by nation states over the lives of farmers?  
3. How does Fairtrade address the power mechanisms that lead TNCs utilise in ‘‘buyer-
driven’’ GVCs? 
4. To what extent and in what way has Fairtrade changed the nature of governance 
relationships between GVC nodes? 
The second part aims to pull the research questions together and summarise the thesis and our 
argument in a concise manner. Following this, we highlight the significance of these findings for 
the disciplines of international development, international trade, political science and agricultural 
economics. In doing so, we outline the strengths and limitations of our analytical framework and 
provide recommendations for further research. 
7.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
7.1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
The first question aimed to understand the relationship between FT’s decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ 
and TNCs corporate sustainability agenda, and, secondly, what have the implications of this 
relationship been for FTI’s organisational sustainability. Our literature review indicated the conflict 
between fair trade’s vision of modifying the existing international trading system and FT’s 
‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach. This has been explained by Renard (2003) who argued that TNCs do 
not adhere to the ideological principles of FT, which means that power relations at the heart of 
the network do not change. In parallel, Fridell (2003) argued that the challenge which FT poses 
to the global capitalist market is ultimately restricted by its involvement in it. As such, the 
dominance of the agents, mechanism, and structures of global capitalism remain unaltered and, 
in many ways, unquestioned. This has been manifested by the participation of TNCs in FT through 
their corporate sustainability programs that represent only a minor quantitative commitment, whilst 
they are simultaneously making huge profits in the conventional market. This has highlighted the 
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main issue for FTI’s organisational sustainability, which hinges on the fact that the relatively minor 
commitment of these TNCs is a major one for FT. Consequently, this gives TNCs great influence 
on the future direction and sustainability of Fairtrade. 
In line with the literature review, our empirical analysis showed that chocolate TNCs like Mondelez 
adopted FT as an add-on, compliance-driven certification to an existing business agenda, driven 
by profit, brand reputation, differentiation, addressing customer trends and especially security of 
cocoa bean supply considerations. But, since FT’s focus is on democratic organisation and not 
on productivity or security of supply, it hasn’t been useful in helping big chocolate brands with 
their security of supply from Ghana. Therefore, they decided to take the matter into their own 
hands and invest in sustainability programmes. As a result, FT was undermined by a plethora of 
sustainability programmes on the ground, like Cocoa Life. Similarly, garment retailers in the UK, 
like M&S, introduced FT as an add-on certification in order to entice a segment of ‘‘ethical’’ 
shoppers to buy their garments. Following this, FT was further demoted as part of M&S’s 
corporate sustainability agenda, Plan A. We argued that Plan A is profit-driven by nature as it was 
underpinned by M&S’s considerations about brand reputation, a range of commercial criteria and 
sustainability, of which FT was only a small part of. 
Fairtrade’s sustainability as an initiative, the organisational sustainability of FTI and other 
Fairtrade organisations have been challenged, as a result of FT being undermined. To this end, 
FT’s approach and cost came under scrutiny. To this end, FTI’s top-down and ‘‘one size fits all’’ 
approach was challenged across our cases for its failure to take into account the context within it 
operates. For example, FT principles have been deemed limited in the multidimensional Indian 
cotton production context with sustainability of production concerns, cotton farmers’ suicides, 
ginners squeezing farmers on price, adverse weather that affects the crop, low productivity cotton 
farming areas, input prices and farmer indebtedness. Lastly, we have demonstrated that FT 
certification is expensive for farmers, particularly by providing cost advantage and access to big 
producer organisations as opposed to small ones. 
In response to FT’s undermining and critique, FTI have reviewed their business model and 
decided to move beyond certification and donations to a self-sustaining organisation based on 
licensee fees. This was further pronounced by the development of a more flexible model for 
garment retailers that would enable them to buy more FT cotton volume, albeit with a slightly 
different FT label, which however led to the compromise of the traceability principle and the 
alienation of FTOs. This also took place in cocoa, resulting in FTOs severely criticising FTI for 
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compromising FT principles in favor of increased sales. To this end, FTI’s new business model  
not only mirrored the move of TNCs to go beyond certification and towards corporate 
sustainability, but also FTI’s conscious strategy to ‘‘go mainstream’’ and consequently having to 
survive in a competitive market as a mainstream organisation. But, having to rely on TNCs, who 
buy on the basis of price and ease of implementation, for its organisational and financial viability 
meant that FT not only had to compromise some of its principles, but also to compete with other 
certifications, like UTZ and BCI who they were losing significant market share to. 
7.1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
The second question aimed to understand to what extent and how Fairtrade shifts the power 
exercised by states over the lives of their cocoa and cotton farmers. In our theory, Wallerstein 
(1995) argued that nation states comprise one of the institutional structures and arrangements 
that have allowed and defended capital accumulation. But, beyond the ‘‘power-over’’ and top-
down approach to power, we have also demonstrated through our feminist power analyses that 
there is a bottom-up conception of power seen as empowerment. In this, we argued the need to 
explore power emerging from the margins of society or through cooperation between the 
dominated (Temperley, 2013). In this context, we have referred to FT’s farmer organisation 
principle whilst in parallel, we have illustrated FT’s attempt to reforming the existing trading system 
on the basis of voluntary commitments from TNCs and consumers, away from international 
market regulation with the nation state as a primary agent in development (Fridell, 2006).  
In light of this, our empirical analysis illustrated that FT has been unable to shift the significant 
power exercised by the Cocobod at multiple levels, including financing of cocoa purchases, 
external marketing of cocoa beans, quality control and pricing. As such, across these levels, FT 
was deemed irrelevant due to the strong role of the state in a partially liberalised market structure 
and the scale of the undertaking. In this context, both FT GVCs have no option but to comply and 
work within these parameters, which effectively means that the FT and conventional GVCs 
overlap at financing, external marketing, quality and pricing level. Although FT could potentially 
provide a complimentary role in quality control through traceability, this was abandoned in 
commercial FT GVCs, like Cocoa Life-Mondelez, in what clearly reflected the dilution of FT 
principles because of FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. At pricing level, the FT minimum price has been 
consistently below the price set by the producer (price) review committee that applies to all 
Ghanaian cocoa farmers. Similarly, Fairtrade has not been successful in shifting the Indian 
Government’s power, although their power has been exercised at pricing and input subsidy level 
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only. To this end, the FT minimum price was deemed irrelevant as market prices and the 
Government’s MSP have been consistently higher.  
In similar fashion, we further argued that FT’s role continued to go unnoticed as we analysed the 
importance of cocoa as a foreign exchange earner for the Ghanaian economy in the context of a 
constantly depreciating cedi and consistent underinvestment in infrastructure that adversely 
affects the lives of farmers. In relation to infrastructure, the role of FT at macro-level has been 
undermined due to the scale of requirement and that it was out of scope. But, at micro-level it 
should be noted that despite some of the FT premium been invested in health services and 
education, the investments did not reach the whole Kuapa Kokoo membership. On the other hand, 
in Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC, the FT premium has been directed exclusively to farm improvement 
and not broader infrastructure investment. In relation to value add in Ghana, FT has also been 
marginalised especially in relation to tariff escalation and direct investment from foreign 
governments. And, despite the potential to fill the gap regarding in country value-added 
processing of cocoa beans, FT’s orientation towards exporting raw cocoa beans further 
exacerbated the existing primary product export tendency, contrary to this been acknowledged 
as a shortcoming by the Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s GVC.  
Similarly, in relation to cotton, FT’s power has been irrelevant in face of the dominance of 
developed countries subsidies that have contributed to an uneven playing field for farmers in 
developing countries, whilst some have attributed its lack of success to the subsidies in India. 
And, despite the prominence and power of the organised value add-spinning/manufacturing 
sector in India, which has been facilitated by the value-add policies of the Indian government, 
FT’s limitations were highlighted arising from the lack of any FT standards related to value-add.  
But, despite FT’s shortcomings, FT has to a certain extent initiated true qualitative differences in 
farmer organisation and empowerment. We have to note though that these differences cannot be 
fully attributed to FTI, but also to Kuapa Kokoo and Cocoa Life who often went ‘‘beyond FT’’, 
through forward integration, farmer ownership (Kuapa) and some diversification (Cocoa Life). So, 
whilst Ghanaian cocoa farmers in the conventional chain are powerless in a context underpinned 
by a paternalistic and highly politicised approach, FT farmers in the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC 
are better off through farmer ownership, a bottom-up approach, forward integration, close 
relationships and women empowerment underpinned by strong democratic processes and 
governance. In Cocoa Life-Mondelez’s chain, on the other hand, despite the formal democratic 
procedures and decentralised approach to FT premiums, farmer empowerment has been top-
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down, excluded farmer ownership and was driven by security of supply considerations. Despite 
the differences in relation to empowerment between the two FT cocoa-chocolate chains, the 
extent of farmer empowerment has been limited due to FT’s overall scale (11% of the Ghanaian 
cocoa farming population), the historical mistrust of cooperatives in Ghana, the infrastructural 
challenges, gender norms, the profit-driven motives of TNCs that consider democratic processes 
costly, and the size as well as the motivations of the cooperatives. 
Similarly, in the cotton-garment FT GVCs, farmer empowerment and organisation were also 
manifested in different ways in the two FT GVCs and treated with more caution compared to the 
cocoa-chocolate GVCs due to contract production. To this end, the Chetna Organic-No Nasties 
GVC, also through going ‘’beyond FT’’, has demonstrated great practice in terms of farmer 
organisation and empowerment, as demonstrated by farmer ownership, technical capability, 
democratic governance, bottom-up approach and women empowerment. This has ultimately 
resulted in COFA’s evolution into an autonomous SPO. In contrast, Agrocel have received 
extensive criticism in relation to their impact on genuine farmer empowerment, due to the lack of 
full representation, capacity to represent farmers, limited women empowerment and minimal input 
on production and marketing decisions, because of their reliance on Agrocel Industries-the 
promoting body. This has been ‘‘nurtured’’ by the contract production framework itself as well as 
Agrocel’s profit orientation. But, despite the differences between the two FT GVCs, the common 
limitations include limited financing and scale, which reaches less than 0.5% of the overall cotton 
farming population in India. 
7.1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION THREE 
The third question aimed to assess the way that Fairtrade addresses the power mechanisms that 
lead TNCs utilise in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs. Our literature review showed that cocoa and cotton are 
‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs driven by international traders/processors, chocolate brands and vertically 
integrated manufacturers, retailers/brands respectively. As such, they dictate the way chains 
operate by requiring suppliers to meet certain standards and protocols (Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark, 2011). In essence, Gereffi (1994) argued that the main job of these powerful TNCs is to 
manage the chain and integrate the various pieces of business. In this background, we showed 
that Fairtrade has chosen to ‘‘go mainstream’’ and work with lead brands and retailers. 
In this context, our empirical analysis demonstrated that consumer demand and positioning are 
significant power dynamics. On this note, FTI rely on the FT mark in order to stimulate customer 
recognition and demand which will be ultimately translated into sales. Whilst this has been 
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successful in terms of FT chocolate sales, it has yielded poor sales for FT garments. In order to 
resolve this and in line with their ‘‘mainstreaming’’ approach, FTI have launched the Fairtrade 
Cotton Programme label, but the extent to which this will substantially change customers’ 
understanding between the two labels is questionable. But, despite the increased FT chocolate 
sales and potential to increase FT garment sales through the launch of the Fairtrade Cotton 
Programme, the absolute level of demand for FT products is still very low, since at cooperative 
level, Kuapa Kokoo sold only 50% of their annual production in FT terms in 2012/13, whilst 
Mondelez only bought 7% in Cocoa Life’s case. Similarly, Agrocel and Chetna only sold 12.4% 
and 12.6% of its cotton production in FT and FT & Organic terms respectively in 2012. Whilst this 
discussion highlights the niche character of FT that relies on unpredictable buyer demand and 
lack of sustainable buyer commitment, the qualitative effect down the FT GVCs through the 
implementation of associated standards hasn’t allowed for proper power redistribution on the 
TNC-driven FT GVCs. This is because despite the FT label and associated standards, Mondelez 
have shaped and managed Cocoa Life and their chain in a top-down manner to ensure security 
of supply, whilst M&S have done the same without the need to go past the vertically integrated 
manufacturers who maintain control down the chain.  
Beyond demand, the purchasing power of lead buyers is also key in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chains. As 
such, the volumes of FT purchased are too small to significantly impact the purchasing power of 
large TNCs, as highlighted by FT being only 4% of Mondelez’s and 2.5-3.75% of M&S’s overall 
purchasing volume. At the same time, the uneven playing field between these TNCs and Divine 
and No Nasties is highlighted by the fact that Divine has only 0.18% of Mondelez’s purchasing 
power whilst No Nasties is too insignificant to even compare. But, beyond the absolute scale of 
purchasing power, FTI have not been successful in convincing M&S or Mondelez to commit long 
term to FT, as they have been leveraging their purchasing power resulting in non-committal 
sustainable purchases of FT. Furthermore, the niche potential of FT was mirrored further down 
the cocoa chain when it became apparent that the limited capacity of farmers’ cooperatives as 
well as Divine’s limited purchasing power means that brands/big manufacturers can only buy at 
scale from someone who is equivalent to their size, like the international traders/processors. At 
garment manufacturing level, whilst FT has raised awareness at spinner and vertically integrated 
manufacturer level, they haven’t shifted their business practices and power exercised through 
their purchasing power and organisation.  
Adding value to cocoa through processing, marketing and branding has been also a key power 
mechanism. This was underpinned by the outsourcing of processing in both FT cocoa-chocolate 
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GVCs and the realisation that Mondelez have overlapping FT and conventional chains at 
processing and marketing/branding level. The outsourcing trend was mirrored by international 
traders’ vertical integration backwards and forward which led to oligopsonistic market structures. 
In this context, FT hasn’t been important in influencing traders’ power due to its focus on consumer 
level and alignment with brands. Similarly, in cotton-garment GVCs, retailers/brands and vertically 
integrated manufacturers have more power than farmers as a result of adding value to cotton 
through ginning, spinning, knitting, dyeing and finishing, garment stitching and retailing. Since 
retailing can provide 30 times greater value add than the second best most value-add activity, 
both M&S and No Nasties focused there. In this sense, both FT chains overlap with the 
conventional one at manufacturing level, but No Nasties is less powerful and consequently 
impactful than M&S compared to the garment manufacturer, due to their limited size. And, whilst 
M&S’s FT chain also overlaps with its conventional at retail level, both FT GVCs impact on the 
overall value added at retail and manufacturing level is marginal given the low FT volumes 
purchased. 
Quality is also an important power mechanism in cotton-garment GVCs as it often determines 
demand and the price. As such, retailers/brands exercise their power on the vertically integrated 
manufacturers on the basis of their quality specifications, whilst the vertically integrated 
manufacturers do the same to ginners. In this context, FT doesn’t play a role in product quality or 
process quality as they have abandoned the FT traceability principle through the Fairtrade Cotton 
Programme in order to increase FT cotton sales. Whilst this has not been successful enough to 
entice greater volumes from big retailers like M&S, FT’s process quality element (traceability) was 
replaced by M&S Plan A’s sustainability strategy. Whilst the abandonment of traceability is also 
related to profitability, the argument on the profitability of lead buyers builds on the basis of FT’s 
decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ and work with TNCs. As a result, vertically integrated manufacturers 
and brands/retailers in cotton-garment GVCs have used FT as a mechanism to increase their 
profits through huge price mark-ups. In this context, FT have no control whatsoever over 
commercial decisions of the participating companies, who only participate in FT on the basis of 
their ability to make money. Whilst this is the case for conventional TNCs participating in FT, the 
Chetna-No Nasties GVC is nowhere near gaining market share from retailers like M&S or shifting 
the power balance, because of their size.  
In a similar vein, strategies like vertical integration were ultimately driven by TNCs profitability 
goals in the cocoa-chocolate GVCs. On this note and on the back of FTI’s licensee-based 
business model, chocolate brands have also been using their purchasing power to lobby FTI for 
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changes to its principles and standards around the FT minimum price, traceability and sourcing 
of other ingredients on a non-FT basis in order to suit their profitability objectives. So, whilst 
chocolate brands have successfully lobbied FTI to loosen its FT principles and FTI earned more 
licensee fees, Divine have been delivering profits proportional to their small scale and in line with 
their focus to go ‘‘beyond FT’’. Beyond lobbying FTI in order to effectively reduce their cost base 
and increase their profits, lead buyers have also been consolidating in an effort to maximize 
profitability through leveraging branding, marketing budgets and optimising costs through greater 
scale. These elements, in combination with the consequent oligopsonistic market structures that 
arise, comprise significant power mechanisms that justify the limitations Divine is facing in order 
to scale up and compete with the lead TNCs.  
But, whilst all the previously mentioned power mechanisms are important, they often are 
exercised by lead TNCs in isolation. To compliment them, lead buyers involved in the cocoa-
chocolate GVCs also advance their security of supply considerations in an organised manner 
under international organisations, like WCF. In this context, FT’s role has been marginal since it 
doesn’t focus on productivity. 
7.1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR 
The fourth question aimed to understand to what extent Fairtrade might have changed the nature 
of governance relationships between GVC nodes. To this end, the analysis was based on Gereffi 
et al. (2005) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark’s (2011) ‘‘governance as coordination’’ and Gereffi 
et al. (2005) typology of governance structures, namely; markets, modular, relational, captive, 
and hierarchy. Importantly, due to FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and sole focus on the consumer and 
farmer ends of the chain, this analysis highlighted FT’s lack of appreciation in relation to the way 
the international trading system works through the systemic approach of world systems and 
GVCs, which put power relations in the centre of the analysis whilst highlighting the States’ vital 
role and the context that GVCs operate within. To this end, existing governance structures-
underpinned by their ‘‘buyer-driven’’ nature-in a node of the chain often drive impact further down 
the chain, especially when driven by the most powerful institutions, like Cocobod, the international 
traders/processors or brands in cocoa-chocolate GVCs and retailers/brands and the 
spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers in cotton-garment GVCs.  
In cocoa-chocolate GVCs, this was illustrated by the fact that both FT GVCs failed to change the 
governance structure in all but one of the nodes of the GVC. But even when this was achieved at 
farmer-LBC level in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s FT GVC, the potential to affect change in the 
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conventional chain at scale for all Ghanaian farmers was deemed unrealistic due to Divine’s 
limited scale, but also due to the existing market structure at LBC level set up by Cocobod. This 
way, FT do not take into account the impact that existing governance structures in the middle of 
the chain driven by Cocobod have down the chain at farming level. 
At farmer-LBC level, the conventional governance structure is ‘’captive’’ on the basis of the 
transactional dependency of farmers on LBCs, which has been driven to a great extent by 
Cocobod’s market structure. This has however shifted in Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s FT GVC to 
‘‘relational’’ due to going ‘’beyond FT’’, that resulted in mutual dependence, elimination of 
purchasing clerk-farmer mistrust issue, accountability and bottom-up empowerment. The Cocoa 
Life-Mondelez FT GVC remained ‘‘captive’’, due to the lack of true political empowerment as a 
result of the organisational goal to secure supply in a top-down manner. Despite this, the intensity 
of the ‘‘captive’’ governance structure was less than the one in the conventional chain due to fact 
that farmers have been receiving more training, advice and support towards diversification. 
At LBC-Cocobod level, the highly intensive ‘‘captive’’ governance exercised by Cocobod 
remained intact, since the highly risky environment LBCs operate is the market structure that both 
FT GVCs are subject to. Similarly, FT is subject to the ‘‘relational’’ governance structure prevalent 
in the conventional chain at Cocobod-International Traders/Processors level. At international 
Traders/Processors-Manufacturing Brands level, since FT is treated as yet ‘‘another product in 
the shop’’ for Mondelez, the Cocoa Life-Mondelez FT GVC overlaps with Mondelez’s conventional 
chain resulting in the maintenance of the ‘‘modular’’ governance structure. This is also the case 
for Kuapa Kokoo-Divine’s FT GVC, but at lower intensity given Divine’s significantly smaller scale 
compared to Mondelez and the international traders/processors. Lastly, at Manufacturing Brands 
& Retailers-Consumer level, despite the introduction of FT branded chocolate products by 
supermarkets, price remained as the main driver in retailers and consumers purchasing decisions, 
which in essence is translated in a ‘‘market’’ governance structure. This has been inevitable given 
FT’s strategic decision to ‘’go mainstream’’ through conventional distribution channels. 
In cotton-garment GVCs, both FT chains failed to shift the relations and governance structure in 
all but the farming and ginner-spinner/vertically integrated manufacturer node of the GVC. But 
even when this was achieved only in the Chetna-No Nasties FT GVC, the potential to affect 
change in the conventional chain at scale for all cotton farmers was deemed unrealistic due to 
their limited scale, but also due to the existing market structure at trading and ginning level as set 
up by the Indian Government’s liberalisation of ginning, the role of agents and moneylenders. 
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At farmer-buyer level, the conventional governance structure is ‘‘captive’’ on the basis of the 
transactional dependency of farmers on buyers and money-lenders, which has been driven to a 
great extent by the context and the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ nature of the chain. Nonetheless, this has 
shifted in Chetna-No Nasties’ FT GVC to ‘‘relational’’ as a result of Chetna ‘‘going beyond the FT 
standards’’, which led to mutual dependence through farmer ownership, bottom-up approach, 
income diversification and sub-contracting the ginning process. The Agrocel-M&S FT GVC 
remained ‘‘captive’’, due to the lack of true political empowerment as a result of the contract 
production framework as well as the motivations and beliefs of participants. Despite this, the 
intensity of the ‘‘captive’’ governance structure was less than the one in the conventional chain 
due to the set-up of the cooperative and the FT premium use. 
At ginner-spinner/vertically integrated manufacturer level, the highly intensive ‘‘captive’’ 
governance exercised by the spinners/vertically integrated manufacturers is based on the highly 
transactional manner underpinned by the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ chain, whereby buyers determine price 
on the basis of supplier availability, quality parameters and their purchasing power. Although, 
‘‘captive’’ relations remained intact in Agrocel-M&S’s chain, the Chetna-No Nasties GVC have 
shifted to ‘‘relational’’ on the basis of the strong collaborative relationship with RCML who also 
own Chetna’s 10%. On the other hand, at vertically integrated manufacturer-retailer/brand level, 
the relations remain ‘‘modular’’ across conventional and FT chains, despite strong collaboration 
beyond price, to service, product development and sustainability qualities. This is because of 
M&S’s profit-driven Plan-A, quality requirements and proximity to consumer demand, in parallel 
to No Nasties lack of scale. Lastly, at retailers/brands-consumer level, despite the introduction of 
FT garments, price remained the main driver in retailers and consumers purchasing decisions, 
which in essence is translated in a ‘‘market’’ governance structure. This has been inevitable given 
FT’s strategic decision to ‘‘go mainstream’’ through conventional distribution channels. 
7.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Having answered each of our research questions independently, this section aims to summarise 
the thesis in a holistic manner and highlight our arguments. As such, we started off with the world-
systems theory that explains the structure of the international trading system through a top-down 
global perspective of power relations. To this end, we argued that in order to understand existing 
power imbalances, we must first understand the agents (nation state, TNCs) and mechanisms 
(production networks, unequal exchange) through which the world system’s primary drive of 
capital accumulation is achieved.  
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In this context, fair trade initially aimed to develop alternatives to the existing system and aspired 
to be free from the pressures imposed by profit-driven transnationals through international market 
regulation and the maintenance of the nation state as a primary agent in development. 
Nonetheless, its orientation shifted substantially and under the influence of neo-liberal reforms 
that advanced market-driven approaches to development, it was shaped into a market-driven tool 
(Fairtrade) based on voluntary commitments from consumers, TNCs and NGOs. In light of this 
‘‘mainstreaming’’, we argued throughout the thesis that there is a serious conflict between 
modifying the existing international trading system and FT’s approach that involves working within 
it and its agents. This was further complemented by FT’s top-down approach, which we argued 
inevitably omits critical for development purposes contextual elements. FT’s top-down approach 
was articulated mainly through its standards that were implemented in different ways with varying 
impacts, whilst being heavily influenced by TNCs due to FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’. Finally, we argued 
that FT’s overall scale is insignificant when considering a variety of scale measures. 
Following this, we argued that the analytical framework that best explains power imbalances and 
the drive for capital accumulation is the GVC approach. This has been further operationalised 
through lead TNCs that exercise value chain governance articulated through ‘‘governance as 
power’’ (with its distinct governance structures: ‘‘Buyer-driven’’ and ‘‘producer-driven’’) and 
overlaid with ‘‘governance as coordination’’. In this framework, we advanced that Fairtrade has 
limited its potential for systemic change by choosing to operate in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs and work 
with the powerful TNCs that drive and control them. On top of this, we have shown that FT’s 
principles and orientation are geared towards only farming and consumer level through working 
with brands. This means, however, that FTI have omitted the key systemic GVC feature that 
involves various governance structures between nodes of the chains that have an impact across 
the chain. But, beyond the top-down, vertical, ‘‘power-over’’ and ‘‘role of the other’’ conceptions 
of power, we argued for the need to examine power articulated through its bottom-up, horizontal 
dimension and its potential to empower. This has enabled us to further investigate FT’s principle 
of farmer organisation and empowerment. 
To this end and building on our goal to synthesise theory, we advanced a qualitative approach, 
based on semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence within a Feminist Grounded 
Theory design and four case studies. To this end, through utilising value chain governance, we 
have examined conventional and FT vertical value chain governance and power relations at 
GVC/macro-level, as articulated by lead TNCs and States, and, GVC node/micro-level, through 
analysis of firm governance relations between each node of the chains. Furthermore, we have 
273 | P a g e  
 
also examined key horizontal relations, such as the one between FTI and TNCs/FTOs, and to 
some extent, smaller and larger cooperatives on the basis of FT’s cost of certification, but also 
the role of marginalised groups, such as women within cooperatives.  
On this basis and as we have already articulated in the previous section, our empirical findings 
weren’t positive for FT’s contribution to systemically shifting the way power relations are 
embedded and exercised in the international trading system. This was demonstrated to us during 
the interviewing process, whereby the only individuals who spoke highly of FT were FTI or FT 
Foundation employees, although they have also questioned FT’s scope and capacity in relation 
to systemic impact. Some of the criticism and dissatisfaction with FT could be traced back to the 
inherent conflict between fair trade and Fairtrade and the notions of state-led development versus 
market-driven development.  
As such, in relation to the debate on FT’s mainstreaming, this dissertation argues that FT’s 
market-driven approach has proven highly problematic as TNCs do not get involved in FT 
because of ethical concerns, but leverage FT as a marketing tool in order to respond to them and 
consequently increase their profitability. This was evidenced by the similarity or, frequently, the 
convergence of governance structures and practices across TNC’s conventional and FT chains. 
However, this has led to FT principle dilution and rapidly declining market share. For example, 
this has taken place in FT cotton as a result of competition from other certifications (e.g. BCI), 
since they are cheaper and easier to implement than FT.  
Furthermore, the market-driven development that FT advances involves working with big brands 
in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ GVCs, which are associated with oligopsonistic and captive or modular market 
and governance structures. These structures are predominantly shaped by the very same big 
brands FT is working with through various mechanisms such as their purchasing power, value 
added, organisation, quality parameters and positioning in relation to demand. In this context, 
FT’s ‘‘mainstreaming’’ and lack of systemic appreciation in combination with its orientation 
towards only farming and consumer level, have not yielded any systemic power shift. In turn, 
we’ve demonstrated that FT’s mainstreaming has generated a problematic horizontal power 
dynamic between FTI and FTOs. To this end, FTOs were let down by FTI’s failure to uphold the 
FT principles, whilst they were reluctant to compete with TNCs in a mainstream context which 
has in essence been threatening their very own organizational sustainability and their fair trade 
values.  
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But, whilst FT and its market-driven approach feature an unsustainable and unsuccessful 
performance in our chosen GVCs, our findings emphasised the significant role of nation-states in 
relation to farmers, with the role of Cocobod being the most prominent example. Cocobod’s 
positive contribution has been widely acknowledged by our interviewees at multiple levels, 
including financing of cocoa purchases, external marketing of cocoa beans, quality control and 
pricing. To this end, Cocobod’s prices paid to farmers have been consistently higher than the FT 
ones and their quality control has been often praised for its role in achieving price premiums and 
forward sales that enable financing of cocoa purchases at large scale. Similarly, albeit at lesser 
extent and impact, the role of the Indian Government was often praised at input subsidy and 
pricing level. The FT minimum price was deemed irrelevant as market prices and the Indian 
Government’s MSP have been consistently higher. These state interventions clearly stood in stark 
contrast to the FT’s current mainstreaming approach we examined earlier that involved FT 
principle dilution as a result of lobbying from TNCs and competition from other certifications. 
This inevitably begs the question whether a shift away from the market back to state-led 
development and international market regulation (as previously advocated by fair trade), would 
deliver greater systemic change in the power structure. This was even echoed in interviewee’s 
67-FTI’s manager-thoughts. He suggested that FTI in India were now looking into ways to 
collaborate with the Indian Government. Our evidence base earlier also suggested there is scope 
given the higher price cocoa and cotton farmers obtain in Ghana and India at scale compared to 
the FT price. This was also further pronounced when comparing the prices that cocoa farmers 
receive in fully liberalized markets compared to the price they receive in Ghana that still involves 
strong state intervention.  Beyond pricing, our fieldwork also identified areas that a strong state 
intervention and presence is vital in counterbalancing oligopsonistic structures in ‘‘buyer-driven’’ 
GVCs. This would, however, also need to be enhanced by state intervention at retail level in the 
developed countries if it were to generate true and sustainable systemic change across the GVCs 
and countries involved. This would be necessary in order to counter the sheer power of TNCs 
and the ‘‘buyer-driven’’ nature of their GVCs. 
To this end, if FT went back to its fair trade roots and worked with strong nation states instead of 
TNCs, this could result in more balanced power across GVCs, greater benefits for farmers and a 
repolitisation of FT and the international trade. As such, fair trade would not only be shaped by 
purchasing decisions (as it took place through FT), which are easily influenced by significant 
marketing budgets and simplistic messaging or constrained by market demand. Instead, it would 
be placed in the complex context where it belongs, which reflects the multifaceted and systemic 
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nature of international trade and development. This would also allow for more accountability and 
power through voting in general elections, whereby nation states can be judged for their 
performance in delivering a fair share to their farmers, citizens and consumers.  
Nonetheless, although state-led development may be a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition 
for delivering greater systemic change in the internal and external power structure when 
considering countries like, for example, China or South Korea. To this end, Angresano (2008) 
argued that Chinese policymakers will need to address growing environmental and income 
inequality, if China's economy is to continue on its favorable path. Working with nation states in 
order to bring systemic change does not come without challenges. Our analysis earlier also 
indicated that nation states want to maintain the ‘‘status quo’’, protect ‘‘vested’’ interests and also 
withhold power from farmers. On this note, this could potentially be countered to some extent in 
the long-run by attempting to leverage and replicate the significant component of farmer 
empowerment and organisation, as implemented by Kuapa Kokoo and Chetna. Our fieldwork 
findings earlier suggested that by going ‘‘beyond FT’’ both the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine and Chetna-
No Nasties FT GVCs have demonstrated genuine bottom-up approach to empowerment through 
farmer ownership, forward integration (in Kuapa Kokoo’s case), close relationships and women 
empowerment, underpinned by strong democratic processes and governance. As such, shifting 
the power structure may require creating a framework and the conditions that could generate a 
significant number of organisations like Chetna and Kuapa. This could potentially be facilitated to 
some extent by enabling genuine bottom-up politics and initiatives that enhance farmer 
empowerment, add value and quality to the commodity, elements which are significant across 
GVCs and their participants. 
7.3 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
On this note, this section aims to highlight the significance of our findings whilst providing 
recommendations for further research for the disciplines of international development, 
international trade, political science and agricultural economics. 
The rationale for the research lay in the assessment of Fairtrade through a value chain 
perspective that investigates its systemic impact on the architecture of the international trading 
system. This has been identified early during the literature review and was confirmed during our 
fieldwork from interviewee 10-senior manager in FT Foundation-who emphasised that ‘‘there is 
no body of evidence to assess value chains and compare conventional to FT ones. More research 
is needed’’. Since most research on FT has focused on its micro-level impact rather than at macro 
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level through a chain-level focus on power relations, we feel this research contributes in this 
regard. Therefore, we envisage that our wider contribution to political economy derives from the 
fact that we assessed a market-driven development mechanism like FT within a political economy 
context and viewpoint. 
Furthermore, the systemic and structural examination of FT through word-systems and GVC was 
further enhanced through a bottom-up and horizontal understanding of power advanced by our 
feminist power analyses. This has allowed us to incorporate this viewpoint in shaping 
development outcomes, whilst in parallel facilitating the analysis of Fairtrade’s standard for farmer 
organisation and empowerment. The combination of GVC and our feminist power analyses as 
our analytical framework has for example resulted in the argument we advanced during chapters 
5 and 6 around Fairtrade’s farmer organisation and empowerment that could be classified as 
upgrading, expanding in this way the GVC theory, but also power relations explanatory power in 
a political economy context. Furthermore, the combined framework has enabled us to highlight 
the influence of external actors and underline key horizontal power imbalances, such as the power 
dynamic between FTI and TNCs/FTOs, the uneven playing field between smaller and larger 
cooperatives on the basis of FT’s cost of certification, but also the role of marginalised groups, 
such as women within cooperatives. On top of this, at methodological level, the use of feminist 
methodology has allowed us to qualify the top-down view and arguments of world-systems and 
GVC with a bottom-up understanding articulated through narratives.  
Lastly, we argue that our selection of cases through a variety of chains, organisations, products 
and geographies has enabled us to enhance external validity, as most studies on FT focus on 
single chains or organisations. The selection of cases has also allowed us to further contribute to 
GVC theory and political economy by underlining the importance of context in development, 
through, for example, showing the importance of CCI and Cocobod in India and Ghana 
respectively in the governance of their chains as lead buyers. Lastly, we have demonstrated that 
GVCs are not only driven by lead-buyers independently, but in groups as well, as articulated by 
bodies like the WCF.  
Nonetheless, there are areas of further research that could enhance this study and provide 
additional insights. For example: 
 A historical examination of strong nation-state intervention in our GVCs that facilitated 
power shift and how could this be further advanced through a collaboration with NGOs 
and fair trade organisations. 
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 A robust analysis of cooperatives like Kuapa Kokoo and NGOs like Chetna in relation to 
the key attributes that enabled them to be successful and how to replicate them. 
 A detailed quantitative value chain margin analysis across both GVCs that demonstrates 
the margins captured by different organisations in conventional and FT GVC nodes, could 
strengthen our existing analysis.  
 Although we have focused on the entire chains as our unit of analysis, we have only briefly 
referred to input level, which seems to be increasing farmer indebtedness across chains. 
As such, further GVC research on FT would benefit from also investigating in more detail 
the input supplier-farmer relationship. 
 Although we have attempted to highlight key horizontal relations through the use of our 
feminist power analyses, we did not explore the entirety of them in detail, such as the one 
between financing/money-lenders and farmers. Financing was also highlighted as a key 
power dynamic but due to the focus of our research we did not elaborate to a great extent 
at micro-level. Similarly, additional power relations research, especially at 
farmer/household/community level would further compliment this study that focused more 
on institutional level. 
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APPENDICES 
1. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Interviewee 
Reference 
Number 
Title/ Organisation Date 
UK Interviews 
1 Director of Policy-FTO 10/03/2014 
2 Programme Manager-Kuapa Kokoo-Divine GVC 10/03/2014 
3 Board Director-FTO 18/03/2014 
4 Cocoa sustainability manager-Major Retailer 20/03/2014 
5 Manager-FT Foundation 20/03/2014 
6 Sustainable materials specialist-Major retailer 24/03/2014 
7 Ex-Chair-FTO 27/03/2014 
8 Board member-FTO 31/03/2014 
9 
Ex-Sustainability Director-Major chocolate 
Brand/manufacturer/current CEO of a cotton sustainability 
consulting firm 
31/03/2014 
10 Senior manager-FT Foundation 01/04/2014 
11 Ex-Sustainability Director-Major chocolate Brand/manufacturer 04/04/2014 
12 Ex-chair-FTO 04/04/2014 
13 Independent FT consultant 11/04/2014 
14 Head of sales & marketing-International trader 14/04/2014 
15 Sustainable materials specialist-Major retailer 23/04/2014 
16 Senior Lecturer: Business, Environment & Corporate 
Responsibility-University of Leeds 
24/04/2014 
17 Director-Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC 06/05/2014 
18 Marketing manager-Cocobod 02/05/2014 
19 Manager-Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC 08/05/2014 
20 Research officer-IDS 22/05/2014 
21 Head of Business Development-Major garment manufacturer 22/05/2014 
22 Professor of Strategic Management-University of Westminster 11/06/2014 
23 Product Manager-Shop for Change 14/06/2014 
Ghana Interviews 
24 Executive logistics assistant-Prominent LBC 25/06/2014 
25 Ex-manager involved in FT-Oxfam 27/06/2014 
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26 Head of Sustainability-Armajaro 02/07/2014 
27 Certification Manager & Deputy-Armajaro 02/07/2014 
28 Programme Manager-Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC 02/07/2014 
29 Project facilitator & District Lead-Cocoa Life-Mondelez GVC 02/07/2014 
30 Farmers-Ashanti region 03/07/2014 
31 Farmers and purchasing agents-Ashanti region 03/07/2014 
32 Corporate responsibility & sustainability head of cocoa-
Prominent LBC 
04/07/2014 
33 Logistics manager-Major cocoa processor/trader 04/07/2014 
34 Founder-Cotton FTO 09/07/2014 
35 Director-Cocobod 10/07/2014 
36 Professor of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness-
University of Ghana 
11/07/2014 
37 Marketing Manager-CMC 11/07/2014 
38 Executive manager to the CEO-Cocobod 11/07/2014 
39 Head of Farmers Cooperative in Amansie West district-Cocoa 
Life-Mondelez GVC 
11/07/2014 
40 Ambassador-Cocoa Life  11/07/2014 
41 Cocoa program officer-Solidaridad 18/07/2014 
42 Technical advisor-World Cocoa Foundation 18/07/2014 
43 National Chief Farmer-Farmers’ Association 21/07/2014 
44 Operations manager-Produce Buying Company (PBC) 21/07/2014 
45 Head of Programme-Cocoa Life 22/07/2014 
46 Deputy marketing manager-Cocoa Processing Company (CPC) 22/07/2014 
47 Manager-Fairtrade International 23/07/2014 
India Interviews 
48 Head-Central Institute for Research on Cotton Technology 05/08/2014 
49 Deputy General Manager-Cotton Corporation of India 05/08/2014 
50 CEO-Major cotton seed trader 06/08/2014 
51 Project manager-Agrocel-M&S GVC 07/08/2014 
52 Director-Ministry of Agriculture: Department of Cooperation 08/08/2014 
53 Cotton industry consultant 08/08/2014 
54 CEO-cotton FTO 11/08/2014 
55 Deputy Director & Senior Scientific Officer-Institute for Rural 
Industrialisation 
12/08/2014 
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56 Cotton farmers-Nagpur, Maharashtra 12/08/2014 
57 Ginner and farmers-Nagpur, Maharashtra 12/08/2014 
58 Owner-Ginning business 12/08/2014 
59 Head-Cotton farmer association 12/08/2014 
60 Director-Institute for Rural Industrialisation 13/08/2014 
61 Quality assurance manager-Vertically integrated manufacturer 13/08/2014 
62 President & owner-Vertically integrated manufacturer 13/08/2014 
63 CEO-Fairtrade India 14/08/2014 
64 General manager-Vertically integrated manufacturer 21/08/2014 
65 Managing director & senior vice president of marketing-
Vertically integrated manufacturer 
21/08/2014 
66 CEO of No Nasties 26/08/2014 
67 Manager-Fairtrade International 28/08/2014 
68 Director-Bombay Textiles Research Association 28/08/2014 
69 Project manager-Agrocel-M&S GVC 29/08/2014 
70 Sustainability assistant manager-Vertically integrated 
manufacturer 
30/08/2014 
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2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY  
 Sustainable Development – It is a broad concept that balances the need for economic 
growth with environmental protection and social equity, and was described as 
‘‘development that met the needs of present generations without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their needs’’ (Wilson, 2003; p.1).  
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – It is also a broad concept that has been around 
much longer than sustainable development or the other concepts. It deals with the role of 
business in society through the ethical obligation that corporate managers have to 
consider and address the needs of society. This involves not just to solely act in the 
interests of the shareholders or their own self-interest. 
 Stakeholder theory – The basic premise is that the stronger your relationships are with 
external parties, the easier it will be to meet your business objectives through developing 
a competitive advantage. 
 Corporate Accountability – It’s the legal or ethical responsibility to provide an account 
of the actions for which one is held responsible. It differs from responsibility in that the 
latter refers to the duty to act in a certain way, whereas accountability refers to the duty to 
explain, justify or report on actions (ibid).  
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3. MARREWIJK’S (2003) CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AMBITION LEVELS 
 Compliance-driven – Consists of providing welfare to society, within the limits of 
regulations from the rightful authorities. In addition, organisations might respond to charity 
and stewardship considerations. The motivation for corporate sustainability is that it is 
perceived as a duty and obligation, or correct behaviour. 
 Profit-driven – Consists of the integration of social, ethical and ecological aspects into 
business operations and decision-making, provided it contributes to the financial bottom 
line. The motivation here is a business case and corporate sustainability is promoted only 
if it is profitable, for example because of an improved reputation. 
 Caring – Consists of balancing economic, social and ecological concerns, which are all 
three important in themselves. The initiatives go beyond legal compliance and profit 
considerations. The motivation is that human potential, social responsibility and care for 
the planet are as important. 
 Synergistic – Consists of well-balanced solutions that create value in the economic, 
social and ecological realms of corporate performance, in a synergistic approach with all 
stakeholders. The motivation is that sustainability is important in itself, especially because 
it is recognised as being the inevitable direction progress takes. 
 Holistic – Fully integrated and embedded in every aspect of the organization, aimed at 
contributing to the quality and continuation of life of every being and entity, now and in the 
future. The motivation is that sustainability is the only alternative since all beings and 
phenomena are mutually interdependent. Each person or organization therefore has a 
universal responsibility towards all other beings (Marrewijk, 2003). 
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4. STAGES OF COCOA/CHOCOLATE PROCESSING AND BY-PRODUCTS 
According to UNCTAD (2008), the industry differentiates between cocoa processing (upstream) 
and chocolate manufacturing (downstream).  
Cocoa processing (upstream) covers the activities needed to convert cocoa beans into semi-
finished cocoa products (cocoa paste/liquor, cocoa butter and cocoa powder). It includes three 
major processing stages: (i) the roasting of cocoa beans; (ii) the grinding of cocoa beans to make 
cocoa liquor; (iii) the pressing of cocoa liquor to extract cocoa butter and produce cocoa powder. 
Chocolate manufacturing (downstream) refers to the blending and further processing of cocoa 
butter and cocoa paste/liquor – and other ingredients, as well – into chocolate. The trade 
distinguishes between two segments: the manufacture of couverture, or industrial chocolate (the 
material from which consumer chocolate is made); and the manufacture of consumer products 
containing chocolate.   
Overall, it is possible to identify four major product categories based on different stages of 
processing, namely: 
1. Cocoa beans (raw, or minimally processed) 
2. Semi-finished cocoa products (cocoa paste/liquor, cocoa butter, cocoa powder) 
3. Couverture, or industrial chocolate 
4. Finished chocolate products 
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5. COSTS OF FAIRTRADE CERTIFICATION FOR SMALL PRODUCER ORGANISATIONS 
Certification 
Fees 
Description Price 
Application 
A non-refundable fee that 
covers  the initial application 
process and all future 
applications 
€ 525 
Initial 
Certification 
An initial certification fee 
charged for the first audit 
Members<50= € 1,466, Members>1000=€ 3,557 
Additional Product=€ 184 
Processing Installation= € 215-635 
Subcontracted Entity=€ 307 
Annual  
Certification 
Following certification, 
producers pay an annual 
certification fee beginning in 
year two. 
Members<50= € 1,199, Members>1000=€ € 2,839 
Additional Product=€ 184 
Processing Installation= € 92-369 
Subcontracted Entity=€ 307 
Modification 
of 
certification 
fee 
A cooperative’s costs of 
compliance vary depending on 
the changes they need to meet 
the Fairtrade standards 
Producers exporting for other producers=additional 
15% 
If established audit costs are exceeded=daily rate is 
358€ 
If Fairtrade products have been traded prior to the 
issuing of the Permission To Trade=Max of €5000 
Source: Adapted from Fairtrade International (2014), FloCert (2014) 
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6. COSTS OF FAIRTRADE CERTIFICATION FOR CONTRACT PRODUCTION 
Certification 
Fees 
Description Price 
Application 
A non-refundable fee that 
covers  the initial application 
process and all future 
applications 
€ 538 
Initial 
Certification 
An initial certification fee 
charged for the first audit 
applicable to: 
A. Promoting body  
B. Group members of the 
producer organisation 
A. Promoting Body= € 1,568 
B. Members<50= € 943, Members>1000=€ 1,784 
Additional Product=€ 184 
Processing Installation= € 215-635 
Subcontracted Entity=€ 307 
Annual  
Certification 
Following certification, 
producers pay an annual 
certification fee beginning in 
year two applicable to: 
A. Promoting body  
B. Group members of the 
producer organisation 
A. Promoting Body= € 1,199 
B. Members<50= € 738, Members>1000=€ € 1,281 
Additional Product=€ 184 
Processing Installation= € 92-369 
Subcontracted Entity=€ 307 
 
Modification 
of 
certification 
fee 
Costs of compliance vary 
depending on the changes they 
need to meet the Fairtrade 
standards 
Producers exporting for other producers=additional 
15%,  
If established audit costs are exceeded=daily rate is 
358€ 
If Fairtrade products have been traded prior to the 
issuing of the Permission To Trade=Max of €5000 
Source: Adapted from FloCert (2014) 
 
